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In the summer of 2009 some friends and I climbed Mount Olympus. I had often seen the 
mountain from one of the villages on the Thessalian plain, a friendly-looking giant with its 
peak usually hidden in a couple of clouds. When actually on one of its many folds, things are 
different. The road was long and steep, there was a fierce and cold wind, and the thick mist 
seriously impeded our sight. Every time we thought the top was near, we saw a more elevated 
piece of rock protruding from the mist still further away. Nonetheless, after a few hours we 
reached the Mytikas. When we were about to start our descent, something marvellous 
happened: the clouds disappeared, the sun broke through and suddenly we could see the entire 
mountainslope, and the path we had taken. 
    It appears to me now that writing this dissertation was an experience very much like 
climbing Olympus. The collection, analysis and especially the presentation of the material 
turned out to be a challenge of mountain-like proportions. I admit that sometimes I could 
barely see where I was going, and simply put one feet in front of the other. It has been 
particularly difficult for me (especially as a self-funded PhD candidate or ‘buiten-
promovendus’) to keep a constant pace and still find the time to re-think, re-consider, or even 
to relax. Fortunately, the right path had been clearly marked, and there were many friends 
along the way cheering me on, and sharing in my experience. It is only now, when I have 
reached my goal, that I can clearly see how much I have learned. 
    Naturally, the journey in itself has been rewarding as well. Hesiod is an immensely 
interesting author, and we have the privilege of living in an age that is more and more coming 
round to appreciate him as such. His scope and influence are awesome, and his relationship 
with Homeric epic is far more dynamic than has often been assumed; I am certain that there is 
still much to gain from future research in this field. It has been a great pleasure for me to 
approach ancient epic within the framework of the main tenets of cultural memory studies. 
Memory wars over culturally important figures from the past are fought out every day, and to 
attempt to analyse this thoroughly human process in the ancient world has never ceased to 
intrigue me. Moreover, the occasional inclusion of modern views of Hesiod has shown how 
truly never-ending the pendulum of imagination and mental construction swings to and fro, 




Climbing Olympus takes two days. This dissertation took slightly less than ten years. I take 
comfort in the fact that in ancient epic too, difficult things usually take ten years to complete. 
During this long period, I have been happy to be part of the research school OIKOS. Apart 
from their support, many friends have helped me: some by letting me work and putting up 
with my continuous bustling; others by forcing me to relax and leave the book alone for a 
while. They are very dear to me, and without them I would certainly have lost my sanity 
somewhere along the way. So thank you Andrea, Daniël, Frans, Hanna, Marja, Marten, 
Michel, Robbert, Sebastiaan, Susannah, and many others. I feel the deepest gratitude towards 
my parents, to whom I owe everything, and towards my sister Naomi and brother Edward, 
who have always loved and supported me. A special thanks goes to the monkeyheads, 
particularly Mark, for countless reasons. Lastly, I thank Joëlle, for always being there for me, 






This is not a book about Hesiod. Instead of offering a historical appraisal of the poet or a 
literary analysis of his principal works, the present study examines the role of Hesiod in the 
ancient imagination. The central question is concerned with the way that Hesiod was given 
shape in the collective memory of the Greeks. Hence, this study deals with the processes of 
remembering and forgetting that created his image, with its meaning and relevance to Greek 
identity, and more particularly with the different manifestations of his image in Greek 
literature. This book, then, is about ‘Hesiod’;1 it conceives of and investigates the poet as a 
concept in later literary-critical discourse, as a locus that was informed with values and 
qualities, and more generally as a cultural icon constructed and reconstructed by later Greek 
authors who employed him in their own texts.2 
    The present study is thus concerned with the ancient reception of Hesiod, but its theoretical 
framework is mostly derived from collective or cultural memory studies. In the first section of 
this introduction, therefore, I will discuss some of the most important approaches and findings 
of this particular discipline. Section 2 will then demonstrate how helpful the main notions of 
memory theory can be in understanding and explaining the ancient imagination of Hesiod. In 
section 3, I will briefly describe how this book is organized, while section 4 presents some 
preliminary findings of interest, and looks ahead to the rest of the book. 
 
1 - Memory Studies 
Collective or cultural memory studies constitute a notoriously broad field, incorporating 
various disciplines with their own methods and approaches. Nevertheless, they are all based 
on the primary observation that remembering is a social act. As was argued by sociologist 
Maurice Halbwachs (1877 - 1945), universally regarded as the founding father of collective 
memory studies, individuals create and recollect their private memories within a social or 
                                               
1 Throughout this study I will speak of Hesiod even when strictly speaking I mean ‘Hesiod’, i.e. the Hesiod as 
imagined by the Greeks; maintaining the inverted commas throughout the book would become too tedious. In 
what follows, the context should always immediately make clear which Hesiod I am referring to: the actual poet 
or his ancient image. 
2 In this book I will not not draw a sharp distinction between ‘the man’ and ‘the works’, both for the sake of 
convenience and for the obvious reason that such a distinction hardly existed in ancient views anyway, the 
reconstruction of which is my main interest. As Lefkowitz (1981) and others have amply shown, the ancients 
believed that the work of an author reflected his person: this means that biographical data were both deduced 
from the work itself and put to use in interpreting it. Obviously, such circular reasoning was especially well-
practiced when relatively little was known of the author through other sources (as in the case of Hesiod). 
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cultural framework; from this observation, it was only a small step to demonstrate the great 
importance of this social or cultural framework for memories shared by groups.3 Because of 
this common point of departure, collective memory studies are based on a large consensus 
about their main focus and ‘objective’: they are concerned with investigating the way groups 
of people construct a shared past. As is suggested by this formulation, two notions are of 
central concern to this type of study.  
    The first is the observation that the past, as remembered at any given moment, is a 
construction of those alive in the present: some events are forgotten, others are highlighted; 
some related events are separated, and unrelated ones are connected.4 This process is partly 
unconscious, but also partly conscious and intentional. The second notion of crucial 
importance relates to group identity: a common past (or a past, at least, constructed as 
common) and the recollections shared by a group provide its members with a sense of 
belonging. Such memory goes beyond the experience of a person’s own lifetime: a modern 
Greek can ‘remember’ the battle at Thermopylae as easily as the Olympiakos championship 
of 2009. In all such cases, recollection makes a person part of a community.  
    Evidently, these two notions of construction and identity are interconnected since, as is 
often observed, the past (i.e. the content of collective memory) is virtually always shaped so 
as to benefit the group in one way or another. Just as a resumé for a job interview is 
constructed to make the candidate appear eminently suitable for the new position, a collective 
past is often formed with a view to the present needs of the group. In other words: the past is 
created in the present, and those who do so usually have a certain goal; in this context, the 
term ‘intentional history’ is sometimes used.5 
 
Collective memory studies constitute a relatively new branch of modern research, 6 especially 
since Halbwachs’ theories laid dormant for a while. His findings, however, were injected with 
new life by theorists like Pierre Nora, who put collective memory back on the scholarly 
agenda even though they developed Halbwachs’ ideas in a wholly new direction, very 
influential though not directly relevant to the present study.7 Despite the relative youth of 
                                               
3 For a fine summary of the essentials of Halbwachs’ theory see Coser (1992) 21-28. 
4 We ‘transform essentially unstructured series of events into seemingly coherent historical narratives’, says 
Zerubavel (2003) 13, leaning on an influential essay of Hayden White (1978), who claimed that historians turn 
historical events into a narrative by techniques also used for the emplotment of a novel or a play. The past that is 
in our heads and in our history books is no ‘truth’, but a construct, and therefore liable to change. 
5 Cf. Gehrke (2001) 285. 
6 See for a brief history and an excellent summary of collective memory theory also Kirk (2005) 1-24. 
7 The new theorists (mostly sociologists and anthropologists) defined memory, as a human modus of 




collective memory studies, however, their main theoretical tenets have quickly developed 
thanks to well-aimed criticism from opponents who were rightly sceptical about the often 
rather sweeping claims. This critique has led to serious modifications, which have made the 
theory considerably more viable, complex and interesting. Three aspects of the theory that 
were criticized and subsequently reconsidered are of particular interest to us. 
    The first point of critique was fueled by the obvious observation that groups cannot 
remember anything: naturally, only individuals are equipped with the hardware to create and 
recollect memories.8 The theory of collective memory came dangerously close to assuming a 
great and single collective mind, and theorists were rightly cautioned not to be led astray by 
their own metaphor. As a result of this critique, scholars found two strategies to improve on 
the earlier, more simplistic view. One of these focuses on the creation of collective memory, 
and the individual’s role in that process. This approach is exemplified by Jan Assmann, who 
argued that in every community at some point in time certain people come to be considered as 
experts on (a particular piece of) the past, and are thus allowed to play a decisive role in 
shaping it.9 That version of the past then achieves definite form through institutionalization of 
some sort (one can think of religious festivals or other holidays), through which collective 
                                                                                                                                                   
the past, history - so the theory goes - stores and recollects, and treats the past as something lost. The historical 
view of the past was regarded as voluntary, incomplete, relative, detached, asocial and analytic; memory was 
thus defined as involuntary, complete, absolute, incarnate, social and unconscious (a useful discussion of the 
dichotomous view can be found in the first chapter of Finnegan 1988). The mode of memory came to be 
associated with archaic communities, often illiterate, while it was claimed that its disappearance in modern 
society was due to the rise of history. Nora famously claimed that it is because modern societies are so 
hopelessly forgetful that they are trying to organize their past with history; modern memory has thus become a 
matter of explicit signs, the so-called lieux de mémoire. These must be understood as the death-throes of 
memory, since it is the true mission of history ‘to suppress and destroy memory’ (Nora 1989 9). The much-
debated relationship between history and memory has long dominated the field, but has now waned into the 
background due to several theoretical objections, the most pertinent of which, in my view, is to downplay the 
difference between history and memory itself: the two are rather inextricably linked than irreconcilably opposed, 
cf. e.g. Olick and Robbins, who pointed out that ‘as historiography [the written expression of the historical view 
of the past] has broadened its focus from the official to the social and cultural, memory becomes central 
“evidence”’ (1998 110); moreover, many collective memory studies use examples from historiography to 
demonstrate how memory is constructed (some even argue that ‘collective memory [is] an expression of 
historical consciousness’ which has ‘found one kind of expression in national or collective histories’, Crane 1997 
131). I am leaving this debate aside, since the present study is concerned with the ancient Greeks, who were 
largely untroubled by the acceleration of history and the concurrent ‘data overload’ that Nora found so 
characteristic of modern times. Nevertheless, the effort of Nora and his followers has been very important as a 
catalyst to the development of collective memory studies. 
8 This was already pointed out by Halbwachs himself: ‘The individual remembers by placing himself in the 
perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in 
individual memories’ (Halbwachs in Coser 1992 40). 
9 According to Assmann (2000), esp. 37-44, there are two kinds of collective memory: 1) communicative 
memory, which is concerned with recent events and is formed and renewed by the live interaction of witnesses 
who are all regarded as equally competent, and 2) cultural memory, which deals with a primal or otherwise 
absolute past and is ceremonially kept alive by special experts who have some way or another solidified this past 
in code (by writing, for instance). These experts appear about forty years after a memorable event has taken 
place and witnesses become scarce: during this ‘crisis of memory’, the memory of the past must be transferred to 
permanent media, or it will be lost. 
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memory is periodically renewed and so preserved.10 This focus on the interaction between 
individual and collective is the first way to counter the simple notion of the great and single 
group mind.  
    The other strategy is less concerned with the individual’s creative powers but focuses on 
his or her recollection of collective memories instead. It has been shown that individuals 
participate in group memories on different levels and in different compositions, the so-called 
‘memory communities’. Since a single person can belong to several groups (a family, a club, 
a city, a nation), his or her memories are multiple. It is now widely held that persons and 
groups remember different things in different contexts, which has left the phantom idea of the 
homogeneous group mind largely abandoned.11 Perhaps even more importantly, this notion of 
multiplicity can easily accommodate the fact that different groups within a larger community 
often entertain incompatible interpretations of the past, and adopt and ‘invent’ new versions 
for their own (present) purposes. Memories can be seen to give birth to counter-memories, 
and ‘wars over collective memory’12 turn out to be the rule rather than the exception. 
Collective memory, then, should not be considered static and univocal, but rather as dynamic 
and pluriform; there is no truly ‘definite form’ (as argued by Assmann and others), but instead 
conflicting traditions stand side by side. 
     The second point of critique on ‘old school’ collective memory studies was concerned with 
their presentist interpretation of the past: the studies suggested that each present constructs a 
wholly new and distinct version of past events. It was soon recognized, however, that memory  
is more than a mere ‘series of snapshots taken at various times and expressing various 
perspectives’13 (the consequence of the presentist approach when held in extreme form). The 
various versions of the past interact, and memory takes hybrid forms. Take, for instance, the 
memory of the Cheruscan general Arminius, who massacred three Roman legions in the 
famous Teutoburgerwald battle of 9 AD. As the liberator Germaniae, he was remembered in 
many forms: as a symbol of German freedom and unity in the mid-19th century, as a stout 
defender of German values against Mediterranean influences in the French War, and as an 
icon of German (racial) supremacy during the second World War. But even though these 
versions of Arminius are all decidedly different, the obvious emphasis on his martial qualities 
                                               
10 One form of such institutionalization is the enshrinement of culturally important texts, on which see more 
below; in fact, Assmann pays much attention to the process of canonization (Assmann 2000 52-61). 
11 Cf. Alcock (2002) 15: ‘This insistence on multiplicity avoids the danger of reifying some monolithic, mystical 
group mind’. 
12 I borrow this term from Mendels (2004) 37. 
13 Coser (1992) 26; cf. Alcock (2002) 95 attacking the notion of a ‘zero-sum competition between different, 




forms a common ground between them, creating continuity amid the several ‘snapshots’. Not 
surprisingly, the memory of Arminius as a war hero lives on today, despite recent attempts to 
create a radically new memory of him by wholly demilitarizing and depoliticizing the icon, 
for instance through the production of the Arminius garden gnome.14 And so memories can be 
seen to respond to each other, one memory leading to an (adapted) other. The ‘wars’ over 
collective memory are not only fought between contemporaries, but also over time. 
    The pervasive continuity of collective memories functions as a warning against an 
overestimation of the present’s power to shape the past. Even though memory is creative, it is 
still bound to a significant degree by (historical) reality: certain views and reconstructions are 
impossible, because they clash too violently with the known facts or the general consensus 
about them (just as the ancient tragedians may shape their mythical subject-matter as they see 
fit, but must remain true to a certain unalterable core of the story). Sure enough, there is no 
‘infinite malleability of the past’,15 and memory is formed by both present and past.16 In fact, 
many historical figures, who knew they would one day be only a memory, took special care to 
influence the way they would be remembered: kings erected monuments, emperors appointed 
poets, and artists laid the foundations for their own reputation.17 
    One other major point of critique remains - concerned not so much with the theory or 
method of collective memory studies, but rather with its usefulness. In recent years, collective 
memory studies have been criticized for being rather predictable. No matter what the 
particular subject was (Solon, the history of the Acropolis, or the Holy Grail), the generalizing 
conclusion of almost any study is that ‘the past is constructed not as fact but as myth to serve 
the interest of a particular community’.18 Such critical voices argue that it is not only the 
content of collective memory, but also (or perhaps mostly) its dynamics that are of interest. A 
study that focuses only on the content of the representation runs the risk of forgetting all about 
transmission, diffusion and the reasons for either receiving or rejecting particular parts of the 
past. The focus on the what-question tends to neglect the (at least as interesting) questions of 
how and why. Confino is one of the theorists pointing to several dangers of such a one-sided 
approach. A scholar, he argues, ‘may read into the symbolic representation what he or she has 
                                               
14 For an extensive and very illuminating overview of the (use of the) ‘myth’ of Arminius (or Hermann) see now 
the catalogue of the 2009 Mythos exhibition (Berke e.a. 2009), part of the Ausstellungskooperation celebrating 
the 2000th anniversary of the Varusschlacht.  
15 Olick and Robbins (1998) 128-130. 
16 Cf. Kirk (2005) 14 ‘the past cannot be reduced to a mythical projection of the present.’ 
17 See e.g. Kapsis (1989) on Hitchcock but especially Lang and Lang (1990) on the ‘reputational dynamics’ of 
etchers from the 19th and early 20th century. 




already learned by other means’. Similarly, focusing on content may blur the fact that any 
representation, especially one evolving over time, is created by ‘wars over memory’: 
‘historical actors simultaneously represent, receive, and contest memory’.19 This third point of 
critique is perhaps the most pressing of all, and it seems that no universal response has yet 
been formulated. In the next section, I will explain how I propose to deal with it.  
     
2 - Hesiod and Collective Memory 
It is time now to zoom in on the main subject of the present study, and explain how collective 
memory theory is relevant to understanding Hesiod’s image in antiquity. As has often been 
demonstrated, memories need anchors. Many scholars point to the importance of places, 
buildings, and artefacts as keepers and generators of memory. The same goes for persons 
from either myth or history: ‘eine Wahrheit muss sich, um sich in der Erinnerung der Gruppe 
festsetzen zu können, in der konkreten Form eines Ereignisses, einer Person, eines Ortes 
darstellen’.20 Culturally important figures from the past, just like events or places, are brought 
to the fore and constructed according to present needs. A good example is provided by 
Mendels, who showed that in 411 BC three different political factions in Athens all claimed 
the figure of Solon to find ‘ideological terms of reference that would enable them to endow 
their present political actions with legitimacy’.21 
     The culturally important figure from the past central to this book is Hesiod, and in 
accordance with the above-given method and objective of collective memory studies, this 
study will thus investigate the way the Greeks constructed their image(s) of Hesiod to 
conform with the ‘present’ need of their own memory communities. Hence, two notions are 
essential to my approach: 1) that of Hesiod as a construct, and 2) that of Hesiod as providing a 
sense of identity. Regarding the first: obviously, the idea of an author as a construct is already 
familiar from reception studies (which in some way or another search for the meaning of a 
text in the interaction between the author’s intent and sociohistorical context on the one hand 
and the readers’ own beliefs, values and paradigms on the other) and theories of 
intertextuality (which in one way or another locate the meaning of a text in its complex and 
often many-layered relation with the reader and especially other texts),22 to which collective 
                                               
19 Confino (1997) 1400; 1398-1399. 
20 Assmann (2005) 38 citing Halbwachs; see also Kirk (2005) 18 ‘images of archetypal persons and events 
embody a group’s moral order’. 
21 Mendels (2004) 31; cf. e.g. the study of Pelikan (1997) on the many images of Jesus, or that of Gribble (1999) 
on Alcibiades. 
22 See on the ‘productive’ relationship between the text and its reader (whether or not an author himself) in 




memory study is comparable in this aspect at least. Nonetheless, the present approach differs 
from these disciplines in its view of Hesiod as the product of a millennium-long process of 
conscious and unconscious remembering and forgetting.  
    The second notion concerns Hesiod’s role in the construction of group identity, i.e. his 
status as a ‘cultural icon’. As an ancient poet whose stories were endlessly retold by Greeks of 
all times and places, Hesiod was of central importance to the formation and preservation of  
that body of codes, values, and wisdom that could be labeled ‘Greekness’. In a way 
comparable to Homer and his poems, Hesiod and his works constituted a ‘fixed standard of 
reference’ for all Greeks,23 which gives these two ancient poets a unique place in the Greek 
imagination. We know that the wandering aoidoi or ‘bards’ in ancient times generally 
embodied ‘the collective memory (…) of the group’;24 but the proto-typical bards Hesiod and 
Homer remained the central anchors of group identity long after they themselves were gone. 
At an early stage in Greek history, Hesiod and Homer achieved canonical status. From that 
moment on, the Greeks spent much interpretative labour on keeping the canonized works 
alive, bridging the gap between their moment of enshrinement and the present. This process 
entails that the poems were solid and untouchable but at the same time ‘modeled, invented, 
reinvented, and constructed by the present’.25 In a sense, they are ‘stable things, landmarks of 
continuity’; but ‘the commemorative activities that surround them, and the interpretations 
placed upon them, can vary remarkably over time’.26 Canonical texts are central to the sense 
of identity and continuity of a mnemonic community, and Hesiod’s works, as we shall see, are 
continuously shaped and reshaped to provide for those needs.  
    Naturally, this study attempts to avoid the major theoretical pitfalls discussed in the first 
section. Staying clear from the monolithic group mind, much attention will in fact be paid to 
the fact that multiple and conflicting constructs of Hesiod existed side by side, not only 
between groups or individuals, but even in the works of individual recipients. Furthermore, 
there are two ways in which I hope to keep away from the dangers of presentism: on the one 
hand, by demonstrating that Hesiod is not ‘infinitely malleable’, and that his actual poems 
remain a determining factor for his image (not least because Hesiod himself did his best to lay 
                                                                                                                                                   
of intertextuality see the fundamental studies of Broich and Pfister (1985) 1-30 and Conte (1986) 23-95, and the 
more recent discussions by e.g. Hinds (1998, esp. ch. 1 and 2) and Van Tress (2004) 1-23 (with bibliography). 
23 Gehrke (2001) 304. 
24 Sluiter (1997) 156; see for general studies e.g. Havelock (1963), Svenbro (1976). Cf. also DuPont (1999) 61 
on the Greek construction of an imaginary Greece ‘with its own mythical authors’: ‘[the Greeks] believed in 
Homer, Hesiod, and Anacreon as they believed in their gods, for both groups vouched for their culture’. 
25 Assmann (1997) 9; see on the enshrinement of a culture’s classics Assmann’s (2000) introduction and first 
chapter, esp. 56-59. 
26 The description of monuments by Alcock (2002) 28 fits canonical texts equally well. 
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the groundworks for his future reputation); and on the other hand, by identifying certain 
traditions of reception that warrant the continuity of Hesiod’s image. 
    Most effort, perhaps, has been spent to circumvent the final point of critique, i.e. that 
collective memory study focuses overmuch on content and produces predictable results. In an 
attempt to avoid this particular trap, this study has developed two distinct but related 
strategies. First of all, the reception of Hesiod is not studied in isolation but related to the 
ancient image of Homer; and secondly, some recent theories on the way memories are created  
(so-called ‘mnemotechnics’) are adapted and applied in a new way to the present 
investigation.  
    As for the first strategy: by drawing the figure of Homer into this book on the reception of 
Hesiod, this study attempts to sharpen its focus on the process of cultural memory, 
concentrating on the interaction between the images of two cultural icons. As we have seen 
above, memory is never static and given, but is continually given shape by many different and 
sometimes conflicting factors and forces. It was an initial survey of the research material that 
led to the main hypothesis of this book, i.e. that among the factors determining the memory of 
Hesiod - and thus his use and functions in a given text - the most important one is his 
(represented or imagined) relationship with Homer, to whom Hesiod was rather uniquely 
connected in the Greek imagination. There is a dynamic interaction between their 
representations that accounts for the fact that some aspects of Hesiod and his poems are 
forgotten, while others are highlighted and passed on.  
    The involvement of Homer in this study will thus help us to focus on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
of the collective memory of Hesiod, and not only on the actual ‘what’ of Hesiod’s 
representation. This central concern for the process of memory is reflected in the organization 
of the book, which is divided into three Parts, each dealing with one particular type of relation 
between the loci Hesiod and Homer as found in our source texts: Hesiod when presented 
together with (i.e. comparable to) Homer, Hesiod when mentioned alone (i.e. without Homer 
in the immediate context), and Hesiod when presented in opposition to Homer. Fortunately, 
the reception of Homer - in contrast to that of Hesiod - has been the object of several rather 
large-scale studies, most of them quite recent;27 to some degree, these studies have functioned 
as an example, and it is largely from them that I have taken the ancient image of Homer 
                                               
27 In 1954 Mehmel could still claim that there were no studies on the relation between Homer and the Greeks 
(16), but fortunately things have changed. Especially useful books on the subject are Lamberton and Keaney 




presupposed in this book. Even so, sometimes my own findings will argue for modification of 
Homer’s image as well. 
    The second strategy is concerned with the use of recent theories on the psychological and 
especially social processes determining how memories are created.28 Particularly useful to the 
present investigation are two concepts connected to the mnemonic process called 
‘periodization’, i.e. mankind’s tendency to divide the past into conventional blocks of history. 
In this process, certain historical data are grouped together since they are classified as 
belonging to the same ‘block’: this is the concept of assimilation or ‘lumping’. It is such 
lumping that, for instance, has made modern scholars regard both Thales and Democritus as 
‘presocratics’ (even though Democritus was a contemporary of Socrates and in fact even 
outlived him). By contrast, other data are separated by means of watershed events: this is the 
concept of differentiation or ‘splitting’. A good example of such a watershed is Alexander’s 
campaign of conquest, which has created the modern notion of the ‘classical’ and the 
‘hellenistic’ age as two conventional ‘blocks’ of history. As Zerubavel has shown, the 
concepts of ‘intraperiodic lumping’ (by which historical persons, events and currents are 
raked together under one heading) and its opposite, ‘interperiodic splitting’ (by which 
historical data are opposed by emphasizing the watershed(s) between them), to a large degree 
construct a people’s history and identity.29 
     As it turns out, the concepts of ‘lumping’ and ‘splitting’ are extremely helpful in clarifying 
the collective memory of Hesiod, for they can also be applied to the constructs Hesiod and 
Homer. The dynamics underlying ‘cutting up the past’ - as Zerubavel calls this construction 
of history with ‘an unmistakably social scalpel’30 - and ‘cutting up the poets’ (so to speak) are 
essentially the same: both are mental acts, dependent on a social framework, organizing the 
past and thus shaping our present and our identity. In a manner very similar to the ‘lumping’ 
of historical data, the concepts Hesiod and Homer can be assimilated through emphasizing 
their similarities, or differentiated by exaggerating their dissimilarities and focusing on the 
distinctive features. As we will see, one ancient tradition in fact constructed such a lumped 
image, picturing Hesiod and Homer together, while another tradition would rather present a 
split picture of Hesiod and Homer as opposite concepts. Naturally, I do not wish to claim that 
there is an exact correspondence between the memory of past periods and that of dead poets, 
                                               
28 For theories of mnemotechnics I am especially indebted to the (compact yet) extremely rich and stimulating 
book of Zerubavel (2003). 
29 See ch. 1.1 for a more detailed discussion of such assimilation and differentiation. 
30 Zerubavel (2003) 96.  
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but the principles of remembering and forgetting are largely comparable. In the course of this 
book, this process will be examined in more detail. 
     The process of lumping and splitting is central to this book as a way of understanding the 
relationship between Hesiod and Homer. Apart from this process, some other mnemonic 
principles will be explored with regard to the reception of Hesiod alone. They are discussed in 
chapter 4 (on which see further below), but recur throughout the book.  
  
3 - This Book 
This study of the role of Hesiod in the Greek imagination presents an overview of Hesiodic 
reception in literary sources covering about one millennium. I have collected explicit 
references to Hesiod from texts dating from the seventh century BC to around 300 AD, 
searching through the works of about two hundred ancient authors of widely different calibre, 
including some twenty Roman writers; on rare occasions, epigraphic material and papyri have 
been used.31 The sheer bulk of the references (about 1200 in total) has allowed me to track 
developments over time, and map the wider resonance of certain views. The regrettable but 
inevitable concomitant of such a scope is the focus on explicit references, and the rather 
general nature of my observations: an in-depth analysis and close reading of all the relevant 
passages turned out to be an impossible task. 
    Obviously, the large amount of data needed some form of classification in order to be 
meaningful. Two such criteria proved to be extremely useful in this respect. The first is the 
presence or absence of Homer, announced above, which provides the basic division of this 
book into three Parts, corresponding to the three distinct ways in which Hesiod appears in 
Greek literature: when associated with Homer, when alone (i.e. without Homer), and when 
opposed to Homer. These are the three fundamentally different Hesiods that can be found 
throughout antiquity, though not, it should be said beforehand, in equal measure. Of all the 
ancient references to Hesiod that I have collected, 31 percent in some way or another presents 
Hesiod and Homer together, 60 percent mentions Hesiod alone, while only 9 percent pictures 
the two poets as opposites. This unequal division may seem to cast doubt on my main 
hypothesis, but only apparently so: as we will see, mere numbers can only offer a quantitative 
indication, whereas the references themselves must always be examined in context. One 
                                               
31 Some collections of references were helpful in creating the database, such as those contained in Buzio (1938), 
West (1966) and (1978), and Most (2006), though all only partially so: Buzio’s reception study only deals with 
the seventh to fourth century BC; the lists of loci similes in the editions of West (largely based on the labours of 
Rzach) mention only quotations (and no other references), and Most’s selection of testimonia in the Loeb series 
appeared too late (though his admittedly incomplete collection still has much to offer, as it contains the greatest 




reference in Plato, for instance, can be more important to Hesiod’s image than ten references 
in the Homeric scholia. Moreover, the three different Hesiods interact and define each other: 
the image of Hesiod alone, for instance, is seriously influenced by the image of Hesiod when 
opposed to Homer - and such observations can never be gathered from quantification alone. 
    The Hesiod who is associated with Homer will be discussed first, for this Hesiod is 
conveniently familiar to us because of some extremely well-known passages that explicitly 
combine the two poets. At the same time, however, a fresh reading of these and other 
passages will demonstrate that this Hesiod has often been misunderstood, mostly through 
scholarly focus on Homer whenever the two poets are mentioned together. This Part will 
illustrate the use of my own particular methods and perspective, and in unsettling some 
modern notions of Hesiod paves the way to the second Part, which is concerned with Hesiod 
alone. This second Part will demonstrate, I hope, the validity of my tripartite approach, since 
we will clearly see how this second Hesiod differs from the first one. This Part will also show 
that Hesiod - even in contexts that treat of him alone - can never be wholly detached from 
Homer: even when Hesiod is at his most Hesiodic, the other poet still looms in the 
background. The second Part thus leads up naturally to the third and final Part, in which we 
shall see how these Hesiodic qualities change and radicalize when Hesiod is opposed to 
Homer. 
    Apart from this fundamental division in Parts, a second criterion is used to organize the 
material and further subdivide the book, and that is an ancient distinction of the qualities of 
the poet qua poet. When evaluating poetry, the Greeks themselves recognized that there were 
three more or less separate aspects concerning their poets’ sofiva (a word often translated as 
‘wisdom’ but perhaps here better understood as ‘mental excellence’): 1) ‘moral and 
educational integrity’, 2) ‘knowledge and factual accuracy’, and 3) ‘technical skill and 
aesthetic/emotional impact’.32 In this study, these three categories or ‘areas of mental 
competence’ are translated as 1) the ethical and political orientation of the poets; 2) their 
status as knowers generally and philosophers in all but the ethical sense; and 3) the 
representation of their poetical skill and stylistic/aesthetic qualities. The different categories 
of sofiva are treated separately in the three Parts, at least as far as  possible. The ethico-
political quality of Hesiod, for instance, is first discussed when he is together with Homer 
(chapter 2), then when Hesiod is alone (5), and again later when he is opposed to Homer (8). 
                                               
32 I borrow this neat description from Griffith (1990) 188-189, see also ch. 7, p. 215.  
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In some cases, however, this convenient manner of organization had to be abandoned, as will 
be pointed out in the general outline of the book below.    
 
The first Part, on Hesiod and Homer together, begins with an introductory chapter (1) dealing 
with the principle of ‘assimilation’ - not historical, as has been explained above, but applied 
to the poets -, and then proceeds to investigate how Hesiod and Homer were ‘lumped’ 
together in antiquity. We will see here that the role of Hesiod’s poetry in society was 
comparable to that of Homer’s poetry, and that it was natural for the Greeks to picture Hesiod 
as combined with Homer. Chapter 2 examines the combination of Hesiod and Homer more 
thoroughly and focuses on the ethico-religious importance of the poets (sofiva-type 1). We 
will find here that moral and religious authority is a quality that both defines and connects the 
poets to a very high degree. Hesiod and Homer are in this respect traditionally credited with 
extraordinary prescriptive powers, since they are often imagined as legislators. This 
exceptional status, however, elicits both positive and negative responses from Greeks who 
either follow or criticize (particular parts of) their poetry. Chapter 3 (on sofiva-type 2, 
philosophy and ‘factual accuracy’) focuses on the poets’ reputation for historical and 
geographical knowledge, which sets the two apart from other literary sources. On the other 
hand, we will also see that in the field of philosophy proper Hesiod and Homer are a very rare 
combination. Instead of assimilation, we find differentiation here, an observation that looks 
ahead to chapters 6 and 9. 
    The second Part deals with Hesiod alone, and begins with a theoretical chapter (4) on the 
different factors that together make up the image of Hesiod in antiquity. We will find that the 
ultimate starting-point of Hesiod’s reception, i.e. his poetry itself, in fact prevents ‘infinite 
malleability’; a similarly restrictive factor is the connection between Hesiod’s work and vita 
(or constructed ‘life’), which appears to be closer than is usually believed. But there are other 
factors at play as well, for instance mnemonic processes such as lumping and splitting, and in 
this chapter an attempt is made to analyze them. Chapter 5 deals with the ethico-religious 
orientation of Hesiod when he is alone, which turns out to be largely political in nature (in the 
sense of ‘connected to the polis’). The scope of this Hesiod’s poetry, when seen from this 
perspective, narrows down to warnings against anti-social behaviour and the propagation of 
justice and reciprocity, characteristics that earn him the sobriquet ‘wise’. In this process, as 
we shall see, the original context of Hesiod’s poetry, that of the small rural community, 
wholly disappears as his advice on reciprocal behaviour is updated and transformed to fit the 




chapter 6, which focuses on Hesiod’s image as a philosopher. This Hesiod, we will find, was 
given shape as a rudimentary thinker concerned with the very things in which his recipients 
were primarily interested: physics and cosmology, epistemology and the gathering of 
knowledge, and the truthfulness of language. Through the same processes of memory that 
modernize and update the poet, he is formed so as to express a coherent and consistent 
philosophy. 
    The third Part, on the ancient opposition between Hesiod and Homer, begins with a 
discussion of the text that originally sparked my interest in the reception of Hesiod: the 
Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi (chapter 7). The brief discussion, I hope, furthers our 
understanding of this intriguing text, but is mostly meant as a way to highlight the most 
important differences between Hesiod and Homer as they were perceived in antiquity, i.e. 
differences with regard to content (fighting versus farming), ethico-political orientation (king 
versus people) and effect on the audience (reason versus emotion). The first two of these three 
differences are treated in chapter 8, which will focus on how Hesiod and Homer are employed 
as evaluative terms in a much wider cultural grid of social and political values. In this chapter, 
we will also see how certain Hesiodic features that had received little attention otherwise are 
amplified through the opposition with Homer. Hesiod, it turns out, ‘radicalizes’ by being 
opposed to Homer, an effect that we will encounter again in chapter 9 (the final chapter). As 
was indicated above, this chapter is different than the others because it examines all three 
Hesiods under the single heading of poetry and style; in the case of this most truly ‘poetic’ 
kind of sofiva, separate treatment would have been too strained, all the more so because the 
chapter on the poetic evaluation of Hesiod and Homer together would have been virtually 
empty: as it turns out, the poets qua poets are almost always constructed as antithetical, and it 
is often through opposition that Hesiod’s poetic qualities are reinforced or defined. In this 
kind of sofiva most of all, Hesiod will prove to be ‘the other poet’. 
 
Obviously, the structure of the book reflects its main theme: the three fundamentally distinct 
ways the Greeks imagined and constructed the cultural icon Hesiod. But there are some other 
threads, that run through the book as a whole. One of these is the state of modern scholarship 
and its relation to ancient views. Even though this is a book about the place of Hesiod in the 
ancient Greek imagination, all chapters deal with the views of modern scholars, often by 
presenting a short status quaestionis in the first paragraph. The modern views discussed do 
not only concern the reception of Hesiod (and, to a lesser degree, of Homer), but also deal 
with Hesiod and his poems themselves. I believe it is worthwhile to occasionally compare 
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ancient and modern views and interpretations of Hesiod; in some cases, we will find that 
modern readers know nothing more or better than the Greeks themselves. Furthermore, 
comparing ancient and modern readings reveals that all reception and interpretation are liable 
to the same sort of fluctuations over time; in order to demonstrate this, relatively much 
attention will be paid to a somewhat older layer of Hesiodic scholarship (from about 1930 to 
1975), which can than be compared with more recent notions. 
    Another main thread is my occasional problem with modern scholarship’s focus on Homer, 
a characteristic I will refer to as ‘Homerocentrism’. Throughout the book I will argue that 
Homer should not only be regarded as a foil to Hesiod, defining his image, but that the 
dynamic relationship between them works the other way around as well, at least to some 
degree. In earliest times, Hesiod was almost Homer’s peer, of near-equal standing and 
importance; and even though this status slowly (but inevitably) diminished over time, his 
poetry was in antiquity never regarded as the relatively uninteresting quasi-epic that modern 
scholars often (implicitly rather than explicitly) made of it in the 20th century, and 
occasionally still do. We will see, however, that Homerocentrism, understandable as it may 
seem, sometimes unnecessarily and incorrectly downplays or ‘forgets’ Hesiod, in certain 
cases leading to serious misinterpretation. In a sense, my own approach to study the ancient 
reception of Hesiod in relation to Homer may seem Homerocentric as well; but it is in fact a 
re-appraisal of this relation which will, I hope, put Hesiod in his own and proper place, and 
avoid undue focus on Homer.33 
    The last of the main threads running through the book as a whole is the story of the slow 
disappearance of Hesiod. In the archaic and early classical period, Hesiod and Homer stand 
side by side, as poets of almost equal status and importance; slowly but surely, however, 
Homer becomes the Greek cultural icon par excellence, so much so that during the Second 
Sophistic he is even generally regarded as the authority on themes and subjects that were 
                                               
33 I will briefly illustrate what I mean with ‘undue focus’. Homerocentrism in most cases simply leads to Homer 
receiving a disproportionate amount of attention. This is what happens, for instance, in Brenk’s (1986) study of 
demonology, a subject on which Hesiod is a very important source; nonetheless, Brenk spends ten pages to 
discuss Homer, and glosses over Hesiod in only one paragraph. Another example is Libanius-translator Norman 
rendering   JHsivodo~ kai;   {Omhro~ as ‘Homer and Hesiod’ (Lib. Or. 16.46). In other cases Hesiod is simply 
overlooked. Collins (2004), for instance, in his recent study on competition in Greek poetry, says of Isocrates’ 
reference to Homer and Hesiod that ‘for the most part, the attacks of Plato, Xenophon, and, indirectly, Isocrates, 
are limited to a rhapsode’s ability to understand and interpret Homer’ (221 n.9), apparently forgetting that 
Hesiod is mentioned in the very passage he is commenting upon. (This type of Homerocentrism is in fact quite 
frequent. See also e.g. Else (1986) 12 stating that the Symposium honours Homer for his legacy (though Hesiod 
is also mentioned in the passage he quotes), and Zeitlin (2001) 204 saying ‘Greek intellectuals’ pointed to 
Homer (together with Musaeus and Orpheus) as ‘founders of civilization and masters of paideia.’) In more 
extreme cases, Hesiod is wholly absorbed by Homer, losing all individuality; thus Mehmel claims that Heraclitus 
dislikes Homer for his polymathy, although Heraclitus in fact attributes that quality to Hesiod (Mehmel 1954 




traditionally associated with Hesiod. This development is caused by several things, notably 
Plato’s concept of inspiration and Aristotle’s notion of poetic craftmanship, which are further 
discussed in the final chapter. 
 
I will conclude this section with three remarks concerning the nature of the ancient sources in 
this book and the way I have dealt with them. First of all: I treat as references to Hesiod those 
ancient text passages that either explicitly mention his name or his works, obviously quote 
him, or otherwise allude to him in a way that makes it clear beyond reasonable doubt that 
Hesiod is indeed referred to.34 This is not because I do not believe in more structural, more 
implicit or generally more sophisticated references - on the contrary, such references abound 
in Greek literature, and a good example of the benefit of their study both for the 
understanding of Hesiod in particular and of reception in general is provided by the recent 
collection of articles published as Plato and Hesiod.35 It is the scope of the present study, 
however, which has largely prevented me from finding or paying much attention to such 
references to Hesiod; the result is an inevitably large blind spot, which most regrettably 
includes virtually all of tragedy.36 I do not presume to have written ‘a full history of Hesiod’s 
Nachleben’;37 I do presume, however, to have found almost all explicit references to Hesiod 
in antiquity, and to present a fair account of them. 
    The second point concerns the quantity of the references. As we will see in the next section, 
the number of references to any Hesiodic verse (or group of verses) is on the whole rather 
small, perhaps even disappointingly so. Most verses in Hesiod’s poems are never referred to 
at all, and the verses that are mentioned by later Greeks are usually referred to only once or 
twice. Only some fifty verses or so are (much) more popular. Such small numbers naturally 
raise questions concerning their value: if a verse is mentioned twice, it could be a matter of 
chance instead of something significant. Determining the value of such references must thus 
always go beyond mere quantification and include an examination of their context, which is 
what the present study in fact aims to do. Nonetheless, numbers can occasionally be 
                                               
34 I generally count as references those passages that apart from a certain thematic resemblance copy at least two 
words from the Hesiodic source text. I mostly follow ancient sources claiming that an author referred to Hesiod 
(as for instance Plu. Mor. 275A claims that Antimachus fr. 51 ‘follows’ Hesiod), although they can be over-
quick to regard something as a reference (see for instance the scholia and Suda calling Ar. Pl. 253 a parody of 
WD 41). I do not include passages taking over certain historical, geographical, or genealogical data in Hesiod 
without the above-mentioned textual reinforcement. 
35 Boys-Stones and Haubold (2009). 
36 Occasionally, however, I did find a place for some of the more implicit references (i.e. the references that do 
not meet the criteria set out in n.34 above) that I chanced upon in the course of my research.  
37 See Solmsen (1949) 103-106 for his view on what such a history should look like. 
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revealing, indicating larger trends that would perhaps go unnoticed in studies with a more 
specific focus. This holds especially true when the numbers are all integrated into one 
overview, as is the case with the figures and the table presented in the next section. 
    Third and finally: in dealing with references to Greek (or Latin) I have always provided a 
translation as well. When no further reference is given, the translation is taken from the Loeb 
series (except those of Plato and Aristotle, for which I used the editions of Cooper and 
Barnes, respectively). In some cases, I adapted translations, and sometimes I produced 
translations of my own; this is always indicated in the notes. 
 
4 - Getting started: the Commemograms 
In order to get a preliminary idea of the scope and focus of Hesiod’s reception I have created 
two so-called ‘commemograms’. The term commemogram is used by Zerubavel for a 
diagram indicating which dates in a people’s history are annually celebrated. It is a visual way 
of demonstrating what periods are (ritually or ceremonially) remembered, considered 
important, and are thus ‘identitätsfundierend’; Zerubavel speaks of ‘mnemonic density’.38 By 
way of introduction, I have fashioned commemograms of the Theogony and Works and Days, 
which indicate which lines are quoted and how often. In these commemograms, the ‘sacred 
mountains and profane valleys’ will reveal not on which periods ‘nations are most intensely 
focused mnemonically’,39 as is the case with Zerubavel’s diagrams, but which of Hesiod’s 
verses were considered most memorable, and, of course, which were virtually forgotten. It 
should be noted that both are of great interest to our investigation:40 the image of Hesiod is to 
a large degree constituted by the passages that are quoted and so passed on. In fact, the 
commemograms of Hesiod’s works show some remarkable mountains and valleys, and as 
such provide a good introduction to a more detailed study of Hesiod’s reception.  
    In the following two figures, the horizontal axis indicates the line numbers of the poems, 
while the number of references are given on the vertical axis. To keep the commemograms 
from becoming too abstract, the different parts of the poems (divided according to a modern 
understanding of them) are indicated in the alternating light and dark planes as explained in 
the legend below. The first figure presents an overview of the so-called mountains and valleys 
of the Theogony, the second of the Works and Days. 
 
                                               
38 Zerubavel (2003) 25-26. 
39 Zerubavel (2003) 28. See for his commemograms in general 25-34. 











It is immediately obvious from the commemograms that the references to the Theogony are 
far less numerous than those to the Works and Days (see on this further below). Secondly, the 
references to the Works and Days are spread far more evenly than those to the Theogony. In 
figure 1, there is one considerable peak around the verses dealing with Chaos and the 
beginning of the universe (line 116-120), and some attention focusing on the proem 
(containing Hesiod’s tale of how he met the Muses) and on the part dealing with the gods who 
are born immediately after Heaven and Earth; the rest of the poem, however, is apparently 
considered far less quote-worthy and is thus almost wholly given up to oblivion. No attention 
is paid to the story of the birth of Zeus, almost none to the hymn on Hecate, and surprisingly 
little to Zeus’ fight with the Titans or with Typhoeus. This extremely narrow focus is rather 
consistent through time. If the Theogony is a poem about Zeus’ rise to power, as is often 
supposed by modern scholars,41 that is apparently not how the Greeks remembered it. 
     References to the Works and Days are spread more evenly, and the valleys and mountains 
are less outspoken. This broader view seems to be consistent through time as well (even 
though the data for the archaic and hellenistic period are rather scanty), which perhaps points 
to a fuller and more inclusive knowledge of the Works and Days. Nevertheless, certain 
passages are still notably more ‘dense’ than others: there is more interest in the passages 
dealing with the two Erides, with Justice, with successful living and with advice on marriage 
and other matters; there is less attention to the tale of the five races, to the advice on farming 
and the seasons, and there are almost no references to the section on good and bad days - the 
Works and Days thus seems to be not primarily remembered for their works and days. This is 
a striking observation which must be accounted for. Another interesting observation concerns 
the place of the peaks: quite a few correspond rather neatly to the ‘joints’ of our modern 
division of the poem. This may indicate that the Greeks too (and perhaps in a way similar to 
us) thought of the Works and Days as a complex poem dealing with many different themes.42 
    A final word concerns the quantity of the references. The Works and Days appears to be the 
more popular poem since the references to it outnumber those to the Theogony by more than 2 
to 1: the commemograms feature 554 references to the Works and Days against 239 to the 
Theogony. Even though quantification alone should be treated with caution, such numbers at 
least appear as evidence against the notion that the Greeks considered the Theogony as 
                                               
41 So e.g. Nelson (1998) 43 et passim. 
42 Incidentally, the commemogram of the Th. also ‘peaks’ at such a joint; cf. Hunter (2008) 154 on Th. 115-116 
as ‘the beginning of ‘the poem proper’.’ 
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Hesiod’s most important poem. It is also interesting to subdivide these numbers from a 
diachronic perspective, as is done in the following table:43  
 
     
 Archaic Classical Hellenistic 2nd Sophistic 
     
Works and Days 37 (8%) 97 (18%) 48 (9%) 344 (65%) 
     
Theogony 5 (2%) 26 (11%) 49 (21%) 158 (66%) 
     
 
Table 1: distribution of references to Hesiod through time 
 
 
Two observations are directly evident. First, the number of references rises through time, 
becoming disproportionally large during the generally quote-eager Second Sophistic (in both 
cases, about two thirds).44 Second, something unique happens during the Hellenistic period: 
the number of references to the Works and Days decreases, while the Theogony is mentioned 
more often. The numbers suggest that this is the only period in which Hesiod’s poems are 
considered equally important. 
 
As has been stressed several times, the commemograms are based on numbers that have come 
about within certain parameters, and this means they are of limited value for the 
understanding of Hesiod’s reception. They leave out the context, do not indicate the relative 
importance of a reference, and do not show how one reference relates to another, in short: 
they do not explain anything. Nevertheless, the commemograms can be of use, because they 
do show rather clearly that some parts of Hesiod are forgotten, while others are remembered; 
they suggest that ancient concept of Hesiod may be very different from ours; and, perhaps 
most importantly, they provide us with a preliminary overview of the material and the first 
clues to our investigation. As such, the commemograms form a good introduction to a more 
in-depth study of the ancient collective memory of Hesiod.  
 
                                               
43 In this table the Roman references (25 to the WD and 1 to the Th.) are left out. 
44 It should be borne in mind that the numbers in table 1 do not contradict the earlier-mentioned trend of 
Hesiod’s growing unimportance in relation to Homer; even though the number of references to Hesiod during 


















Chapter 1  
 
Introduction: Equating Hesiod and Homer 
 
 
0 - Introduction 
Martin West begins the Prolegomena to his monumental commentary on the Theogony with a 
motto taken from Zimmern: ‘Besides Homer, there is Hesiod’.1 The motto is aptly chosen at 
the head of an enterprise devoted to demonstrating that Greek oral poetry consists of more 
than the heroic poems of Homer alone: ‘Hesiod’s Theogony, no less than the Iliad, is a 
representative of an ancient and widespread type’.2 West’s introductory remarks are clearly 
meant as a (timely) call to widen our view beyond Homer, and understand Hesiod on his own 
terms. 
    I hope West will not take it amiss when I point to the ambiguity of Zimmern’s words, 
which taken by themselves could equally well mean the complete opposite, namely that 
Hesiod belongs at Homer’s side, as if they were two of a kind, or some inseparable duo. It is 
with this particular conception of Hesiod, i.e. as a poet equated with Homer, that Part One is 
concerned. In this Part we will examine the representation of Hesiod when he is mentioned 
together with Homer, i.e. contexts in which both poets are coupled so as to form some sort of 
unity. Some well-known examples are Xenophanes’ attack on the anthropomorphic 
representation of the gods by ‘Homer and Hesiod’, or Herodotus’ claim that ‘Hesiod and 
Homer’ gave the Greeks their religion.3 Throughout this study I will use the terms ‘together’ 
and ‘comparable’ to denote this type of relationship. 
    In Part One I will investigate what caused the Greeks to picture Hesiod and Homer 
together, what their purposes were in doing so, and in what specific respects the two poets 
were imagined to be identical. These questions will be addressed in chapters 2 and 3, where 
we will find that the coupling of Hesiod and Homer goes hand in hand with their 
representation as educators, teachers of ethics and authorities on religion. We will see that the 
assimilation with Homer thoroughly affects the presentation of Hesiod, not only with regard 
to the themes and subjects ascribed to him, but also in the way he is treated. To give just one 
example: when Hesiod is together with Homer, he provokes far more negative responses.  
                                               
1 The quote is from Zimmern (1915) 91. Fowler (2004b) 225 echoes the quote, but probably unwittingly. 
2 West (1966) 1. 
3 Xenoph. DK 21 B 11, Hdt. Hist. 2.53 (see on both more in ch. 2). 
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    In this chapter, however, I will not yet discuss the actual dynamics underlying the equation 
of Hesiod and Homer. First, it is necessary to (briefly) set out the theoretical background 
against which the first Part should be understood - in its barest essence, the theory of 
historical assimilation and differentiation derived from cultural memory studies but applied in 
a radically different way. This is the subject of the first section. In the second section, we will 
turn our attention to modern scholarship and give a short overview of how scholars from the 
beginning of the twentieth century onwards have understood the relationship between Hesiod 
and Homer.  
    In the third and final section, we will take a preliminary look at the ancient coupling of 
Hesiod and Homer. Instead of going into their thematic association, which will be left to 
chapters 2 and 3, we will focus on some of the other ways the Greeks connected Hesiod and 
Homer: for instance, the biographical tradition that placed the two poets in the same age and 
sometimes even the same family, and the sources that give their work a comparable place in 
Greek society. Perhaps of greatest interest here are the conscious efforts to harmonize Hesiod 
and Homer, and the more or less explicit indications for an ancient belief that their poems 
belonged to the same genre. Taken together, these three sections will give us the necessary 
background before we start investigating the thematic connections between the two poets. 
 
1 - Lumping and Splitting 
In this section I will briefly set out how some of the theories and observations from the field 
of cultural memory studies can be employed to elucidate the ancient reception of Hesiod and 
its relation to Homer. Even though the dynamic interplay between two cultural icons has 
never (to my knowledge) been the object of any study in this field, cultural memory studies do 
provide some valuable insights and methods directly relevant to the present investigation. 
    As has been said in the introduction, cultural memory studies operate on the premise that 
memory of both individuals and communities is socially structured. Of greatest interest to our 
concern are two observations: 1) people tend to fit data from the past into certain culturally 
determined schemata, as demonstrated from the fact that the past is structured and narrated 
according to formulaic plotlines that are limited in number; and 2) remembering is informed 
by social norms of remembrance that to a large degree define what we should remember or 
forget.4 These two mechanisms explain how we can ‘cut up the past’ into supposedly discrete 
                                               
4 See Introduction, p. 2. 
INTRODUCTION: EQUATING HESIOD AND HOMER 
25 
periods, as Zerubavel phrases it,5 and organize the whole of our past into conventional blocks 
of history that lead up to the here and now - and so explain who we are today. 
    In his chapter on historical discontinuity, Zerubavel shows how such periodization takes 
place: through the principles of assimilation and differentiation the differences between 
certain historical data - such as persons, events and movements - are downplayed, with the 
result that they coagulate into one conceptual whole. By contrast, the differences between 
certain other historical data are exaggerated, which leads to periodical boundaries. This is 
what Zerubavel calls ‘intraperiodic lumping’ and ‘interperiodic splitting’.6 For instance: 
because of our concept of the Middle Ages, Augustine and Chaucer are assimilated even 
though they are 900 years apart (‘lumping’), while the discovery of America in 1492 creates 
an enormous conceptual rift (or ‘watershed’, as Zerubavel calls it) between the years 1491 and 
1493 (‘splitting’).7 We can compare, for instance, the ‘lumping’ of Archilochus and Solon 
(both situated in the archaic period), and the watershed commonly attributed to the activities 
of Socrates (resulting in the awkward term ‘presocratics’). 
    What is most relevant to us is the arbitrary or relative nature of this kind of ‘social 
punctuation of the past’.8 We need to see that conventional blocks are created from a present-
day perspective and fulfill a certain present-day need for viewing the past. For instance, our 
concept of the ‘classical period’ conforms to the so-called ‘rise and decline’-plotline we 
conveniently impose on antiquity, according to which one period is regarded as the most 
interesting one; consequently, those before are labeled ‘preliminary’ or ‘archaic’, and those 
that come after as ‘decadent’ or ‘late’. A different perspective, however, or a different 
present-day need, can cause the re-drawing of boundaries and re-construction of conventional 
blocks. For instance, the term ‘presocratics’ is nowadays (rightly) thought to be imprecise and 
even misleading, and the flourishing study of late antiquity has (rightly) argued for 
investigating that period in its own right.  
    I suggest that the theory of assimilation and differentiation can be of great help to our 
investigation. The principles that Zerubavel connects with historical periods we can connect  
mutatis mutandis to the poets as cultural icons. In the sources, Hesiod and Homer are 
sometimes differentiated or ‘split’: the differences between them are highlighted in order to 
present them as separate. Far more often, on the other hand, differences are downplayed or 
ignored altogether, and the poets appear as one ‘block’, so to speak. Incidentally, it is 
                                               
5 Zerubavel (2003) 96. 
6 Zerubavel (2003) 87. 
7 The examples are taken from Zerubavel (2003) 86-88. 
8 Zerubavel (2003) 83. 
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interesting to note that this ‘personic lumping’, which is the subject of Part One, often 
coincides with a historical notion of coupling Hesiod and Homer as representatives of a long-
gone age: it is especially Hesiod and Homer who the Greeks called ‘the ancients’ (oiJ ajrcaiòi 
or palaioiv).9 
     The precise dynamics of assimilation will be further examined in chapters 2 and 3, where it 
will be shown when Hesiod and Homer are lumped together, on what grounds, in what 
contexts and to what purposes. First, however, we shall take a look at the lumping and 
splitting done by modern scholars. 
 
2 - Modern scholarship 
It has long been customary for modern scholarship to present a ‘split’ image of Hesiod and 
Homer. It is especially the standard reference books on Greek literature that vividly present 
the differences, which are exaggerated in order to make such splitting possible. I have found 
that the most important criteria of differentiation employed are quality, outlook, intent, subject 
matter, and the individuality of the author. I will now briefly illustrate these with examples 
from some of the best-known handbooks and other literature. 
    The first area concerns the sheer quality of the poems. Schmid-Stählin (1929), who 
subdivide the chapter on Das Epos into Das Epos in Ionien and Epos und Lehrgedicht im 
Mutterland, say that ‘der dankbarsten Gegenstände mutterländischer Sagenüberlieferung 
haben sich, bevor das Mutterland zu Wort kam, die ionischen Sänger bemächtigt und haben 
sie, vermischt mit allerlei neuen Motiven, in ihre grossen glänzenden epischen Prachtbauten 
eingegliedert’.10 According to the handbook, these poems were transmitted to the mainland by 
the Homeridae, because ‘es ist nicht wahrscheinlich, dass sie im Mutterland viel eigene 
künstlerische Initiative vorfanden’.11 West too is very outspoken when comparing Hesiod and 
Homer with with regard to craftmanship: ‘It is as if an artisan with his big, awkward fingers 
were patiently, fascinatedly, imitating the fine seam of the professional tailor’.12 There is in 
fact an almost endless list of more or less harshly derogatory remarks on Hesiod’s relatively 
poor poetical capabilities.13 
                                               
9 See section 3.1 below, pp. 35-40. 
10 Schmid-Stählin (1929) 246. 
11 Ibid. The inferiority of mainland or Hesiodic poetry is here as elsewhere taken as an indication of Homeric 
priority (for a similar view in antiquity see below, pp. 37-38); such reasoning is rightly rejected by e.g. Martin 
(1984) 29 and Lamberton (1988) 21-22. 
12 West (1966) 73.  
13 See for instance Van Lennep (1823) iii ‘…there is no way of denying that the poetic merits of Homer, in 
variety, power and brilliance, exceed those of Hesiod’ (my translation of the Dutch original); Banks (1879) x 
calls the Th. ‘coarser and less delicate’ than Homer; Paley (1883) v-vi ‘Hesiod is eclipsed by Homer both in the 
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    As for outlook: Lesky remarks that Homer and Hesiod were often taken together in 
antiquity (although he does not mention their ancient opposition), and then claims that ‘in 
Wahrheit überwiegt dem Verbindenden gegenüber, wie es sich im Versmaß, epischer Sprache 
und rhapsodischer Tradition darstellt, weitaus das Trennende, das Hesiod sozial und geistig in 
eine andersgeartete Welt verweist.’14 The poets are, according to Lesky, separated not so 
much because of any ‘Entwicklung in der Zeit’, but ‘vielmehr hören wir bei Hesiod deshalb 
Anderes und Neues, weil er geographisch und sozial in einem völlig anderen Bereiche 
wurzelt’. Hesiod is ‘so unionisch wie nur möglich’.15 
    Other factors of differentiation are subject matter and the intent attributed to Hesiod and 
Homer. Perhaps the most well-established and widespread notion concerning these poets is 
that Hesiodic poetry distinguishes itself ‘essentiellement’ from its Homeric counterpart 
because ‘elle est didactique’.16 Hesiod is commonly believed to be more reflective, and, 
according to Rose, ‘is not trying to entertain, but rather to edify’.17 This distinction is of 
course closely linked to the subject matter treated by Homer and Hesiod: while Homer is 
generally characterized as the war poet par excellence, the absence of martial themes in 
Hesiod’s poetry is often stressed, sometimes leading to somewhat exaggerated claims.18 It is 
                                                                                                                                                   
choice of a subject and the treatment of it’ - he describes the WD as ‘matter-of-fact and unimpassioned poetry’ 
and the Th. as ‘certainly a dull poem’ (ibid.), ‘a compendium of dogmatic theology’ (ibid.); Robert (1905) 472 
finds Hesiod in comparison to the Ionians ‘stammelnd’ and without ‘Anmut’; Aly (1913b) 30 calls the WD and 
Th. ‘echte Flickpoesie’; Thomson (1914) 89 ‘who does not feel that [Hesiod’s style] is not only a less masterly 
but a less developed thing than the art of Homer?’; Wilamowitz (1916) 473 speaks of a ‘Disharmonie’ between 
Hesiod’s ‘Begabung’ and the Homeric form; Sellschopp (1934) 54 ‘Hesiod war kein Erzähler, ihm steht die 
Kunst der Darstellung nicht in dem Masse zur Verfügung, wie manchem homerischen Dichter’; Myres (1958) 19 
describes the Th. as ‘declining at times into a mere list of names, conventional and often prosaic in style’; Rose 
(1961) 58 ‘not of the transcendent genius of Homer, but of great talent’; Von Fritz (1962) 45 ‘es ist sehr oft 
wirklich Ungeschiklichkeit und Unbeholfenheit’; Sinclair (1966) xi ‘such was his enthusiasm for his subject that 
he almost succeeded in writing a fine poem’; Mondi (1986) 25 calls Hesiod’s compositional technique 
‘unrefined’. These examples must suffice here. 
14 Lesky (1971) 113. Lesky does not treat Hesiod and Homer under the same heading: Homer features in the 
chapter on Das homerische Epos, while Hesiodic poetry makes out the first section of the next chapter on Die 
archaische Zeit.   
15 Ibid. See also Paley (1883) xii-xiii on Homer, ‘the representative of the Asiatic and Ionic phase of life, and 
Hesiod, of the European and Hellenic’, and Geffcken (1926) 58: despite the fact that Hesiod resembles Homer in 
language, ‘ist er doch ein Mensch von anderer Rasse, von verschiedener dichterischer Struktur, erwachsen unter 
einem anderen Himmel, in anderen äusseren Verhältnissen, in einer völlig verschiedenen archaisch-religiösen 
Umwelt’. Mehmel (1954) 19 contrasts the ‘homerische Welt’, ‘gelöster, lockerer, fast wie spielerisch, frei, oft 
unmoralisch, ohne Ernst, frivol - von einem freien menschlichen, geradezu aufklärerischen Geist durchdrungen’ 
with ‘der biedere, etwas schwerfällige, moralische und religiöse, nach Sinn und Nutzen fragende Ernst des 
böotischen Festlandsgriechen Hesiod’. Levy (1963) following the work of the anthropologist Redfield 
distinguishes between a ‘great tradition’, to which the bulk of the Homeric poems belongs, and a ‘little tradition’ 
which he calls the ‘culture of the country folk’. See further ch. 8.2, pp. 238-245. 
16 Croiset (1910) 458. 
17 Rose (1961) 63; for more on the difference between heroic and didactic epic see ch. 9. 
18 Marsilio (2000) 59 suggests that there were ‘two rival traditions: unlike the heroic poet’s choice of ‘war’ 
(povlemo~) as a subject, Hesiod composes poetry that exalts the spirit of ‘work’ (e[rgon).’ Polarization sometimes 
leads to over-simplification; see the claim of e.g. Wade-Gery (1949) 91 that ‘Hesiod is almost unique in Greece’ 
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easy to see how Hesiod and Homer could be opposed as the creators of Gedankenepik versus 
Tatenepik.19 
    The three ‘watersheds’ mentioned above - outlook, intent, and subject matter (and 
probably, more or less implicitly, quality too) - have made scholars doubt whether the poems 
of Hesiod and Homer belong to the same genre: François, for instance, discusses the use of 
the words qeov~ and daivmwn in Homer and Hesiod under separate headings, one called ‘la 
poésie épique’ and the other ‘la poésie Hésiodique’.20 The problem of classification, however, 
is usually solved by assuming an ancient common poetic tradition to have branched off into 
two distinct types or ‘schools’, one heroic, Ionian and Homeric, and the other that of Hesiod: 
‘the Boeotian school of poetry with its emphasis on catalogues, genealogies, concern for the 
daily realities of practical life [which] reflects the non-heroic aspects of Achaean oral 
poetry.’21 The Boeotian School theory, traced to Grote by Myres and to Mure by Havelock,22 
attracted many scholars and still finds numerous adherents - it is a neat middle-ground 
position that explains similarities between the two poets and at the same time allows for 
significant differences due to (more or less) independent development.23 
    As to the fifth criterium: much has always been made of Hesiod’s individuality, which is 
inflated so as to form a powerful contrast with the anonymous voice of Homer. The fact that 
Hesiod mentions himself in line 22 of the Theogony has often been interpreted in celebratory 
terms: Hesiod is hailed as the world’s first fully self-aware poet, breaking away from Homeric 
anonymity, telling us with pride about a historically true personal experience.24 The 
                                                                                                                                                   
because he ‘practically never mentions war’, or Hesiod’s characterization by Kaczynska (1998) 45 as ‘a 
Boeotian farmer, for whom all war-struggles are quite strange’; there is plenty of war and violence in the 
Theogony and the fragments, especially of the Catalogue. 
19 Geffcken (1926) 63. 
20 François (1957) 21 and 56; they are the headings of chapters counting 35 and 2 pages, respectively. See also 
the handbook of Rose (1961), whose second chapter is called Homer and the Ancient Epic, and the third Hesiod 
and the Hesiodic Schools.  
21 These summarizing words are those of Notopoulos (1960) 191. 
22 Myres (1958) 91; Havelock (1963) 111 n.2. On the Boeotian school see also Pinsent (1985). 
23 See e.g. Thomson (1914) 89, who contrasts the ‘ideally treated saga-stuff’ with the ‘long lists of mnemonic 
precepts for the farmer and generations of gods and heroes’; Rose (1961) 57-79 (esp. 67-69), Renehan (1980) 93, 
Lamberton (1988) 83-84; Dupont (1999) 61 (‘the rhapsodes of Boeotia put together a panhellenic theogony for 
Greece, that is to say a theological epic, under the name Hesiod’). 
24 See e.g. Aly (1913a) vi ‘Die erste Persönlichkeit der griechischen Literatur, die uns in greifbarer Deutlichkeit 
entgegentritt, ist Hesiodos von Askra’ (the very first line of his Einleitung); Trever (1924) 167 (on the WD: ‘if 
ever there was a piece of literature that had the personality of its author indelibly stamped upon every page, it is 
this poem’); Cadoux (1929) and Latimer (1930) take all details in Hesiod’s poems as historical; Sellschopp 
(1934) 41 (‘Wir können hier zum ersten Male eine Persönlichkeit in ihrer historischen Gebundenheit erkennen’); 
Falter (1934) 14 (‘so streift er die Unpersönlichkeit der bisherigen Epiker ab und in voller Persönlichkeit vor den 
Kreis seiner Zuhörer hintretend erzählt er stolz seine Berufung und Weihe zum Dichter’); Jaeger (1945) 62-64; 
Latte (1946b) 152; Diller (1946) 141-142; Wade-Gery (1949) 81 (‘the first Greek poet to break the tradition of 
anonymousness and to talk about his own concerns’; Hesiod even ‘delights in talking about himself’, 84); Kirk 
(1962) 94 (‘he had a new awareness of himself as a person, as a poet, and as a Boeotian poet’); Havelock (1963) 
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autobiographical statements in the Works and Days have greatly strengthened this view of 
Hesiod as a historical ‘Mensch von Fleisch und Blut’;25 many scholars took the poet’s self-
referential remarks at face value and devoted their attention to a detailed reconstruction of the 
particulars of Hesiod’s life, especially his relationship to his brother and father, both assumed 
to be historical persons as well.26 This firm belief in the historicity and individuality of Hesiod 
has at times led to far-going (and utterly unverifiable) speculations, such as those of 
Kambylis, who claims that Hesiod did not leave Ascra often, or of Marsilio, who suggests that 
Hesiod’s father had wanted to become a poet but failed.27    
    To sum up: when the differences between Homer and Hesiod are focused on and blown up, 
Hesiod is pictured as the ‘Antipode Homers’, making any comparison between them ‘ganz 
unzulässig; Homers und Hesiods Epik ist nicht in einem Atem zu nennen’.28 Moreover, this 
split image is further enhanced by the almost universally acknowledged - though basically 
unverifiable - notion that Hesiodic poetry is younger than the Homeric poems.29 Of course 
there have been several studies devoted to finding solid evidence for the priority of Homer 
over Hesiod,30 but none of these have presented a clear and cogent case (which can 
incidentally also be said of the opposite argument, i.e. that Hesiod is the older poet).31 But the 
notion still remains, though to a large degree assumed tacitly and left implicit - witness the 
many handbooks on ancient literature, introductions to ancient philosophy, articles on ancient 
thought or beliefs, studies on semantics, which all begin with Homer and after that treat 
                                                                                                                                                   
97; Kumaniecki (1963) 86; Maehler (1963) 35 (‘Die neue Haltung ist gekennzeichnet durch seine durchaus 
unhomerische Selbstauffassung und das Verhältis zu seinem eigenem Dichtertum’); Kambylis (1965) 16 (the 
first ‘über sich selbst und seine Kunst reflektierender Künstler’); Will (1965) 556 (what Hesiod tells us is not 
part of a ‘thème littéraire’, ‘mais porte la marque de la réalité individuelle et vécue’); Häussler (1973) 120; 
Østerud (1976) 13; Fakas (2001) 50. West (1978) 33 argues that since the autobiographical information is 
‘dragged a little clumsily’, ‘we cannot help but believe what we are told’ (cf. Cadoux 1929 261 claiming that 
‘the invention of such unwelcome details [i.e. the family drama of Perses] is in the last degree unlikely’); see 
also Most (1991), who argues for a protreptic function of the autobiographical information.  
25 Wilamowitz (1928) 161. 
26 See for a detailed discussion of the autobiographical reading Stoddard (2004) 1-33. 
27 Kambylis (1965) 47; Marsilio (2000) 37-39. There have also been some attempts to define the occasion for the 
performance of the poems. Jensen (1966) 10, for instance, believes the WD to have been the actual defence plea 
held by Hesiod in the historical trial against Perses, and claims that ‘Hesiod may actually be guilty’; Wade-Gery 
1949 87 suggested that the poem recited by Hesiod in Chalcis (see WD 654-655) was the Theogony (he is 
followed by West 1966 44-45 (and 1977 32) and Janko 1982 94); according to Walcot (1960) 39 the poem may 
have been the Catalogue. 
28 Geffcken (1926) 62-63.  
29 Cf. Graziosi (2002) 104 speaking of a ‘modern prejudice in favour of Homer’s authority and antiquity’, cf. 
Rosen (1997) 464-473. Some scholars, such as Wilamowitz (1916), Sellschopp (1934) and Wade-Gery (1949), 
believed Hesiod came after the Iliad but before the Odyssey; Finley (1979) 31 thinks Hesiod was ‘a generation or 
two’ later than the Iliad but contemporary with the Odyssey.  
30 See e.g. Edwards (1971), Neitzel (1975), Tsagarakis (1986). 
31 The chief adherent of this view is West (1966) 40-48, who names Bethe as the only one to have held this view 
before (47 n.1); in his edition of the WD he mentions Heitsch and Burkert as possible allies for the minority view 
(1978 vi).  
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Hesiod, suggesting a chronological sequence.32 Much has also been written on the ways in 
which Hesiod presupposes Homer and supposedly responded to Homeric poetry.33 
    It is the combination of the split image and the notion of posteriority that have often caused 
scholars to present the relationship between Hesiod and Homer in terms of chronological 
development; this is true for all of the five criteria just mentioned. Much attention has been 
paid, for instance, to Hesiod’s developed sense of justice, which is supposedly better suited to 
a more polis-centered society: his gods have a high moral standard (at least when compared to 
the morally neutral gods of the Iliad), and Hesiod’s view on ethics is comparatively modern.34 
As for quality: Kirk is not alone in claiming that Hesiod’s poetry ‘belongs to a secondary 
stage of development’, as ‘the old formulas from the Ionian tradition, even when not varied, 
are combined with each other in a clumsy, redundant or colourless manner’.35 And where 
genre is concerned: many have followed the well-known schematizing tendency of the 
handbooks that positions Hesiod somewhere on the transition between epos and lyric.36 This 
very wide-spread developmental thinking can sometimes lead to circular or self-fulfilling 
argumentation.37 
 
The current in modern scholarship to present Hesiod and Homer as split is strong and 
pervasive. However, during the last thirty years or so many traditional views in the Hesiod-
Forschung have been strongly attacked, and it has been the (often unintentional) effect of 
these recent studies to ‘lump’ Hesiod and Homer together. Two trends have fueled this  
powerful countermovement: a more nuanced view on the splitting factors discussed above, 
and a better understanding of how oral poetry works. I will now briefly illustrate this. 
                                               
32 Books and articles with both poets in the title usually put Homer first; see below p. 47. 
33 See e.g. Sihler (1902) xxx, saying that ‘it is difficult not to conceive these [= Homeric] epics as a fait accompli 
when the Hesiodean poetry was making’; Jaeger (1945) 60, who states that ‘Hesiod knew Homer’s poetry from 
his youth, before he became a professional rhapsode (…) Every subject that he treats automatically enters the 
already fixed Homeric pattern’; Wade-Gery (1949) 92 speaking of Hesiod’s ‘profound’ reaction to the Iliad; Sale 
(1961); Krafft (1963) 84 et passim mentions Hesiod’s conscious ‘Anklänge’ to the Homeric poems; Verdenius 
(1983) 28 ‘[Hesiod] was in a position to compare different kinds of poetry, the narrative style of Homer and his 
own didactic style’; Tsagalis (2006) 93 et passim discussing ‘Homeric echoes’. That the idée fixe of Homeric 
priority is hard to escape, is well exemplified by Lamberton, who in his 1988 monograph on Hesiod argues that 
the question of priority cannot be solved (see further below, p. 34), while in his 1986 study on Homer (5 n.10) he 
still claimed that ‘Hesiod (Th. 36-38) adapts the description of Calchas’ wisdom to describe that of the Muses’. 
34 See e.g. Geffcken (1926) 63; Adkins (1960) 70-73 (‘the arete of Hesiod is something new’, 72); Adkins 
(1972) 23-35; Detienne (1963) 29; Claus (1977) 74 credits Hesiod with ‘significantly more modern moral views’ 
than Homer; Finley (1979) 141; Athanassakis (1992). 
35 Kirk (1962) 66. 
36 See e.g. Rzach (1913) 1179-1180, Geffcken (1926) 60; Barron and Easterling in Easterling/Knox (1985) 93. 
37 See e.g. Croiset (1910) 461, who argues that Hesiod must be later than Homer because it is ‘presque une 
nécessité morale d’admettre que l’loeuvre d’imagination a précédé l’oeuvre de réflexion’; Mele (1979) 19 claims 
that Hesiod is later because he is more autobiographical; Walsh (1984) 31 speaks of ‘post-Homeric self-
consciousness’. 
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    To begin with the latter: although scholars were relatively quick to see that Hesiodic poetry 
was composed orally, just like that of Homer,38 the idea of mutual influence was often still 
approached with a concept of written texts in mind. A good example of such an approach is 
the study of Tsagarakis, who derives one of his arguments to prove the priority of Homer 
from Hesiod’s passage on Hephaestus creating Pandora; since Hephaestus is mentioned in the 
Works and Days without any introduction whatsoever, the passage must (the argument goes) 
postdate the Iliad, since it is there that Homer describes Hephaestus as a craftsman; Hesiod’s 
references to Hephaestus thus ‘presuppose some knowledge on the part of his listeners’, and 
this ‘background’ information comes from Homer.39 But this is clearly not how oral poetry 
works: the poems of both Hesiod and Homer ‘go back’ a long time, stem from the same 
source and very probably influenced each other over a longer period. As Lamberton says, ‘to 
say that one imitates the other is meaningless, given the availability of the significant 
elements of the description in both the related traditions of song.’40 The ‘presupposition’ 
Tsagarakis mentions goes both ways. 
    And then there are the factors of differentiation mentioned above - quality, outlook, intent, 
subject matter, and individuality. With regard to quality: some recent studies with a more 
sympathetic view towards Hesiod than, for instance, that of Paley, have been more alert to his 
craftsmanship, and sensitive critics have pointed to compositional structures and connections 
hitherto unseen. As a whole, Hesiod’s poems are now more than ever appreciated for their 
value as literary works instead of as a Fundgrube for historians and anthropologists. An 
undisputable landmark in this development is Hamilton’s insightful book The Architecture of 
Hesiodic Poetry, or, more recently, Clay’s Hesiod’s Cosmos. Slowly but certainly, it is going 
out of vogue to criticize Hesiod’s artistic skills.41 To the best of my knowledge, no-one has 
                                               
38 According to Hoekstra (1957), Hesiod’s epic diction is in the same state of development as that of Homer; see 
also Notopoulos (1960) and Edwards (1971) 193 (‘in Hesiod as in Homer then, we are dealing with poems 
whose language and style show features which are best explained by reference to an oral tradition which these 
poets inherited and themselves practised’). Nagy (1992a) argues that the evolutionary model according to which 
the Homeric poems came into being could also be applied to Hesiod. Some believe Hesiod composed with the 
aid of writing; see e.g. Walcot (1961), a view he seems to abandon in Walcot (1962), and Most (1991). 
39 Tsagarakis (1986) 191 and 198; see also e.g. Solmsen (1949) 6 (‘the heroic epos forms the starting point of 
Hesiod’s interpretation of the world and of things divine and human’). 
40 Lamberton (1988) 22. See Walcot (1963) 11-12 for very similar point, and Martin (1984), who also assumes a 
common source for the poems of Hesiod and Homer. 
41 Walcot (1966) 82 ‘the Works and Days is far from being the amorphous shambles that some believe it so be’; 
Beye (1972) 23-24 and 43 makes a stand for Hesiod’s style; Thalmann (1984) 62 says the repetitiveness of the 
WD, the very characteristic for which it was so often criticized, contributes to a ‘fine poetic texture’; Blaise 
(1996) sets out to show that ‘incohérences’ (256) in Hesiod are only apparent; Most (1991) 89 argues that 
Hesiod’s adaptation of the Prometheus myth in the WD ‘testifies not to his clumsiness’ but instead ‘leads us to 
admire Hesiod’s audacity and resourcefulness in undertaking what turned out in the end to be an impossible 
challenge’. Verdenius (1962) 159 went so far as to call the WD a ‘Meisterwerk der Weltliteratur’. 
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yet dared to call him equal to Homer in this respect, or even better, but he has at least come to 
be regarded as an artist in his own right instead of simply worse than Homer.42  
    As to outlook, intent, and subject matter: traditional views on these subjects are challenged 
as well. It is slowly being realized, for instance, that there is far more to Hesiod than 
‘catalogues, genealogies, concern for the daily realities of practical life’; and besides, these 
elements are not restricted Hesiod: there are plenty of lists, family-trees and gnomai in the 
poems of Homer as well. The Boeotian School hypothesis is under heavy fire.43 Moreover, 
recent studies have pointed to the similarities in structure and content of certain Hesiodic and 
Homeric passages - a good case in point is Lardinois comparing the whole of the Works and 
Days to a typical ‘angry speech’ in the Iliad.44 Differences between the poems of Hesiod and 
Homer are of course still recognized, but several scholars try to understand both the archaic 
period and their poems better by seeing Hesiod and Homer as complementary rather than in 
terms of development. One of the most forceful and most recent of these attempts at 
‘lumping’ is Homer: The Resonance of Epic, in which the authors Graziosi and Haubold 
argue very convincingly that ‘the Homeric and Hesiodic epics describe the same world, albeit 
from different perspectives and at different stages of development’.45 The poems ‘share an 
understanding of the overall shape of history’, but whereas Hesiod gives a general account of 
the world, Homer ‘zooms in’ on crucial moments within that history.46 Age-old conceptions 
of Hesiod as the Empfangende47 who counts on the audience’s knowledge of the ultimate fons 
et origo Homer are forcibly brought down as it is shown that a) the Homeric poems often 
                                               
42 An important step in the emancipation of Hesiod in this respect seems to have been the realization that Hesiod 
composed his poems (esp. the WD) by a technique of association instead of following some grand design or 
logical plan, i.e. in a way different from and not necessarily worse than Homer. See on this so-called ‘assoziative 
Kompositionsprinzip’ especially the study of Kumaniecki (1963), and further Van Groningen (1958) 283-303, 
Kirk (1962), Verdenius (1962) and (1972), West (1977) 41-46, Thalmann (1984), and Fakas (2001) 72-76; Nagy 
(1992a) 29 notes on the Homeric poems that ‘the attribution of their preeminence (…) to artistic superiority over 
other epics is merely an assumption’ because there is hardly any material available for comparison.  
43 See e.g. Edwards (1971), who shows that Hesiod and Homer are both part of the linguistic tradition and 
probably responded to each other; moreover, he detects few Boeotisms in Hesiod’s language which he 
characterises as ‘predominantly Ionic’ (195). See further e.g. West (1977) 26 ‘… we should look towards Ionia 
rather than to Dark Age Boeotia for precursors of the Works and Days’, Robb (1994) argues convincingly that 
the idea of the two schools is ‘to view the poetic words surviving from Archaic Greece with the literate mentality 
of Alexandria and Byzantium’ (257). 
44 Lardinois (2003); some precursors of his argument are Jaeger (1945) 66, who like Lardinois points to the 
speech of Phoenix in the Iliad and claims that the WD ‘is directly descended, both in style and in tone, from the 
speeches of the Homeric epic’; Solmsen (1949) 80 Hesiod followed ‘the pattern set by Homeric speeches of 
advice (paraivnesi~)’; Krafft (1963) 92-93 who speaks of the ‘Mahnredentyp’ as ‘ein literarisches Genos’ and 
refers to Munding and Dornseiff; Maehler (1963) 47 says that the ‘Typus des Lehrgedichts’ was created ‘in 
Anlehnung an die Mahnreden, die parainevsei~ des Epos’. 
45 Graziosi and Haubold (2005) 36.   
46 Ibid. 41 and 38. 
47 Cf. Lesky (1971) 113. 
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presuppose knowledge of facts and stories narrated in other poems, such as the Theogony,48 
and b) the narrator does not simply assume all kinds of background information but ‘actively 
challenges his listeners to situate the story within a wider history of the cosmos’.49 This is a 
radical break from the simplistic and one-way view of Tsagarakis and others, and presents a 
far more complex (and interesting) picture of mutual influence - two traditions responding to 
each other in presenting complementary viewpoints of the same world. This recent notion still 
allows for the poets’ own and unique character, but at the same time stresses their active 
engagement with each other and especially their impact on the Greek audience, which must 
have perceived Hesiod and Homer as together in this sense. It appears that more and more 
scholars believe in such a ‘lumped’ view of Hesiod and Homer.50 
    Even his individuality, the most Hesiodic quality of Hesiod, has come under heavy fire 
over the last two or three decades. The image of the surly farmer-poet, taken so seriously 
during the first three-quarters of the 20th century, is now by most scholars understood as a 
poetic persona adopted for the purpose of moral instruction and advice.51 All autobiographical 
data are seriously doubted. It is now generally assumed, for instance, that the quarrel between 
Hesiod and his brother Perses, taken so literally in the past,52 is fictive or at least need not be 
                                               
48 Graziosi and Haubold point out that both the Iliad and Odyssey begin in medias res and do not give any 
summary of previous events; the poems thus ‘carefully present themselves as part of a larger narrative’ (40). 
49 Graziosi and Haubold (2005) 40. A good example is the use of patronymics, which ‘remind us of the 
genealogical structure of the cosmos’ (57). Kronides, for instance, reminds us of the origins of Zeus’ rule, a story 
told by Hesiod. Patronymics ‘assign to each person or god their place in the larger scheme of things and help to 
frame the narrative by lending it a temporal dimension’ (58).  
50 Nussbaum (1960) 214 already said that ‘the difference between them is a complementary one’; see further e.g. 
Thalmann (1984) xii speaking of ‘a narrative and thematic continuum’ and ‘essentially a single view of the 
world’; Sihvola (1989) 9 not ‘ representatives of two contrary and competing ideologies but rather of two 
complementary viewpoints on the same culture’; Blaise and Rousseau (1996) 224-225 ‘le but de la Théogonie 
est de montrer que l’état réglé du monde qui constitue le cadre de l’Iliade (prise comme paradigme de la tradition 
épique qu’elle résume) n’est pas donné de toute éternité, mais qu’il a dû s’instaurer.’ Hartog (2001) 22 states that 
‘Hesiod is normative and static, Homer is dynamic and narrative (…) Hesiod’s poems strive to conceptualize the 
dividing lines; the Odyssey makes a story out of them’; Clay (2003) 1 ‘despite significant differences in style 
(…) archaic epos presents a coherent picture of the way men view their gods and their relationship to them, 
which, in turn, constitutes a fundamental component of their understanding of the cosmos and their place within 
it’; Murnaghan (2007) 100-107 explores the similarities between Odysseus and Hesiod; Most (1997) 120-127 
argues that even the myth of the races, commonly believed to go back to Eastern sources, is more likely 
connected to the Homeric tradition. We can safely assume that the cyclic epics were part of the same process 
(see Dowden 2004). Foley (2004) 177-178 reminds us that there is a large ‘understood, implicit context’ in epic 
around the world. We should also remember that the epics of Hesiod and Homer are in all likelihood part of a 
common legacy as old as the neolithic period, see Walcot (1966) and West (1997). 
51 Another way of downplaying Hesiod’s uniquely self-conscious quality is by arguing that the Th. originally 
functioned as a ‘mere’ prooimion, like the (longer) Homeric Hymns, which similarly give information about 
their composer, cf. Rosen (1997) 481-483.  
52 See e.g. Rand (1911), who even tries to interpret the myth of the five races autobiographically, Van Groningen 
(1957), Will (1965), whose argumentation for a historical Perses is so weak it actually makes his point more 
improbable; Gagarin (1974b) and a considerably more nuanced view Gagarin (1992); Cook (1989) 170 who 
somewhat cryptically remarks he thinks ‘the bibliographical remarks in WD are true or anyhow true enough’, 
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historically real; it serves as a suitable literary vehicle for Hesiod’s poetry, and that is all that 
can be said about it.53 In a similar fashion, Hesiod’s self-proclaimed descent from a Ionian 
immigrant has been explained as a useful way of taking the position of the outsider.54 With 
the historical brother and father gone, scholars went after the historical Hesiod. His name was 
unmasked as a telling nom d’artiste,55 and some argued the whole encounter with the Muses 
was part of a hymnic proem that could be sung before any poem that rhapsodes wanted to 
present as belonging to the Hesiodic tradition. Even Ascra was probably unreal!56 All this 
leads to a conclusion nicely phrased by Lamberton: ‘we must perceive Hesiod as a mask for 
many anonymous voices, all trained (…) to sound the same, to speak with the same identity, 
and to pass on the same traditions. (…) [Hesiod] is a composite that defies analysis’.57 In this, 
he has become exactly like Homer.58 
 
    In this section I have tried to show that the history of scholarship on the relationship 
between Hesiod and Homer can be described in terms of splitting and lumping. The same 
situation can be discerned in antiquity as well, the Greeks either differentiating or assimilating 
Hesiod and Homer. This Part will focus on the process of lumping in antiquity, and the next 
two chapters explore texts from many different periods in order to find out how and when 
                                                                                                                                                   
Rousseau (1996). These studies represent only a fraction of a larger trend to take all the autobiographical data 
literally. 
53 See Lamberton (1988) 27, who compares Perses to Theognis’ Kyrnos, and Nagy (1979) 312 arguing that ‘the 
neikos of Perses and Hesiod is in fact a formal context for engaging in blame as a positive social function’. The 
communis opinio today seems to be that it is at least possible that Perses is fictional, see e.g. Beye (1972), 
Griffith (1983) 57 ‘the character and behavior of Perses vary according to the rhetorical point that Hesiod wishes 
to make’; Athanassakis (1992), Bowie (1993) 23; Clay (1994) does not address the question of Perses’ 
fictionality, but ‘must dispute the common claim [commonly used to argue that the quarrel is a literary fiction] 
that the presentation of Perses is inconsistent’ (24-25). 
54 See Martin (1992), an influential article though somewhat flawed (in my opinion) by the far-fetched Homeric 
parallels.  
55 Thomson (1914) 218 already stated that ‘the name Hesiod is obscure. (…) it is perhaps a traditional name like 
Homer’. Nagy (1979) 296-297 argued that ‘Hesiodos’ means ‘he who emits the voice’; in Nagy (1992b) 120 he 
claims that the names of both Hesiod and Homer fit ‘the semantic requirements of an epithet for a Muse’; he is 
followed by some, though I find the etymology proposed by Meier-Brügger (1990) ‘he who enjoys the road’ - 
more convincing. See Most (2006) xv for an interesting middle ground position: perhaps Hesiod was named 
‘Enjoyroad’ by his father, but ‘resemanticized’ his own name as ‘Songsender’ after his initiation. See for some 
ancient etymologies Most (2006) T27-29. 
56 This is implied by Nagy (1990) 74. 
57 Lamberton (1988) 35-36, and p. xiv on ‘the impossibility of demonstrating conclusively the historicity or 
nonhistoricity of Hesiod’. Note the contrast with the claim of West (1978) 34 that ‘no one supposes Hesiod to be 
an assumed character’. But note also the fervent ‘anti-biographist’ Stoddard (2004) arguing (esp. in ch. 2) that 
the Hesiodic narrator is more ‘self-assertive’ than the Homeric one. 
58 The historian Beloch (1912) may have been the first to claim that Hesiod is ‘so wenig eine historische 
Persönlichkeit wie Homer’ (312 n.1). Incidentally, it has sometimes been noted that parallels between Hesiod 
and Homer can also be drawn with respect to the history of their textual criticism, a more analytical phase 
(Jacoby, Wilamowitz, Nilsson, Murray, Solmsen, Rzach, Kirchhoff) preceding a unitarian one that seems to have 
begun somewhere in the sixties (Sale, Schwabl, Robert, Sinclair) and still constitutes the ruling paradigm today; 
see Hamilton (1989) 47-48.  
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Hesiod and Homer were assimilated, and for what purposes. We will find that the Greeks 
were mostly moved by different reasons for lumping together Hesiod and Homer than we are 
(though there is of course a certain overlap). Generally speaking, it was mostly in the field of 
ethics and theology that the two poets were closely associated, and both gained the status of 
educator.  
    Before we proceed to these chapters, however, we will first briefly look at two other ways 
in which the poets were lumped by the Greeks: in their temporal relationship, and in the 
performance of their poems. 
 
3 - Lumping in Antiquity 
3.1 - Hesiod and Homer in Time 
Contrary to what some may believe,59 the question of the chronological priority of either 
Hesiod or Homer was a vexed one in antiquity. Obviously, there was much at stake here: a 
competition in age is a competition in authority.60 When Pausanias on his visit to Boeotia has 
described a statue of Hesiod on Mt. Helicon, he continues:  
 
peri; de;   JHsiovdou te hJlikiva~ kai;   JOmhvrou polupragmonhvsanti ej~ to; ajkribevs-
taton ou[ moi gravfein hJdu; h\n, ejpistamevnw/ to; filaivtion a[llwn te kai; oujc 
h{kista o{soi kat’ ejme; ejpi; poihvsei tẁn ejpẁn kaqesthvkesan. 
 
‘As to the age of Hesiod and Homer, I have conducted very careful research into the 
matter, but I do not like to write on the subject, as I know the quarrelsome nature of 
those especially who constitute the modern school of epic criticism.’        
 
According to Diogenes Laertius, the fourth-century philosopher Heraclides Ponticus wrote 
two books on exactly this topic (‘On the age of Homer and Hesiod’, Peri; th~̀   JOmhvrou kai;   
JHsiovdou hJlikiva~),61 and (Pseudo-)Lucian testifies to great uncertainty on the matter as 
well.62 The Suda claims that all three chronological possibilities found their adherents: 
                                               
59 The claim of Østerud (1976) 13, ‘it has been the practice ever since antiquity to range together Homer and 
Hesiod’, is as broad-sweeping as that of Wilamowitz (1916) 305-306, ‘die Gleichzeitigkeit der beiden Dichter ist 
in der alten Zeit allgemein anerkannt’. 
60 See Graziosi (2002) 102 and 109 (cf. Zerubavel 2003 103-110). 
61 D.L. 5.87; the book ‘on Hesiod and Homer’ Diogenes mentions in 5.92 is probably the same one. Heraclides 
supposedly concluded that Homer was older (fr. 177 Wehrli). 
62 The interlocutor in the Praise of Demosthenes claims that there is virtually nothing known about Homer’s life, 
as ‘they admit they do not even know for sure how he compared for age with Hesiod’ (mhd’ o{pw~ pro;~ to;n    
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‘according to some, [Hesiod] was older than Homer, and according to others they were 
contemporaries; Porphyrius and most of the others figure him to be a hundred years 
younger’.63 But such variation nevertheless points to their connection: in antiquity Homer was 
almost exclusively dated in relation to Hesiod.64 
    One of the ways the ancients shaped this relation was by presenting Hesiod and Homer as 
related by kin. According to Proclus, the fifth-century historians Hellanicus, Damastes and 
Pherecydes claimed that both Hesiod and Homer were descendants of Orpheus; the family 
tree they provide makes them cousins and so contemporaries.65 The fourth-century historian 
Ephorus came up with an original story that makes Hesiod an uncle of Homer;66 according to 
another source, however, Ephorus made them cousins.67 The Certamen, which of course 
depends on the assumption that Hesiod and Homer were contemporaries, mentions two other 
traditions, one that Homer was older, the other that Homer was younger and of the same 
family;68 Homer is here made into the son of the river Meles and a girl who was the 
granddaughter of Perses, the brother of Hesiod.69 The uncertain family ties even extend into 
the next generation: the father of the poet Terpander was said to be either Hesiod or Homer.70 
The tradition of their kinship, we must conclude, was firmly rooted.71 
                                                                                                                                                   
JHsivodon ei\cen hJlikiva~ safẁ~ eijdevnai, Dem. 9). See also S.E. 1.204 and Seneca Ep. 88.6, who mentions the 
difficult question as an example of ill-directed study.  
63 h\n de;   JOmhvrou katav tina~ presbuvtero~, kata; de; a[llou~ suvgcrono~: Porfuvrio~ kai; a[lloi pleìstoi 
newvteron eJkato;n ejniautoì~ oJrivzousin, Suda s.v.   JHsivodo~ (2.592). 
64 Graziosi (2002) 101. 
65 FGH 4 5b; according to this genealogy, Homer’s father Maion and Hesiod’s father Dius were brothers, both 
sons of one Apellis whose line is traced (through Melanopus, Epiphrades, Chariphemus, Philoterpes, Idmonis, 
Euclees and Dorion) back to Orpheus. See on such genealogies Harriott (1969) 101-102. 
66 FGH 70 3a. According to this tale there were three brothers from Cymae: Apelles, Maeones and Dius. Dius 
moved to Ascra for financial reasons, married Pycimede and became the father of Hesiod. Apelles had a 
daughter, Critheis, whom he entrusted to Maeones when he died. Maeones raped her, however, and then gave 
her in marriage to a certain Phemius from Smyrna. One day, when she was doing her washing somewhere close 
to the river Meles, she gave birth to Homer. 
67 FGH 70 3b. 
68 Cert. 44-45 (Allen): ‘some say that [Homer] was older than Hesiod, other that he was younger and related’ 
(e[nioi me;n ou\n aujto;n progenevsteron   JHsiovdou fasi;n ei\nai, tine;~ de; newvteron kai; suggenh̀). 
69 Cert. 45-53. In the stories that present Hesiod and Homer as related, Homer is almost never the older one (the 
only exception is Suda 2.592, where the text is doubtful). Perhaps rhapsodes in the Hesiodic tradition used the 
typically Hesiodic tool of genealogy to downplay the predominance of Homer; this might also account for the 
rather nasty tale that makes Homer a descendant of Hesiod’s no-good brother Perses.   
70 Suda s.v. Terpander (4.527). Stesichorus too was called the (grand)son of Hesiod (Suda 4.433, Tzetz. Vit. Hes. 
18, Procl. S WD 271a, Cic. De Rep. 2.20); nevertheless he is often characterized as Homeric (AP 7.75, Athen. 
4.172e, AP 9.184, D.H. Comp. 24, [Long.] De Subl. 13.3, Quint. 10.1.62).  
71 Enough, at least, to evoke a powerful counter-reaction by Proclus (Chrest. 1.6): ‘And there are some who have 
written that he was the cousin of Hesiod: they are no experts in poetry, for Homer and Hesiod are as far from 
being related by birth as their poetry is different. In any case, they were not even contemporaries’ (eijsi; de; 
oi{tine~ ajneyio;n aujto;n  JHsivodo~ parevdosan, ajtribeì~ o[nte~ poihvsew~: tosoùton ga;r ajpevcousi toù 
gevnei proshvkein o{son hJ poivhsi~ dievsthken aujtẁn).  
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    Lefkowitz rightly points out that turning Hesiod into a relative of Homer expresses his 
importance,72 though it is just as much - or perhaps even more - a way of expressing the idea 
that the works of Hesiod and Homer were akin.73 The list of ancestors given by Hellanicus 
seems to imply a belief in a long tradition of singers74 that was split in two with the birth of 
Hesiod and Homer, who are thus characterized as different but also - and this is the point of 
the genealogy - very much alike.  
    Although the question was never definitively resolved, the communis opinio among experts 
in antiquity seems to have been, much like today, that Homer was earlier. Apart from the 
passages already mentioned, there are few sources for the priority of Hesiod.75 Xenophanes 
was the earliest to claim that Homer was older than Hesiod, and even the greatest fan of 
Hesiod in antiquity, Plutarch, had to admit that Hesiod was second to Homer ‘in reputation as 
well as in time’ (th/̀ dovxa/ kai; tw/̀ crovnw/).76 The idea of Homer’s priority is especially well-
attested in the Homeric scholia; one of them even explicitly says that ‘Hesiod has read Homer 
because he was supposedly later’ (ajnevgnw  JHsivodo~ ta;   JOmhvrou wJ~ a]n newvtero~ 
touvtou).77 The evidence for this overall idea mentioned by the scholia falls into roughly two, 
text-internal, categories.78 The first is the (not always correct) observation that Hesiod has 
borrowed a line or idea from Homer - when the presentation in Hesiod is (slightly) different, 
this is always interpreted as a mistake by Hesiod and a misrepresentation of the original idea. 
The most striking example is perhaps the notion of Pandora’s box, said to go back to Homer’s 
                                               
72 Lefkowitz (1981) 5-6; it is a slightly Homerocentric remark. 
73 Clay (2003) 181-182 says that Hesiod himself points to his shared origin by telling us his father came from 
Cymae (WD 635-40), where Homer too came from (according to some). West (2003) 371 intriguingly suggests 
that the story of Hesiod’s father leaving Cymae may be connected to that of Homer cursing the Cymaeans for not 
providing for him, saying that ‘no poet of note should be born in the place to glorify the Cymaeans’ (mhdevna 
poihth;n dovkimon ejn th/̀ cwvrh/ genevsqai o{sti~ Kumaivou~ ejpaglai>eì).  
74 The genealogy contains some very telling names: Chariphemus is ‘Pleasant-Speech’, Philoterpes is ‘Loves-to-
Please’, Euclees ‘(He who gives) Far Renown’; Idmonis may be ‘Knowledge’, Epiphrades is perhaps ‘Thinker’. 
75 See the Parian Marble, FGH 239 A27 and 28, and further Accius (in Gell. NA 3.11.4) and the Vit. Hes. 2-5 
Allen. Interestingly enough, Accius uses the same arguments as Tsagarakis, but the other way around: Homer 
not mentioning that the Cyclops is one-eyed according to Accius clearly presupposes Hesiod. The fact that 
Hesiod is often mentioned after Orpheus and Musaeus and before Homer is sometimes taken as an (implict) 
statement on chronology; on this see Appendix A. 
76 Xenophanes DK B 13, Plu. Mor. 105D; others claiming the priority of Homer include Eratosthenes, 
Aristarchus, Apollodorus (on whom see Graziosi 2002 102), Cicero (De Senect. 15.54), Velleius Paterculus 
(1.7.1). See further Allen (1915). 
77 S Il. 12.22 (A); see also Posidonius (fr. 459 Theiler), saying ‘that Hesiod himself was born much later and 
corrupted many of Homer’s verses’ (aujto;n to;n  JHsivodon u{steron genovmenon polla; parafqeìrai tẁn   
JOmhvrou ejpẁn, transl. Most). 
78 Arguments based on text-external data are extremely rare. One instance is S Il. 23.683 (T), where Homer 
mentions two boxers putting on a zẁma or ‘girdle’; the scholiast argues that Hesiod must be younger since he 
depicts athletes naked, in accordance with a rule that was established later.  
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picture of Zeus dealing out bad and good from two pithoi.79 The second is the observation that 
Hesiod, owing to mankind’s gradual accumulation of factual information, seems to know 
more than Homer; for instance, he is familiar with the name of the river Nile (called 
‘Aegyptus’ by Homer), and knows the entire Peloponnesus (instead of only a small part of 
it).80 These two arguments may be representative for the ideas most current in schools and 
other places of education; for even though the Homeric scholia are of course biased in favour 
of Homer, similar observations are present in the Hesiodic scholia as well.81  
    The chronological watershed, however, should not be overemphasized. The same scholia 
make it very clear that despite the minor age difference Hesiod and Homer were largely 
regarded as comparable. Very much like modern commentaries, the scholiasts explain 
Homeric passages by adducing parallels from Hesiod, and vice versa. The poets are by far the 




 Author referred to 
 
 Homer Pindar Aeschylus Euripides Plato Aristotle 
S Theogony 31 1 0 3 5 2 
S WD 47 1 2 3 28 5 
 
 
Table 2: References to other authors in the scholia to the Hesiodic poems 
 
 
  Author referred to 
  
 Hesiod Pindar Aeschylus Euripides Plato Aristotle 
S Iliad 84 51 28 34 22 47 
S Odyssey 39 4 9 6 5 15 
 
 
Table 3: References to other authors in the scholia to the Homeric poems 
 
Parallels are sought and found on the level of word-meaning (e.g. an instance of axulon in 
Hesiod tells us how the word should be interpreted in Homer), grammar (e.g. Homer’s use of 
a masculine dual for two female figures is matched by an instance in Hesiod), rhetoric or 
                                               
79 S Il. 24.527-8a (A) and -b (T). See for other instances the scholia on Il. 4.59b (AbT), 5.741 (bT), 5.880 (bT), 
11.36b (bT), 16.385 (T); Od. 1.8, 5.478, 7.54, 8.362, 9.106, 11.360; WD 317-318. The opposite situation, i.e. that 
of Homer supposedly correcting Hesiod, is extremely rare, cf. Philostr. Her. 25.7: ‘Once when Hesiod was 
describing the shield of Kyknos, he sang about the Gorgon’s form carelessly and not poetically (uJptivw~ te kai; 
ouj poihtikẁ~); hence, correcting him, Homer sang about the Gorgon in this way’ (transl. Maclean/Aitken). 
80 S Od. 477, Il. 9.246 (A). See also the scholia on Il. 8.368 (A) and 14.275-277 (A).  
81 See the scholia on Th. 338 (the Nile), 746, 927b, 1013, and WD 94a (the pithos) and 150b.  
82 The tables are based on the indices in the editions of DiGregorio (scholia on the Th.), Pertusi (WD), Erbse (Il.), 
and Dindorff (Od.). 
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poetic speech (e.g. Homer’s application of the figure antiphrasis is illustrated by a similar 
case in Hesiod), and content (e.g. Homer and Hesiod both tell us that one can benefit from a 
wise man).83  
    Even more interesting, however, are those cases in which the scholiast is consciously 
attempting to harmonize data provided by Hesiod and Homer, as if it were desirable that the 
two poets say the same. The scholion on Iliad 24.624 (A), for instance, remarks that the 
authenticity of the Homeric line is doubted because of a slightly deviant formulation in 
Hesiod. Similarly, the scholiast on Iliad 2.507a (A) believes Zenodotus was wrong to change 
the Homeric reading ‘Arne rich in vines’ to ‘Askre’ since Hesiod had clearly described his 
native town as an unpleasant place.84 The scholiast on Iliad 11.306 (T) says that some read an 
‘or’ between Homer’s ajrgestaò Novtoio (‘the white South Wind’) because Hesiod has 
mentioned the Argestos (‘White’) as a separate wind.85 In two cases, the scholiast adduces a 
parallel from Hesiod without qualifying it as such, leaving the impression that he thought it 
was Homeric.86  
    ‘Lumping’ practices like these seem to indicate that Hesiod and Homer were generally 
believed to be contemporary, or at least contemporary enough;87 most Greeks probably 
thought, with Pausanias, that figuring out the exact temporal relationship between Hesiod and 
Homer should be left to the experts. There are some explicit and many implicit passages that 
assert the contemporaneity of the poets. Some of these are very early and affirm that the 
togetherness of Hesiod and Homer was a concept both old and widely shared: examples 
include Herodotus’ famous statement on the poets inventing Greek theology about 400 years 
before his time, the early attacks on both Hesiod and Homer by Xenophanes, and of course 
                                               
83 S Il. 11.155 (A), 8.455a (A), 9.457 (T), and 13.733a (bT), respectively. Other examples are: on the level of 
word-meaning S Il. 11.736 (T), 18.100d (T), Th. 10, 28b, 713b, WD 37-38; on that of grammar S Il. 4.222a (A), 
5.299b (T), 5.487 (Eust. 574.21), 18.488b (T); on rhetoric or poetic speech S Th. 22, 75, WD 104a 
(personification), 127b, 151a; on content S Il. 24.611 (bT), Th. 84, WD 171, 311-312, 712a. We may compare 
the practice of Aristarchus, who sometimes counts Hesiod among the neoteroi but still regards him as a ‘treuer 
Eideshelfer bei Feststellung einer Mythologeme’ (Roemer 1924 137); see also the comparative practice of 
Herodian (e.g. 1.404 (Lenz), 2.10.22-25), who also assumes that Hesiod is younger (see 2.25.26). 
84 Cf. Strabo 9.2.34; see ch. 3, pp. 103-104. 
85 Some other examples are S Il. 2.496a (A), 11.710 (T), 13.484 (bT), 16.748a (A) and b (T), 23.638-642 (A). 
See for similar harmonizing also Str. 1.12.14 and Plu. Mor. 361b. A most interesting case is Porph. Antr. 30 who 
attributes a second pithos to Hesiod’s account of Pandora (WD 94-98).    
86 S Il. 11.84 (T) and 15.713b (bT); in both cases a simple fhsi (subject not specified) introduces the parallel; it 
is also possible that the scholiast supposed the reader would know it was Hesiod. There are some cases of 
Hesiodic phrases being attributed to Homer; see e.g. Ar. Av. 909-914, Max. Tyr. 35.1, and Jul. Mis. 347c. 
87 Cf. e.g. Max. Tyr. 4.3 and 17.3. Really big gaps are very rare; see Tzetzes’ calculation that Hesiod was 400 




the age-old tradition that the two had met in a poetic competition.88 It is a common feature of 
all of these sources that Hesiod and Homer - whatever their own minor age difference may be 
- are together placed way back in time; and so a massive ‘watershed’ is created between them 
and the younger poets.89 Hesiod and Homer, when they are together, are thus sealed off from 
the present and ‘enshrined’90 as the most important representatives of an age gone by. They 
become untouchable through their distance in time, which is of course connected to their 
canonical status. Just like their reputed kinship or the similarity of their poetry, it was the 
quality of being ajrcaìo~ that connected them in the Greek mind.91 
 
3.2 - Hesiod and Homer in Greek Society: Performance, Symposia, Schools 
We know a great deal about Homeric poetry’s place in society, which has been the object of 
thorough study. We know, for instance, that there were rhapsodes who called themselves the 
‘Sons of Homer’ and recited the Iliad and Odyssey throughout Greece; figures like Plato’s Ion 
show us that rhapsodes were also able to explain the poetry of Homer and demonstrate its 
relevance to society.92 Recitals must have occurred both incidentally and during festivals, of 
which the Panathenaea are the best-known example. Such performances, however, were only 
one way in which the Greeks encountered Homer. Mothers would tell their young children his 
stories, which they then read and memorized in schools; and at a more advanced level, they 
were still studying Homer, but now for rhetorical purposes. Homeric tales formed the basis of 
much tragedy; furthermore, well-educated citizens quoted Homer regularly and showed off 
their familiarity with his work during symposia. In short, Homer was everywhere.93 
    Considerably less attention has been paid to the presence in society and practice of 
performance of the Hesiodic poems. This is of course partly due to the fact that there is much 
less evidence than in the case of Homer. Nonetheless, the evidence that we do have permits 
us, I believe, to reconstruct a largely comparable picture. 
     Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence proving the existence of a guild of ‘Hesiodists’, 
but it would be unwise to conclude that there was no such body of rhapsodes devoted to the 
                                               
88 On Hdt. Hist. 2.53 and Xenophanes see chapter 3; on the Certamen see chapter 8. Other explicit references are 
e.g. Cic. Tusc. 1.1.3, Strabo 7.3.7 (but Strabo 1.2.34 makes Hesiod later than Homer), Clemens Strom. 
1.21.107.5 (and in Strom. 1.21.117.4-5 naming the historians Euthymenes and Archemachus for a similar view), 
Philostr. Her. 43.2-7, and D.L. 1.38.  
89 See for more on this ch. 3.2, esp. pp. 94-101. 
90 The term is Assmann’s (cf. Introduction, p. 7 n.25). See on Hesiod and Homer as a separate category ch. 3.2. 
91 On either Hesiod and Homer themselves or their age being called ajrcaìo~ see e.g. D.Chrys. 36.33-35,  D.L. 
1.38, S.E. 1.204; another term for them is palaiov~, cf. Lucian Astr. 22, Max.Tyr. Or. 26.2.   
92 See e.g. Rijksbaron (2007) 124-128 on the rhapsode as a eJrmhneuv~ (Pl. Ion 530c). 
93 See on the performance of the Homeric poems and their presence in everyday life e.g. Verdenius (1970), 
Zeitlin (2001), Nagy (2002), Sluiter (2005). 
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recital of the Hesiodic poems.94 Apart from the oral nature of the poems, which in itself 
allows for a transmission comparable to the Homeric ones, there are some other telling hints, 
not amounting to proof but carrying some cumulative weight, that the Greeks regarded Hesiod 
as the same sort of Ur-rhapsode as Homer, and that they believed his poems were composed 
and handed down in the same way.95 First of all, there is the telling observation that of all 
Greek poets only Hesiod and Homer are said to ‘stitch’ or ‘rhapsodize’,96 which sets the 
experience of their poems quite apart from that of other poets. Secondly, Hesiod and Homer 
are sometimes together pictured in rhapsode-like fashion; this happens as early as Plato.97 
And third, some may have believed that the poems of Hesiod were subjected to the notorious 
Peisistratean redaction,98 just like those of Homer.99 I therefore suggest, on the basis of the 
little evidence that we do have, that the Greeks imagined Hesiod as an ancient proto-rhapsode 
- a somewhat blurry picture, probably given shape on the basis of two things: 1) a thorough 
                                               
94 So also Solmsen (1982) 1; the argument of West (1966) 47, that Homer became more popular than Hesiod 
because of the ‘propaganda of the Homeridae’ overshadowing Hesiod, who ‘had no corresponding body to look 
after his interests’, is not based on any positive evidence. 
95 See Graziosi (2002) 18-50 for a lucid discussion of the terms bard (ajoidov~), rhapsode (rJayw/dov~), and poet 
(poihthv~). See also Dowden (2004) 195 ‘the works ascribed to Hesiod (…) are arguably designed for the same 
sort of performance environment as the epic’. 
96 Graziosi (2002) 33; according to a certain Nicocles or Nicocrates (date unknown) Hesiod was even ‘the first to 
rhapsodize’ (S Pi. Nem. 2.1 = FGH 376 F 8). Dowden (2004) 194 suggests that Hesiod perhaps presents himself 
as a rhapsode since his sceptre (Th. 30) may be the staff ‘of a non-singing performer’; this was already suggested 
by Cadoux (1929) 260 (cf. Kirby 1992 41 arguing that the staff turns Hesiod into a rhetor rather than a singer, 
who would receive a lyre, like Archilochus did). I am much tempted to connect this to the curious story related 
by Pausanias (10.7.3) that Hesiod was not allowed to compete in the Pythian competition ‘because he had not 
learned to acompany his own singing on the harp’ (a{te ouj kiqarivzein oJmoù th/̀ wj/dh̀/ dedidagmevnon); cf. 9.30.3 
where Pausanias comments on a Heliconian statue of Hesiod, sitting holding a harp upon his knees, ‘a thing not 
at all appropriate for Hesiod to carry, for his own verses make it clear that he sang holding a laurel wand’ (oujdevn 
ti oijkeìon   JHsiovdw/ fovrhma: dh̀la ga;r dh; kai; ejx aujtwǹ twǹ ejpẁn o{ti ejpi; rJavbdou davfnh~ h\/de).  
97 Pl. R. 600d, which speaks of the poets as ‘roaming about rhapsodizing’ (rJayw/deìn periiovnta~); see also 
Paus. 1.2.3.  
98 It is still a question of hot debate whether or not there actually was a Peisistratean redaction of the poems of 
Homer; see the discussions by e.g. Merkelbach (1952), Davison (1955a), Goold (1960), Jensen (1980), Nagy 
(1992a) and, most recently, Slings (2000) and Nagy (2002). See for overviews of the vast literature on this 
subject Janko (1992) 29-32 and Haslam (1997) 82-84. Slings (2000) approaches the question from a historian’s 
perspective and rightly concludes that ‘the literary activities ascribed to Peisistratus are anachronistic and the 
witnesses untrustworthy’ (77). Nagy (2002) 15 explains the emergence of the recension-story as a ‘coherent 
aetiology for the evolving institution of rhapsodic performances’.  
99 Plu. Thes. 20.2) says that according to the third-century BC Megarian historian Hereas, Peisistratus tinkered 
with the text of Homer and deleted a Hesiodic line that was damaging to the reputation of Theseus (Hesiod 
supposedly wrote that Theseus left Ariadne on Naxos because ‘dreadful indeed was his passion for Aigle child of 
Panopeus’, MW 298; there is mention of interpolation in Hesiod by Paus. 2.26.7). Even though some might find 
it ‘fishy’ that this is ‘the only time that Peistratos’ editorial intervention in Hesiod is mentioned’ (Slings 2000 74-
75), and say there is no reason why the Peisistratean recension should have included Hesiod (see Solmsen 1982 1 
and West 1966 50 n.1), there is no reason for assuming that Hesiod was not edited by Peisistratus either (the 
famous passage from Lycurgus’ In Leocr. (102) merely states that the only poems to be recited at the Great 
Panathenaea were Homer’s). Moreover, strictly speaking the historicity of a redaction of Hesiod’s poems is 
irrelevant to my case. 
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experience with contemporary rhapsodes, and 2) assimilation with Homer, whose association 
with rhapsodes was more firmly rooted. 
    As to the performance of the Hesiodic poems, there is proof for recitals of Hesiod in the 
classical age, since Plato mentions a rhapsodic performance of ‘the Iliad and Odyssey or 
something of the Hesiodic poems’ (  jIliavda kai;   jOduvsseian h[ ti tẁn   JHsiodeivwn, Laws 
658d). He compares such recitals to puppet shows, comedies or tragedies, which indicates 
they must have occurred regularly. Unfortunately, neither this passage nor the one from Ion 
(531a-532a) can prove that rhapsodes were experts in either the Homeric or the Hesiodic 
poems, or were able to perform both - I suspect that both exclusive specialists (focusing on 
Homer, such as Ion himself) and more inclusive performers existed, depending on their own 
preference and training.100 Explicit references to the performance of Hesiod’s poems are very 
rare: apart from those mentioned above, I have found one for the fourth century BC and one 
for the second AD.101 It is not unlikely that Hesiod continued to be performed throughout 
antiquity, but we do not really know. Curiously enough, there is one source that mentions an 
actor ‘playing’ (uJpokrivnasqai) the poems of Hesiod in the great theater at Alexandria.102 
    There is evidence for Hesiod being sung during symposia, even though his poetry might a 
priori seem somewhat out of place in such contexts.103 The connection of Hesiod with 
sympotic poetry is as old as the earliest lyric poets, who referred to his poems just as much as 
they did to Homer’s, in most cases without distinguishing between them. Moreover, the 
riddles and poetry-games that make up the greatest part of the contest in the Certamen in all 
likelihood find their origin in drinking-parties; all this suggests that Hesiod’s poetry, just like 
Homer’s, formed an inextricable part of the sympotic experience from the earliest times 
onwards. There are reasons to believe his poetry was both performed by professionals and 
sung by the symposiasts in later times as well. Philodemus, for instance, argues against the 
practice of ijdiw`tai, ‘normal people’ who during symposia listen only to music - it would be 
far better, according to the philosopher, to listen to ‘Homer and Hesiod and the other poets 
                                               
100 So also Lamberton (1988) 23-24. Perhaps in time the distinction faded: according to an unknown historian 
Aristocles (Athen. 14.620b) ‘Homerist’ was just another name for ‘rhapsode’ (an example of the species-name 
becoming used to denote the genus, like the jeep). Schmid-Stählin (1929) 251 claim, on the basis of Th. 100, that 
Hesiod himself on his ‘Vortragsreisen’ sang ‘nicht nur eigene, sondern auch homerische’ poetry.   
101 According to Athenaeus (14.620c), the fourth-century peripatetic Chamaeleon claimed not only the poems of 
Homer were ‘sung’ (melw/dhqh̀nai), ‘but also those of Hesiod and Archilochus, and even those of Mimnermus 
and Phocylides’. In Lucian Icar. 27.13 Menippus visits Olympus and tells us that ‘during dinner Apollo played 
the lute, Silenus danced the can-can and the Muses got up and sang us something from Hesiod’s Theogony and 
the first song in the Hymns of Pindar’. Perhaps this joke could only have worked if the Th. was regularly recited 
in Lucian’s time. 
102 Athen. 14.620d, which mentions a similar ‘acting’ of the Homeric poems as well; we are probably dealing 
with some curiosity here. 
103 In hellenistic times, Hesiod was associated with water-drinking; see ch. 9, pp. 288-295. 
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who have composed verses and melodies (to;n   {Omhron kai; to;n   JHsivodon kai; tou;~ a[llou~ 
pohta;~ tẁn mevtrwn kai; melẁn) as the beneficial effect of such performances is not so much 
in the actual sound but in the poetic text that the music accompanies.104 We may compare a 
sympotic epigram mentioning Hesiod, where Posidippus describes a drinking bowl that is 
filled by pouring in lovers and poets: first Nanno, Lyde, Mimnermus, Antimachus, Posidippus 
himself and ‘everyone who ever chanced to love’ go in; they are followed by Hesiod, Homer, 
the Muses and Mnemosyne.105 The image is a colourful expression of what, according to 
Posidippus, matters most during the symposium: love and poetry, which also includes 
Hesiodic poetry.106 
    Hesiodic poetry was certainly on the curriculum at schools and other institutions or places 
of education. It seems that Heraclitus was hardly speaking metaphorically when he called 
Hesiod the didavskalo~ pleivstwn (‘teacher of most’) and Plato says that the stories of 
Hesiod and Homer were especially damaging to the young.107 Listening to poetry constituted 
the first stage of a proper Greek education, but Hesiod remained an object of study at later 
stages as well. Isocrates, for instance, tells us how the sophists of his age explain Hesiod and 
Homer to their students; Menander says that one must have memorized the poems of Homer 
and Hesiod in order to be able to improvise, and Plutarch gives us examples of how the two 
poets are sometimes quoted at the wrong moment, which can cause embarrassing scenes.108 
These are all indications of the firm place of Hesiod in Greek paideia. Plutarch explicitly 
informs us that the texts of both Hesiod and Homer were meticulously studied in his day and 
very often criticised for details;109 the Hesiod presented by Lucian in similar fashion 
complains to be the victim of ferocious nitpicking - it is interesting that this Hesiod, defending 
his poetry, complains that his ‘fellow-craftsman’ (oJmovtecno~) Homer suffers from the same 
treatment.110 Cribiore, who studied Egyptian papyri of the hellenistic and Roman period, 
confirms Hesiod’s canonical status in education: ‘The large number of papyri that preserve his 
                                               
104 Philodemus De musica IV p. 83 (Kemke). Philodemus argues against the view of the Stoics, especially 
Diogenes of Babylon, who did believe that music alone could be beneficial to the soul and help to improve one’s 
life; see Neubecker (1986) 157-158. 
105 AP 12.168; Nanno and Lyde are the lovers of Mimnermus and Antimachus, respectively. There may be a 
climax in the enumeration. 
106 See also Lucian Symp. 17.6, where a symposiast is ‘reciting verse, combining the lines of Pindar and Hesiod 
and Anacreon in such a way as to make out of them a single poem and a very funny one’ (ejrraywv/dei ... kai; 
sunevferen ej~ to; aujto; ta; Pindavrou kai;  JHsiovdou kai;  jAnakrevonto~, wJ~ ejx aJpavntwn mivan wj/dh;n 
paggevloion ajpoteleìsqai). The curious thing, however, is that the two lines cited from this interesting poem 
are both from the Iliad. 
107 Heraclitus DK B 57; Plato R. 377c; see also Aeschin. In Ctes. 135, Lib. Or. 16.46. 
108 Isocrates Panath. 18 and 33, Menander Rhetor 3.393 (Spengel), Plu. Mor. 373C. 
109 Plu. Mor. 28B. 
110 Lucian Hes. 5. 
CHAPTER 1 
 44
work are an excellent index of a popularity that must have originated in the schools’.111 A 
final indication is the number of exegetical works devoted to him by ancient writers, ranging 
from Heraclides Ponticus to Proclus.112  
    We should conclude, therefore, that Hesiodic poetry was studied in schools, sung during 
symposia and performed at festivals, just like the poems of Homer (though on a smaller 
scale). In fact, it is exactly the combination with Homer that seems to be the main thread in 
the sources on the presence and performance of Hesiod: most of the sources discussed above 
mention Homer too, which contrasts sharply with the many passages that speak of the study 
and performance of Homer without any reference to Hesiod. This is due, of course, to the 
greater popularity of the Homeric poems, but also leads one to suspect that Hesiod was 
believed to be complementary to Homer in a way. For instance, it seems to have been 
uncommon for ancient grammarians, rhetoricians and scholars to focus solely on Hesiod,113 
while there are many works devoted to Homer alone. At the schools, Hesiodic poetry may 
have been studied at the higher levels, which means that pupils dropping out earlier had 
mostly been in contact with Homer. Furthermore, I doubt that rhapsodes from classical times 
and later were exclusive experts on Hesiod, and it seems very unlikely that large-scale poetic 
festivals could fill a two- or three-day program with the poems of Hesiod alone. All things 
considered, I think it is fair to conclude that the ancients were often confronted with Hesiodic 
                                               
111 Cribiore (2001) 197. Cribiore suspects that Hesiod was especially studied at ‘high educational levels’, 
because students seem to have turned to Hesiod mainly to compose genealogies of gods and heroes and other 
mythographic work, which seems a fairly advanced task. 
112 I found the following ancient works on Hesiod: Aristotle, one book of Hesiodic Problems (fr. 16.143 Rose); 
Heraclides Ponticus (4th cent. BC), On the Age of Homer and Hesiod (D.L. 5.87, two books), and On Hesiod 
and Homer (D.L. 5.92, unknown size, possibly the same as those mentioned in 5.87); Chamaeleon (4th cent. 
BC), a treatise on Hesiod and Homer (D.L. 5.92); Hecataeus of Abdera (4th cent. BC), On the Poetry of Homer 
and Hesiod (Suda 2.213); Zeno the Stoic, On Hesiod’s Theogony (SVF 1 p. 71); Antidorus of Cymae (third cent. 
BC), a treatise about Homer and Hesiod (S Dion. Thrax 448.6); the grammarian Demetrius Ixion (2nd cent. BC), 
an exegesis of Hesiod (Suda 2.41); Zenodotus of Alexandria (2nd or 1st cent. BC), On Hesiod’s Theogony (Suda 
2.506); Aristonicus (late 1st cent. BC), On the critical signs in Hesiod’s Theogony and in the Iliad and Odyssey 
(Suda 1.356); an undateable Demosthenes Thrax, a paraphrase of the Th. (Suda 2.47); an undateable Dionysius 
of Corinth, a commentary on Hesiod (Suda 2.110); an otherwise unknown Cleomenes, On Hesiod (Clem. Strom. 
1.61.2). Aristophanes, Aristarchus, Praxiphanes, Crates, Didymus and Seleucus wrote scholia on (parts of) the 
Hesiodic corpus. Zenodotus of Ephesus produced a critical edition of Hesiod; Plutarch wrote a Life of Hesiod 
and a commentary on the WD. In late antiquity, a certain Procleius (4th cent. AD) wrote a commentary on the 
Pandora-myth in Hesiod (Suda 4.210), and Proclus wrote a commentary on the WD (Suda 4.210) - this, 
incidentally, together with Plutarch’s commentary, is the only piece of writing on Hesiod of which significant 
parts still remain. (Most (2006) T128-150 presents a nearly exhaustive list of the testimony on the literary 
scholarship on Hesiod, to which only Demosthenes Thrax and Zeno should be added.) 
113 Of the treatises mentioned in the previous note, five deal with Homer as well; all of the remaining authors 
mentioned had written separately on Homer as well. 
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poetry in a wider context, largely determined by the poems of Homer. The combination of 
Hesiod with Homer must have been natural to them.114 
 
Appendix: the Hesiod-Homer Sequence 
Some have speculated on what the sequence in which Hesiod and Homer are mentioned may 
tell us about the way their (temporal) relationship was perceived in antiquity. As far as I 
know, the matter has not yet been examined systematically and has so far led to 
misunderstanding. In this appendix, I will focus on three manifestations of the sequence: 1) 
the simplest combination, i.e. ‘Hesiod and Homer’ (or the other way around), 2) the 
combination of Hesiod and Homer with Orpheus and Musaeus, and 3) a somewhat more loose 
combination occurring in contexts in which both poets are referred to.115 
    First, we will look at the closest combination, ‘Hesiod and Homer’ (or vice versa), i.e. 
instances where the two poets are connected by a conjunction and no others are mentioned. It 
has been claimed that Hesiod in such combinations regularly precedes Homer, a supposedly 
remarkable observation: does it mean that some thought Hesiod was earlier, or more 
important perhaps? Renehan suggests   JHsivodo~ kai;   {Omhro~ ‘may have sounded more 
mellifluous (…) than the reverse’,116 but Graziosi dismisses this option117 and believes that 
the front position of Hesiod was natural for Greeks knowing the tradition of the Certamen, 
where Hesiod is the first to speak and in the end wins the contest.118  
    Speculation of this sort is somewhat cut short by simple quantification: of the 34 
combinations in question that I have been able to find, Homer goes first 25 times, and Hesiod 
only 10. The favorite conjunction is kaiv (21 times), followed by te kaiv (9 times).119 Closer 
investigation suggests that the front position of Hesiod is often context-determined: in at least 
7 out of the 10 passages a certain logic can be detected behind Hesiod’s first place. In 
Republic 363a, for instance, Plato perhaps speaks of the nasty tales of oJ gennaiò~   JHsivodo~ 
                                               
114 See also Paus. 5.26, who mentions statues of Homer and Hesiod standing together north of the temple of Zeus 
in Olympia. The statues were placed there around 460 BC, and it is revealing that ‘the earliest attested statue of 
Homer’ (Zanker 1995 19) stands close to one of Hesiod. 
115 See ch. 4 (pp. 97-98) for the sequence ‘Hesiod and Homer and others’, be they poets or not. 
116 Renehan (1980) 341. 
117 She claims that  {Omhro~ q’  JHsivodo~ te at the end of a hexameter line is ‘better’ than   JHsivodo~ kai;   
{Omhro~ at the beginning, because the first is attested once (Xenophanes DK B 11) and the second never 
(Graziosi 2002 106 n.46) - but it is impossible to speculate on the basis of such numbers.    
118 Graziosi (2002) 106-107. Graziosi puts much emphasis on the contest: she even suggests that if the 
combination  JHsivodo~ kai;   {Omhro~ had occurred in a hexameter, it would ‘probably’ have been in a poem 
connected to the contest (107 n.46) - but there is nothing to substantiate this. 
119 It must be said though that for the classical time, on which Graziosi focuses, the numbers are less marked 
(6:4). Incidentally, the combination occurs most in Plato (6 times), Dio Chrysostom (3), Plutarch (4), Lucian (7) 
and Pausanias (3); there is only one occurrence in Latin (Ovid Ars Am. 2.4: Ascraeo Maeonioque seni; I am not 
counting Philo Prov. 2.40). 
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te kai;   {Omhro~ because he will first attack Hesiod’s story of Ouranos’ castration and then 
proceed to Homer. When Herodotus in Histories 2.53 comes to speak of the ‘theogony’ of the 
Greeks, it is natural to think of Hesiod first; and when he later in the same paragraph restates 
his claim, Hesiod is of course put in front again.120 It appears, then, that naming Homer first is 
the default option. He is usually put in front, not for the sake of euphony or out of 
chronological speculation, but because one would normally first think of him. 
 
The matter of chronological priority is often connected to another combination: that of Hesiod 
and Homer together with Orpheus and Musaeus. It must have been common in antiquity to 
take these poets together, since I have been able to find 12 occurrences of the foursome, 







Hippias DK B 6 Orpheus - Musaeus - Hesiod - Homer 
Aristophanes Ran. 1033 Orpheus - Musaeus - Hesiod - Homer 
Plato Ap. 41a Orpheus - Musaeus - Hesiod - Homer 
Plato R. 364d Hesiod - Homer - Musaeus - Orpheus 
Hermesianax (ap. Athen.   
    13.597B-599B) 
Orpheus - Musaeus - Hesiod - Homer - Mimnermus - Antimachus -        
     Alcaeus - Anacreon - Sophocles - Euripides - Philoxenus - Philitas 
Chrysippus (Cic. ND  
    1.15.41)  
Orpheus - Musaeus - Hesiod - Homer 
Philodemus Euseb. 13 Orpheus - Musaeus - Homer - Hesiod - Euripides 
Cicero Tusc. 1.41 Orpheus - Musaeus - Homer - Hesiod 
Plinius NH 25.12 Homer - Orpheus - Musaeus - Hesiod 
Pausanias 10.3.7 Chrysothemis - Philammon - Thamyris - Orpheus - Musaeus - Hesiod -  
     Homer 
Clemens Strom. 2.340.27 Orpheus - Linus - Musaeus - Homer - Hesiod 
Philostratus Her. 25.7-8 Homer - Hesiod - Orpheus - Musaeus - Pamphos 
 
 
Table 4: Ancient references to the foursome Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer 
 
The group is obviously a tight one, for seven of the passages are exclusive; in only five cases 
other poets are added to the foursome. It is also striking that the sequence is often the same: 
Orpheus - Musaeus - Hesiod - Homer (6 times); this is the main reason for assuming121 that 
the order is chronological and thus indicates an ancient belief in Hesiod’s priority. This is not 
improbable, at least not for the classical period, because most deviations from the ‘basic 
                                               
120 Pl. R. 612b, Lucian Sat. 5.22, Anach. 21, and Paus. 1.2.3 can be explained along similar lines; the title of 
Heraclides Ponticus’ book On Hesiod and Homer, Plu. Mor. 396D-E and Paus. 9.30.3 are harder to explain. 
121 See e.g. West (1966) 40 n.1, Athanassakis (1983) 1, Graziosi (2002) 107 n.51. The argument of West is 
tendentious because he refers only to Hippias, Aristophanes and Pl. Ap. 41a, and leaves out the counter-
evidence; the other passages he mentions have only Hesiod before Homer, but without Orpheus and Musaeus. 
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pattern’ (different sequence, persons added)122 occur in post-classical times; the prominence 
of Homer in the later lists may testify to his ever-growing importance. Still, one could argue 
that the evidence is far from conclusive and leaves open other explanations: perhaps the 
sequence forms a climax, with the greatest poet at the end; or there could be some thematic 
association.123 The data do not seem to allow anything better than speculation. 
    For the third and final combination I have examined all the passages in which Hesiod and 
Homer are mentioned or referred to in the same context, explicitly named or not, together or 
opposed, closely combined or somewhat more apart. The total numbers, divided per century, 













Table 5: Priority of either Homer or Hesiod in ancient references 
 
In this figure, the light left beam represents the number of instances where Hesiod and Homer 
are mentioned in the same context and Homer goes first; the dark beam on the right represents 
those instances where Hesiod is the first one mentioned. It is clear at once that Hesiod is not 
nearly the ‘minor’ he is usually supposed to be. The total scores for these ten centuries are 
153 to 89 in favour of Homer, a proportion of roughly 3 to 2. It is interesting to compare this 
with modern times: of the 26 books and articles published from 1900 onwards with both 
Hesiod and Homer in the title, 24 name Homer first and only 2 Hesiod! The figure suggests 
                                               
122 In one case, Pl. R. 363b-c, Orpheus is missing; in Maximus of Tyre, Musaeus is absent three times (Or. 4.3, 
17.3, 37.4). See also Hdt. Hist. 2.53 (discussed in ch. 2, pp. 54-62), who implies that Orpheus and Musaes came 
after Hesiod and Homer. 
123 The first three poets deal with cosmology and mysticism; perhaps Homer was originally added because the 
Greeks felt he could not be left out because of his age and importance; in later times, however, Homer was 















that, generally speaking, the Greeks were not particularly bent on mentioning either Hesiod or 
Homer first; they are in fact regularly alternated - such variation also normally occurs within 
the corpora of individual authors. 
     This general impression can be slightly qualified. First, the preference for the front 
position of Homer seems to be stronger in the later centuries, although the small numbers in 
the first centuries make comparison difficult. And second, it seems to matter whether Hesiod 
and Homer are presented as a couple in a specific context, or played out against each other. In 
the first case (as a ‘team’), the ratio is 132 to 71, Homer thus in most cases taking the lead; in 
the second case, however, the difference is remarkably smaller: 21 to 18. One might say that 
when named together, Hesiod becomes somewhat of Homer’s associate; and when opposed, 
Hesiod is more of an equal. These are of course statements based on nothing more than the 
sequence of their names - as the following chapters make clear, however, they prove a 























The Boundless Authority of Hesiod and Homer 
 
 
0 - Introduction 
It was the main aim of chapter 1 to demonstrate that it was common and natural for the 
ancient Greeks to lump Hesiod and Homer together and regard them as a duo. The poets were 
generally believed to be (at least) roughly contemporary, and visualized as comparable proto-
rhapsodes engaged in the same business. In daily life, the Greeks often encountered Hesiod 
and Homer in combination: as young children, they were taught their stories; the grammarians 
explained Hesiod with the aid of Homer and vice versa; their verses were cited and recycled 
during symposia; and their poems were recited at the same (religious) festivals, presumably 
alongside each other, and by similar or even identical performers. With such a prominent 
place for the combination of Hesiod and Homer in Greek education and recreation, it is easy 
to see how the Greeks came to view them as naturally belonging together. It is now time to 
proceed beyond such preliminary observations and examine the thematic association between 
Hesiod and Homer. In this chapter, we will investigate the combined appearance of the poets 
in contexts dealing with morality, education and the closely-related subject of religion. 
    It is a truism to state that throughout antiquity both Homer and Hesiod were regarded as 
great authorities and revered specialists in these fields; it is especially the status of Homer as 
educator of the Greeks that has often been investigated - in section 1, a short overview of the 
scholarship is presented. My investigation, however, will focus on those passages in which 
Hesiod and Homer together are credited (either implicitly or explicitly) with a certain 
normative or prescriptive value, i.e. where the poets are turned into moral guides, teachers of 
ethics, and authorities on life and how to lead it. This focus, which is necessary to test the 
main hypothesis of this book (i.e. that the reception of Hesiod is thoroughly affected by his 
relation to Homer), might at first seem a bit peculiar; but contrary to what one may expect, the 
moral and religious authority of Hesiod and Homer does indeed differ from that of either of 
them alone. Section 2, a case study taken from Herodotus’ Histories, will demonstrate that the 
focus on Hesiod and Homer together can at times lead to interesting interpretations and 
insights that would be missed by a too one-sided or Homerocentric approach. 
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     The ground is then sufficiently cleared for section 3, which will investigate the question of 
how the Greeks in general pictured the moral authority of Hesiod and Homer. Two 
characteristics of their combination in this respect are particularly marked. First of all, the 
poets together seem to be unique in being often compared to lawgivers, while their poems are 
described as laws - a sure indication of the great importance ascribed to them. Secondly, the 
combination of the poets considerably narrows the range of subjects they are supposedly 
authoritative about: the encyclopaedic Homer and the polymath Hesiod together know only 
about the gods and the underworld. These two characteristics added up to create a vast 
problem that was intensely felt from the archaic period onwards: the supposedly prescriptive 
poets presented gods who were engaged in all kinds of immoral and in fact unlawful 
behaviour, and provided a morally unsettling picture of life after death.   
    How the Greeks dealt with the tension arising from panhellenic educators telling immoral 
tales is the subject of section 4. In this discussion of the several strategies of attacking and 
defending Hesiod and Homer we will see that the terminology derived from cultural memory 
studies is especially useful. In perfect agreement with the model described by Assmann,1 the 
enshrinement of the poets calls to life a caste of specialist interpreters to keep the archaic 
poems up to date and secure their value in an ever-changing society. In contrast to what 
Assmann described, however, these specialists too seem to be caught up in a perpetual war of 
memory, not only with other experts but also with ordinary people. 
 
1 - The Authority of Homer 
Much has been written on the omnipresence of Homer in the Greek world. He was by far the 
best-read, best-studied, most-quoted and most-discussed author of antiquity. He held a prime 
position in all levels of Greek education, and was recited at public festivals and private 
gatherings. His poems were of seminal importance to the development of all Greek literature, 
not only according to modern scholars but to the Greeks as well.2 It is well known, however, 
that the dominance and ubiquity of Homer went far beyond the artistic realm: Homer’s voice 
carried weight on all kinds of affairs, and even if the well-known story about the Athenians 
                                               
1 See Introduction, pp. 3-4. 
2 See Hunter (2004), who not only discusses the influence of Homer on Greek literature but also stresses the fact 
that the Greeks were very aware of his importance in this respect; another valuable discussion is that of Goldhill 
(1986) 138-167; for the influence of Homer in the Second Sophistic see Kindstrand (1973) and Zeitlin (2001), 
who focuses on the place of Homer in visual culture.  
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referring to Homer in order to get the naval command in the battle of Salamis is a fiction, it is 
still indicative of the poet’s universal authority.3 
    Obviously, Homer’s influence on Greek ethical and social thought was enormous. As 
Zeitlin states, ‘it seems fair to say that if there is one figure who might be said to dominate the 
field of Greek values and identity, it is Homer and the legacy of his epics’.4 It is perhaps not 
possible for us to fully understand the magnitude and pervasiveness of Homer’s cultural 
power, as the modern Western world seems to have nothing that is really comparable. 
Scholars sometimes resort to figurative speech: Hegel for instance called Homer ‘das 
Element, in dem die griechische Welt lebt wie der Mensch in der Luft’ - and this is hardly an 
exaggeration.5 Homer has also often been compared to the bible, but, as Mehmel says, the 
Greeks cited, alluded and referred to Homer with a zeal that ‘wir mit unseren Goethe- und 
Bibelzitaten nichts Entsprechendes an die Seite zu stellen haben’.6 
    Despite the importance of Homer for Greek thought it has taken relatively long for modern 
scholars to pass from very general remarks to the detailed and systematic study of Homeric 
reception.7 The article of Verdenius (1970) presents a very useful collection of some of the 
most relevant sources, but the best studies dealing with Homer in the Greek imagination are 
still somewhat later: Kindstrand (1973), Lamberton (1986), and especially Lamberton and 
Keaney (1992) and Graziosi (2002). 
    What emerges most clearly from studies like these is that from the earliest times onwards 
the Greeks were very conscious of Homer’s position in their own system of values and ethics. 
Because the poet was so early and so often attacked for his morally reprehensible tales, those 
who wished to defend the canonical status of Homer were forced to explain why his poems 
                                               
3 Hdt. 7.161. See also Arist. Rh. 1375b28-30 for the similar case (also referred to by Quint. 5.11.40) of the 
Athenians claiming (and getting) possession of Salamis on the basis of two lines in Homer (Il. 2.557-558). 
4 Zeitlin (2001) 202. See also Verdenius (1970) 7 arguing that Homer was studied at school not so much for 
‘literary education but [for] the formation of character’ and Robb (1994) 166 ‘to convey an oral paideia was the 
fundamental cultural purpose of Homeric speech’. 
5 Hegel (1923) 529. Compare, for instance, Heraclitus’ Homeric Problems 1.5-7 (cited in Hunter 2004 235): 
‘From the very earliest infancy young children are nursed in their learning by Homer, and swaddled in his verses 
we water our souls with them as though they were nourishing milk. He stands beside each of us as we start out 
and gradually grow into men, he blossoms as we do, and until old age we never grow tired of him, for as soon as 
we set him aside we thirst for him again; it may be said that the same limit is set to both Homer and life’. See for 
a somewhat similar description D.Chrys. 18.8. Remarks on Homer’s cultural hegemony abound; see e.g. Pl. Rep. 
606e and 598de, Plu. Mor. 667F, Caes. 41. 
6 Mehmel (1954) 17, cf. Verdenius (1970) 6 ‘the Homeric epic even surpassed the bible in point of cultural 
power by its central position in the system of education’; see also 14. Modern scholars often compare the 
influence of the Homeric poems to that of the bible; see e.g. Long (1992) 44, who compares the texts because 
they are both ‘the foundation of (…) cultural identity’. The comparison is very illuminating in many respects but 
should not be pushed too far: there were, for instance, no actual wars being fought over the correct interpretation 
of Homer. 
7 In 1954 Mehmel could still honestly say there were no studies focusing on the relationship between Homer and 
the Greeks (18). No-one has as yet undertaken a detailed study of the ancient reception of Homer as a whole.  
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earned their prime position in (moral) education. It seems that there are basically two defence 
strategies adopted by the Greeks: one that remains on the surface level of the poems and one 
that seeks to explain Homer by postulating all kinds of meaning below the surface. 
    The second of these strategies involves allegory,8 for which the early Greeks used the term 
uJpovnoia (‘undersense’). In the case of Homer, this practice has been well studied.9 Though 
the origins of allegory are very unclear, and it is uncertain when,10 how,11 or with what 
purpose12 allegory got started, it is fairly certain that the earliest allegorical interpretations of 
the Homeric poems neutralized morally offending passages by offering a ‘deeper’ reading. 
Some examples are provided by Pherecydes of Syros, who supposedly interpreted Zeus’ 
binding of Hera (Iliad 15.18-22) as god ordering the matter of the universe, and Metrodorus 
of Lampsacus, who explained Homer’s heroes as parts of the universe, and his gods as parts 
of the body.13 Morally problematic passages from Homer are thus defused. It is unclear 
exactly when Homer’s myths were allegorically explained to actively promote certain values 
and virtues, but this was certainly being done in the age of the sophists. From then on, the 
                                               
8 It is customary, after Long (1992), to speak of two kinds of allegory: strong allegory (‘the author composes a 
text with the intention of being interpreted allegorically’) and weak allegory (‘the allegory is not something we 
know to be present in the text as originally constructed’). This distinction resembles that of Tate (1934), who 
speaks of ‘(pseudo-)historical interpretation’ and ‘intrinsic interpretation’. Long cogently argues that the Stoics 
were weak allegorists (and thus sought deeper truths in the texts of Hesiod and Homer without believing these 
were intentional), whereas those before them practised the stronger variant. 
9 See the ground-breaking articles of Tate (1927, 1929 and 1934), who discusses all the important sources, and 
further Richardson (1975), Lamberton (1986) and Lamberton and Keaney (1992); Steinmetz (1986) and Most 
(1989) are useful surveys of Stoic allegoresis.  
10 Theagenes of Rhegium (a grammarian from the 6th century BC) is traditionally held to be the first allegorist of 
Homer (DK 8 A 2), but modern scholars agree that ‘the probability is’, to speak with Tate (1927) 215, that 
allegorical interpretation did not ‘suddenly spring from his brain’. Small (1949) very sensibly points out that 
there are some obvious allegories (in the strong sense) present in both Hesiod (examples are the Erides, the myth 
of Pandora, and the marriage of Zeus and Thetis) and Homer (the personifications of Phobos and Eris and the 
like, the story of the two pithoi) - these passages may have invited or stimulated allegoresis. Most (1993) goes a 
step further in saying that Patroclus was the first ‘Allegoriker’. Svenbro (1976) 119-121 connects the birth of 
allegoresis to the rise of the polis, since that enabled Homer to be regarded as a ‘citoyen’ with ‘arrière-pensées’.  
11 Given the nature of the allegories (often connected to cosmology and physics, especially in earliest times) it 
seems likely that a great interest in natural philosophy (on which Homer does not say much) may have sparked 
allegory; see Tate (1929) 142: ‘Allegorical interpretation of the ancient Greek myths began not with the 
grammarians, but with the philosophers’, and Tate (1927) 215 The early philosophers who expressed their 
doctrines in mythical language, which is to be taken as symbolical and allegorical, may well have been the first 
to interpret the poetic traditions as though they were conscious allegories.’  
12 As to the why: scholars are divided with regard to the the question of whether allegory originated either to 
defend Homer against attacks (what Tate calls ‘negative or defensive allegory’) or ‘to make fully explicit the 
wealth of doctrine which ex hypothesi the myths contained’ (‘positive or exegetical allegory’, Tate 1929 142). 
The fact that early allegory focuses on offensive passages seems to be in favour of the first view (see e.g. Sikes 
1931 16 ‘the use of allegory was the only defence against the charge of immorality’, and Long 1992 44), but 
scholars tend to think that positive allegory was earlier: see e.g. Tate (1929), who even says that the defensive 
function of allegory was ‘unimportant’ (144), Tate (1934), Lamberton (1986), stating that ‘the desire to tap 
Homer’s prestige probably came earlier than the desire to defend him’ (15), and Sluiter (1996) 167. Some argue 
that the distinction should be given up since ‘‘defensive’ and ‘positive’ allegory worked hand in hand from the 
outset’ (Coulter 1976 26); see esp. Struck (2004) 14-16. 
13 Pherecydes DK 7 B 5; Metrodorus DK 61 A 4. 
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practice flourished throughout antiquity, culminating in such exegetes as Porphyry and 
Proclus, who offered grand-scale interpretations of the Iliad and Odyssey as stories on the 
descent of souls into this world (caused by the beauty of this universe, represented by Helen) 
and the difficult return of one of those souls, respectively.14  
    As for the first of the strategies: the scholarly attention for the allegorical interpretation of 
Homer should not make us lose sight of the fact that the surface meaning of the Homeric 
poems was believed to contain positive values as well. For most people, allegory was not 
necessary to appreciate Homer. According to Aristophanes’ Aeschylus, Homer had received 
‘honour’ and ‘glory’ (timhv and klevo~) ‘because he taught valuable things, tactics, virtues and 
weaponry of men.’15 One of those present at Xenophon’s symposium says his father forced 
him to memorize all of Homer, ‘so that I would become a good man.’16 It is very well 
possible that the famous dictum of Anaxagoras, that Homer’s poetry is ‘about virtue and 
justice’ (peri; ajreth~̀ kai; dikaiosuvnh~), is not allegorical at all, as it is usually believed to 
be.17 And there are many more sources that (either explicitly or implicitly) mention Homer as 
an educator inspiring all the virtues necessary for living a good life,18 especially the martial, 
liberal and generally ‘manly’ virtues.19 Even Plato sometimes refers approvingly to the views 
and values contained in Homer’s poems,20 and in the Apology compares his own hero 
Socrates to the greatest hero of the Trojan War, Achilles.21 It is in fact especially Homer’s 
heroes, brought on stage by the rhapsodes, commented upon by the sophists, reincarnated in 
tragedy’s protagonists - in short, endlessly shaped and reshaped by artists, orators and 
philosophers from all times - that provided the ethical paradigms for a Greek’s everyday life. 
The ethics contained in the epic were re-lived everywhere - without the need for any 
‘undersense’. The Greeks wore the surface meaning of Homer on their very skins. We may 
                                               
14 Lamberton and Keaney (1986) xx, speaking of ‘readers such as Porphyry (…) and Proclus’.   
15 Ar. Ra. 1035-1036: o{ti crhvst’ ejdivdaxen, tavxei~, ajretav~, oJplivsei~ ajndrẁn. 
16 X. Smp. 3.5: o{pw~ ajnh;r ajgaqo;~ genoivmhn. 
17 D.L. 2.11; see also Richardson (1975) 69-70. 
18 ‘In general, it may be said that the constructive elements of Greek ethics have developed from the Homeric 
poems’, so Verdenius (1970) 13; so similarly Hunter (2004) 249: ‘Homeric values had been subsumed into, 
rather than erased by, the values of the polis.’ Cf. e.g. Quint. Inst. 1.8.5 advising young people to read Homer 
and Virgil because they are ‘morally improving’ (honesta). 
19 This is exemplified by Dio Chrysostom’s Second Discourse on Kingship, an elaborate speech on the ‘noble, 
lofty and kingly’ (gennaivan kai; megalopreph̀ kai; basilikhvn, 2.6) poetry of Homer.  
20 E.g. Phd. 94d-95a, Tht. 194c, Sph. 216a, Prt. 348c, R. 389e, R. 441b-c, R. 468b-c, Grg. 525d. 
21 Ap. 28c-d. See for an elaborate discussion of this comparison Hobbs (2000) 178-186, who also discusses 
Socrates’ likeness to Odysseus (193-198); cf. also Sluiter (2009). 
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conclude, then, that Homer could more than anyone else claim the title of ‘Educator of the 
Greeks’, bestowed upon him by Verdenius.22 
    It appears, however, that this view should be somewhat qualified. For if Verdenius is right, 
why then does Heraclitus call Hesiod and not Homer the didavskalo~ pleivstwn, ‘teacher of 
most’? And if Homer is indeed the chief moral guide and authority of the Greeks, why then 
do new educators like Xenophanes and Plato criticize traditional paideia by attacking both 
Homer and Hesiod? It seems that Hesiod is a figure that deserves attention as well, but all too 
often scholars have ignored his presence in contexts that nonetheless mention both Hesiod 
and Homer. This Homerocentric approach to the question of epic’s influence on Greek ethics 
can be highly misleading; this will now be illustrated by a discussion of perhaps the best-
known passage on the influence of the poets on Greek thought: Herodotus’ Histories 2.53. 
 
2 - Herodotus on Greek Theology 
There are many reasons why Herodotus’ famous statement on the origins of Greek religion 
should be given a prominent place in this chapter. For one, it is one of the earliest places 
where Hesiod and Homer are mentioned together at all; furthermore, it has become the locus 
classicus for the influence of epic on Greek religious thought in particular and their education 
and morality in general. Most interesting to us, however, is that the passage from the 
Histories, though much commented on, has (in my view) never been fully understood, and 
that the main defect of interpretations so far has been that too little attention has been paid to 
the fact that Hesiod and Homer are mentioned together - this I will demonstrate in a brief 
discussion of other views below. And finally, my own reading of the passage is meant to 
show the depth of the poets’ authority in the mind of Herodotus; there are indications that he 
thinks of their poems in terms of laws, and it is that particular notion that we will explore 
during the remainder of the chapter. 
    Herodotus Histories 2.53 runs thus: 
 
o{qen de; ejgevnonto e{kasto~ tẁn qewǹ ei[te ajei; h\san pavnte~ oJkoiòiv tev tine~ ta; 
ei[dea, oujk hjpistevato mevcri ou| prwvhn te kai; cqev~, wJ~ eijpeìn lovgw/.   JHsivodon 
ga;r kai;  {Omhron hJlikivhn tetrakosivoisi e[tesi dokevw meu presbutevrou~ 
genevsqai kai; ouj plevosi. ou|toi dev eijsin oiJ poihvsante~ qeogonivhn   {Ellhsi kai; 
tois̀i qeois̀i ta;~ ejpwnumiva~ dovnte~ kai; timav~ te kai; tevcna~ dielovnte~ kai; ei[dea 
                                               
22 Verdenius named his 1970 article on the poet’s influence ‘Homer, Educator of the Greeks’; perhaps he took 
his cue from Jaeger (1945), whose chapter on the same subject is called ‘Homer the Educator’. 
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aujtwǹ shmhvnante~. oiJ de; provteron poihtai; legovmenoi touvtwn tẁn ajndrwǹ 
genevsqai u{steron, e[moige dokevein, ejgevnonto. touvtwn ta; me;n prwt̀a aiJ 
Dwdwnivde~ iJevreiai levgousi, ta; de; u{stera ta; ej~  JHsivodon te kai;   {Omhron 
e[conta ejgw; levgw. 
 
‘But whence each of the gods came into being, whether they had all for ever existed, 
and what outward forms they had, the Greeks knew not till yesterday or the day 
before, so to speak; for I think that the time of Hesiod and Homer was four hundred 
years before my own, and not more; and it is they who created a theogony for the 
Greeks, and gave to the gods their several epithets, and divided their honours and arts, 
and declared their outward forms. But those poets who are said to be older than Hesiod 
and Homer were, to my thinking, of later birth. The earlier part of all this is what the 
priestesses of Dodona tell; the later, that which concerns Hesiod and Homer, is what I 
myself say.’              
 
Generally speaking, modern interpretations of this passage suffer from three defects. The first 
one is concerned with focus. It is obvious, as many scholars have noticed, that Herodotus is 
very anxious to present his own opinion (dokevw, ‘I think’, e[moige dokevein, ‘to my thinking’, 
ejgw; levgw, ‘I myself say’).23 But what is his own opinion about? It is the communis opinio 
that Herodotus here claims ‘what is very definitely his own view about the role of Homer and 
Hesiod in the development of the Twelve Gods’.24 But this is a misinterpretation, caused by 
the fact that this passage is so often cited out of context. Histories Book 2 is the book on the 
history and culture of Egypt; a correct interpretation of 2.53 must include the Egyptian 
context.25 In fact, the statement on Greek religion is embedded in a larger discussion of 
Egyptian religion,26 and 2.53 is meant to illustrate what is one of the most defining 
                                               
23 See e.g. Burkert (1985) 124-125, and Thomas (2000) 216-227 and 235-248, who links the emphatic first 
person statements to the style of display performance.  
24 In the words of Thomas (2000) 216, who expresses the universally accepted view. Scholars differ, however, 
on how Herodotus pictures this ‘role’. According to Cartledge (1993), for instance, Herodotus did not mean that 
Hesiod and Homer invented ‘the gods out of whole cloth, but that they so to speak reinvented them for the 
Greeks, describing and defining them in terms the Greeks could and did comprehend and worship’ (172). 
Boardman (2002) 185 thinks the purport is that they ‘codified much of what was current in a rich oral tradition, 
and filled the gaps’. Hartog (1980) 358 believes that it is Herodotus’ point that Hesiod and Homer are known as 
the creators of the Greek pantheon because they had made an inventory of gods; by implication, he says, 
Herodotus portrays himself as a type of aoidos as well, creating the known world because he too makes an 
inventory of its elements. 
25 Cf. Cartledge and Greenwood (2002) 354. 
26 From 2.37 onwards Herodotus discusses the religion of the Egyptians, the most pious of all men. Just as the 
Egyptians are the most ancient people on earth, and their cities the oldest still in existence, so their religion is of 
tremendous age and dates back many thousands of years. No wonder, Herodotus argues, that the Greeks took 
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characteristics of Egyptian religion and Egyptian culture in general: its awe-inspiring age. It 
has long been recognized that Herodotus to a significant degree presents peoples according to 
an oppositional schema,27 and it is only when compared to its Egyptian counterpart that Greek 
religion appears extremely young. Herodotus claims that Greek religion started ‘not till 
yesterday or the day before’28 to make clear how old Egyptian religion really is - and that is 
Herodotus’ point.  
    We can see how Herodotus is pulling the beginning of Greek religion towards his own time 
in two successive moves: first Hesiod and Homer (‘four hundred years before my own time, 
and not more’) are reeled in, and then the poets generally believed to be older than these two 
(presumably Orpheus and Musaeus) are said to be younger. It is these two moves that are 
accompanied by the emphatic personal pronouns, and this is the view that Herodotus wants to 
connect with his own name.29 The historian is thus not primarily concerned with propagating 
the idea that Hesiod and Homer were important to the development of Greek religion; he 
subscribes to it, but he does not claim it as his own. Most likely, it is a view already well-
known. 
    The second defect is involved with Homerocentrism. Most interpretations of this passage 
feature in larger-scale discussions on (the influence of) Homer. That Hesiod is mentioned 
alongside (and even before) Homer in this passage is in such cases often completely ignored. 
This practice is to some degree understandable but nonetheless likely to lead to 
misinterpretation. Graziosi, for instance, focusing on the ancient conception of Homer, 
explains the relatively early date of Homer by claiming that Herodotus wants to distance the 
poet from the Trojan War: by thus disqualifying the Iliad as a iJstorivh~ ajpovdexi~, Herodotus 
‘implicitly defines his relationship to his subject matter as different from the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                   
over many of their gods’ names (oujnovmata) and rites from the Egyptians, as we are told in the paragraphs 
leading up to our passage (2.50-52). What Hesiod and Homer did, was turn a collection of foreign names into a 
fully-fledged anthropomorphic pantheon (2.53). After demonstrating that divination as the Greeks know it was 
also an originally Egyptian art (2.54-58), Herodotus returns to his description of Egyptian cultural peculiarities. 
27 Herodotus’ ethnology is heavily influenced by polar thinking, with qualifications opposed on geological 
dividing-lines; see the ground-breaking study of Hartog (1980), esp. chapter 1. The south, for instance (Hartog in 
fact takes Egypt as a testcase), is old, civilized and warm, while the north (the example is Scythia) is young, 
savage and cold.  
28 There is an interesting and very close parallel for this expression in Josephus (Ap. 1.7). Wishing to detract 
from the authority of Greek historians, he states that in comparison to really old civilizations like those of the 
Egyptians and Chaldaeans, ‘everything in the Greek world will be found to be modern, and dating, so to speak, 
from yesterday or the day before’ (ta; me;n ga;r para; toi~̀   {Ellhsin a{panta neva kai; cqe;~ kai; prwv/hn, wJ~ a]n 
ei[poi ti~, eu{roi gegonovta).  
29 touvtwn ta; me;n prẁta, ‘the earlier part of all this’, refers to Hist. 2.52, where Herodotus tells us how the 
Pelasgians (Herodotus’ proto-Greeks) came by the names for their gods (‘this I know, for I was told at Dodona’, 
wJ~ ejgw; ejn Dwdwvnh/ oi\da ajkouvsa~). 
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Homer has with his’.30 This is a very ingenious hypothesis, which moreover is in perfect 
accordance with other references to Homer in the Histories,31 but it does not account for 
Hesiod’s presence.32 There are many other examples of such Homerocentrism in the 
scholarship on this passage. The text, however, does not offer any reason for ignoring or 
marginalizing the figure of Hesiod. 
     The third defect can be discerned in interpretations which do take Hesiod into account, but 
fail to see that the poets are presented as a combination - hence, Hesiod and Homer are 
regarded as separate. This defect is perhaps encouraged by the word qeogonivh (‘theogony’), 
that according to some contains an allusion to Hesiod. Not, of course, because one of his 
poems actually bore this title,33 but because a great part of his work is concerned with the 
descent of the gods, whereas ‘theogony is not an important trait of Hom.’s writings though 
examples do occur’.34 It is easy to see how such an alleged allusion could lead to the view that 
Herodotus distinguished between the poets and believed that the gods’ ejpwnumivai, timaiv, 
tevcnai and ei[dea (‘epithets, honours, arts and outward forms’) were mostly Homer’s 
specialty. Such a simplistic dichotomy goes back to 19th-century scholarship and is still 
maintained by Lloyd.35 The twofold division, however, must be rejected as unauthentic for at 
least three reasons: 1) it evidently conflicts with the very emphatic plural in the Greek (ou|toi 
                                               
30 Graziosi (2002) 113. Graziosi’s argument is largely based on the fact that Herodotus places the Trojan War 
800 years before his own time (Hist. 2.145), thus putting Homer as far from the Trojan War as he himself is from 
Homer. But we can object to her argument that a) Herodotus puts the Trojan War rather at a distance of 850 than 
800 years in Hist. 2.145, b) it is not very likely that the ancient audience when hearing 2.145 would in retrospect 
interpret 2.53 as a negative comment on Homer, and, perhaps more fundamentally, c) the fact that 400 is the 
exact half of 800 actually neither favours her argument nor undermines it.  
31 See Hist. 2.23 and 2.216, where Herodotus contrasts the poetry of Homer to his own work as a historiographer 
as well. 
32 See, for instance, the commentary of Lloyd (1976) 247, who says of this passage that it is ‘the only 
pronouncement by an important writer of antiquity on the date of Hom.’ - why not the date of Hesiod? Verdenius 
(1970) claims that the Greek tradition of regarding Homer as qeìo~ ‘forms the background of Herodotus’ 
assertion that Homer and Hesiod gave shape to Greek religion’ (6 n.2). Lamberton (1986) 23 says that Hist. 2.53 
presents a ‘peculiar conception of Homer as a source, a creator, (…) rather than a transmitter of information’ - 
apart from the fact that this is a debatable statement, there is no sign of Hesiod in his discussion (incidentally, 
Lamberton translates ‘Homer and Hesiod’, reversing the sequence of the original). Banks 1876 is so eager to 
maintain Homer’s priority that he suggests that ‘perhaps it may be assumed that Herodotus is speaking of Homer 
generally as representing the beginning, and Hesiod as the close, of a period; and that (…) he notes down the 
proximate date of the former as standing for both’ (v-vi).  
33 The actual title Qeogoniva cannot be found earlier than Chrysippus (SVF 2.256); it was perhaps coined by the 
Alexandrians (see West 1966 150). In Herodotus’ time, it is still unusual to refer to poems or other writings by 
giving a title (see also Davison 1955b). 
34 Lloyd (1976) 250; Paley (1883) however makes a stand for Homer and argues that Herodotus ‘must have 
referred to the ‘Cypria’ in saying that Homer ‘made a Theogony’; for we know that the origin and pedigrees of 
the gods were narrated in that work’ (xv). 
35 Lloyd (1976) 250-251; cf. the discussion of scholarship by Wiedemann (1890) 239-240. Wiedemann himself 
does not believe Herodotus distinguishes between them, but nonetheless should have done so: ‘Um genau zu 
sein, hätte Herodot auch zwischen Hesiod, der systematisch und didaktisch die Götterwelt darstellte, und Homer, 
der naiv und poetisch einzelne Ereignisse der Göttersage berichtete, einen Unterscheid machen müssen’ (239). 
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dev eijsin oiJ poihvsante~ qeogonivhn, ‘it is they who created a theogony’), 2) there is no 
reason whatsoever to regard qeogonivh as anything else than a common denomination of a 
genre (instead of a title),36 and, most importantly, 3) it is a priori unlikely that Herodotus 
meant for his fifth-century listening audience to be concerned with the question to which poet 
the terms timaiv etc. would be most applicable37 - it is clear, therefore, that the dichotomous 
view ascribed to Herodotus is an anachronistic projection by modern scholars. 
    Histories 2.53 thus provides a good example of how our own views of Hesiod and Homer 
can sometimes get in the way of interpreting those of the ancients. In this case, they have 
prevented us from seeing that Hesiod and Homer are here together credited with having 
‘created a theogony for the Greeks, and given to the gods their several epithets, and divided 
their honours and arts, and declared their outward forms’. The poets are presented as a unity, 
a team, so to speak: there is no distinction made in terms of hierarchy, importance, or 
individual contribution. It is likely, as I argued above, that this is a common representation, as 
Herodotus is only claiming the statement on the age of Hesiod and Homer, and not on their 
combined importance to Greek religion, as his own. 
    What remains now is to investigate what the statement of Herodotus can tell us about the 
way the authority of Hesiod and Homer was perceived. Three observations suggest that the 
historian emphasizes their quality as universal teachers and at the same time compares their 
status to that of lawgivers. This comparison, which the next section will show to be common 
throughout antiquity, can thus be seen as early as the middle of the fifth century BC. 
 
The first of the observations concerns Herodotus’ claim that Hesiod and Homer ‘made a 
theogony for the Greeks’ (poihvsante~ qeogonivhn   {Ellhsi). Athough the verb poievw can be 
used for ‘shaping’ older material,38 we must assume that the poets thought up everything by 
themselves, since it is explicitly stated that there were no poets before their time: this 
emphasizes their power and prominence as educators. And even though we are dealing with a 
somewhat idiosyncratic view meant to make the Egyptian religion look even more ancient, 
Herodotus apparently believes Hesiod and Homer make credible creators ex nihilo. Of greater 
interest, however, is the qualification ‘for the Greeks’. Nowhere else in the Histories does a 
                                               
36 In 1.132 Herodotus mentions a common Persian sacrifice during which a Magian sings a qeogonivh, and there 
are examples in the Histories of poets ‘creating’ (poieìn) all sorts of poems, be it a dithyramb (1.23), an epic 
poem (4.13), a hymn (4.35) or a play (6.21). 
37 And even if they would, they would probably pick Hesiod as the expert on divine timaiv, cf. e.g. Th. 74, 112, 
418, 426, 462, 491, 882, 885, 892, 904 (see on the importance of Zeus as a distributor of timaiv Nelson 1998 
102-107, and further Clay 2003 28-29). Homer by contrast speaks mainly of the honours among mortals. 
38 See, for instance, Hist. 2.116 and 4.16. 
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poet ‘create’ anything for ‘the Greeks’ (or any other people) in general. Poems are usually fit 
for a specific occasion and a specific audience,39 but the theogony of Hesiod and Homer is 
created without such restrictions in time and place.40 It is obvious that Herodotus is here 
participating in the process of the ‘enshrinement’ of the poets, since they are presented as 
distant and unchangeable, and of timeless importance and universal appeal.41 Moreover, it is 
clear that Hesiod and Homer are represented here as contributing to the national (i.e. supra 
city-state) identity of the Greeks, who are in the Histories always indicated with their 
collective name of the   {Ellhne~ when they are compared to other people. 
    The second observation involves the expressions timav~ te kai; tevcna~ dielovnte~ (‘they 
divided their honours and arts’) and ei[dea aujtwǹ shmhvnante~ (‘they declared their outward 
forms’). Both verbs are in the Histories often used for powerful authorities with greater 
capabilities than a normal human being. Diairevw (‘to divide’) is a verb connected to 
establishing law and custom: Egypt is ‘divided’ into provinces (2.164), the land of the King is 
‘divided’, and in 3.89 - the closest parallel to our passage - we hear how King Darius 
‘divided’ his ‘governments’ (ajrca;~ ... dieìle). Shmaivnw (‘to declare’) is used not only for the 
statements of authority figures, but also for giving voice to divine signs;42 there might even be 
a hint here that Hesiod and Homer are (nearly) as divine - where authority is concerned - as 
their subjects.43 It is at least clear that the use of the two verbs make the poets resemble both 
prophets and rulers. That these functions are naturally connected can be seen in Herodotus’ 
picture of Melampus, an ancient hero, quasi-historical like Hesiod and Homer, who was both 
a seer and a king44 - he is also the only other example in the Histories of a person teaching 
‘the Greeks’.45 
                                               
39 Phrynichus, for instance, created a play for the Athenians (6.21), Olen created hymns to be sung at Delos 
(4.35), and Alcaeus created a song for his friend Melanippus (5.95). 
40 In contrast to the other poets in the Histories, Hesiod and Homer are not paid or otherwise rewarded either.  
41 Graziosi (2002) 58-61 speaks of the ‘universality’ of Homeric audiences; his poems are meant for all the 
Greeks (cf. e.g. AP 9.97, 16.295, 16.296). It is likely that this goes for the combination of Hesiod and Homer as 
well; see further below, esp. pp. 62-70. 
42 Priests, divine signs and those reporting divine signs can shmaivnein, see e.g. Hist. 1.43, 1.78, 1.34, 1.89, 
1.108, 4.179, 7.192, 8.41 (cf. Heraclitus DK B 93); it is also done by the commander Themistocles (Hist. 8.62 
and 8.111). Furthermore, the verb is often used in statements of Herodotus himself (e.g. Hist. 1.5, 1.75, 2.20, 
4.99, 5.54, 7.77, 7.213), who is perhaps the highest authority in the Histories (see for Herodotus’ control of his 
narrative by means of first person statements and prolepseis through oracles, dreams and divine signs De Jong 
1999, esp. 227-228 and 230-241). 
43 Their distribution of timaiv, moreover, strongly resembles Zeus dividing the divine timaiv anew after his hostile 
takeover (see Th. 74, 426-428, 885, 904). 
44 Hist. 2.49 and 9.34; the second passage moreover tells us how he divided the kingship over Argos in three 
parts. 
45 He supposedly introduced the cult of Dionysus into Greece (Hist. 2.49). 
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    Third and finally: the ‘lawgiving’ or normative quality of the poets comes out clearly in the 
expression ejpwnumiva~ dovnte~ (‘they gave epithets’). jEpwnumivh, literally ‘eponymy’, 
indicates a ‘named-after relation’46 between two words, establishing a connection between an 
original ‘name’ (o[noma) and another entity named after it: for instance, the Blackcloaks have 
their eponymy from the fact that they wear black clothes, and the Persians have this 
ejpwnumivh from the ancient hero Perses.47 There is thus always an historical perspective, in 
that eponymy provides an explanation of how a name has come to be: ‘Herodot verwendet 
eponumiè, wenn die Herkunft des Namens im Blick ist.’48 Moreover, and this is especially 
relevant to our case, the historical or traditional aspect makes that eponymy defines the 
identity of the ‘named after’ group or person, and thus informs the audience of their place in 
the structure of the world.49 Whoever knows the eponymy of the Persians, for instance, at 
once knows the Persians and how to distinguish them from other groups.  
    It takes an authority figure to create an eponymy and thus to define a person; this is usually 
done by fathers naming their children, such as Polymnestus the Therean naming his son 
Battus (‘Stammerer’) because of his speech impediment, or Hippocrates the Athenian calling 
his son Peisistratus after Nestor’s son to indicate his descent from the house of Pylos.50 There 
are none in the Histories so powerful as to be able to create eponymies and impose them upon 
an entire people, but there is one interesting exception to this rule; apparently, lawgivers can 
invent ejpwnumivai. In Hist. 5.66 we are told how the great reformer Cleisthenes, who divided 
the Athenians into ten tribes instead of four, does away with the old tribal ejpwnumivai and 
finds out (ejxeurwvn) for his new groups the ejpwnumivai of ten other Athenian heroes instead. 
                                               
46 The ‘named-after relation’ is a term of Levin (1997) 50. See also her note 1 on the difference between 
etymology and eponymy. 
47 Hist. 4.107 and 7.61. See further Levin (1996 and 1997) for a good collection of eponymies in the literary 
tradition up to and including Euripides. In both articles she distinguishes between four types of eponymy but in 
(1996) 200 concedes there is no real ‘system’: individuals, groups, natural inanimate entities and places or 
parcels of land can be both the primary and recipient entities. 
48 Burkert (1985) 130 n.25. Oddly enough, Burkert distinguishes between eponymies like that of the Blackcloaks 
and Persians on the one hand, and the ejpwnumivai of the gods, which he calls ‘Beinamen’, on the other; Levin 
does not include Hist. 2.53 in her list of eponymies either (she does not say why not). I would say, however, that 
the ejpwnumivai of the gods are excellent examples of the ‘named-after relation’, pointing at, e.g. the functions 
(‘high-thunderer’), appearance (‘grey-eyed’), or mythological feats (‘Argus-slayer’) of the gods. Seen in this 
light, ejpwnumiva~ dovnte~ sits perfectly well with timav~ te kai; tevcna~ dielovnte~ kai; ei[dea aujtẁn 
shmhvnante~. 
49 It is interesting therefore that the word ejpwnumivh shows up quite often in connection with the earlier-
mentioned ‘divisions’ that were once made in the past but still continue into the present. In the discussion on the 
names of the three continents, Herodotus says he cannot find out ‘the names of those who divided 
(diourisavntwn) the world, or whence they got the ejpwnumivai which they gave’ (4.45). In 1.94 the king of the 
Lydians divided (dievlonta) his people into two; one part stayed and the other part left their native soil; they 
were henceforth called Tyrrhenians after their leader Tyrrhenus, ejpi; touvtou th;n ejpwnumivhn poieumevnou~. In 
2.17 Egypt is said to be divided (diairevesqai) into two parts, carrying the ejpwnumivai of Libya and Asia. 
50 Hist. 4.155 and 5.65. 
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Such a remarkable feat can apparently only be performed by a lawgiver or a man with law-
giving faculties, as is confirmed by a story told in 5.68, where Cleisthenes’ grandfather, tyrant 
of Sicyon, changed (metatiqeiv~) the ejpwnumivai from the Dorian tribes from the old into new 
and ridiculous ones (such as ‘Assites’ and ‘Porkites’) to annoy them. Such an act destroys the 
historical connection, distorts tradition, and unsettles collective identity; and Herodotus 
knows this. His comment on the re-naming of the Athenian tribes is of great interest: 
 
Taùta dev, dokevein ejmoiv, ejmimeveto oJ Kleisqevnh~ ou|to~ to;n eJwutoù mhtropavtora 
Kleisqevnea to;n Sikuwǹo~ tuvrannon. Kleisqevnh~ ga;r  jArgeivoisi polemhvsa~ 
toùto me;n rJayw/dou;~ e[pause ejn Sikuwǹi ajgwnivzesqai tẁn  JOmhreivwn ejpevwn 
ei{neka, o{ti   jArgeiòiv te kai;   [Argo~ ta; polla; pavnta uJmnevatai: toùto dev, hJrwvion 
ga;r h\n kai; e[sti ejn aujth/̀ th̀/ ajgorh/̀ twǹ Sikuwnivwn  jAdrhvstou toù Talaoù, 
toùton ejpequvmhse oJ Kleisqevnh~ ejovnta   jArgei`on ejkbaleìn ejk th̀~ cwvrh~. 
 
‘Now herein [renaming the Athenian tribes], this Cleisthenes was imitating his own 
mother’s father, Cleisthenes the tyrant of Sicyon. For Cleisthenes, after going to war 
with the Argives, made an end to rhapsodists’ contests at Sicyon by reason of the 
Homeric poems, because wellnigh everywhere in these it is Argives and Argos that are 
the theme of song; furthermore, he conceived the desire to cast out from the land the 
hero Adrastus son of Talaus because he was an Argive, even though his shrine stood 
then as now in the very market-place of Sicyon.’51 
 
Herodotus compares the invention of new ejpwnumivai for a people to cancelling the 
performance of the Homeric poems and the (attempted) banishment of a hero’s cult, both  
activities bent on erasing the Argive element from Sicyonian history, tradition and identity.52 
Cleisthenes is a showcase example of a damnator memoriae trying to rewrite memory and 
thus create a new identity for his people. Creating eponymies is just as much part of this 
procedure as suppressing history (in the form of the Iliad) and eradicating traditional cult (by 
taking away Adrastus’ qusiva~ te kai; oJrtav~, ‘sacrifices and festivals’).  
    It is obvious from Herodotus’ words that only people with great power can impose 
ejpwnumivai on others: Cleisthenes (‘stronger by far than his political rivals’, pollw/̀ 
                                               
51 Hist. 5.67; in 5.68 Herodotus recounts how Cleisthenes the tyrant changed the names of the Dorian tribes. 
52 A hero’s shrine is a powerful site of memory which can greatly contribute to a feeling of common identity (see 
e.g. Alcock 2002, esp. chapters 3 and 4), as does the performance of the Homeric poems (see e.g. Nagy 1990 36-
47, and Hist. 7.161 for another example from Herodotus).   
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katuvperqe tẁn ajntistasiwtevwn, 5.69) for the Athenians, the tyrant Cleisthenes for the 
Sicyonians, and Hesiod and Homer for an even larger group, ‘the Greeks’. The two poets are 
thus presented as a kind of Ur-lawgivers of tremendous power, shaping Greek religion and 
successfully imposing their entire theology on the Greeks, thus determining their traditions, 
memory and identity. 
    The notion of Hesiod and Homer as lawgivers, present already in Herodotus (though 
perhaps somewhat implicitly), finds expression throughout antiquity. In the next section I will 
investigate in what ways the two poets are equated to lawgivers, and examine whether there is 
a specific subject in regard to which the poems are regarded as normative. 
 
3 - Hesiod and Homer as Lawgivers 
Herodotus is one of the earliest sources for the lawlike authority of Hesiod and Homer in 
antiquity, but he was not the first. Before we investigate the numerous ways in which the 
Greeks presented Hesiod and Homer as lawgivers of some kind, it is important to note that the 
poets themselves already promoted such a view. In Odyssey 3.267-271, for instance, Nestor 
tells Telemachus how Agamemnon left an anonymous aoidos to keep an eye on his wife 
while he went to war; and Hesiod is far more explicit still when he compares the rhetorical 
capabilities of the king to those of the poets (Theogony 79-103).53 Even when we keep in 
mind that it can only be expected of poets to present poets as venerable and trustworthy, it is 
obvious that such descriptions influenced later views.54 To these we will now turn. 
     There are several ways in which a certain legislative quality can be attributed to the poems 
of Hesiod and Homer. In the most obvious cases, their poetry is quite directly said to be 
understood as law, as in Lucian’s De Luctu, where the author ridicules people for their 
methods of mourning and beliefs about death: 
 
  JO me;n dh; polu;~ o{milo~, ou}~ ijdiwvta~ oiJ sofoi; kaloùsin,   JOmhvrw/ te kai;   JHsiovdw/  
                                               
53 The other singers in Homer, Demodocus and Phemius, are also held in great esteem (though they are not 
associated with lawgiving); see e.g. Svenbro (1976) 19-21. See on Hesiod’s comparison of kings and poets e.g. 
Solmsen (1954), Combellack (1974), Roth (1976), Martin (1984), Gagarin (1992), and Kirby (1992). Scholars 
nowadays agree that at least one of the functions of the comparison is to elevate the status of the poet, who 
becomes somewhat of a king and lawgiver himself.  
54 See the scholia on Od. 3.267 which (completely unaware of the ‘propaganda for Homer’s own profession’, as 
Stanford 1959 puts it) say that in ancient times singers were like philosophers who guarded the ajndrẁn kai; 
gunaikẁn ajretav~ (‘virtues of men and women’). See for the passage from the Th. the scholia (esp. 93 and 99b, 
where the singer and king are closely associated), and the comments by Cornutus (Epidr. 14) and Plutarch (Mor. 
746D). Interestingly enough, the ancients noticed that Hesiod and Homer agreed on the likeness between poets 
and statesmen (S Il. 1.175c (T), 17.251a (A) and Plu. Mor. 801E).  
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kai; toi~̀ a[lloi~ muqopoioi~̀ peri; touvtwn peiqovmenoi kai; novmon qevmenoi th;n 
poivhsin aujtwǹ, tovpon tina uJpo; th̀/ gh/̀ baqu;n    {Aidhn uJpeilhvfasin...  
 
‘The general herd, whom philosophers call the laity, trust Homer and Hesiod and the 
other mythmakers in these matters, and take their poetry for a law unto themselves. So 
they suppose there is a place deep under the earth called Hades…’55 
 
It is because the people believe the poets’ picture of Hades as a dreadful place that they 
engage in all the ridiculous rituals of mourning that the rest of Lucian’s treatise is concerned 
with mocking. The poetry of Hesiod and Homer is here clearly said to be turned into nomoi 
by the many, who live their lives in accordance with them. Such straightforward cases, 
however, are both rather rare and late.56 
    Secondly, Hesiod and Homer seem to be associated with reputable lawgivers and 
archetypes of justice. Perhaps the first indication for this particular association can be found 
in Plato’s Apology (40e-41b), where the poets (together with Orpheus and Musaeus) are 
mentioned in a list of famous people Socrates would like to meet in the underworld; they 
occupy the middle position after a group of righteous half-divinities (Minos, Rhadamantys, 
Aeacus, Triptolemus)57 and before a few heroes who met their death through an unfair trial 
(Palamedes, Ajax, Telamon) - obviously, they are included as experts on justice here. The link 
with lawgiving is more apparent in Symposium 209c-e, where Socrates’ teacher Diotima is 
measuring the superiority of spiritual love over physical love by the superiority of spiritual 
offspring over physical children. Her examples are the children of ‘Homer, Hesiod and the 
other good poets (  {Omhron ... kai;   JHsivodon kai; tou;~ a[llou~ poihta;~ tou;~ ajgaqouv~)’  that 
                                               
55 Lucian Luct. 2. 
56 There is a close parallel in S.E. Adv. Phys. 1.15, where ‘those who first led mankind’ are said to have 
‘invented both the fancy about the gods and the belief in the mythical events in Hades’, and ‘purposing to check 
the wrongdoers they laid down laws (novmou~ e[qento) (…) and after this they also invented gods as watchers of 
all the sinful and righteous acts of men, so that none should dare to do wrong even in secret, believing that the 
gods ‘cloaked in garments of mist all over the earth go roaming, watching the violent doings of men and their 
lawful behaviour’ (hjevra eJssavmenoi pavnth/ foitẁsin ejp’ ai\an, / ajnqrwvpwn u{brei~ te kai; eujnomiva~ 
ejforẁnte~).’ The quotation is a combination of WD 255 and Od. 17.487, which makes it likely that Hesiod and 
Homer are primarily on Sextus’ mind (together with Orpheus, who was quoted somewhat earlier). One may 
compare Lucian Nec. 6, Plu. Mor. 9 and Athen. 12.546c. Lycurgus (In Leocr. 102) is the first to explicitly 
compare novmoi with poihtaiv, but he does so in a rather general way and gives only Homer as an example (cf. 
Pl. R. 599e and Lg. 858e which deal with the question whether Homer can be called a nomoqevth~). Incidentally, 
there are also several scholia that ascribe a certain nomothetical quality to Homeric verses. When Nestor in Il. 
23.644-45 says he is too old to compete in Patroclus’ funeral games, the scholiast remarks that Homer 
nomoqeteì kaq’ hJlikivan ajei; poieìn (‘prescribes by law that one should act according to one’s age’). See 
further S Il. 3.16b (bT), 4.413-417 (b and T), 14.309 (bT), 15.349-351 (bT).  
57 Minos, Rhadamantys, and Aeacus were kings, lawgivers and (after their death) judges in the underworld; they 
were famous for their virtue, justice, and piety. 
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‘make them forever honoured and remembered (ejkeivnoi~ ajqavnaton klevo~ kai; mnhvmhn 
parevcetai)’, and the laws of Lycurgus and Solon that in similar fashion provided them with 
great esteem. Hesiod and Homer, again linked to wisdom and justice, are here compared to 
the most famous lawgivers of Greece. Solon, who was both a poet and a lawgiver, seems to be 
a key figure here as he is elsewhere associated with both Hesiod and Homer as well.58  
    Third, there is the Greek habit of appealing to the poets as ‘witnesses’ (mavrture~) or 
‘proofs’ (martuvria), both terms with obviously legal overtones. This was a well-established 
practice in the classical age, and provides another indication of the poets’ sayings being 
credited with a lasting validity. It must be granted that Hesiod and Homer were not the only 
poets thus appealed to, but their appearances as witnesses are nonetheless most frequent.59  
    That Hesiod and Homer can be called to witness is closely connected to their quality as 
lawgivers; I will briefly illustrate this with one example, taken from Plato. In Republic 364c-
d, Plato is concerned about citizens who use poetic sayings to justify morally objectionable 
notions and actions. Some people, he says, entertain revolting ideas: they claim, for instance, 
that acting unjustly is pleasant and easy, and pays better than acting in accordance with 
justice, or that it is not wrong to harm the just and injust alike - 
 
Touvtoi~ de; pàsin toì~ lovgoi~ mavrtura~ poihta;~ ejpavgontai oiJ me;n kakiva~ pevri, 
eujpeteiva~ didovnte~, wJ~ ‘th;n me;n kakovthta kai; ijlado;n e[stin eJlevsqai / rJhi>divw~: 
leivh me;n oJdov~, mavla d’ ejgguvqi naivei: / th̀~ d’ ajreth̀~ iJdrwt̀a qeoi; propavroiqen 
e[qhkan,’ kaiv tina oJdo;n makravn te kai; traceiàn kai; ajnavnth. oiJ de; th~̀ tẁn qewǹ 
uJp’ ajnqrwvpwn paragwgh̀~ to;n   {Omhron martuvrontai, o{ti kai; ejkeiǹo~ ei\pen 
‘listoi; dev te kai; qeoi; aujtoiv, / kai; tou;~ me;n qusivaisi kai; eujcwlaì~ ajganais̀in / 
loibh̀/ te knivsh/ te paratrwpẁs’ a[nqrwpoi / lissovmenoi, o{te ken ti~ uJperbhvh/ 
kai; aJmavrth/.’ 
 
‘And the poets are brought forward as witnesses to all these ideas. Some harp on the 
ease of vice, as follows: ‘Vice in abundance is easy to get; / The road is smooth and 
                                               
58 Solon was said to have given shape to the public recitations of Homer in Athens (see D.L. 1.57, perhaps a 
democratically-inspired correction for the story of the Peisistratean recension), which, incidentally, Lycurgus 
supposedly did for the Spartans. Plato and Aristotle too couple Solon and Homer in a legal context (R. 858e, Rh. 
1375b28-35). Aelius Aristides compares Hesiod and Solon (Or. 23.23-24). For more on the connection between 
Solon and Hesiod, already noted in antiquity, see ch. 5, pp. 149-150. 
59 In the works of Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle there are only four poets called mavrture~ or martuvria: Homer 
(10 times) and Hesiod (4), and the thoroughly gnomic poets Theognis (2) and Solon (1). The standard examples 
for the rhetorical trick of ‘calling the ancients (palaioiv) to witness’ come from Hesiod and Homer (see Aristotle 
Rh. 1375b28-31 and Aphthonius I 66 Walz). See also Dem. Fals. Leg. 243 and Aristid. 34.42. 
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begins beside you, / But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue,’ and a road 
that is long, rough, and steep. Others quote Homer to bear witness that the gods can be 
influenced by humans, since he said: ‘The gods themselves can be swayed by prayer, / 
and with sacrifices and soothing promises, / Incense and libations, human beings turn 
them from their purpose / When someone has transgressed and sinned’.’60 
 
This passage illustrates not only how easily poetic passages are stripped of context and 
adapted, but also how people justify their obvious ajdikhvmata by appealing - as to witnesses -
to the authority of the poets.  
    It is of course this lawlike authority that Plato wishes to contend with, and it is in this light 
noteworthy that the passage from the Republic is preceded by the remark of Adimantus that 
there is ‘another sort of logoi about justice and injustice employed both by private individuals 
and by poets’.61 Private individuals are here put on a par with the poets: they employ the same 
logoi because the one group interprets passages from the other in order to support their amoral 
behaviour. The word ijdiva/ is aptly chosen for at least two reasons: an i[dio~ is both someone 
without skill or tevcnh,62 so that the poets (in keeping with statements made by Socrates in Ion 
and elsewhere) are implicitly said to have no tevcnh, and the exact opposite of a magistrate or 
lawgiver.63 By thus equating the legovmenon of poets and those not in office, the former are 
implicitly called unauthorized to be involved in the business of governing and lawmaking64 - 
exactly the fields where they, much to Plato’s dismay, are market leaders. As Robb puts it: 
‘Epical incidents, and epical narrative of established customs, along with the thousands of 
maxims and sayings embedded in the narrative, were used to settle daily disputes of all sorts 
in all periods’.65 
    Fourth and finally, it appears that laws and legal documents are in some respects treated in 
the same way as poetry, especially that of Hesiod and Homer. In juridical speeches from the 
fourth century BC, citations from poetry were alternated by readings of legal passages; in one 
                                               
60 I have slightly altered the translation in Cooper (1997). The quotes are WD 287-290 and Il. 9.497-501, both 
with minor alterations of our text. 
61 Pl. R. 363e: a[llo ei\do~ lovgwn peri; dikaiosuvnh~ te kai; ajdikiva~ ijdiva/ te legovmenon kai; uJpo; poihtẁn.  
62 See Rubinstein (1998) 140. 
63 See LSJ s.v. I.1; Arist. EN 1113b21-23 contrasts individuals ‘in their private capacity’ (ijdiva/) and ‘the 
legislators themselves’ (aujtẁn tẁn nomoqetẁn). 
64 Cf. Pl. R. 366e, where i[dioi lovgoi (‘private conversations’) and poivhsi~ (‘poetry’) are again equated with 
regard to the concept of justice. 
65 Robb (1994) 78. Robb shows that analogical thinking, with characters of an age gone by serving as exempla 
for present behaviour, is already present in the Homeric poems themselves; Phoenix, for instance, refers to the 
story of Meleager laying aside his wrath to help his dear ones in order to convince Achilles that he should listen 
to his friends as well.  
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extant speech, the orator even turns to the clerk and has the Homeric passages in question 
read aloud, as it was done with the laws;66 as Perlman says, ‘quotations from poetry [were] a 
substitute for proof from laws and for evidence by witnesses’.67 According to Aristotle, in 
juridical speeches it is very common for an orator to bring in poets as witnesses,68 and he even 
calls them the most trustworthy (pistovtatoi) of witnesses since they cannot be corrupted 
(ajdiavfqoroi gavr).69 Among the relatively few references to poetry present in the extant 
speeches, Hesiod and Homer figure prominently.70 Furthermore, it has often been pointed out 
that the study of poetry formed an integral part of an orator’s training in eloquence and 
diction; but, as Ford has shown, it was also of great practical value since it developed two 
highly relevant skills: interpreting difficult texts (ancient epic or old laws), and the recycling 
of traditions ‘to speak to present social and political arrangements’.71 To these two I would 
like to add a third one: selecting from a vast corpus the passage most pertinent to the context 
and the rhetorical ends of the speaker. Selection, interpretation and re-application are the three 
basic approaches to Hesiod and Homer that we encounter throughout antiquity;72 it is also 
exactly what lawyers and orators do with the corpus of laws, rules and regulations. 
 
We have seen, then, that the prescriptive value of Hesiod and Homer, in their capacity as 
educators and guides for life, is rated so highly that their poetry can be compared to law. 
Although the Greeks to a certain extent regarded all poets as educators, Hesiod and Homer 
held a special position in this respect. So far, however, we have not yet examined the actual 
content of their ‘laws’. In her pioneering study on the reception of Homer, Graziosi rightly 
claims that ‘when Homer and Hesiod do not compete’ - i.e. are combined or ‘lumped’ - ‘they 
                                               
66 Aesch. 1.148-150. See also Lyc. In Leocr. 110, where Lycurgus’ ‘résumé and application of the [Homeric] 
quotations to Leocrates clearly show that they are regarded as legal evidence on which the condemnation of 
Leocrates may be based’ (Perlman 1965 168). 
67 Perlman (1965) 168. 
68 Arist. Metaph. 995a7-8. See also Aristotle’s discussion of witnesses in Rh. 1375b26-1376a17. 
69 Arist. Rhet. 1376a16-17. As the passage from the Republic shows, the practice of ‘calling the ancients to 
witness’ was not above corruption: quotations from Hesiod and Homer (and the other poets as well) are often 
incorrect, incomplete or out of context, so as to better fit the rhetorical purposes of the person quoting. See for 
this practice also ch. 4, pp. 123-127. 
70 Perlman (1965) lists all references; out of 25 quotations, five are from Homer and five from Hesiod (they are 
quoted close together once, Aeschin. Tim. 129) - the other numbers are Euripides 5, anonymous epigrams 5, 
Sophocles 1, Tyrtaeus 1, Solon 1, unknown poets 3. Perlman attributes the scarcity of references to ‘very deep-
rooted antagonism towards experts and, what is even more important, a growing tendency to develop a prosaic-
oratorical style, independent of poetry’ (161). According to Ford (1999) 236 n.15 ‘poetic quotation was most 
impressive when it seemed to be the ‘spontaneous’ impulse of a well-bred and educated citizen’, and he 
therefore assumes it was more common in oral than written eloquence - unfortunately, there is no way of 
knowing this.  
71 Ford (1999) 236; Ford’s approach is unduly Homerocentric. 
72 On this see further section 4, pp. 74-87. 
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(…) are represented as religious experts’.73 But it appears that this general observation can be 
more narrowly specified when we investigate more closely whether there are any particular 
subjects on which the Greeks believed that the two poets were especially authoritative. 
    It must be said beforehand that the subjects Hesiod and Homer are said to talk about are not 
always described in detail. There are some broad and rather casual definitions of the content 
of their poetry, such as that of Lucian in the Anacharsis, a treatise on Athenian law and 
education; somewhere in this dialogue Solon explains that young Athenians are educated with 
the aid of ‘Hesiod and Homer’, whose poetry consists of the ‘sayings of wise men, deeds of 
olden times, and helpful tales’ (sofwǹ ajndrwǹ gnwvma~ kai; e[rga palaia; kai; lovgou~ 
wjfelivmou~), and stories of ‘certain feats of arms and famous exploits’ (ajristeiva~ tina;~ kai; 
pravxei~ ajoidivmou~).74 Such broad, practically all-inclusive definitions are quite rare, 
presumably because they are so obvious - the poetry of Hesiod and Homer would not be at the 
heart of Greek education if people generally believed otherwise. This also accounts for the 
generally positive tone of such descriptions.  
    When the content of their poetry is more narrowly defined, however, this picture changes in 
two respects: 1) the tone becomes decidedly negative, and 2) the number of subjects 
commented on in detail turns out be rather limited, since the more specific descriptions of the 
poetry of Hesiod and Homer are almost always concerned with their presentation a) of the 
gods and b) of the underworld - roughly speaking, the material found where the two poetic 
corpora intersect.75 
    As to subject a): even though Herodotus credits the poets with inventing the ‘epithets, 
honours, arts and outward forms’ of the gods, it is in fact the behaviour of the epic gods, so 
remarkably out of tune with the laws of human beings, that the recipients in antiquity focus 
on. Xenophanes, who provides the first of our extant texts that mention Hesiod and Homer 
together, complains about the klevptein moiceuvein te kai; ajllhvlou~ ajpateuvein (‘theft, 
adultery and mutual deceit’) among the gods; in similar fashion, Plato opens his attack on the 
poets in the Republic with heavy criticism against the Hesiodic and Homeric stories of gods 
mistreating each other in numerous ways.76 We should guard here against Homerocentric 
                                               
73 Graziosi (2002) 181. Her observation may seem obvious at first but she is the first (to my knowledge) to have 
focused on this particular question. 
74 Lucian Anach. 21 (transl. adapted). See for a similar description Pl. Ion 531c-d (cf. Graziosi 2002 182-184).  
75 The description of Tartarus is the first example in the list of Walcot (1966) 127-129 of elements common to 
both epic corpora. Walcot suggests that it is such common elements that are less influenced by tales from the 
Near East and may point to a Greek tradition ‘before epic poetry was divided into two streams’ (127).  
76 Xenophanes DK B 11 (on which see further 4.1); Pl. R. 377c-378d. In the passage from the R. cited above, the 
gods (as presented by Hesiod and Homer) are again mentioned, but this time it is not their behaviour towards 
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interpretations such as that of Robb, who says that during Plato’s attack on Homer and poetry, 
Hesiod ‘is suddenly thrown in for good measure and similarly deprecated’.77 This is to 
underestimate the ancient tradition of criticizing the gods of both Hesiod and Homer, running 
from Xenophanes to Philo, who mentions objections to Homer and Hesiod ‘who did not 
abstain from any kind of impiety and blasphemy against the gods’ (nihil omittens eorum quae 
spectant ad impietatem ac blasphemiam daemonum)78 or Lucian, whose alter ego Menippus 
says he read in Hesiod and Homer about ‘wars and quarrels, not only of the demigods but of 
the gods themselves, and besides about their amours and assaults and abductions and lawsuits 
and banishing fathers and marrying sisters.’79 We should note that the passages focused on are 
always the same: Zeus fettering Hera, Cronus castrating Uranus, Cronus devouring his 
children, and the theomachy of Iliad 21.80 
    The poets’ depiction of the underworld (subject b) is similarly denounced by critics. There 
are some value-neutral references connecting Hesiod and Homer to Hades and the afterlife,81 
but their description of the underworld is mostly censured. Pythagoras, for instance, attacked 
their poetic view on the afterlife, and Lucian in De Luctu takes nine paragraphs to deride the 
mythical underworld pictured by ‘Homer, Hesiod and the other mythmakers’;82 moreover, 
when the very same Menippus who was mentioned above descends into the underworld, he 
satirically describes it in exactly the way the poets do - this is primarily meant as a gibe at the 
philosophical speculations concerning the afterlife, but of course in the end it is disclosed that 
                                                                                                                                                   
each other but towards mortals that is critized: they are either discouraging mortals to choose virtue instead of 
vice or are too easily coaxed into forgiving them for their mistakes.  
77 Robb (1994) 231 on Pl. R. 600c-d. He seems to find an ally in Aristides (Or. 4.45) saying that Plato attacked 
Homer (too) viciously and considered Hesiod as an ‘addition’ (parenqhvkh). 
78 Ph. De Prov. 2.34-37. 
79 Lucian Nec. 3: polevmou~ kai; stavsei~ ouj movnon tẁn hJmiqevwn, ajlla; kai; aujtwǹ h[dh tẁn qeẁn, e[ti de; kai; 
moiceiva~ aujtẁn kai; biva~ kai; aJrpaga;~ kai; divka~ kai; patevrwn ejxelavsei~ kai; ajdelfẁn gavmou~. 
80 See further on the impious presentations of the divine by Hesiod and Homer together D.Chr. 14.21; S.E. Pyrr. 
3.210-211; Clem.Al. Protr. II.26.6; Jul. Ep. 423b; Suda 1.44.30-31 (including Orpheus). Perhaps there is a 
reference to Homer and Hesiod in Isocrates’ allusive list of poetic blasphemers in Busiris 38: it is obvious that he 
refers to Homer, and it could very well be that the poet feuvgwn th;n patrivda kai; toì~ oijkeiotavtoi~ polemẁn 
(‘who spent all his life in exile from his fatherland and in warring with his kinsmen’) is not Alcaeus (nor 
Archilochus) but Hesiod, whose father left his city Cymae ‘fleeing evil poverty’ (feuvgwn ... kakh;n penivhn, WD 
637-8) and who quarreled with his brother. Livingstone (2001) ad loc. provides the fullest discussion of the 
passage in question, though he does not mention Hesiod. 
81 See e.g. Socrates’ remark that he will meet the poets in Hades (Pl. Ap. 40e-41b), Plutarch’s attempt to 
harmonize Hesiod’s and Homer’s account of demons (the souls of the deceased, Plu. Mor. 361b), and Socrates’ 
inclusion of ‘the phenomena of the heavens and occurrences in the underworld’ (peri; tẁn oujranivwn 
paqhmavtwn kai; peri; tẁn ejn   {Aidou) in the list of subjects treated by Hesiod and Homer (Pl. Ion 531c). 
82 Pyth. fr. 42 Wehrli (= D.L. 8.21); Lucian De Luctu 2-10. 
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the underworld of the poets is not to be believed in either.83 Incidentally, the poets are also 
attacked separately for their presentation of Hades.84 
 
At the end of this section we may conclude two things. First of all: the Greek evaluation of 
the normative status of Hesiod and Homer is highly ambiguous. It has been shown that their 
verses are explicitly and implicitly regarded as laws and hence deemed worthy of observance. 
In some contexts, this attitude is applauded: general descriptions of their poetry as containing 
‘wise sayings’ and ‘famous deeds of reverend ancestors’ are in perfect accord with an 
undoubtedly wide-spread appreciation of the poems as educational or morally prescriptive 
material. In other contexts, zooming in on specific and notorious passages (at the intersection 
of both corpora) reveals problems that threaten the respectability of their poetry as a whole: 
the presentations of unlawful behaviour of gods, and a questionable picture of the afterlife.85 
This double-faced, problematic position of Hesiod and Homer is felt throughout antiquity; in 
the next section, we will discuss the various ways the Greeks dealt with it. 
    Secondly, it should be observed that this deeply ambiguous response to poetry is not 
limited to that of Hesiod and Homer alone; see, for instance, how Plutarch, speaking of poets 
in general, warns us for their ‘delusion and ignorance regarding the gods’ (ajpavthn peri; qeẁn 
kai; a[gnoian) as well as ‘the monstrous tales of visits to the shades, and the descriptions, 
which in awful language create spectres and pictures of blazing rivers and hideous places and 
grim punishments’86 - he voices the exact same objections that are levelled against the poems 
of Hesiod and Homer. This generally ambiguous attitude to poetry, however, should not lead 
us to conclude that Hesiod and Homer are arbitrary representatives of the larger group of 
poets, equal to, say, Sophocles or Alcman - instead, they are the archetypes. Not only do 
Hesiod and Homer ‘stand for epic at large’, as Graziosi puts it,87 but they rather stand for 
                                               
83 Nec. 21. Menippus’ journey to the underworld is parallelled by his trip to heaven in the Icaromenippus; here 
too the philosophers are ridiculed by presenting a picture of heaven that conforms exactly to that of the poets (cf. 
Sacr. 8.3). 
84 See e.g. D.Chr. 53.2; it is also relevant that Pherecydes, one of the first allegorical readers of Homer, wrote on 
his view of the underworld (cf. Tate 1927 214-215). Hesiod was the author of a catabasis of Peirithous and 
Theseus (fr. 280 MW), and it could very well be that the Cercops that Aristotle mentions as a critic of Hesiod (fr. 
75 Rose) attacked him on that particular subject, seeing that he was a student of Pythagoras who moreover wrote 
a Katavbasi~ eij~   {Aidou as well (Clem.Al. Strom. I.21.131.5). 
85 We should note that the subjects on which the poets are most authoritative are those on which rational thought 
and investigation cannot ever provide real certainty.  
86 aiJ peri; ta;~ nekuiva~ teratourgivai kai; diaqevsei~ ojnovmasi foberoì~ ejndhmiourgoùsai favsmata kai; 
ei[dwla potamẁn flegomevnwn kai; tovpwn ajgrivwn kai; kolasmavtwn skuqrwpẁn (Plu. Mor. 17B). 
87 Graziosi (2002) 184. 
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(Greek) poetry at large.88 This observation makes it all the more interesting to examine further 
how the Greeks approached this poetic authority. 
 
4 - Dealing with Poetic Authority: Reactions and Counter-Reactions 
In this section we will investigate how the Greeks tried to negotiate the fact that the poetry of 
Hesiod and Homer was of great educational value but at the same time contained passages 
that set a decidedly bad example. The first subsection will set the tone with two very early 
(and comparable) reactions against Hesiodic and Homeric poetry, i.e. those of Xenophanes 
and Pythagoras. Together they exemplify the Greek intellectual apprehension of the unlawful 
and socially dangerous quality of their poetry, and of the most elementary response to the 
problem: banishment from the educational program. The second subsection deals with the 
most important strategies designed to save the two poets: selection, (allegorical) interpretation 
and the concept of poetic licence. Section 4.3 will argue that these strategies, efficient though 
they are, create a new problem since they shift the authority from the poets themselves to their 
interpreters - and who can guarantee their integrity? In the final subsection, we can see how in 
hellenistic and later times a seemingly definitive solution presents itself, as critics try to 
harmonize the poetic accounts with other texts that have become canonical: mostly ethical 
philosophies, notably that of Plato. 
 
4.1 - A Frontal Attack on Fellows 
The theologian, philosopher and hexameter poet Xenophanes, ‘the first Greek author drawing 
a parallel between [Homer and Hesiod]’,89 criticized the epic poets harshly. His famous 
statement runs thus:  
 
pavnta qeoi~̀ ajnevqhkan   {Omhrov~ q’   JHsivodo~ te, 
o{ssa par’ ajnqrwvpoisin ojneivdea kai; yovgo~ ejstivn, 
                                               
88 This special archetypical status is suggested by the fact that, as was already mentioned above, the comparison 
of Hesiod and Homer to lawgivers is rather unique; there are no other poets whose verses are so explicitly or 
frequently equated with laws. This is relevant because it is exactly the friction between the lawlike authority of 
the poets and their picture of unlawful gods that is at the heart of the ambiguous view of poetry - and if Hesiod 
and Homer are the only poets with obviously nomothetical connotations, their offending passages are especially 
problematic and likely to be archetypical. Moreover, the oft-heard expression ‘Homer and Hesiod (or vice versa) 
and the other poets’ is virtually without parallel: there are no instances of ‘Pindar and Euripides and the other 
poets’, or the like. This also suggests that Hesiod and Homer, though epic poets, were thought to represent the 
whole field of poetry (see for a fuller discussion of this expression and its variations ch. 3, pp. 97-98). 
89 Sihvola (1989) 7. It should be borne in mind that this claim has the same status as the one making Theagenes 
the first allegorist (see n.10 above); in all likelihood, the comparison did not ‘suddenly spring from Xenophanes’ 
brain’, either. The first Greeks ‘drawing parallels’, just like the first Greeks applying allegory, were of course the 
poets themselves. 
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klevptein moiceuvein te kai; ajllhvlou~ ajpateuvein. 
 
‘Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all 
sorts of things which are matters of reproach and censure among men: 
theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.’90 
 
The main point of this much-discussed fragment is clear: Hesiod and Homer represent the 
gods as displaying behaviour that is unacceptable among men.91 Stealing, committing 
adultery and deceiving each other are unlawful acts that disrupt the organized society of the 
polis; hence, the gods of epic set a bad example, and Hesiod and Homer are responsible.92  
    Even though we do not know how this fragment related to the poem of which it was part, 
we should notice (as modern commentators seem not to do) how the three lines are specially 
arranged to drive the point home: the first line contains a statement that seems positive and is 
per se wholly unremarkable,93 but in fact it is the setup preparing for the twist of the second 
line, where the pavnta turn out to be morally reprehensible things, further elaborated on in the 
third line.94 This strategy, common in archaic poetry,95 reminds one of the sympotic game of 
ajmfivboloi gnwm̀ai, in which the first speaker composes a hexameter verse containing a 
problem, which the next speaker has to resolve in a second verse,96 except it is the other way 
around: the problem is raised in the second line, almost as if Xenophanes wanted to suggest 
that there are no poetic solutions, only problems. 
                                               
90 DK B 11, translation Lesher (1992), slightly altered. 
91 Babut (1974) rightly stresses that Xenophanes chose crimes that damage the very ‘fondements de la société’ 
(91) - he applies a politico-social criterion rather than an ethico-religious one. But the distinction is not adamant, 
so that I think it is too strained to argue that the fragment is wholly unrelated to Xenophanes’ rejection of 
anthropomorphism, as Babut does. The interpretation of Lesher (1992) 83-84, who argues that the poets are 
attacked not because of their anthropomorphic representation of the gods but because of their deviation from 
Xenophanes’ own doctrine of divine perfection, is equally strained. 
92 We should beware of Homerocentrism or the wish to separate Hesiod and Homer. Babut claims that ‘theft, 
adultery and mutual deceit’ are allusions to Homer only (87), but this is both incorrect (as there is plenty of 
thieving, adultery and deceiving among the gods in the Th.) and beside the point (we are dealing with 
Xenophanes’ presentation of Hesiod and Homer, and he presents Hesiod and Homer as comparable); there is 
something similar in Detienne (1981) 65 pointing to Homer as the ‘real culprit’. Babut runs into further 
difficulties because of his belief that Hesiod is more of a theologian than Homer, so that he is forced to claim 
that Xenophanes criticizes Hesiod and Homer not as theologians but as poets, the representatives of ‘la culture 
grecque’ (115). This is strained and unnecessary.  
93 In fact, it accords perfectly well with the (presumably) common view voiced by Hdt. Hist. 2.53 (see above, 
esp. p. 56), i.e. that (the poems of) Hesiod and Homer were of crucial importance in the development of the 
Greek view of their gods. 
94 Lesher (1992) 84 points to the ‘touch of sarcasm’ in ajnevqhkan (‘most men honour the gods by ‘offering’ or 
‘dedicating’ (ajnativqhmi), but Homer and Hesiod pay tribute to the gods by ‘attributing’ all sorts of things that 
are matters of shame and reproach’), which adds to the sudden twist. 
95 Cf. Griffith (1990) 197 on the ‘adding-on’ style of the hexameter, making it ‘especially well suited to sudden 
reroutings and inversions’. 
96 This type of riddle is part of the poetical contest in the Certamen, cf. ch. 7 p. 216. 
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    Although it is impossible to determine with certainty the argument of the poem to which 
this fragment belonged, it is not unlikely that it was designed to disqualify the poets as 
educators; we can compare fragment 10 (‘Since from the beginning all have learned according 
to Homer...’),97 which hints at a similar rejection of traditional paideia. It is obvious that 
Xenophanes the wandering poet regarded Hesiod and Homer, who were in the same business, 
as competitors - hence the promotion of his new theology goes hand in hand with the attack 
on the old one. Xenophanes cannot educate, because epic poetry was there first: he has to re-
educate, first eradicating the old views.98  
 
It is interesting to compare Xenophanes’ critique with that of Pythagoras, who - as a leader of 
a religious community in southern Italy - was a theologian and a lawgiver himself. He too 
seems to have condemned Hesiod and Homer because of their immoral picture of the gods: 
 
fhsi; d’   JIerwvnumo~ katelqovnta aujto;n eij~   {A/dou th;n me;n   JHsiovdou yuch;n ijdeìn 
pro;~ kivoni calkw/̀ dedemevnhn kai; trivzousan, th;n d’   {Omhvrou kremamevnhn ajpo; 
devndrou kai; o[fei~ peri; aujth;n ajnq’ w|n ei\pon peri; qeẁn, kolazomevnou~ de; kai; 
tou;~ mh; qevlonta~ suneiǹai taì~ eJautwǹ gunaixiv: kai; dh; kai; dia; toùto timhqh̀nai 
uJpo; tẁn ejn Krovtwni. 
 
Hieronymus [of Rhodes] says that he [Pythagoras], when he descended into Hades, 
saw the soul of Hesiod there, bound against a bronze column and squeeking, and that 
of Homer too, hung from a tree, with snakes all around it, as a punishment for what 
they have said about the gods; and he also saw being punished the men who did not 
want to have sex with their own wives. And that is why, according to Hieronymus, he 
was honoured by the inhabitants of Croton.’99 
 
                                               
97 ejx ajrch̀~ kaq’   {Omhron ejpei; memaqhvkasi pavnte~, transl. Lesher. It is incorrect to take this fragment to 
mean that Xenophanes regarded Homer as the worse of the two poets, as Detienne (1981) 126-127 does. This is 
unduly Homerocentric, because a) there is no way of knowing how this fragment continued (it may have 
mentioned Hesiod as well), b) there is also a reference to Hesiod without Homer in the fragments of Xenophanes 
(see next note), and c) the fragment denouncing the poets explicitly (11) mentions both Homer and Hesiod 
(which is the most important and principal point). 
98 Cf. DK B 1, where Xenophanes argues that the plavsmata twǹ protevrwn (‘fictions of the poets before us’, 
22), i.e. the ‘songs of battles between Titans and Giants’ (21), should be replaced with eujfhvmoi~ muvqoi~ kai; 
kaqarois̀i lovgoi~ (‘reverent words and pure speech’, 14). He is obviously hinting at Hesiod here (cf. also the 
wordplay on promhqeivhn in 24).  
99 Fr. 42 Wehrli (= D.L. 8.21). 
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This story of Pythagoras’ descent into the underworld is old, although we can never be sure 
whether Pythagoras himself or one of his followers came up with it.100 However that may be, 
it contains an attitude toward Hesiod and Homer that is very similar to that of Xenophanes: in 
return for ‘what they have said about the gods’, the poets are presented as suffering 
punishment in hell, which I take to be an imaginative way of criticizing both the ungodly 
behaviour and lack of perfection of the epic gods.101 It appears that it is especially the 
destructive influence of such representations on society that Pythagoras is concerned with, 
since the other sinners in the underworld committed adultery, a crime associated with the 
poets by Xenophanes too.102 The link is not explicit, though it is not unlikely that this is what 
connects the two types of sinners: one group of adulterers, and the two poets for presenting 
the gods as such. 
    But there is more to be gained from the fragment. The punishment of the poets, which no-
one seems to have commented on before, is described in decidedly mythical terms. Hesiod 
himself informs us that bronze is the main building material of Tartarus, and according to 
Homer ‘squeeking’ (trivzw) is what dead souls do.103 Moreover, in the Theogony Prometheus 
is ‘bound’ to a ‘column’ by Zeus.104 It appears, then, that Hesiod - or his soul at least - is 
getting a taste of his own medicine. The fate of Homer in similar fashion resembles that of the 
mythical musician Marsyas, who was also hung from a tree.105 
    This repayment in kind serves a purpose, for it is obviously a powerful stroke of satire to 
make the souls of Hesiod and Homer pay for their ‘sins’ in a way that they could have 
described themselves. On the other hand, however, the fact that the souls are punished after 
                                               
100 White (2004) 203 suggests that the story was contained in Hieronymus’ work On Citharodes, the fifth book 
of On Poets (3rd century BC); it may go back several centuries earlier. White also points to the verse narrative 
entitled Descent into Hades which presumably dealt with Pythagoras’ adventure and may have included his 
seeing the poets. The Descent was in antiquity ascribed to several Pythagoreans; one of them was Cercops, who 
according to Aristotle (fr. 75 Rose) was a critic of Hesiod.  
101 Cf. Iamb. VP 218: ‘[Pythagoras] proved that the gods are not responsible for evil: diseases and other bodily 
afflictions are the offspring of bad conduct. He refuted the mistakes of storytellers and poets’ (periv te tẁn 
kakw~̀ legomevnwn ejn toì~ muvqoi~ dihvlegxe tou;~ logopoiouv~ te kai; poihtav~, transl. Clark 1989). 
102 Adultery was perceived as a particularly heinous crime by Pythagoras, cf. Iamb. VP 48, 50 and 132. See also 
Kahn (2001) 9-10, who suggests that ‘the protected and even egalitarian position of women and the emphasis on 
strictly conjugal sex (…) seem to reflect a family policy designed to enhance the prospects of the community for 
physical survival’. 
103 According to the Th. there is a bronze fence around Tartarus (726), and a bronze gate around the prison of the 
Titans (733); Day and Night are said to cross a bronze threshold (749-750). For the squeeking of souls see Il. 
23.100 and Od. 24.5 and 7. Plato also objects to Homer representing souls as squeeking (citing both passages 
from Homer in R. 387a). 
104 Th. 521-522; the words devw and kivwn are used. Incidentally, this punishment is by the scholiast ad Th. 522  
interpreted as a description of the soul being bound to the body. 
105 The story is not in Homer but already referred to by Herodotus (Hist. 7.26); many versions attribute the 




their bodies die is not in itself discordant with what we know of Pythagorean eschatology. 
Despite the great scholarly discord on particulars, it is commonly accepted that Pythagoras, 
the expert ‘in matters concerning the afterlife’,106 was a firm believer in the immortality of the 
soul and reincarnation, and could very well have propagated some form of purification after 
death.107 So even though the fragment contains an explicit attack on the poets, it still allows 
for the language of myth, when properly interpreted, to point to the truth - there is thus no 
need to abandon poetry altogether. It is this observation, which transfers the obligation of 
propriety from the author to the interpreter, that is of great importance for the defence of the 
two poets. To this we will now turn. 
 
4.2 - Strategies of Defence 
The Greek defence of poetry against reproaches of impiety and injustice is a subject 
thoroughly studied, both as a whole and from more limited perspectives.108 What follows in 
this subsection is such a small-scale approach, which focuses on Hesiod and Homer together 
and is limited to the ways in which the Greeks tried to negotiate the difficult status of epic as 
educational poetry containing distinctly unedifying passages. From early periods onwards, at 
least five such defensive strategies developed: selection, altering the surface, in-depth or 
allegorical reading, applying the concept of poetic licence, and harmonization. These will now 
be briefly discussed.  
 
4.2.1 - Selection 
The easiest way around the problem of poetic authority - and not, strictly speaking, a strategy 
of defence - is to leave aside the morally doubtful passages in Hesiod and Homer, and focus 
on the beneficial ones instead. This practice is both very common and very obvious, but it 
deserves attention because it helps us to remember the peculiar way the Greeks made use of 
their poetic texts. In everyday situations, the recipient author or speaker would quote (or refer 
to) lines or small passages that fit a certain ad hoc goal in his own discourse. He focuses on 
one specific part at a time, and so the general notion of Homeric and Hesiodic impiety does 
not at all prevent him from quoting and praising particular verses. And so the well-known 
                                               
106 Kahn (2001) 11, referring to such early sources as Herodotus and Ion of Chios, among others (11-13). 
107 See Von Fritz (1963) 187-191 for early parallels for the evidence for such a Pythagorean purification; he 
omits the most obvious parallel to our passage, i.e. Pl. R. 615e-616a, where Er, the traveller from beyond, 
recounts how he saw the souls of great wrong-doers (in this case, tyrants) being bound, flayed and lacerated.  
108 See e.g. the excellent study of Stoic ways of defending poetry by Nussbaum (1993) 131-145, who singles out 
four weapons from the ‘Stoic rationalizing arsenal’ (131) used to render poetry harmless: censorship, the writing 
of new poetry, allegorical interpretation, and critical spectatorship. 
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objections are generally ignored and the poets appear as wise and pious as they could be. This 
process of ‘fragmentation’ of the poets was extremely common109 and suggests that the 
existence of some objectionable passages may therefore have been less of a problem to the 
average Greek. 
    To give just one example: although the fragment discussed above strongly suggests that the 
Pythagoreans were critical of the poems of Hesiod and Homer, there are nonetheless several 
reports that their poetry formed part of Pythagorean training. Iamblichus, for instance, 
mentions their part in the curriculum twice, saying that the Pythagoreans ‘used selected 
passages of Homer and Hesiod to ‘correct’ the soul (pro;~ ejpanovrqwsin yuch~̀)’.110 
Detienne, who collected a good many proofs of the Pythagorean interest in the pedagogical 
use of Homer and Hesiod,111 rightly stressed that the keyword here is ‘selected’ (the levxei~ 
are called ejxeilegmevnai or dieilegmevnai): the use of certain epic passages, interpreted – of 
course – within the right Pythagorean framework, resulted in ‘une certaine conformité de leur 
pensée avec les oeuvres poétiques’.112  
    In this case, the recipients did not simply ignore the objectionable passages in Hesiod and 
Homer, but there is even evidence that they positively condemned them - nonetheless, they 
still found an educational or purificational use for particular passages. This practice of partial 
rejection is in no way unique in antiquity and perhaps connected to a theory often attested in 
later antiquity, i.e. that Hesiod and Homer were not so much creative mythmakers as rather 
preservers of ancient wisdom. According to this theory, especially en vogue in Stoicism, 
originally true stories stemming from an age so pure that language still reflected reality 
became almost hopelessly corrupted by an endless process of poetic reworking, so that the 
end products visible today are perverted and unintelligible. Hesiod and Homer occupy a 
special place in this chain of degeneration because they are so ancient that there are still some 
                                               
109 The process should be connected to the curious fact that there are no Gesamtinterpretationen of any of the 
epic poems extant extant from antiquity, though small passages, single lines or individual words are heavily 
commented upon. Incidentally, the practice of fragmentary appreciation is sometimes made explicit; the most 
interesting passage is perhaps Pl. R. 468d, when Socrates in the midst of his attack on the epic poets still 
indicates that there are also praiseworthy passages in Homer and Hesiod, so that when Homer speaks fittingly of 
a reward for a hero it is said that ‘we will follow Homer in these matters at least’ (peisovmeqa (...) taùtav ge   
JOmhvrw/).   
110 Iamb. VP 111 and 164. 
111 Detienne (1962), esp. chapter 2 (Les poèmes Homériques et Hésiodiques dans la secte Pythagoricienne). See 
on the reputed connection between Pythagoras and Hesiod also Struck (2004) 103-104. 
112 Detienne (1962) 31. At the same time, Detienne argues, poetic training ensured that all Pythagoreans went 
through a form of paideia comparable to that of their master, who had reportedly been a student of the Homerists 
of Samos (31-32). 
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traces of the original wisdom left in their works.113 This approach makes it unnecessary to 
defend or save Hesiod and Homer as they are regarded as untrustworthy vessels of ancient 
truths. The morally challenging passages can simply be rejected. 
 
4.2.2 - Altering the surface 
Passages that were thought offensive did not always need clever allegory to save them; 
sometimes clever re-interpretation was enough. I count as ‘altering the surface’ all cases in 
which a critic takes the sting out of a certain passage by offering an alternative surface 
reading, for instance by redefining the meaning of some key-term; more radical solutions are 
suggesting an emendation or even deleting a line or passage. This strategy does not take 
recourse to any ‘deeper’ or allegorical truth; the apparent flaws are shown to be the result of 
misunderstanding the (original) text of Hesiod and Homer. 
    The practice must have been extremely common, especially in hellenistic times and 
beyond. As far as redefinition is concerned: Plutarch in his treatise on how to understand the 
poets in fact exhorts students to ‘adapt the usage of words to fit the matter in hand, as the 
grammarians teach us to do, taking a word for one signification at one time, and at another 
time for another’.114 Needless to say, the defensive power of this procedure is immense. For 
instance, Hesiod’s potentially elitist remark that ‘virtue goes along with wealth’ (plouvtw/ d’ 
ajrethv ojphdeì) is easily neutralized by explaining that with ajrethv he meant ‘repute, or 
influence, or good fortune, or the like’.115 Plutarch’s remark that this interpretive manoeuvre 
was taught at schools seems to be borne out by the fact that there are many traces of it in the 
scholia;116 the same goes for emendation and deletion.117 
                                               
113 On the Stoic view of Hesiod and Homer as vehicles instead of allegorists see Most (1989, esp. 2018-2023) 
Long (1992). Cornutus states explicitly that of Hesiod’s Theogony ‘some parts, as I think, were borrowed from 
more ancient sources, while other parts were in a more mythical fashion put forward by himself; and in this way 
the greatest part of the ancient theology became corrupted’ (ta; mevn tina, wJ~ oi\mai, para; tẁn ajrcaiotevrwn 
aujtoù pareilhfovto~, ta; de; muqikwvteron ajf’ auJtoù prosqevnto~, w|/ trovpw/ kai; pleìsta th̀~ palaià~ 
qeologiva~ diefqavrh, Epidr. 17). There is a clear link between this theory and one attributing the true and 
valuable part of epic poetry to flashes of inspiration; as these flashes became ever more rare Hesiod and Homer 
could still occasionally benefit from them, while later poets were utterly bereft of the Muse and forced to make 
everything up. See further ch. 9, pp. 312-313. 
114 Plu. Mor. 22F: th;n creivan th;n tẁn ojnomavtwn sunoikeioùn toì~ uJpokeimevnoi~ pravgmasin, wJ~ oiJ 
grammatikoi; didavskousin, a[llhn pro;~ a[lla duvnamin lambanovntwn. 
115 Plu. Mor. 24E: ajnti; dovxh~ h] dunavmew~ h] eujtuciva~ h[ tino~ oJmoivou (referring to WD 313). See for a 
comparably convenient re-interpretation of a Hesiodic passage 23E-F. 
116 See e.g. S WD 42a, 302-303, 311, 315-316, 324-326. 
117 See e.g. S WD 30, 160-161, 287-290, 353-354; see also Plutarch deleting WD 267-73 (where Hesiod wishes 
not to be just if Zeus will not reward the just) ‘because they are unworthy of Hesiod’s opinion concerning justice 
and injustice’ (wJ~ ajnaxivou~ th̀~   JHsiovdou peri; dikaivwn kai; ajdivkwn krivsew~, S WD 270-273. 
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    But ‘altering the surface’ was also practised in classical times. Perhaps the finest example 
of this strategy is found in Xenophon’s version of the trial of Socrates. According to 
Xenophon, ‘the accuser alleged that [Socrates] selected from the most famous poets the most 
immoral passages, and used them as testimony in teaching his companions to be tyrants and 
malefactors’118 - the examples given are Works and Days 311,119 which Socrates supposedly 
‘interpreted as the poet’s advice to refrain from no work, dishonest or disgraceful, but to do 
anything for gain’, and Iliad 2.188-191 and 198-202,120 which Socrates supposedly ‘explained 
to mean that the poet approved of chastising common and poor folk’. Socrates is thus accused 
of selecting the morally worst passages in Hesiod and Homer (i.e. passages better left 
‘unselected’), and interpreting them in a way that is destructive to (democratic) society. 
Xenophon, however, defends Socrates by arguing that he in fact interpreted them differently. 
As to Works and Days 311: since Socrates himself understands e[rgon as ‘good work’ 
(ajgaqovn ti poieìn), and ajergivh as ‘any occupation that is immoral and leads to loss’ (ti 
ponhro;n kai; ejpizhvmion poieìn), he could not possibly have taken Hesiod’s line to mean 
anything bad, but rather as an injunction to do good work. And as for the passage from the 
Iliad: Socrates merely cited it to show that ‘those who render no service either by word or 
deed, who cannot help army or city or the people itself in time of need, ought to be stopped’ - 
be they rich or poor, noble or base. 
    At the end of Xenophon’s defence, Socrates through this re-interpretation turns out to have 
done the exact opposite of the things he is accused of: he promotes doing good work instead 
of inciting people to be kakoùrgoi, and is not tyrannical but instead ‘one of the people and a 
friend of mankind’ (dhmotiko;~ kai; filavnqrwpo~). But we should also notice that not only 
Socrates himself but the poets are cleared as well. This is especially obvious in the case of the 
Hesiodic passage, where two observations suggest that this line of defence was originally 
meant for Hesiod: a) the fact that this explanation of Works and Days 311 was common and 
thus not invented by Socrates (or Xenophon),121 and b) the fact that Xenophon concludes his 
                                               
118 X. Mem. 1.2.56: e[fh d’ aujto;n oJ kathvgoro~ kai; tẁn ejndoxotavtwn poihtẁn ejklegovmenon ta; ponhrovtata 
kai; touvtoi~ marturivoi~ crwvmenon didavskein tou;~ sunovnta~ kakouvrgou~ te ei\nai kai; turannikouv~. 
119 WD 311 runs e[rgon d’ oujde;n o[neido~, ajergivh dev t’ o[neido~ (‘work is no disgrace [or, as it was obviously 
interpreted in this context, ‘no work is a disgrace’], but idleness is a disgrace)’. When understood wrongly, this 
verse could incite people to become kakoùrgoi. 
120 In this passage Odysseus prepares the Greek army for a meeting; he restrains the noblemen with gentle words 
but insults the common people; such behaviour could inspire men to become turannikoiv. This passage was 
perhaps notorious for its possibly anti-democratic purport, cf. Iambl. VP 259.  
121 Cf. Pl. Chrm. 163b and perhaps Democritus DK B 218; see also D.Chrys. 7.110-111. 
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re-interpretation with the exonerative remark that ‘when thus interpreted, there is nothing 
amiss with the line’.122  
    The examples show how ‘altering the surface’ could radically change the moral purport of 
a poetic passage, without taking recourse to allegorical reading. The poetry of Hesiod and 
Homer, being so fundamental and at the same time so problematic, was rather susceptible to 
this form of defence.  
 
4.2.3-  Allegorical Reading 
Allegorical reading was a very early response to epic poetry; as stated above, it sought for 
meaning of poetic texts in a ‘sense’ hidden ‘under’ the surface content - hence the term 
uJpovnoia.123 Allegory, loosely defined by Richardson as ‘any interpretation which disregarded 
the obvious literal sense of a passage in favour of a more subtle way of taking the words’, is a 
fairly straightforward concept, though some nuances are called for. Apart from the valuable 
distinction between weak and strong allegory made by Long,124 we should recognize that 
some allegorical readings are ‘easier’ than others. Understanding Hesiod’s Eros as a cosmic 
principle is a form of allegory, but it takes considerably less interpretive effort than seeing 
Zeus’ threat to hang all the world by a golden chain from Olympus as a statement on the 
universe’s dependence on the circular motion of the heavenly bodies.125 It is perhaps not 
unlikely (although there is no direct evidence for it) that allegory of Hesiod was perhaps 
slightly earlier than that of Homer, given the great similarities between (the first part of the) 
Theogony and the cosmogonical accounts of the natural philosophers,126 and the cosmological 
interests of the first allegorists in general.127 The allegorical interpretation of Homer, on the 
other hand, was definitely more popular: the Homeric poems allowed for more spectacular 
                                               
122 ejk de; touvtwn ojrqw~̀ a]n e[coi, Mem. 1.2.57. 
123 The term was much en vogue in Plato’s time but, as Struck (2004) 39 has shown, the original term for hidden 
meaning was ai[nigma (cf. Ford 1999b 38-42 discusses ai\no~ and aijnivttomai as the central terms of allegorical 
reading, Nünlist 2009 225-237 commenting on the wide application of aijnivttomai, and Coulter 1976 57 citing 
Proclus In R. 1.85 who states that allegory is prompted by the ‘grim, monstruous, and unnatural character of 
poetic fictions’ which causes the reader to look beyond - or rather beneath - the literal meaning). The term 
ajllhgoriva is of later, probably Stoic, origin. 
124 See p. 52 n.8. 
125  Plato mentions this allegorical reading of Il. 8.18-27 in Tht. 153d. 
126 On which see further ch. 6, pp. 164-172. 
127 On the other hand, it is certainly true that ‘Homer seemed to cooperate with his allegorically minded readers’, 
as Clarke (1981) 63 puts it, discussing the allegorical interpretation of Homer in the 15th to 18th century. The 
judgement of Paris, however, the passage described as ‘blatantly allegorical’ by Clarke (ibid.), does not feature 
in the Homeric poems. It is interesting, in this light, that Homer’s clearest ‘cosmology’ (the representation of the 
world on the shield of Achilles, Il. 18.478-608) resembles Hesiod’s account of the birth of the universe; see Clay 
(1992) 132-137.   
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interpretations and thus provided interpreters a better occasion for surprising their audience 
and showing off their knowledge and learning.128 
    Despite such modern observations, however, the Greeks themselves seem to have regarded 
the allegorical reading of both the Hesiodic and the Homeric poems as roughly comparable. 
First of all, the corpora most often searched for hyponoiai are the poems of Hesiod and 
Homer.129 In Plato, for instance, Hesiod and Homer are almost the only poets allegorically 
interpreted; in the Stoic corpus they are still pre-eminent.130 Secondly, allegorical readings of 
either poet were used indiscriminately to strenghten one’s own argument, as the numerous 
(‘weak’) allegories by for instance the Stoics show.131 And thirdly, there is ample evidence for 
the notion that allegory was a very legitimate way of acquitting the two poets of whatever was 
deemed unfitting in the surface text. For instance: in the passage from Philo’s De Providentia 
mentioned above, the philosopher claims that objectional passages in Hesiod and Homer in 
fact ‘do not include blasphemy about the gods, but are a sign of the presence of a physical 
theory’ (neque … blasphemiam includit de Diis, sed est indicium inclusae physiologiae), and 
that it is childish not to admit ‘the rules of allegory and its interpretations’ (regulas allegoriae 
aut sententiarum).132  
                                               
128 See also ch. 1, pp. 40 and 44. There might be a trace of the classical preoccupation with Homeric (instead of 
Hesiodic) allegory in Plato R. 377e-378e. Socrates, beginning the attack on poetry, gives an example of the lies 
Hesiod and Homer have spread: ‘There is, first of all, the greatest lie about the things of greatest concern (to; 
mevgiston kai; peri; twǹ megivstwn), which was no pretty invention of him who told how Uranus did what 
Hesiod says he did to Cronus, and how Cronus in turn took his revenge, and then there are the doings and 
sufferings of Cronus at the hands of his son. Even if they were true (eij h\n ajlhqh̀) I should not think that they 
ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons...’ (377e-378a). When switching to some of the horrors 
Homer has been telling about, Socrates says: ‘But Hera’s fetterings by her son and the hurling out of heaven of 
Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of the gods in 
Homer’s verse are things that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegory or without allegory 
(ou[t’ ejn uJponoivai~ pepoihmevna~ ou[te a[neu ujponoiẁn). For the young are not able to distinguish what is and 
what is not allegory…’ (378d). We should note the parallelism of both passages: first Socrates gives some 
examples of the dreadful lies of the poet in question, and then imagines how these would affect the young. It is 
therefore remarkable that in the case of Hesiod Socrates suggests the stories are either untrue or true (and in 
either case the young should never hear of them), but that in Homer’s case the stories are either literal or 
allegorical (and here too in either case the young should never hear of them). This difference is perhaps an 
indication that allegorical reading of Homer was more popular than that of Hesiod. 
129 See Lamberton and Keaney (1992). 
130 Plato mentions allegorical interpretation of Hesiod at least 7 times (Cra. 397e, 402b; Tht. 155d; Ly. 215c; Prt. 
316d; R. 468e, 546e), that of Homer at least 10 times (Cra. 402a, 407a; Tht. 153d, 160d, 179e, 194c, Smp. 179b, 
Phdr. 252b, Prt. 316d, R. 378d) - I found no such interpretations of the other poets Plato often refers to (Pindar, 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides). Among the Stoic interpreters, Euripides is the only one coming close to 
the status of Hesiod and Homer (cf. SVF 1.539). 
131 Incidentally, during the post-classical age we find more ‘spectacular’ allegories of Hesiod as well; see for 
instance Zeno’s interpretation of the Cyclopes as the circular motions of heaven (SVF 1.118), and Chrysippus’ 
reading of Athena’s birth from the head of Zeus (SVF 2.208-9).  
132 Ph. De Prov. 2.40-41; see also n.123. 
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    Since allegorical interpretation was used and recognized as a defence of poetry, and Hesiod 
and Homer were the authors most often allegorically interpreted, we may conclude that their 
poetry was generally believed to be most worthy of (and most in need of) allegorical defence. 
 
4.2.4 - The Freedom of Poets  
So far, we have seen three attempts to come to terms with what I have called the problem of 
poetic authority: one can 1) simply ignore the morally inexcusable passages and focus on 
fitting ones instead; 2) argue for a positive re-reading of the surface meaning; or 3) accept the 
‘bad’ surface and argue that there is a ‘good’ meaning hidden underneath. To these old 
strategies, applied especially to the poems of Hesiod and Homer, another is added at a later 
time: it is the claim, first explicitly stated by Aristotle, that poetry is a special type of 
discourse allowed to defy the normal demands of truth, propriety, and possibility.133 The poets 
thus became ‘free’. 
    Most discussions on poetic freedom in antiquity take the socio-political perspective and 
focus on the poet’s right to speak out as an independent and unrestrained voice.134 The 
freedom I am concerned with, however, is freedom in a much narrower sense: poetic ejxousiva 
(‘licence’).135 Some critics believed that the aim of poetry was to please and enchant the 
audience, and in order to do this, poets were allowed to create their own universe with its own 
laws.136 Consequently, the poets could freely bend or break rules that were expected from 
ordinary discourse, both with regard to form (displaying deviations in morphology, syntax, 
diction, and metre) and, which is of greater interest to the present discussion, to content 
(allowing for plots lacking in consistency or plausibility). 
     It appears that Hesiod and Homer were the poets most often associated with this form of 
poetic licence. For instance: Strabo, who often feels the need to defend Homer against charges 
of historical or geographical falsehoods, points out several times that Homer is a poet; and 
poets sometimes ‘weave in myths intentionally, not through ignorance of the facts, but 
                                               
133 See the elaborate treatment in Arist. Po. 1460b6-1461b26. Of special interest is 1460b35-1461a1, where ‘the 
tales about gods’ (ta; peri; qeẁn) with which Xenophanes found fault, are excused on the basis of the principle 
that poets may represent things 1) as they are (oi|a h\n h] e[stin); 2) as they ought to be (oi|a ei\nai deì) or 3) 
(which applies in this case) as they are said to be (oi|av fasin kai; dokeì, see 1460b10-11). 
134 See, for instance, Sluiter and Rosen (2004), esp. the contributions of Raaflaub (41-61) and Braund (409-428). 
As far as I know, there are no articles or monographs on the subject of poetic licence in its more narrow sense; 
the most exhaustive treatment is that of Meijering (1987) 62-67. 
135 According to Grube (1965) 131 the technical term used by the Alexandrians was (poihtikh;) ajreskeiva, but 
the example he gives (S Il. 2.45a A) is the only time ajreskeiva occurs in this sense in the Homeric scholia. 
136 ‘Impossibilities (…) are correct, if they serve the end of poetry itself’ (ajduvnata ... ojrqẁ~ e[cei, eij tugcavnei 
toù tevlou~ toù auJth̀~, Arist. Po. 1460b23-24); Lucian says of poetry that ‘liberty is absolute and there is one 
law - the will of the poet’ (a[krato~ hJ ejleuqeriva kai; novmo~ ei|~ - to; dovxan tẁ/ poihth̀/, Hist.Conscr. 8); cf.  
Quint. 10.1.28-30.  
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through an intentional invention of the impossible, to gratify the taste for the marvellous and 
the entertaining’137 - and in this respect, he is compared first and foremost to Hesiod.138 
Plutarch complains that critics are often too involved with small problems in poetic texts and 
thus fail to see the bigger picture; he gives Hesiod and Homer as examples.139 It is Hesiod 
himself, however, who offers the best example for the poet’s claim to ejxousiva as a defence 
against overly enthousiastic nitpicking. When Lucian in his Dialogue with Hesiod accuses 
him of not making good on his promise to tell the future, Hesiod replies that he was inspired 
and thus cannot be held accountable for what he said. But then he turns to another line of 
defence: 
 
ouj gavr, oi\mai, crh; para; twǹ poihtẁn ej~ to; leptovtaton ajkribologoumevnou~ 
ajpaiteìn kata; sullabh;n eJkavsthn ejntelh̀ pavntw~ ta; eijrhmevna, ka]n ei[ ti ejn tw/̀ 
th̀~ poihvsew~ drovmw/ pararrue;n lavqh/, pikrẁ~ toùto ejxetavzein, ajll’ eijdevnai o{ti 
polla; hJmeì~ kai; twǹ mevtrwn e{neka kai; th~̀ eujfwniva~ ejpembavllomen: ta; de; kai; 
to; e[po~ aujto; pollavki~ leìa o[nta oujk oi\d’ o{pw~ parevdexato. su; de; to; mevgiston 
w|n e[comen ajgaqẁn ajfairh/̀ hJmà~ - levgw de; th;n ejleuqerivan kai; th;n ejn tw/̀ poieìn 
ejxousivan, kai; ta; me;n a[lla oujc oJra/̀~ o{sa th~̀ poihvsew~ kalav, skindalavmou~ de; 
kai; ajkavnqa~ tina;~ ejklevgei~ kai; laba;~ th/̀ sukofantiva/ zhtei~̀. ajll’ ouj movno~ 
taùta su; oujde; kat’ ejmoù movnou, ajlla; polloi; kai; a[lloi ta; toù oJmotevcnou tou ̀
ejmoù  JOmhvrou kataknivzousi lepta; ou{tw komidh/̀ kai; mavlista mikra; a[tta 
diexiovnte~. 
 
‘It is not, I think, proper to examine poetry in minute detail, nor to demand complete 
perfection down to every syllable of what is said, nor again to criticise bitterly any 
unconscious oversight in the flow of composition. No, you must realise that we 
include much for the sake of both metre and euphony, and often the verse itself has 
somehow let in some things, they fit so smoothly. But you are robbing us of our 
greatest possession – I mean freedom and poetic licence. You are blind to the other 
beauties of poetry, and pick out a few splinters and thorns and seek out handles for 
captious criticism. You are not alone in this, nor am I the only victim. Many others 
                                               
137 muvqou~ paraplevkousin eJkovnte~, oujk ajgnoiva/ twǹ o[ntwn, ajlla; plavsei tẁn ajdunavtwn terateiva~ kai; 
tevryew~ cavrin, 1.2.35. See also 1.2.17 for a definition of ejxousiva, said to consist of iJstoriva (‘history’, aiming 
at truth), diavqesi~ (‘composition’, aiming at vividness) and muvqo~ (‘myth’, aiming at pleasure and amazement). 
138 Cf. Str. 1.2.14 and 1.2.35. See further ch. 1.3, pp. 35-45. 
139 Plu. Mor. 28B. 
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pick the poetry of my fellow-craftsman Homer utterly to pieces, pointing out similar 
niggling details, the merest trifles.’140 
 
This passage is taken from a larger ‘defence of poetry’ (poihtikh; ajpologiva, Hes. 5) that 
carries juridical overtones: although Lucian’s alter ego Lycinus does not formally ‘charge’ 
Hesiod, the poet reacts as if he is on trial.141 More directly relevant to us, however, are three 
points: 1) the fact that Hesiod defends himself by appealing to poetic licence, 2) the fact that 
he mentions Homer as his oJmovtecno~ or ‘fellow-craftsman’, entitled to the same freedom, and 
3) the fact that Lycinus, as the rest of the dialogue shows, does not accept ejxousiva as a valid 
line of defence. These three observations indicate that Hesiod’s tirade is a caricature of the 
misunderstood artist, whose recourse to poetic freedom is subsequently rejected. To provoke 
such criticism by Lucian, the practice of defending especially Hesiod and Homer through 
ejxousiva must have been frequent.  
    The examples from Strabo, Plutarch and Lucian imply that the ‘strategy’ of poetic licence 
was primarily used to account for historically or physically impossible tales that strike the 
audience as incredible or fantastic (the so-called ajpivqanon). This is borne out by the scholia, 
which often acquit the poets of such ‘mistakes’ by pointing to their right to exaggerate, distort 
or simply invent stories as they see fit.142 It is in fact only on rare occasions that poetic licence 
is employed to explain away morally challenging passages, although the scholiast’s remark on 
the Homeric description of Ares being bound by the giants Otus and Ephialtes sounds like a 
general rule: ‘Aristarchus believes that we should understand what the poet says as part of a 
myth, in agreement with poetic licence, and that we should not trouble ourselves with 
explanations beyond what the poet says’.143 In reaction to other, allegorical interpretations, 
                                               
140 Lucian Hes. 5. 
141 Hesiod’s reply is couched in the language of law: he speaks several times about ‘defending’ himself, calls 
Lycinus a ‘sycophant’ and describes Lycinus’ reproach as a ‘charge’. But it is also the structure of Hesiod’s 
reply that reminds us of legal discourse: his plea as a whole (Hes. 4-6) seems to be informed by the legal-
rhetorical theory of stavsei~ or status, which is concerned with finding the right position to be taken up by the 
defence. Hesiod shifting his lines of defence (‘it was not I making promises but the Muses’ - ‘there should be 
some freedom for poets’ - ‘Homer did it too’ - ‘Lycinus does not know what poetry is about and so should not 
judge me’) resembles the accused party in a trial considering which status to choose for the defence. See Sluiter 
(2005) for a lucid exposition of status theory. 
142 See Meijering (1987) 62-67 and Nünlist (2009) 174-184, both dealing only with poetic freedom with regard 
to realism and consistency. 
143 S Il. 5.385 (D):   jArivstarco~ ajxioì ta; frazovmena uJpo; toù poihtoù muqikwvteron ejkdevcesqai, kata; th;n 
poihtikh;n ejxousivan, mhde;n e[xw tẁn frazomevnwn uJpo; toù poihtoù periergazomevnou~. 
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Aristarchus thus explains the passage through poetic licence: the shocking episode is simply 
part of myth. There are other examples, though not many.144 
 
4.2.5 - Harmonization 
The Greeks thus developed an impressive range of strategies to defend the poets’ central 
position in education: selection, altering the surface, allegorical reading, and the concept of 
poetic licence. Such interpretive tools, however, also at the same time shift the meaning and 
authority from the poems to their interpreters. This shift is unavoidable and universal: 
whenever texts are canonized or ‘enshrined’, an ever-growing gap arises between the moment 
of fixation and the subsequent re-readings that keep moving away from that moment, and a 
continuous exegetical effort is needed to keep the canon relevant.145 Usually, a special caste 
of interpreters takes care of this: in the case of Greece, these are the schoolmasters and 
rhapsodes, but also the sophists and philosophers. Paradoxically, the tools that are supposed to 
keep Hesiod and Homer close to later generations also indicate an ever-growing distance. The 
poems speak less and less for themselves, and they must be understood through others.  
    It is another well-known paradox that the fixation of the text is followed by a proliferation 
of meanings: the interpreters all have their own agenda. This is not necessarily a problem, for 
the source text thus becomes richer and more interesting. The scholia, for instance, show us 
that Hesiodic or Homeric verses can often be interpreted in different but nonetheless non-
exclusive ways; in general, the scholiast does not prefer or disqualify certain readings but 
demonstrates his knowledge by enumerating all the exegetical possibilities.146 From another 
perspective, however, this polyinterpretability of the poems, together with an apparent 
absence of clear rules for interpretation, could also be a dangerous thing, especially where 
ethics are concerned: it provides a carte blanche for the interpreter in question, since it is 
nearly impossible to determine what the ‘right’ interpretation is.   
    This problem seems to have been considerable in the case of Hesiod and Homer, whose 
poems were felt to belong to everybody. At least two factors contributed to this feeling: first, 
the poets’ fundamental position in Greek education, which provided all citizens with (at least) 
a rudimentary knowledge of their poems; and second, the scale of the appropriation of their 
poems by professionals, which made the ‘laymen’ aware of many different and perhaps 
                                               
144 S Il. 8.428-429 (AbT), 14.176 (bT). I have not been able to find Hesiod connected to such licence; perhaps on 
his own he was too ethically sound to need it. The statement of Richardson (2006) 185, that the scholia ‘defend 
poetic freedom to ‘follow the myths’ however shocking or odd these may seem later’ thus seems slightly 
inaccurate, as ejxousiva far more often explains the odd than the shocking. 
145 Cf. Assmann (2000) 56-59. 
146 Alternatives being separated by the (neutral) term a[llw~ (cf. Dickey 2007 108-109). 
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contradictory interpretations. Richardson speaks of ‘a climate of opinion in which less 
enlightened figures might pursue their own theories about Homer’s ‘true meanings’’,147 and 
his Homerocentric remark undoubtedly goes for Hesiod as well. The sophists in fact thrived 
on the poems’ status as cultural common property,148 which seems to go hand in hand with a 
democratization of Hesiod and Homer in legal contexts.149 In Plato too we find a particular 
concern for the fact that everybody could harness the authority of the poets for his own 
cause.150 Interpreting Hesiod and Homer could thus become a very individual, almost 
personal affair.151 
    Apart from this unsettling polyinterpretability, the problem of poetic authority was further 
increased by the rise of another authority on ethics, i.e. philosophy. So far, we have seen how 
thinkers found fault with the nomothetical status of Hesiod and Homer because their poems 
contained passages that advocated behaviour incompatible with the laws. But after the 
foundation of the Academy, the Lyceum, and the schools of Epicurus and the Stoa, the Greeks 
were faced with no less than three different prescriptive bodies: laws, poets, and philosophical 
doctrine. This potentially confusing situation is problematized in the Second Sophistic. In 
Lucian’s Necyomantia, for instance, the protagonist Menippus descends into Hades to ask 
Tiresias how one should live, because it is exactly the contradictory instructions by the poets, 
laws and philosophers that have made him utterly confused. As a boy, he listened to the poets 
talk about quarrels, adultery and theft - but these things, as he found out later, were forbidden 
by the laws, which gave rise to a great ‘ambivalence’ (ajmfiboliva, 3) in Menippus. He tried 
                                               
147 Richardson (1975) 69. 
148 See Morgan (2000) 89-94. There is an interesting passage from Isocrates’ Panathenaicus, that seems to 
oppose two ways of teaching: Isocrates’ ideal, i.e. one schoolmaster organizing a single coherent system of 
education without any room for the poets, or the sophistical practice of sharing and repeating interpretations 
about ‘the poets, especially the poetry of Hesiod and Homer’ (periv te tẁn a[llwn poihtẁn kai; th̀~   JHsiovdou 
kai; th̀~   JOmhvrou poihvsew~, Panath. 18). 
149 Cf. Ford (1999). 
150 Of all the times Hesiod and Homer are mentioned together in the Republic, they are quoted only twice, and in 
both instances in support of a moral abomination: in 364c-e (quoted above), to demonstrate that injustice pays 
better than justice, and in 363a-c, where the poets - according to their interpreters - praise the benefits of a 
reputation of justice rather than of justice itself. Plato deliberately quotes the passages from Hesiod and Homer 
out of context and ascribes a meaning to them never intended by the poets themselves; in fact, the circumstance 
that all citations are fare more naturally explained as exhortations to justice, excellence and godliness adds 
considerably to the irony of the Republic-passages (see further Koning 2009). Other than in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia, no interpretative correction is offered: the reading of the nameless ‘they’ is allowed to run 
completely off the rail, as a clear demonstration of yet another dangerous aspect of poetry: the fact that its 
interpretations cannot be checked. See also Euthphr. 5e-6a, where Euthyphro defends his prosecution of his 
father with Hesiod’s tale of Zeus castrating Kronos; such a ‘Platonic reductio ad absurdum of contemporary 
moral and legal debate’ (Robb 1994 83) is comparable to the absurd interpretation of Homer by some of 
Aristophanes’ characters (on which see Verdenius (1970 11-12). 
151 See the discussion of Xenophon’s Memorabilia in 4.2.2 above: it is because of Socrates’ idea of e[rgon as 
‘good work’ that Hesiod’s line passes the test, and because of Socrates’ supposedly democratic persuasion that 
he did not use Homer to promote aristocratic values. 
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to solve his ajporiva by going to the philosophers, but this only made things worse:152 in the 
end, Menippus felt ‘like a drowsy man, nodding now this way and now that.’153 Eventually, 
he gives up and ends up following the simple life of the cynic.  
    This, however, was not the only possible response. Some critics recognized that the 
philosophers, especially those whose thoughts had become part of the canon too, could offer 
the criterion by which interpretations of poetry could be measured. Such ‘harmonization’ of 
the poetical and philosophical canon could greatly benefit the Greek ethical or educational 
system by making ethical prescriptions 1) more powerful (for they could lean on the authority 
of both poets and philosophers), 2) unified and unequivocal, and 3) thoroughly Greek. These 
advantages were particularly appealing to the intelligentsia of the Second Sophistic, who were 
eager to present themselves as the latest heirs of an unbroken line of Greek tradition. Hence 
they often tried their hand at the merging of canons.154 
    One of the clearest examples of this practice of harmonization comes from Plutarch’s 
treatise on how to understand the poets, designed to enable young readers to recognize 
(ethically) good passages in poetry. After going through the several steps155 necessary for the 
development of the readers’ power of judgement, we come to the final and crucial test, in 
which the thoughts of the poets are compared to those of philosophers. In 36a-b, Plutarch 
demonstrates that the purport of Zeus’ words to Aphrodite in Iliad 5.428-429 (‘not to you, my 
child, are given works of war; but attend to the lovely works of marriage’) corresponds 
exactly to that of the famous maxim ‘Know yourself’, just as Works and Days lines 40 (‘fools, 
they do not know how much more the half is than the whole’) and 266 (‘an evil plan is most 
evil for the planner’) ‘are identical with the doctrines of Plato in the Gorgias and the Republic 
upon the principle that ‘to do wrong is worse than to be wronged’ and ‘to do evil is more 
                                               
152 He went ‘out of the smoke into the fire’, as he himself puts it, eij~ aujto; to; pùr ejk toù kapnoù (4).  
153 Nec. 4: e[pascon toì~ nustavzousi touvtoi~ o{moion, a[rti me;n ejpineuvwn, a[rti de; ajnaneuvwn e[mpalin. This 
perplexity is brought on especially by the philosophers, who each expressed ‘the most contradictory opinions’ 
(peri; tẁn ejnantiwtavtwn e{kasto~ aujtwǹ levgwn); but it is obvious (both from the earlier-mentioned 
‘ambivalence’ and the fact that the philosophers in paragraph 4 cite Hesiod to add further to the confusion) that 
Menippus’ uncertainty is also due to the three authorities disagreeing with each other.  
154 Such harmonization is a relatively common practice, see e.g. Varro (who is borrowing from Greek sources) 
distinguishing three types of theological discourse (the mythical, physical, and political, fr. 6 and 7) and 
demonstrating how they are in fact three separate expressions of the same truth.  
155 The five steps (Heirman 1972 8) are the following: 1) we have to come to a realization of the nature of poetry 
and its relation to the truth; 2) we must look at examples of evaluation in the text; 3) we must try to acquire a 
deeper understanding of the nature of poetry; 4) we must engage in exercises such as trying to improve upon the 
words of the poet, or giving them a wider application; 5) if the poem is beautiful enough, we ought to find the 
corresponding words of the philosophers. A good example of the second step is provided by Plutarch himself in 
the Comp. Arist. Cat. 3.3.2, where Odysseus’ pronounced dislike of work in Od.14.222-225 is by Plutarch 
believed to agree with the praise of labour in WD 498-501, since Odysseus is playing the role of a villain.  
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injurious than to suffer evil’.’156 According to Plutarch, poetic passages are good and valuable 
when they can be harmonized with the statements of sages and philosophers.157 At the same 
time, the alignment of the voices of the Greek champions of education, i.e. Plato, the well-
known Delphic inscriptions and of Hesiod and Homer, brings on an almost irresistible 
authority: the ethical advice cannot but be true. 
    More evidence for the practice of harmonization can easily be gained from the scholia on 
Hesiod and Homer. Apparently Plato, despite his own persistent attacks on the poets, was felt 
to be a particularly suitable philosopher to harmonize with Hesiod and Homer. For instance: 
Hesiod and Plato are said to agree on demons overseeing human affairs, on the essential role 
of one’s education for leading a good life, on the fact that leading a life in agreement with 
ajrethv is both the best and sweetest, and on the importance of kairos.158 At the same time, the 
scholiasts point to similarities in Homer and Plato: both say that the soul of a living person is 
bound up with his bones, that plenty of food and drink fill a person with the right attitude, and 
that it is essential to honour one’s parents; there are even some, the scholiast says, who 
believe that Plato derived the tripartition of the soul from Homer.159 Attempts at 
harmonization can also be found in other sources.160 
    Our evidence points out that the poets most often interpreted to fit the philosophers are 
Hesiod and Homer. Even though Plutarch in the passage mentioned above shows that the 
expressions of other poets can be brought into harmony with the thoughts of the philosophers 
as well, he thinks first of Hesiod and Homer. Similarly, Maximus of Tyre in his fourth 
oration, specifically designed to demonstrate that poetry and philosophy ‘are two names for 
                                               
156 Plu. Mor. 36A-B. The Gorgias-passages referred to are 473a and 474c, and examples from the Republic may 
be found in 354a and 334d. See Hunter (2008) 161-162 for another example of such alignment by Plutarch. 
157 See also Mor. 35F, where Plutarch advises his students in poetry to ‘shatter the authority of worthless and 
harmful poems (faùla kai; blabera; poihvmata) by pitting against them the remarks and views of well-known 
political thinkers (lovgou~ kai; gnwvma~ ajntitavttonte~ ejndovxwn kai; politikẁn ajndrẁn). But, by the same 
token, whenever we come upon something noble and gracious we ought to foster it and give it more importance 
by using proofs and testimonies (ajpodeivxesi kai; marturivai~) from the works of philosophers (...). Our 
confidence in the poets gains strength and dignity whenever the doctrines of a Pythagoras or Plato are in 
agreement with what is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school’ (transl. Heirman 1972). In 
Mor. 763E Plutarch claims that poets, legislators and philosophers agree that Love is a god, and refers to Hesiod, 
Solon and Plato. 
158 S WD 122a (and 124a), 130a, 290-292, 689-694. See also the scholia on WD 15, 111, 113-115, 130-131, 200-
201, 266a, 274-280, 286, 423-427, 448-452, 689-694, 695-698, 706, 709 and 759a. Most of these harmonizing 
interpretations are made by the neoplatonist Proclus, though some go back to Plutarch or are anonymous. 
159 S Il. 12.386d (T), 19.167 (bT), 24.371 (T), 18.113b (A). The scholia also pay attention to the Plato’s critique 
on Homer, see for instance S Il. 14.176b (bT), 14.342-351 (bT), 18.22-35a (A), 24.527-528b (bT). 
160 The Stoics are perhaps the most obvious harmonizers, cf. SVF 1.539 (= Phld. Piet. 13). See further e.g. Aelius 
Aristides, who makes Plato agree with Hesiod (2.438), while Dio Chrysostom in his 55th oration elaborately 
compares Socrates with Homer, claiming the philosopher was the poet’s pupil. Clemens of Alexandria often tries 
to harmonize Christian thought with sayings of the poets (see e.g. Strom. 5.100.3, 107.2, 112.3, 129.5-6); see 
also Lib. Or. 16.46-47 (calling both Hesiod and Homer and Plato and Pythagoras educators providing essential 
moral instruction) and Philo De Aeternitate Mundi 17. 
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what is, in reality, a single thing’,161 points first to the philosophical quality of Hesiod and 
Homer.162 Furthermore, the scholia on the other popular poets - Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles 
and Euripides - do not show comparable attempts at harmonization, at least not to the same 
degree.163 Harmonizing the ‘Big Three’ - law, poetry, and philosophy - was the dream of any 
educator: it instilled in the pupil an unequivocal, unshakeable, and thoroughly Greek ethical 
ideal with the tremendous force of the three authorities combined: laws, poets, and 
philosophers - and it is clear that Hesiod and Homer were the poets’ foremost representatives. 
 
5 - Conclusion 
This chapter began with a short description of Homer’s central position in Greek education 
and ethics, and has demonstrated that scholars both ancient and modern are often quick to 
raise his status as guide and teacher to monopolistic proportions (section 1). It is the 
conclusion of this chapter, however, that such a picture is too simplistic and inaccurate, at 
least for the archaic and early classical period. Instead of taking the (oft-discussed) position of 
Homer as the starting-point for an investigation into the authority of Hesiod and Homer 
combined, we should probably turn things around, and accept that a great prescriptive value 
was originally ascribed equally to both poets, or to their combination.  
    A number of considerations favour such a view. First of all: we have seen that from earliest 
times onwards the poems’ morals and maxims were believed to be so pertinent that they were 
comparable to the laws of a community. Such a comparison is already implicitly present in 
Herodotus’ statement on Greek theology (one of the first texts mentioning Hesiod and Homer 
together, see section 2), and is frequently seen throughout antiquity: the poets are sometimes 
explicitly said to be engaged in nomoqeteìn, they are compared to lawgivers, they are invoked 
as ‘witnesses’ or ‘proofs’, and their poems are in some respects treated as laws (see section 3). 
Apart from these indications, there is the ancient sense of the poems’ universal appeal (they 
are composed ‘for the Greeks’) and of their essential contribution to a collective identity. 
    The positive evidence for the nomothetical status of Hesiod and Homer is affirmed by 
negative approaches from critics. It is significant that the earliest attacks on poetry that we 
                                               
161 Or. 4.1: crh̀ma ditto;n me;n kata; to; o[noma, aJploùn de; kata; th;n oujsivan (transl. Trapp 1997). 
162 Or. 4.3. See also Lucian Anach. 21.23, where Solon presents an idealized form of Greek education and 
pictures the young Athenians as studying the laws and discussing with philosophers - before this, however, they 
are to listen to and remember the poetry of Hesiod and Homer. 
163 The scholia on Pindar mention Plato only five times, and in four of those instances ‘harmonization’ takes 
place. The numbers for the scholia on the three tragedians are even more revealing: Aeschylus 5 (0), Sophocles 2 
(0), Euripides 1 (1). Even when one takes into account that there are considerably less scholia on these four poets 
than on Hesiod and Homer, the contrast remains striking. 
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have, by thinkers like Xenophanes, Pythagoras and Plato,164 are aimed at Hesiod and Homer 
together. The critics recognized that their poetry was filled with passages that could inspire 
immoral behaviour; it was especially their descriptions of the underworld and of the conduct 
of the gods that were thought to be damaging to society. As a general rule that holds in 
classical as well as later times, attacks on Hesiod and Homer together are usually aimed at the 
Homeric poems in combination with the Theogony (concentrating on the brutal behaviour of 
the gods), while praise is reserved for Homer’s poetry combined with the Works and Days 
(focusing on ‘great deeds and wise sayings’). It seems inaccurate to say, on the basis of the 
evidence presented in sections 3 and 4.1, that Homer is generally linked to either the 
Theogony or the Works and Days165 - the connection depends on the context.  
    It is highly illustrative of the importance of Hesiod and Homer that they were not, on 
account of ‘what they said about the gods’, punished, ejected from education or banished 
altogether - whatever some critics may have suggested. Instead, in order to keep the poets, a 
refined and elaborate system of defensive strategies emerged to evade or neutralize 
problematic passages, or to positively turn them around: selection, altering the surface, 
allegorical reading, poetic licence and harmonization (see section 4). Such exegetical 
weaponry was not used exclusively on the poems of Hesiod and Homer, but their poetry was 
definitely the main target.   
    In sum, this chapter has first and foremost shown that in the Greek imagination the 
combination of Hesiod and Homer in the field of ethics and education was extremely strong. 
Together, their poems are both forcefully defended and attacked as the most powerful 
prescriptive texts of society. In the course of time, Homer becomes the most prominent figure 
- but throughout antiquity we find traces of an original unity of Hesiod and Homer together as 
the greatest ‘educators of the Greeks’. 
 
 
                                               
164 To the list of early critics can perhaps be added the lyric poet Stesichorus (c. 632-556), who wrote two 
palinodes, one rejecting a Homeric story, and the other a Hesiodic tale (fr. 193 PMG, on which see Bowie 1993 
23-28). It is impossible to determine, however, whether or not his criticism was ethical/moralistic.  





Hesiod and Homer: the Storekeepers of Knowledge 
 
 
0 - Introduction 
In chapter 2, we have seen that Hesiod and Homer were strongly bound together in the Greek 
imagination where ethics, morality and education are concerned. The two poets, whose 
authority in this field amounted to laws, were often presented together. As a team, they were 
believed to have invented Greek religion and to have established the moral code according to 
which one should interact with other people and the gods. As a unity, they were severely 
attacked by Plato and others for promoting ethically questionable behaviour that could disrupt 
society, while countless teachers defended the canonical status of Hesiod and Homer through 
an extremely elaborate apparatus of exegetical strategies that was developed and passed on 
through the centuries. Eventually, the poets were aligned with other true ‘educators of 
Greece’, such as Plato, Pythagoras, and the Seven Sages. 
    The present chapter will shift from the poets’ authority in the field of ethics to a different 
area of competence: that of natural philosophy, science, and (factual) knowledge. In the first 
section, we will examine if and to what extent Hesiod and Homer together are associated with 
particular scientific and natural-philosophical notions. Contrary to what one may expect, we 
will find that the unity of the poets is extremely weak in this respect. Despite the fact that both 
Hesiod and Homer are often connected with particular philosophical theories and views when 
they appear apart from each other,1 they hardly even count as philosophers when they are 
combined. This is a curious fact in need of explanation. 
    On the other hand, the poems of Hesiod and Homer were often searched for purely factual 
information, especially in the fields of history, geography, anthropology and (human and 
animal) physiology; section 2 will concentrate on the poets’ role as storekeepers of 
knowledge. It is not the main concern of this section to examine what sort of information the 
epic poems were thought to contain (this subject is briefly discussed in 2.1), but rather how 
this information was evaluated. Some critics believed that all poets wrote fiction and were 
more concerned with enchanting the audience than with providing factual information; as 
                                               
1 See on Hesiod’s philosophical qualities ch. 6, and on their incompatibility with the qualities ascribed to Homer 
ch. 9, pp. 263-268. 
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could be expected, Homer was their example par excellence. But others disagreed, and it is 
especially interesting for us that Hesiod played an important part in their argumentation. We 
will see in this chapter that our sources suggest that the combination of Hesiod and Homer 
could somehow be regarded as a class of its own, a special category of just two poets that 
could (to some degree) escape the accusations of fiction and fantasy. We will gain insight into 
the workings of this mechanism if we investigate how this ‘special category’ was given shape 
by the sophists (2.1), and how it related to other categories, such as that of the tragic poets 
(2.2) and the historians (2.3). These sections will make clear that the combination of Hesiod 
and Homer has a different conceptual value than that of the poets treated separately, since it is 
used in a decidedly different way.   
 
 
1 - Hesiod and Homer as Philosophers 
When speaking of the Greek view of Hesiod and Homer as philosophers, it is fundamental to 
distinguish between two types of references: 1) general references to their philosophical 
insights and wisdom, and 2) specific references to their propagation of particular doctrines.  
    The first type is common, and understandably so: the philosophical status of both Hesiod 
and Homer was acknowledged throughout all periods of antiquity. There is ample evidence, 
for instance, that the earliest recipients of epic, the natural philosophers from Milete, regarded 
the poets as their own predecessors; they borrowed freely from and reacted seriously against 
the physiological views either explicit or implicit in the poems of Hesiod and Homer.2 A 
similar debt can be seen in the works of Parmenides and Empedocles.3 It was common 
procedure to select what one needed from the poetic tradition as a whole, and thus use 
Hesiodic material for some purposes, and Homeric for others. This approach continues in the 
classical and later periods. In the fragments that remain from the sophists, and in the works of 
Plato and Aristotle, we often see references made to either Hesiod or Homer: they are hailed 
as the ‘first founder’ of a particular theory, and quotations from their work are employed to 
illustrate a certain notion, be it in the field of epistemology, natural philosophy or linguistics.4 
                                               
2 See e.g. Cornford (1952) 187-201, Stokes (1962 and 1963), and Ferrari (1984) 202 dismissing the statement of 
Havelock (1983) 80 that ‘philosophy proper arose as a commentary upon and correction of the cosmic imagery 
of Homer and the cosmic architecture of Hesiod’ as ‘disappointingly uncontroversial’; see further ch. 6, pp. 164-
172. It was especially the cosmogonical and cosmological passages in the poems the Milesians were interested 
in, but other passages of a more physiological nature must have appealed to them as well (we can think, for 
instance, of Hesiod’s ‘physical’ explanation of mist, clouds and rain in WD 548-553).  
3 For Hesiodic influence on the works of Parmenides and Empedocles see ch. 6, pp. 181-188. For Homeric 
influence on Parmenides cf. e.g. Vos (1963) and Meijer (1984). 
4 See further ch. 6 and  9.  
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This eclectic use of the poets allows for them to be occasionally mentioned together as 
philosophers.5 This observation fits well with one of the conclusions of the previous chapter, 
i.e. that the two poets were often aligned with the best-known philosophers and sages and thus 
achieved a certain philosophical quality. 
    The second type of reference, however, is extremely rare. None of the early philosophers 
refers to Hesiod and Homer together, and nowhere do we find the two poets together as either 
the creative source or even the illustrative material for a specific philosophical doctrine. This 
observation is confirmed by Stoic references to Hesiod and Homer: their poems are the 
Stoics’ favorite texts for philosophical exegesis, but they do not provide the same 
philosophical insights.6 And a similar picture emerges from the scholia: Hesiod and Homer 
appear as the most ‘philosophical’ of poets,7 but the specific tenets ascribed to them are not 
the same. Generally speaking, then, the poets are both regarded as philosophers, and hence 
comparable, but they are not seen as a combination where the particular content of their 
respective philosophies is concerned. 
    Exceptions to this general rule are hard to find. The only explicit example I could find for 
the classical period is a passage from Plato’s Cratylus, where Socrates ascribes the 
Heraclitean notion of flux to both poets. After a brief summary of Heraclitus’ beliefs,8 
Socrates conjectures that such thinking is more ancient since ‘Homer speaks of ‘Ocean, origin 
of the gods, and their mother Tethys’, and I think Hesiod does so too…’.9 The connection of 
the poets to a specific doctrine seems fairly straightforward here: the literary depiction of a 
river as the origin of all things is put on a par with the theory of flux. But even in this one 
                                               
5 Thus Hesiod and Homer are for instance said to ‘philosophize’ by Clemens (Strom. 5.4.24.1). According to 
Maximus of Tyre (Or. 4.3), the human soul was less complicated in archaic times, and Hesiod and Homer 
provided ‘gentle and artistic kind of philosophy which would guide it and control it by the use of myths’ 
(filosofiva~ mousikh̀~ tino~ kai; pra/otevra~, h} dia; muvqwn dhmagwghvsei aujth;n kai; metaceirieìtai, cf. Or. 
26.2). See also  Arist. Metaph. 982b7-983b20 (on which see Schmitter 1991 58) and the epilogue of Cornutus’ 
Epidrome (saying that ‘the ancients’ (oiJ palaioiv), by which he primarily means Hesiod and Homer, were ‘both 
able to understand the nature of the universe and inclined to philosophize about it through symbols and riddles’ 
(kai; pro;~ to; dia; sumbovlwn kai; aijnigmavtwn filosofh̀sai peri; aujth̀~ eujepivforoi, Epidr. 35 p. 76 Lang).   
6 It is striking that the Stoics themselves do not refer to the combination of Hesiod and Homer, but of course do 
refer to the poets very often separately. Only in the mouths of others (cf. Plu. Mor. 948E-F = SVF 2.430), 
especially their opponents (cf. Galen Hipp. 3.2 260 Müller = SVF 2.906, Cic. N.D. 1.41, Phld. Piet. 13 = SVF 
1.539), do we hear that the Stoics make use of the poems of ‘Hesiod and Homer’. 
7 In the scholia, Hesiod and Homer are explicitly called philosophers or said to philosophize far more often than 
other poets; compare the number of instances for Hesiod (4 times) and Homer (9), for instance, with those for 
Pindar (1), Aeschylus (0), Sophocles (2; in one of those, S El. 86, the philosophical thought is said to go back to 
Hesiod) and Euripides (1; although his characters are called philosophical three times). 
8 Pl. Cra. 402a:  ‘Heraclitus says somewhere that ‘everything gives way and nothing stands fast’, and, likening 
the things that are to the flowing of a river, he says that ‘you cannot step into the same river twice’’ (Levgei pou   
JHravkleito~ o{ti ‘pavnta cwrei ̀kai; oujde;n mevnei’, kai; potamoù rJoh/̀ ajpeikavzwn ta; o[nta levgei wJ~ ‘di;~ ej~ to;n 
aujto;n potamo;n oujk a]n ejmbaivh~’). 
9 Pl. Cra. 402a-c:   {Omhro~ ‘  jWkeanovn te qewǹ gevnesivn’ fhsin ‘kai; mhtevra Thquvn’: oi\mai de; kai;   
JHsivodo~... (transl. slightly altered). 
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explicit case the combination is rather weak as Hesiod is added with a certain hesitation 
(oi\mai) - and rightly so -10 and the theory of flux is elsewhere in Plato only associated with 
Homer.11 Besides this passage from Cratylus, other philosophical equations of Hesiod and 
Homer qua content are much later and not very strong either.12  
    We must conclude, then, that Hesiod and Homer were generally regarded as philosophers, 
but that their combination was not attached to any particular doctrine. This is a remarkable 
conclusion since it clearly contrasts with the findings of the previous chapter, where we have 
seen that the two poets were both regarded as moral authorities and were often credited with 
the same ethical notions, be it either approvingly (the ‘wise sayings’ and ‘famous deeds 
worthy of imitation’) or disapprovingly (the objectionable picture of the gods and the 
underworld).  
    Part of the explanation for this discrepancy lies in the fact that Hesiod and Homer have 
always played a central part in Greek education, and thus had to be seen as comparable in this 
respect. Their combination in the field of ethics both carried the weight of tradition and was 
proven of educational value each day. Philosophy, however, was a later and more intellectual 
endeavour, which makes it a priori more suitable for differentiation.13 As we will see in 
chapters 6 and 9, Hesiod and Homer were in fact, from the classical period onwards, credited 
with very distinct and often completely opposite notions on especially epistemology and 
ontology. With such a contradictory view on the poets rather firmly in place, it was unlikely 
for the Greeks to present them as a philosophical combination, except in a most general way.  
    Such a combination, on the other hand, was possible in cases where Hesiod and Homer 
were regarded as age-old authorities recording and handing down factual knowledge. This is a 
matter to which we will now turn. 
 
2 - Old Knowers: an Exclusive Category 
The poems of Homer, for a Greek, contained more than moral advice and stories of gods and 
heroes; as Havelock pointed out, the Iliad and Odyssey constituted a kind of ‘encyclopaedia’ 
                                               
10 The cited verse on Ocean occurs twice in Homer (Il. 14.201 and 302) but nowhere in Hesiod. Perhaps Plato 
means that Hesiod says something comparable (‘I think Hesiod says much the same’, in Reeve’s unaltered 
translation); maybe he is thinking of Th. 337 (‘Tethys bore to Ocean eddying rivers’, the introductory sentence to 
the catalogue of rivers), as Patzer (1986) 52 suggests. There can be little doubt that Plato mentions Hesiod in the 
first place because he derives his material from Hippias’ Synagoge (see pp. 95-98). 
11 Cf. Tht. 153a, 153d, 160d, 179e (and see further ch. 9.1, pp. 263-268). 
12 See Plu. Mor. 1088D (the reference to Hesiod is obvious here, see e.g. Adam (1974) and Einarson-De Lacy 
(1967) ad loc. contra Zacher 1982 103) and fragm. 178; S.E. Adv. Phys. 1.7.  
13 Such differentiation is perhaps sharpened by the Greeks’ conscious search for the prẁto~ euJrethv~ (‘first 
founder’) of particular views or inventions, which allows only one ‘discoverer’ at a time. 
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filled with all sorts of factual knowledge relevant to the audience, be it historical, technical, or 
geographical.14 The breadth of such knowledge attributed to the poet seems to have been 
virtually endless, from instruction on the proper way to conduct a sacrifice to the rules of 
successful seamanship - anyone listening to the adventures of Odysseus would in the 
meantime learn how to build a raft or address a stranger. And although Havelock stressed the 
importance of epic’s encyclopaedic function in an essentially oral society, Homer’s immense 
scope of learning seems to have remained a commonplace throughout antiquity, as the famous 
libellum De Vita et Poesi Homeri II demonstrates.15  
    Scholars have been remarkably less eager to point to the comparable position held by 
Hesiod, who seems to have been a similarly encyclopaedic figure to the Greeks: he was 
considered an expert in such fields as the (early) history of Greece, geography, astronomy, 
ethnology, animals and monsters, and specific crafts like household economy and of course 
agriculture.16 It need not surprise us, therefore, that the poets are often mentioned together as 
the authorities on numerous matters. Herodotus, for instance, names both Hesiod and Homer 
as sources for one of the world’s most obscure peoples, the Hyperboreans,17 and Stesichorus 
is said to have written two poems to correct stories told by Hesiod and Homer.18 Apart from 
such early cases there are many other references to the two poets as knowers: according to 
Ephorus, Hesiod and Homer agreed on the justice of the Scythian people, and Strabo too 
mentions the two poets as authorities familiar with Scythians, Arabians and Pelasgians, as 
well as with certain geographical data.19 Plutarch says that Hesiod and Homer showed us the 
right way of praying, and rightly distinguish between sorts of seers, and Lucian (ironically) 
                                               
14 See Havelock 1963, who pays much attention to religious and ethical instruction as well. Although he focuses 
on Homer, Havelock grants this encyclopaedic function to Hesiod as well (61-64, and further 97-114). 
15 Cf. Max.Tyr. Or. 26.1 and 4 presenting a long list of Homer’s areas of expertise; cf. Seneca Ep. 88.5 mocking 
all philosophical schools for their appropriation of Homer. 
16 Examples of the expertise attributed to Hesiod: early history and genealogy Hecat. fr. 19, Str. 7.72, S Il. 
2.523a (b), 2.604 (test.), 12.292-3 (T), Od. 10.2, 10.139, 12.69, J. Ap. 11.6 and Ant. 1.108, Theon 2.93, Paus. 
2.6.5, Men.Rhet. 3.338 Spengel; geography Str. 8.3.11, 8.6.8, 9.5.22, 14.5.17, S Il. 2.523a (b), Od. 1.85; 
astronomy [Pl.] Epin. 990a, Plin. Nat. 18.213, Plu. Mor. 402E; ethnology Str. 7.7.2; animals and monsters Arist. 
HA 591a4, Nic. Ther. 10-12, Str. 9.1.9, S Il. 6.181b (bT), 8.367-8 (AbT), Plu. Mor. 978F; the household Pl. Lg. 
677e, Arist. Oec. 1343a18-21, S Il. 1.250b (AbT), Plu. Mor. 157F, 753A, 940C; agriculture Varro RR 1.1.9, 
Virgil Georg. 2.176, Prop. 2.34.77-78, Ovid Fasti 6.13-14, Plin. NH 14.3, 15.3, 18.201 and 25.12. Heraclitus 
called Hesiod a much-knower (DK B 40). The scholia on Th. and WD abound with references to Hesiod’s factual 
knowledge. 
17 Hdt. Hist. 4.32. It is clear that Herodotus, who after this passage tells us what he knows of this half-mythical 
people, was at first hesitant to accept their existence; a reasonable doubt, considering that their close neighbours 
the Scythians, who speak even of one-eyed men, do not mention them at all. It is the authority of Hesiod and 
Homer that encourages him to carry on his investigation. 
18 Stesichorus fr. 193 PMG. One poem of Stesichorus was directed against Homer and argued that his account of 
the abduction of Helen was false; the other poem was directed against Hesiod, but it is unknown what story he 
found fault with.  
19 Ap. Str. 7.39; Str. 7.3.7, 1.2.34, 7.7.10, 9.2.34, 9.3.16. 
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calls them both astronomers.20 The scholia provide us with ample evidence on the coupling of 
Hesiod and Homer in the field of knowledge: for instance, they agree on the name of 
Achilles’ daughter, the place where Oedipus died, the origin of man, the existence of a race of 
heroes, the name of the town Hyria, the hiding-place of Typhoeus, the wind-appeasing 
capabilities of the Sirens, and the right way to grind grain.21 
    Obviously, Hesiod and Homer were not the only poets credited with factual knowledge of 
many different subjects; to a certain extent the Greeks considered their poets and prose-
writers in general as storekeepers of knowledge. Nonetheless, there are several indications 
that Hesiod and Homer in this respect belonged to a category of their own. Their special 
status finds expression in at least two ways: 1) they were often taken together in a way that 
excluded all other Greek authors, and 2) more credence was attached to their words than to 
those of others, especially when those others were poets. I will now illustrate these two ways 
by examining how the Greeks distinguished Hesiod and Homer from other groups of alleged 
knowers, i.e. the tragedians (2.2) and the historians (2.3). Whereas Homer was often regarded 
as a tragic poet, we will see that such a qualification was impossible for Hesiod; as a result, 
their combination set them apart from the tragic poets, who are generally described as later 
but less truthful and less accurate. The veracity and reliability of the poets are also at stake in 
the ancient debate concerning the relationship of Hesiod and Homer with the historians; I 
hope to show that in this debate, it is especially the combination of the two that plays a vital 
role.  
    First, however, by way of introduction, I will briefly discuss the sophists’ categorization of 
Hesiod and Homer (2.1). Some of them attempted to appropriate the poets’ authority by 
turning them into proto-sophists, and in so doing, they were the first to explicitly group them 
together as a separate category. 
 
2.1 - Making Groups: the Sophists 
Scholars have often pointed out that the sophists’ approach to Hesiod and Homer was widely 
different from that of the (early) philosophers. Whereas the latter tended to find fault with the 
poets because they regarded them as competition, the sophists deliberately appropriated ‘the 
cultural tradition of which mythological poetry was so important a part’,22 and tried to 
assimilate the poets as proto-sophists. In an excellent study of the sophists’ treatment of 
                                               
20 Plu. Mor. 169B, 593D; Lucian Astr. 22. Cf. Aristid. Or. 27.18 coupling the poets as experts in ancient lore.  
21 S Il. 16.175a (T), 23.679 (T), Od. 24.13, WD 159a, Il. 2.496 (A), Th. 304, Od. 12.168, 7.104.  
22 Morgan (2000) 90. 
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Hesiod and Homer, Morgan demonstrated the many advantages that such an approach could 
have. Apart from the fact that the sophists could manipulate myth and harness the authority of 
the poets, there were considerable practical benefits. The sophists were itinerant teachers, and 
the epic poems fulfilled their need for a Hellenic lingua franca. At the same time, the very 
fact that mythological poetry was so well-known allowed the sophists to impress the audience 
with new and stunning insights into old and familiar texts. Moreover, by aligning themselves 
with traditional education, the sophists intended to trade their image of radical innovation for 
one of reassuring continuity.23 
   Hesiod and Homer were not the sophists’ only area of interest; in fact, the sophists aimed to 
present themselves as incorporating all possible wisdom and learning. In this great collection 
of knowledge, however, some did reserve a special place for the two poets. Consider, for 
instance, the proem of Hippias’ Synagoge: 
 
touvtwn i[sw~ ei[rhtai ta; me;n   jOrfeì, ta; de; Mousaivw/ kata; bracu; a[llw/ ajllacoù, 
ta; de;  JHsiovdw/ ta; de;  JOmhvrw/, ta; de; toi~̀ a[lloi~ tẁn poihtẁn, ta; de; ejn 
suggrafai~̀ ta; me;n  {Ellhsi ta; de; barbavroi~: ejgw; de; ejk pavntwn touvtwn ta; 
mevgista kai; oJmovfula sunqei;~ toùton kaino;n kai; polueidh̀ to;n lovgon 
poihvsomai.  
 
‘Of these things some may perhaps have been said by Orpheus, some briefly here and 
there by Musaeus, some by Hesiod, some by Homer, some by others among the poets, 
some in prose-writing whether by Greeks or by barbarians. But I will put together the 
most important and inter-related passages from all these sources, and will thus make 
this present piece both new and varied in kind.’24 
 
Hippias’ Synagoge (‘Collection’) was a compilation of quotations from all kinds of sources, 
ordered around particular themes or ‘philosophical’ views, such as the primacy of Eros or the 
theory of flux; the result was a ‘collection of quotes (...) extended (…) into the philosophical 
realm’, an ‘umfassender Überblick über die Lehrmeinungen und Ansichten’, maybe even ‘a 
beginning of the writing of the history of philosophy’.25 Of greatest interest to us is Hippias’ 
                                               
23 See Morgan (2000), chapter 4. Morgan rightly stresses that this is indeed only a matter of image. The sophists’ 
treatment of traditional stories in their speeches is morally conservative on the surface but at the same time 
contains hints of innovation and subversiveness meant to attract the attention of the smart (and wealthy). 
24 DK 86 B 6 (transl. Kerferd 1981, slightly adapted). 
25 Morgan (2000) 95-96, Patzer (1986) 32, Kerferd (1981) 49. As such, the program of the Synagoge fitted very 
well with one of Hippias’ most fundamental beliefs, i.e. that all men are comparable and share the same basic set 
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obvious attempt to organize and categorize sources of knowledge; he is the first, for instance, 
to distinguish between poetry and prose. Amid his subdivisions, Hesiod and Homer occupy a 
special place: between Orpheus and Musaeus (separated from them spatially by the phrase 
kata; bracu; a[llw/ ajllacoù)26 and the rest of the poets (distinguishing them by calling them 
‘other’ and leaving them anonymous). Even though Hippias uses some formal criteria (such 
as the division between poetry and prose, and that between Greek and barbarian), this way of 
setting Hesiod and Homer apart suggests that the combination of their names is enough to 
indicate a specific category. According to this reading, Hippias visualizes five sources of 
knowledge: the sayings of Orpheus and Musaeus, the poetry of Hesiod and Homer, the other 
(presumably Greek) poets, Greek prose, and non-Greek prose. The category of Hesiod and 
Homer is thus presented as unique and exclusive.27 
    Hippias’ list calls to mind a similar division made by Protagoras, or at least the Protagoras 
presented to us by Plato. When Socrates meets him, the sophist mentions the dangers of being 
a traveling professor: sometimes one meets with hostility and resentment. He then continues: 
 
ejgw; de; th;n sofistikh;n tevcnhn fhmi; me;n ei\nai palaiavn, tou;~ de; metaceiri-
zomevnou~ aujth;n twǹ palaiẁn ajndrwǹ, foboumevnou~ to; ejpacqe;~ aujth̀~, provschma 
poieìsqai kai; prokaluvptesqai, tou;~ me;n poivhsin, oi|on  {Omhrovn te kai;   
JHsivodon kai; Simwnivdhn, tou;~ de; au\ teletav~ te kai; crhsmw/diva~, tou;~ ajmfiv te   
jOrfeva kai; Mousaìon: ejnivou~ dev tina~ h[/sqhmai kai; gumnastikhvn, oi|on   [Ikko~ te 
oJ Tarantiǹo~ kai; oJ nùn e[ti w]n oujdeno;~ h{ttwn sofisth;~ JHrovdiko~ oJ 
Shlumbrianov~, to; de; ajrcaiòn Megareuv~: mousikh;n de;   jAgaqoklh~̀ te oJ 
uJmevtero~ provschma ejpoihvsato, mevga~ w]n sofisthv~, kai; Puqokleivdh~ oJ Keìo~ 
kai; a[lloi polloiv. ou|toi pavnte~, w{sper levgw, fobhqevnte~ to;n fqovnon tai~̀ 
tevcnai~ tauvtai~ parapetavsmasin ejcrhvsanto. 
 
‘Now, I maintain that the sophist’s art is an ancient one, but that the men who 
practiced it in ancient times, fearing the odium attached to it, disguised it, masking it 
                                                                                                                                                   
of rules and ideas: perhaps his work ‘both new and varied in kind’ was meant to demonstrate exactly that. The 
Synagoge, far more than a mere display of learning, would then become a sort of atlas of human culture. 
26 Obviously, the repeated use of dev suggests that all the four named poets are more or less separate entities, but 
the structure of the sentence divides them into two groups. 
27 I disagree wholeheartedly with Patzer (1986) 18, who distinguishes between six ‘Einzelglieder’ (Orpheus, 
Musaeus, Hesiod, Homer, the poets, the prose-writers) and so heaps together the prose-writers who are obviously 
subdivided in Greek and non-Greek specimens. I also reject his claim (20) that Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod and 
Homer are opposed to all other, non-epic poets; in my view, the four poets are subdivided in two groups of two 
(suggested by word-order), and there is nothing to suggest that Hippias regarded Orpheus and Musaeus as epic 
poets.   
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sometimes as poetry, as Homer and Hesiod and Simonides did, or as mystery religions 
and prophecy, witness Orpheus and Musaeus, and occasionally, I’ve noticed, even as 
athletics, as with Iccus of Tarentum and, in your own time, Herodicus of Selymbria 
(originally of Megara), as great a sophist as any. Your own Agathocles, a great 
sophist, used music as a front, as did Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others. All of 
them, as I say, used these various arts as screens out of fear of ill will.’28 
 
Just as in Hippias’ proem, the art of the sophist is presented as one of a most comprehensive 
and varied nature.29 The sophist recognizes several types of education - poetry, religion, 
physical training, music - and claims that they are all to be regarded as part of an all-inclusive 
sophistic discipline. As in the Synagoge, the famous predecessors are mentioned as a way to 
introduce oneself,30 and, most importantly, Hesiod and Homer are again named as one 
particular category of educators (a category more clearly demarcated from that of Orpheus 
and Musaeus than in Hippias’ list), and no less exclusive.31 
    Whether Hippias was really the first to distinguish between genres in a systematic way or 
not, and whether Protagoras’ words are actually Plato’s or not, we can see that early divisions 
of educators and knowers result in Hesiod and Homer constituting a separate and exclusive 
category, distinct from other authors. This status aparte remains visible throughout antiquity. 
Let us examine, for instance, the phrase ‘Hesiod and Homer and the other poets’, i.e. 
instances where Hesiod and Homer are presented as a couple and then combined with a group 
of nameless other poets.32 This phrase occurs, as far as I have been able to establish, 15 times 
(Homer going first in 8 of those instances). In five cases, the group of other poets are further 
                                               
28 Pl. Prt. 316d-e. 
29 The question of the authenticity of Protagoras’ words remains inconclusive. Even though it can be argued that 
the similarity to the Synagoge’s proem makes Protagoras’ speech more sophist-like, this could also be a clever 
picture by Plato (who certainly knew the Synagoge, as was established by Snell 1944 (esp. 178), who is followed 
by e.g. Patzer 1986 33-37 and Kerferd 1981 48-49). 
30 The passage from Protagoras is taken from the beginning of the dialogue, when Protagoras is introducing 
himself to Socrates. He goes on to claim that he is more straightforward than his predecessors since he freely 
admits to being a sophist, and so does not use any provschma (‘front’). But of course the very fact that he is 
ascribing such screens to others is his own screen: in this way he can appropriate the authority of Hesiod and 
Homer (and other acclaimed Greek educators).  
31 The name of Simonides being added to those of the great poets does not invalidate my argument because he is 
only there for narrative economy; in Prt. 339a-347a one of his poems is discussed at length. This may also 
explain why the possibly chronological sequence in Hippias’ list is destroyed, and Orpheus and Musaeus are 
mentioned as the second group. Cf. Prt. 338e-339a, where Plato makes Protagoras say that ‘the greatest part of a 
man’s education is to be in command of poetry, by which I mean the ability to understand the words of the poets, 
to know when a poem is correctly composed and when not, and to know how to analyse a poem and to respond 
to questions about it’ (ajndri; paideiva~ mevgiston mevro~ ei\nai peri; ejpwǹ deino;n ei\nai: e[stin de; toùto ta; 
uJpo; tẁn poihtẁn legovmena oi|ovn t’ ei\nai sunievnai a{ te ojrqw~̀ pepoivhtai kai; a} mhv, kai; ejpivstasqai 
dieleìn te kai; ejrwtwvmenon lovgon doùnai). 
32 See for a other types of phrases containing the names of Hesiod and Homer the appendix to ch. 1. 
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defined. These are simply characterized as the ‘good’ poets in Plato’s Symposium, but in later 
times a genre-distinction seems to play a role since Strabo calls them ‘the tragic poets’, 
Seneca ‘the lyric poets’, and Lucian ‘the other mythmakers’ and elsewhere ‘the best poets and 
especially the tragedians’.33 Another type of phrase, in which Hesiod and Homer are coupled 
and then connected to named others (poets or not), also indicates their separate status, since of 
all 36 cases, I could find only 8 where they are not mentioned right next to each other.34  
    With the ‘separateness’ of Hesiod and Homer well established, we will now investigate 
how the combination of the two poets related to other groups or genres, more specifically the 
tragedians and the historians. 
 
2.2 - Hesiod and Homer versus the Tragedians 
The combination of Hesiod and Homer is often set against the collective tragic poets. This 
might seem rather remarkable, since Homer - without Hesiod - is usually closely affiliated 
with tragedy. Plato, for instance, called him the ‘leader’ (hJgemwvn) of tragedy,35 and Aristotle 
similarly regarded his poetry as both the source of drama and its greatest example.36 The most 
important of reasons for this exceptional position was the extensive mimesis present in 
Homer’s poems, manifest in the many speeches. Both Plato and Aristotle comment on the fact 
that the Homeric poems contain much direct speech, which makes them tragic to a 
considerable degree.37 It must also be borne in mind that rhapsodes were no mere reciters but 
acted out the speeches, imitating the speaker in question. The distinction between Homerist 
and tragedian must thus occasionally have been blurry, and the scholia testify to this fine line: 
they say, for instance, that Homer was the first to introduce in tragedy (eij~ th;n tragw/divan) 
                                               
33 Pl. Smp. 209d, Str. 11.6.3, Seneca Ep. 27.6 (so also Men.Rhet. 3.393.6 Spengel), Lucian Luct. 2.2 and Salt. 
61.2. See also D.Chr. 14.21, who compares Hesiod and Homer to nameless ‘wise men’ (sofoì~ ajndravsin). See 
for the fourth century AD and later e.g. Lib. Ep. 181.4 (‘Hesiod and Homer and the rest of the poets’), Suda 
2.348 (‘Homer and Hesiod and the Attic writers’), and Planudes 5.448 (defining ‘poetry’ as ‘the things by 
Homer and Hesiod and the others’). 
34 The names occurring most in these lists are Pindar (10 times), Stesichorus (8), Archilochus (7) and Euripides 
(7) - all poets that were (with the exception of Euripides) considered old.  
35 Pl. R. 598d; cf. Tht. 152e, R. 595b and R. 607a: crh; ... sugcwreìn  {Omhron poihtikwvtaton ei\nai kai; 
prẁton tẁn tragw/dopoiẁn (‘you should agree that Homer is the most poetic of tragedians and the first among 
them’).  
36 See e.g. Arist. Po. 1448b34-38, 1451a24-29, 1454b11-14, 1454b25-30, and 1460a5-11. Else (1986) speaks of 
the ‘admiration, not to say worship of Homer’ in the Poetics (67), and concludes that for both Plato and Aristotle 
‘the storm center of the debate over tragedy is not the tragedians but Homer’ (85). Cf. Hogan (1973) 96 stating 
Aristotle regarded Homer ‘as the predecessor of all drama’. 
37 Pl. R. 393a-394c makes the famous distinction between imitative poetry (tragedy and comedy), narrative 
poetry (e.g. dithyrambs) and the third, mixed type (of which Homer provides the example). A strikingly similar 
distinction can be found in Arist. Po. 1448a19-25. 
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the peripeteia, silent characters, and children as characters; the scholia also refer to the bards 
depicted in Homer as tragedians.38 
    Hesiod is very different from Homer in this respect. Of the two literary critics mentioned 
above, Plato does not associate him with tragedy, and Aristotle does not refer to him at all in 
his Poetics. This is most likely due to the lack of mimesis in the Hesiodic poems,39 a fact 
commented on by Proclus in his commentary on the Works and Days. After he has introduced 
the traditional distinction between the narrative (dihghmatikovn), dramatic (dramatikovn) and 
mixed (miktovn) modes, he explains:  
 
kai; dihghmatiko;n mevn ejstin ejn w|/ oJ poihth;~ movno~ faivnetai fqeggovmeno~, 
w{sper ejntaùqa oJ poihth;~  JHsivodo~ movno~ ejn panti; tw/̀ suggravmmati faivnetai 
dialegovmeno~: dramatiko;n de; ejn w|/ oujdamoù oJ poihth;~ fqevggetai, w{sper ejn tai~̀ 
kwmw/divai~ oJrwm̀en, kai; taì~ tragw/divai~ genovmenon: mikto;n de;, ejn w|/ o{ te poihth;~ 
dialevgetai, kai; provswpa eijsh̀ktai dialegovmena, oi|on ejn th/̀  jIliavdi ejmfaiv-
netai. 
 
‘And the narrative mode is that in which the poet appears as the only one speaking, 
just as the poet Hesiod here appears as the only speaker in the entire book; the 
dramatic mode however is that in which the poet nowhere speaks, just as we see in the 
comedies, and what happens in the tragedies; and the mixed mode is that in which the 
poet both speaks and has put on characters that are speaking, as is exemplified in the 
Iliad.’40 
 
Proclus seems to voice the communis opinio in antiquity here;41 and since Hesiod, generally 
speaking, was thought to possess no obviously mimetic or tragic quality, he could not easily 
be associated with the tragedians.   
    Hesiod’s decidedly a-tragic quality has a great impact on the position of the combination of 
Hesiod and Homer vis-à-vis the tragedians. The epic poets together are mostly viewed as 
                                               
38 S Il. 2.156 (bT), 1.332b (AbT), 6.466 (bT); S Od. 1.152, 3.267, 8.74, 8.499, 8.542, Il. 13.637a (T). See also S 
Il. 2.478-479a (AbT) for the notion that Homeric poetry contains all genres (history, tragedy, comedy) within 
itself. 
39 The Iliad contains 45 percent direct speech, the Odyssey no less than 67 (see e.g. De Jong 1991 409); compare 
the Th.’s 3 and WD’s near-2 percent (my own calculations, based on the lists of direct and indirect speech in the 
Th. and WD by Leclerc 1993 83-84). On the ‘character-text’ in the Th. see Stoddard (2004) 98-125.  
40 Prol. Procl. Gaisford (1823) 5, own transl. 
41 There are nonetheless two scholia that explicitly state that Hesiod belongs to the mixed category and thus 
contains switches from narrative to dramatic (S Th. 75 and Il. 2.484-877 (b), where Erbse’s conjecture mikthvn 
for mimhtikhvn is surely correct). 
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distinct from the tragedians, and although some critics note that the tragic poets use a different 
language than Hesiod and Homer,42 the main criterion to distinguish between them is that of 
factual information: the tragedians tell the stories differently. It also appears that in those 
cases, the account of Hesiod and Homer is generally believed to be more true.43 
    There are some examples of this belief in greater veracity in the scholia, for instance when 
the scholiast notes that Hesiod and Homer say that Oedipus died in Thebes, in contrast to the 
tragedians.44 Most interestingly, the Socratic dialogue called Minos very explicitly says that 
the tragic depiction of Minos as an evil tyrant conflicts with that of Hesiod and Homer, who 
present him as a just king - and although Socrates’ friend is convinced of the Attic account, 
Socrates calls the epic poets ‘more trustworthy than all the tragedians put together’ 
(piqanwvteroi h] suvmpante~ oiJ tragw/dopoioiv).45 On the very same subject, Plutarch 
remarks that ‘it seems to be a grievous thing for a man to be at enmity with a city which has a 
language and a literature’ ( [Eoike ga;r o[ntw~ calepo;n ei\nai fwnh;n ejcouvsh/ povlei kai; 
moùsan ajpecqavnesqai); despite the praise for Minos by Hesiod and Homer, the ‘tragic poets 
prevailed, and from platform and stage showered obloquy down upon him, as a man of 
cruelty and violence.’46 It is clearly implied that Hesiod and Homer provide the more accurate 
picture as they composed their verse sine ira et studio, ‘for the Greeks’ (in Herodotus’ 
words), and not for some particular city-state. A similar impartiality and aloofness is 
attributed to Hesiod and Homer by Dio Chrysostom in his Borysthenitic oration. Here Dio 
claims that the two epic poets are more truthful than the tragedians because they are older and 
hence closer to divine truth, but also because the tragic poets are dependent on their audience; 
they write in order to be ‘applauded by the multitude’ (qaumazovmenoi uJpo; twǹ pollwǹ).47 
The ‘enshrinement’ of the poets makes them impartial, incorruptible and eternally true: other 
versions than those of Hesiod and Homer are to be considered aberrations.48 
    That there is a basic incompatibility between Hesiod and Homer on the one hand and the 
tragedians on the other is confirmed by the scarcity of passages where they are explicitly 
                                               
42 See S Il. 16.336a (A), 21.430b (A), Th. 691, WD 3. 
43 Griffith (1990) 197 rightly argues against the notion that the Homeric or Hesiodic version of a story should be 
regarded as more true than later ones; but he does not discuss the Greek view on this matter. Nünlist (2009) 178-
179 touches on this subject, but seems to overstress the liberal attitude of Greek critics. 
44 S Il. 23.679b (T). The scholia quite often contrast the epic account with the tragic, see also S Il. 1.7 (D), 
2.199b (AT), 9.145 (D), 9.448 (A), 9.481a2 (T), 14.114b (T), Od. 11.260, 11.271, 11.563, WD 48f.  
45 [Pl.] Min. 318e. 
46 Plu. Thes. 16.2-3: ejpikrathvsante~ oiJ tragikoi; pollh;n ajpo; toù logeivou kai; th̀~ skhnh̀~ ajdoxivan aujtoù 
kateskevdasan wJ~ calepoù kai; biaivou genomevnou. 
47 D.Chrys. 36.35; this passage is discussed more fully in ch. 9, pp. 312-313. 
48 See also Plu. Mor. 857F, where Herodotus, described as a filobavrbaro~ (‘pro-barbarian’) is said to have 
given us a picture of Heracles that is at odds with that of the poets, Homer and Hesiod first.   
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associated with each other. I have found only two such passages:49 one is Strabo 11.6.3, 
where Hesiod, Homer and the tragic poets are said to be more trustworthy than (some of) the 
historians; the other is a fragment from Agatharchides,50 claiming that all poets (he names 
Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and Euripides) are unconcerned about historical reality. It is not a 
coincidence that these two cases introduce another party, i.e. the historians; we will now 
briefly turn to their relationship with the poets in general and Hesiod and Homer in particular.  
 
2.3 - Hesiod and Homer as Historians 
Even though Herodotus issued an early warning that epic poetry and historiography were not 
the same thing,51 the Greeks regarded much in the Homeric and Hesiodic poems as 
historically true. The Trojan War, the wanderings of the heroes, the genealogies of gods and 
men - it was generally believed that Hesiod and Homer had written them down in complete 
and detailed accordance with historical reality.52 Some of the historians themselves, however, 
saw the poets as competition and departed from the subtlety of Herodotus to heavy attacks on 
the poets in general and Homer in particular, focusing on his ignorance, implausibility and 
desire for pleasure instead of truth. Much of the discussion among historians concerning the 
veracity of Homer is preserved in the works of the geographer Strabo, who nonetheless 
regarded Homer as the ‘founder of the science of geography’53 and was eager to defend the 
authority of the epic poet. The words of Strabo reveal that the combination of Hesiod and 
Homer played an important role in the debate. 
                                               
49 But see also Arist. Mete. 353a34-b3, where the two poets are not explicitly named. In this passage, Aristotle 
introduces his new topic of the sea: ‘The ancients who concerned themselves with theology make it have 
sources, their purpose being to provide both land and sea with origins and roots. They perhaps supposed that this 
would give a more dramatic and grander air to their theories, according to which the earth was an important part 
of the universe’ (oiJ me;n ou\n ajrcaiòi kai; diatrivbonte~ peri; ta;~ qeologiva~ poioùsin aujth̀~ phgav~, i{n’ 
aujtoì~ w\sin ajrcai; kai; rJivzai gh̀~ kai; qalavtth~: tragikwvteron ga;r ou{tw kai; semnovteron uJpevlabon i[sw~ 
ei\nai to; legovmenon, wJ~ mevga ti toù panto;~ toùto movrion o[n:). Most likely, Hesiod and Homer are meant 
here (cf. Th. 282 and 790-792).  
50 Phot. Bibl. 250 444b 8; see on this fragment further below, n.55, and ch. 9, p. 311. 
51 Hist. 2.23.3 and 2.116.2. 
52 Hesiod and Homer are often ranked among well-known historians such as Hecataeus, Hellanicus and Ephorus 
(see e.g. J. Ap. 1.16, 1.118, Athenaeus 13.557a), and early historians are sometimes pictured as continuing the 
poets’ work (e.g. Str. 1.1.11, Clem.Al. Strom. 2.443.3); moreover, many fragments surviving from historians 
such as Hecataeus and Hellanicus suggest that they regarded Hesiod and Homer as historical sources to be taken 
seriously (see for Hecataeus FGH 1 14, 18a, 18b, 19; Hellanicus FGH 4 74, 88, 94, 95, 156); see also Apollod. 
Bibl. 2.3.1 mentioning Homer and Hesiod together and describing the latter’s activity as iJstoreìn. Thucydides 
appears to have little faith in Homer as a historian (cf. Th. 1.9.3 and 1.10.3).  
53 Str. 1.1.2: ajrchgevthn th̀~ gewgrafikh̀~ ejmpeiriva~. Strabo believes geography is a philosophical enterprise 
and attempts to prove this by saying that it was practised first by Homer, who clearly was a philosopher (1.1.1; 
cf. 1.2.17, ‘everybody agrees that the poetry of Homer is a philosophic production’ (th;n ga;r ejkeivnou [= 
Homer] poivhsin filosovfhma pavnta~ nomivzein). 
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    Strabo seems to have taken up a middle position between historians like Agatharchides, 
Eratosthenes and Apollodorus on the one hand, who believed that Homer was only out for 
‘entertainment’ (yucagwgiva) and thus could not be trusted in anything, and scholars like 
Crates of Mallus on the other, who claimed that Homer was perfectly trustworthy in all 
matters, including history and geography.54 It is exactly in this debate on mythological 
yucagwgiva versus historical pivsti~ (‘proof’) that Agatharchides in the passage briefly 
mentioned above equated all poets - Hesiod, Homer and the tragedians - and claimed that 
‘every poet strives more to give pleasure than to tell the truth’, pà~ poihth;~ yucagwgiva~ 
mal̀lon h] ajlhqeiva~ ejsti; stocasthv~.55 This statement, perhaps an allusion to the historian 
Eratosthenes’ saying that ‘every poet is after entertainment, not instruction’,56 erases the 
distinction discussed in the previous section and instead opposes an indiscrimate heap of all 
the poets together (epic and tragic) to the group to which Agatharchides himself belongs, i.e. 
the historians. The criteria applied are allegiance to the truth and didactic intent. The poets are 
classified as story-tellers in historians’ clothes.   
    Strabo, however, held a more nuanced view: according to him, a trained reader of Homer 
could occasionally penetrate the ‘shell of myth’ to find ‘the facts of history’, a method called 
‘historical exegesis’ by Schenkeveld.57 Even though he recognizes that entertainment 
(yucagwgiva) was an important objective, it is Strabo’s belief that Homer wrote primarily in 
order to instruct (didaskaliva~ cavrin). He knew that his instruction would be more effective 
if it was wrapped in myth, but was also aware that making up everything would not be 
credible.58 Thus, when Strabo in 11.6.3 equates Hesiod and Homer with the tragic poets, he 
does align himself with historians like Eratosthenes, who claim that historiography should be 
cleansed of all fiction. Strabo, however, has a different purpose: he wishes to oppose the poets 
in general to the phantasts who tell marvelous stories to please the audience, while they 
                                               
54 See Schenkeveld (1976).  
55 The whole passage (Photius Bibl. 250 444b 8) reads ‘… then why do I not censure Homer for describing the 
quarrel of Zeus and Poseidon, a thing for which he can furnish no evidence (pivstin) to anyone? Why do I not 
blame Hesiod for daring (tolmẁnti) to reveal the birth of the gods? Why do I not reproach Aeschylus for lying 
often (dieyeusmevnon) and writing many things that cannot be allowed (ajsugcwrhvtwn)? Why do I not arraign 
Euripides for assigning the deeds of Temenus to Archelaus and bringing on stage Teiresias who had lived more 
than five generations? (...) I do not do so because every poet strives more to give pleasure than to tell the truth’ 
(transl. Burstein 1989). It is likely that these are the words of Agatharchides himself, see Burstein (1989) 37 and 
49 n.1. 
56 Str. 1.10.1: poihth;~ pà~ stocavzetai yucagwgiva~, ouj didaskaliva~. The similarity is striking, even though 
the notion was a commonplace (see Berger 1880 ad fr. I A 20). 
57 Schenkeveld (1976) 59. Strabo is understandably obscure about the actual procedure of this method. 
Schenkeveld’s reconstruction, i.e. to speak of historia when Homer’s words check out, and of mythos when they 
do not, does little to elucidate the method itself.  
58 Cf. e.g. 1.2.8-9, 1.2.19. 
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pretend to be historians (ejn iJstoriva~ schvmati); the examples are Ctesias, Hellanicus and 
Herodotus.59 They are the real story-tellers in historians’ clothes, presumably the worst 
possible insult for a historian.60 Their tribe is in fact far worse than that of the poets, who do 
not claim to tell the truth but nonetheless offer it to the reader with intelligence.61  
    Strabo’s nuanced opinion of Homer as a truthful mythographer seems to have held for other 
poets as well, first and foremost for Hesiod. On the whole, Strabo seems to assume that 
Hesiod and Homer inhabited roughly the same world, so that their accounts are more or less 
in accord with each other. The poets, for instance, agree on the age-old connection between 
the Pelasgi and Dodona, and are the oldest sources on the Arabians.62 A more telling 
indication for the agreement attributed to them can be found in a passage from book nine, 
where Strabo criticizes Zenodotus, the Alexandrian scholar and first editor of Homer, for 
changing ‘Arne’ in Iliad 2.507 to ‘Ascre’: 
 
Zhnovdoto~ dev, gravfwn ‘oi} de; polustavfulon  [Askrhn e[con’, oujk e[oiken 
ejntucovnti toi~̀ uJpo;   JHsiovdou peri; th~̀ patrivdo~ lecqeìsi kai; toi~̀ uJp’ Eujdovxou, 
polu; ceivrw levgonto~ peri; th̀~   [Askrh~. pẁ~ ga;r a[n ti~ polustavfulon th;n 
toiauvthn uJpo; toù poihtoù levgesqai pisteuvseien; 
 
‘Zenodotus, who writes ‘and those who possessed Ascre rich in vineyards’, seems not 
to have read the statements of Hesiod concerning his native land,63 nor those of 
                                               
59 Str. 11.6.3: ‘For, seeing that those who were professedly writers of myth enjoyed repute (tou;~ fanerẁ~ 
muqogravfou~ eujdokimoùnta~), they [the fake historians] thought that they too would make their writings 
pleasing (hJdeìan) if they told in the guise of history (ejn iJstoriva~ schvmati) what they had never seen, nor even 
heard – or at least not from persons who knew the facts – with this object alone in view, to tell what afforded 
their hearers pleasure and amazement (hJdeìan kai; qaumasthvn). One could more easily believe (a[n ... 
pisteuvseien) Hesiod and Homer in their stories of the heroes (hJrwologoùsi), or the tragic poets, than Ctesias, 
Herodotus, Hellanicus, and other writers of this kind…’.  
60 Plutarch too accused Herodotus of muqologiva, Mor. 857E; he corrects Herodotus’ account of Heracles with 
the aid of the poets (this time Hesiod and Homer and the lyricists). 
61 See also Lucian’s Verae Historiae for critique of the ‘sensationalist and mendacious historians’ (Georgiadou 
1998 2), a critique that appears to date back several centuries. Strabo, for instance, makes mention of the fourth-
century historian Ephorus, who wrote about the Scythians in a book called Europe; for information on this 
people he had to rely in part on the testimonies of Hesiod and Homer, since his colleagues focused only on the 
Scythians’ negative qualities and had no eye for anything else: ‘the other writers, he [Ephorus] says, tell only 
about their savagery, because they know that the terrible and the marvelous are startling (eijdovte~ to; deinovn te 
kai; to; qaumasto;n ejkplhktiko;n o[n, 7.3.9).’ 
62 Str. 7.7.9, 1.2.34. 
63 Hesiod’s description of his own country (‘evil in winter, distressful in summer, not ever fine’, WD 640) was 
famous in antiquity. 
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Eudoxus, who says much worse things concerning Ascre. For how could anyone 
believe that such a place was called ‘rich in vineyards’ by the poet?’64  
 
Since Hesiod can fairly be trusted to have described his own country correctly, the argument 
goes, Homer could never have meant Ascre. It is natural for Strabo to regard both poets as 
harmonized; hence the critique on Zenodotus. 
    It is this view of the poets that allows Strabo to employ the combination of Hesiod and 
Homer as an argument against scholars harping on Homer’s ignorance and the implausibility 
of his tales. Such charges against Homer, Strabo feels, could be averted by showing that they 
would not hold against Hesiod either. In one passage Strabo turns against the second-century 
BC historian Apollodorus, who believes that all the poets, Homer first of all, blend myth and 
history because they are ignorant of the facts; Strabo, however, believes they are not ignorant 
but rather tell their story in the guise of a myth (ejn muvqou schvmati): 
 
kaqavper kai; tẁn par’   JHsiovdw/ kai; toì~ a[lloi~, a} profevrei oJ   jApollovdwro~ 
oujd’ o}n trovpon parativqhsi toì~   JOmhvrou taùta eijdwv~. ta; me;n ga;r   JOmhvrou ta; 
peri; to;n Povnton kai; th;n Ai[gupton parativqhsin a[gnoian aijtiwvmeno~, wJ~ levgein 
me;n ta; o[nta boulomevnou, mh; levgonto~ de; ta; o[nta, ajlla; ta; mh; o[nta wJ~ o[nta kat’ 
a[gnoian.   JHsiovdou d’ oujk a[n ti~ aijtiavsaito a[gnoian,   JHmivkuna~ levgonto~ kai; 
Makrokefavlou~ kai; Pugmaivou~: oujde; ga;r aujtoù   JOmhvrou t<oi>aut̀a muqeuv-
onto~, w|n eijsi kai; ou|toi oiJ Pugmaiòi, oujd’ jAlkmaǹo~ Steganovpoda~ 
iJstoroùnto~, oujd’ jAiscuvlou Kunokefavlou~ kai; Sternofqavlmou~ kai; 
Monommavtou~... 
 
And the same is true of the stories that Apollodorus cites from Hesiod and the other 
poets without even realising in what way he is comparing them with the stories in 
Homer. For he compares them with what Homer says about the Pontus and Egypt and 
charges him with ignorance, on the ground that, though he wanted to tell the truth, he 
did not do so, but in his ignorance stated as true what was not true. Yet no one could 
charge Hesiod with ignorance when he speaks of ‘Half-doggers’, of ‘Big-Heads’ and 
of ‘Pygmies’; no more should one charge Homer with ignorance when he tells such 
mythical stories of his, one of which is that of these very Pygmies; nor Alcman when 
                                               
64 Str. 9.2.35; ‘the poet’ is, as usually in Strabo, Homer. There are numerous attempts in the scholia to establish 
the Homeric text by adducing parallels from Hesiod, cf. e.g. S Il. 2.496a1 (A) (referring to Hes. fr. 181 MW). 
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he tells about ‘Web-footers’; nor Aeschylus when he speaks of ‘Dog-Headers’ or of 
‘Breast-Eyers’, or of ‘One-eyes…’65 
 
In this passage, probably referring to Apollodorus’ critique of Homer’s ignorance concerning 
the workings of the Nile,66 Strabo makes the point that Hesiod, who is supposedly more 
knowledgeable about the world than Homer, still included pygmies and half-dog people and 
the like in his poems. Such fantastic elements, which represent the obviously untrue material 
making up the mythos of poetry, are put in on purpose, Strabo argues, to comply with the 
generic rules of poetry, and not out of ignorance. Similarly, the argument goes, Homer should 
not be called ignorant when his words do not always agree with (historical) reality; in such 
passages, we must assume that he is merely satisfying the mythographic demands of poetry. It 
is wrong to charge Homer with ignorance but let Hesiod off the hook when they both tell tales 
of pygmies, for the poets are the same in this respect. Apollodorus, then, does not understand 
the consequences of his own comparison: comparing Homer with Hesiod will result in 
acquitting them both of ignorance. 
    Apollodorus’ strategy for undermining the credibility of Homer (making him less 
knowledgeable and more ‘mythographic’ than Hesiod and the other poets) resembles that of 
Eratosthenes, who also attempts to bring down Homer by contrasting him with a (supposedly) 
more knowledgeable Hesiod. In one passage explaining Homer’s occasionally indeterminate 
references to locations, Strabo says: 
 
... ou[te ga;r to;n poihth;n ajkribẁ~ e{kasta puqevsqai ou[q’ hJmeì~ par’ ejkeivnou 
zhtoùmen to; ajkribev~: ouj mh;n oujd’ ou{tw~ e[comen wJ~ uJpolambavnein kai; mhde;n 
pepusmevnon peri; th~̀ plavnh~, mhvq’ o{pou mhvq’ o{pw~ gegevnhtai, rJayw/dein.   
jEratosqevnh~ de;   JHsivodon me;n eijkavzei pepusmevnon peri; th̀~   jOdussevw~ 
plavnh~, o{ti kata; Sikelivan kai;   jItalivan gegevnhtai, pisteuvsanta th/̀ dovxh/ 
tauvth/ mh; movnon twǹ uJf’   JOmhvrou legomevnwn memnh̀sqai, ajlla; kai; Ai[tnh~ kai;   
jOrtugiva~, toù pro;~ Surakouvsai~ nhsivou, kai; Turrhnwǹ,   {Omhron de; mhvte 
                                               
65 Str. 1.2.35 (transl. slightly altered); all the references, except the one to Homer (who speaks of Pygmies in Il. 
3.6) are to now lost works (Hesiod fr. 153 MW; Alcman PMGF 148; Aeschylus TGF 3.431, 441, and 434a). 
66 Cf. Str. 7.3.6: ‘But this ignorance [concerning the flooding of the Nile and comparable geographical 
particulars of Arabia and Ethiopia, attributed to Homer by Eratosthenes] in Homer’s case is not amazing, for 
those who have lived later than he have been ignorant of many things and have invented marvellous tales (polla; 
ajgnoeìn kai; teratologeìn): Hesiod, when he speaks of ‘Half-doggers’, of ‘Big-Heads’ and of ‘Pygmies’; and 
Alcman, when he speaks of ‘Web-footers’...’. Ancient historians were generally concerned about the limits of 
Homer’s knowledge; so much so, in fact, that they wondered whether he knew about the things he did not write 
about (see Schenkeveld 1976 53-54).  
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eijdevnai taùta mhvte bouvlesqai ejn gnwrivmoi~ tovpoi~ poieìn th;n plavnhn. povteron 
ou\n Ai[tnh me;n kai; Turrhniva gnwvrima, Skuvllaion de; kai; Cavrubdi~ kai; Kivrkaion 
kai; Seirhnoùssai ouj pavnu; kai;  JHsiovdw/ me;n e[prepe mh; fluareiǹ, ajlla; taì~ 
katecouvsai~ dovxai~ ajkolouqeiǹ,  JOmhvrw/ de; ‘paǹ, o{ ti ke;n ejp’ ajkairivman 
glws̀san i[h/, keladeìn;’ 
 
‘… for we do not demand of the poet [Homer] that he should have inquired accurately 
into every detail, nor do we in our School67 demand scientific accuracy in his 
statements; yet, even so, we surely are not entitled to assume that Homer composed 
the story of the wanderings without any inquiry at all, either as to where or as to how 
they occurred. But Eratosthenes conjectures that Hesiod learned by inquiry that the 
scene of the wanderings of Odysseus lay in the region of Sicily and Italy, and, 
adopting this belief, mentioned not only the places spoken of by Homer, but also 
Aetna, Ortygia (the little island next to Syracuse), and Tyrrhenia; but he [Eratosthenes] 
contends that Homer knew nothing about these places and had no intention of placing 
the wanderings in any known regions. Now, were Aetna and Tyrrhenia well-known 
places, but Scyllaeum, Charybdis, Circaeum, and the Sirenussae wholly unknown? 
Was it the proper thing for Hesiod not to talk nonsense and to follow prevailing 
opinions, but the proper thing for Homer to ‘give utterance to every thought that 
comes to his inopportune tongue’?’68 
 
Eratosthenes too apparently believed that Hesiod had a greater knowledge of geographical 
particulars than Homer.69 Exactly why Eratosthenes thus preferred Hesiod over Homer is a 
matter of speculation,70 but it is at least certain that he employed the alleged difference 
between them as a tool to attack Homer for his mythologia. Strabo tries to avert this attack by 
again pointing out how absurd it is to apply different standards to Hesiod on the one hand and 
to Homer on the other. In their geographical descriptions, just as in the rest of their poetry, 
they both mix fact with fantasy; it is ridiculous to assume that Hesiod never talks nonsense, 
but Homer is constantly lying.  
                                               
67 Strabo is talking of the Stoics. 
68 Str. 1.2.13-14. 
69 Cf. Str. 1.2.22: ‘But, persisting in his false assumptions [about the winds being only two in total], Eratosthenes 
says that Homer does not even know that there are several mouths of the Nile, nor yet does he know the real 
name of the river, though Hesiod knows, for he mentions it.’ 
70 He may have supposed Hesiod lived at a later date (cf. n.66 above), but it could also be that the Alexandrian 
poet and physiologist felt more inclined toward the ‘natural philosopher’ Hesiod (see further ch. 6, esp. pp. 164-
172); perhaps he also wrote a poem on Hesiod (see Fraser 1972 902 n.200). 
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    It is fair to deduce from the evidence discussed above, however slight it may be, that 
separating Homer from Hesiod was part of the ancient historian’s strategy to disqualify the 
former as a historian. Both Apollodorus and Eratosthenes recognize that Hesiod’s 
geographical knowledge is more extensive than Homer’s, and use it to demolish his aura of 
omniscience. Strabo responds to the attack on his hero by ‘lumping’ Hesiod and Homer back 
together: they inhabited and knew roughly the same world, and in wholly similar fashion 
blended myth and history together. Even though Strabo thinks that ‘generally speaking, it is 
wrong to place the poetry of Homer on the same level with that of other poets’,71 he is willing 
to make an exception for Hesiod. 
 
3 - Conclusion 
Throughout antiquity both Hesiod and Homer were regarded as great philosophers who were 
the first to speculate on nature and being. Despite their comparable status, however, they are 
never presented as sharing the same philosophical doctrines or propagating similar theories. 
This is a highly remarkable fact (especially so when seen against the poets’ far-reaching unity 
in the field of ethics and education), but it agrees very well with the observation (made in 
chapters 6 and 9) that the Greeks attributed incompatible or even contradictory philosophical 
notions to Hesiod and Homer. Whereas it is practically impossible for the age-old system of 
paideia to differentiate between the traditional pillars of education, philosophy could: the 
philosophers adopted a more critical and selective stance towards their sources, and often set 
Hesiod against Homer. Their combination in any but the most superficial way was hence 
problematic. 
    On the other hand, the connection between Hesiod and Homer as ‘encyclopaedic figures’ 
was very strong: the poets together are generally credited with a vast scope and great 
knowledge, and are furthermore believed to know roughly the same things. As such, they are 
often set against other sources of factual information and seem to form a separate and 
exclusive category of their own; this can be deduced from the classifying lists of Hippias and 
especially Protagoras, and the frequency of formulations like ‘Homer and Hesiod and the 
other poets’. 
    It is obvious that with the exclusive category comes a status aparte where their knowledge 
is concerned. For instance, what is told by Hesiod and Homer is regarded as more respectable 
and trustworthy than the tales of other poets, especially the tragedians. Since it was easier to 
                                               
71 Str. 1.2.20: To; d’ o{lon oujk eu\ to; th;n  JOmhvrou poivhsin eij~ e}n sunavgein th̀/ twǹ a[llwn poihtẁn. 
Interestingly enough, the ‘other poets’ Strabo mentions are tragedians, i.e. Sophocles and Euripides. 
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‘contextualize’ the tragic poets than the enshrined poets of a hallowed age, the information in 
their poems was far more easily attacked as imperfect, deviant or partial. We have also seen 
that the special status of Hesiod and Homer extended beyond the poetic genre: they were 
sometimes ranked among historians, and even though the historians themselves tended to 
heap all poets together as unreliable mythographers, they were nonetheless particularly 
concerned with the authority of Hesiod and (especially) Homer. Strabo reinvigorated the age-
old idea that Hesiod and Homer belong together in order to exonerate Homer from charges of 
ignorance and fantasy; in so doing, he turned both Hesiod and Homer into poets who 





















Introduction: Searching for Hesiod 
 
 
0 - Introduction 
In the first Part we have seen how the locus or lieu Hesiod was informed and defined by the 
combination with Homer: when presented together with the other poet, Hesiod appeared as a 
religious authority, an ancient lawgiver, an author belonging to a special category, and a 
reliable storekeeper of knowledge. It is the purpose of the second Part to demonstrate that 
these characteristics do indeed derive (at least to a considerable degree) from the combination 
itself; for Hesiod alone, i.e. without Homer in the immediate context as either friend or foil, is 
a different Hesiod. This can be seen in chapter 5, which deals with Hesiodic ethics, and 
especially chapter 6, which focuses on Hesiod’s qualities as a philosopher. These chapters 
will show that Hesiod could be employed in texts as far more than Homer’s sidekick. There 
was a Hesiod without Homer as well; and this chapter is concerned with the ways he was 
constructed.  
    The title for the second Part is The ‘Real’ Hesiod. The inverted commas are there for two 
reasons. The first and most obvious one is that I am not looking for das Hesiodische in den 
Werken Hesiods, trying to single out das spezifisch Hesiodische.1 It is not Hesiod himself I 
am primarily interested in, but his reception by others. This relieves me from the virtually 
impossible task of finding criteria for determining what is specifically Hesiodic in the works 
of Hesiod, and allows me to adopt the fairly straightforward method of looking for Hesiod in 
texts where Homer is not mentioned, in order to find out what the ancients believed was 
specifically Hesiodic. But there is still one caveat here, and that is the second reason for the 
inverted commas: I am sure that in the end we must accept that even where the reception of 
Hesiod is concerned, there is no ‘real’ Hesiod, in the sense of an ‘independent’ Hesiod that is 
wholly Homer-free. For even when Homer is not mentioned explicitly, he lurks in the 
background as a determining factor, claiming areas of expertise and monopolizing themes no 
longer accessible to Hesiod. This is also why we will meet Homer from time to time in this 
chapter; Hesiod, it seems, is never really alone. 
                                               
1 Von Fritz (1962). 
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    Of course this ‘Homeric’ influence is only one of the factors determining the ancient 
construction of Hesiod. In this chapter I will investigate six of these ‘mechanisms of 
memory’, which I deduced from the many references to Hesiod in antiquity, in an attempt to 
address Confino’s important question of why certain parts of the past are received and others 
rejected:2 the practice of assimilation (2.1), the catchword-factor (2.2), the principle of 
snowballing (2.3), the principle of clustering (2.4), the Homeric factor (2.5), and the persona’s 
paradox (2.6). We will begin our search, however, with a body of texts most directly tied to 
the construction of Hesiod: the biographical tradition. Understanding Hesiod’s vita (as a 
construct) is essential for understanding the reception of his poems, since a writer’s life and 
his work were in antiquity regarded as mutually informative, which entails that ‘the figure of 
the author is (…) a means of circumscribing interpretive possibilities.’3 
 
1 - The Biographical Tradition 
The biographical tradition concerning the Greek poets is a good place to start looking for the 
way they were imagined, as ‘virtually all the material in all the lives is fiction’.4 The fantastic 
nature of the lives is largely due to the scarcity of reliable information, which has caused 
ancient ‘biographers’ to scrutinize the poet’s works for biographical clues and then speculate 
and extrapolate at will. This recourse to fancy, however, is somewhat uncalled for in the case 
of Hesiod, who is very explicit about some of the particulars of his life. That this is highly 
exceptional for a poet that old has been noted by many scholars,5 but was also felt by the 
ancients themselves, who regarded the very tangibility of Hesiod as a Hesiodic quality: the 
clarity of Hesiod’s background was often contrasted to the obscurity surrounding Homer, 
especially with respect to origins and whereabouts: Hesiod tells us where he was born, where 
he lived, where he travelled - but we know nothing like that of Homer.6 
    Apart from his origin and place of residence, Hesiod tells us more about himself in his 
poems. Two of these autobiographical remarks were taken very seriously and became 
inextricable parts of the Hesiodic persona:7 his victory in the funeral games of Amphidamas 
                                               
2 Confino (1997) 1390; see Introduction, pp. 5-6 and 8-11. 
3 Too (1998) 133. 
4 Lefkowitz (1981) viii (and the introduction in general). The chapter on Hesiod is a thorough collection of all 
the material concerning Hesiod’s ‘life’; I will discuss only the most relevant points here.  
5 See ch. 1 (pp. 28-29 and 33-34) for the scholarly appreciation of Hesiod’s autobiographical remarks.   
6 For the opposition e.g. Cert. 1-17 (Allen), Strabo 13.3.6, Velleius Paterculus 1.7.1.  
7 The fifth important autobiographical datum, Hesiod’s quarrel with his brother Perses, is the only clue not 
further pursued by the ancients (the only reference I could find is Plu. Mor. 480E) - perhaps because there were 
other, more powerful examples of (brotherly) strife to be gotten from mythology; or perhaps the ancients 
generally believed, much as modern scholars do today, that the quarrel with Perses was a fiction useful to 
Hesiod’s purpose (see e.g. S WD 27a: ‘The whole business with Perses must be understood either as historically 
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(WD 646-662), which formed the basis of the well-known story of Hesiod having beaten 
Homer in a poetry contest; and his meeting with the Muses on mount Helicon (Theogony 22-
34), which started off the long and complicated tradition of Hesiod’s inspiration.8 It is 
especially the tale of how Hesiod became a singer - perhaps a conscious attempt of the poet 
(or the tradition of poets) to influence his own reputation9 - that established his undying image 
of the ragged old shepherd turned venerable poet.10 The archetype of the pitiful peasant 
delivered by the gods from ignorance and pettiness firmly rooted itself both in ancient 
reception and modern scholarship.11 Nonetheless, to say that ‘the persona of the shepherd 
poet, the peasant, so dominates the tradition’s perception of the Hesiodic corpus that it is the 
Works and Days rather than the Theogony that has seemed the essential Hesiod’ would be an 
exaggeration,12 not least because the story of Hesiod’s initiation is told in the proem of the 
latter poem, and not in the Works and Days. In my opinion, one should rather say that the 
inspiration-scene in the Theogony has caused both ancient Greeks and modern scholars (either 
consciously or not) to believe a) that the Theogony and Works and Days were by the same 
poet;13 and b) that the Theogony was earlier than the Works and Days.14   
    I submit that the obvious difference between Homer’s obscure background and Hesiod’s 
autobiographical candour is one of the main reasons behind the curious fact that the ancients 
generally regarded Homer as qeiò~ but never understood Hesiod as such. Homer and his 
verses are called ‘divine’ from the times of Pindar to those of Philostratus, by fans as well as 
critics, and in both Greek and Roman writings;15 and the mystery surrounding him only added 
                                                                                                                                                   
true or as fictitious and hypothetical, because that would make his argument look better’ (ta kata; to;n Pevrshn, 
h[toi iJstorikw~̀ ejklhpteo;n h] plasmatikẁ~ kai; uJpoqetikw~̀ dia; to; eujprovswpon toù lovgou).  
8 On which see ch. 9.2, pp. 276-288. 
9 Lang and Lang (1990) 319-326 describe the artist’s own efforts as one of the four factors shaping his 
reputation; cf. Introduction, p. 5 n.17. 
10 See e.g. [Virgil] Culex 96; D.Chr. 2.8; Lucian Hes. 7, Ind. 3; there is an elaborate discussion of the 
Dichterweihe in ch. 9, esp. pp. 259-263. According to Wilamowitz (1916a) 472 the inspiration-scene is the 
‘Echteste des Echten’ from the Th.’s otherwise heavily corrupted proem. 
11 See e.g. Snell (1982) 298, describing Hesiod ‘as a true herdsman’; Hesiod is obviously the default 
interpretation of the statue of a peasant-poet for Zanker (1995). See for further qualifications of Hesiod as a 
peasant ch. 8, pp. 234-245.  
12 Lamberton (1988) 38. 
13 The fact that Hesiod features in one poem as a shepherd and as a farmer in the other has (to my knowledge) 
never upset anyone, either ancient Greek or modern scholar; apparently, these professions are (taken to be) so 
alike that they rather seem to connect the two poems. The significance of the oft-mentioned remark by Pausanias 
(9.31.4) that the Boeotians living around Helicon believed only the WD was authentic should probably be 
downplayed since the Th. is referred to on the so-called Helicon-stèle (see Hurst 1996 62-63).  
14 See e.g. S on WD prol. B (and for an alternative sequence in antiquity P. Oxy. 3537 = Most T95). It is the 
modern communis opinio, although the arguments for this case are weak (see ch. 8, pp. 239-240).  
15 See e.g. Pi. Isthm. 3.55, Philostr. Her. 43.5, Hermesian. fr. 7 Powell (calling Homer the h{diston pavntwn 
daivmona mousopovlwn, the ‘sweetest divinity among all poets’), Pl. Phd. 95a, Fronto 2.67. The (short) 
inscription on Homer’s grave in Ios also calls him qeìo~ (see e.g. Cert. 338 Allen), and so, notably, does the 
inscription on the bronze tripod that Hesiod dedicated to the Muses to celebrate his victory over Homer (Cert. 
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to his status.16 See, for instance, how Dio connects Homer’s lack of self-reference to his 
divine nature: ‘Homer by contrast [to authors mentioning themselves] was so liberal and 
magnanimous that nowhere in his poetry will he be found to refer to himself, but in fact, like 
the prophets of the gods, he speaks, as it were, from the invisible, from somewhere in the 
inmost sanctuary’.17 Several laudatory epigrams suggest Homer’s indeterminability points to 
a divine origin.18  
    Hesiod, on the other hand, was never called divine in classical times,19 and the Greeks 
apparently remained reluctant to do so throughout antiquity.20 One can easily think of several 
factors contributing to this glaring contrast with Homer: Hesiod’s reputedly human descent,21 
his own very infrequent use of the term qeìo~, the history of the formation of the Hesiodic 
and Homeric corpus,22 and the subject matter of their poems.23 Still, I would suggest that it is 
mostly Hesiod’s ‘tangibility’, which derives from his openness in referring to himself, that 
has made him - his divine inspiration and extraordinary knowledge notwithstanding - more 
‘human and close to us’ (ajnqrwvpinon kai; pro;~ hJma~̀).24 
 
But this is not the whole story. For even though we should conclude that Hesiod was 
considered too human to be truly divine, he was surely more than a mere mortal. Despite the 
                                                                                                                                                   
214 Allen). See Skiadas (1965) 63-75 for more places where Homer is called ‘divine’ (esp. in Greek epigram). 
See Pinkwart (1965) 169-173 on the evidence for Homerkult and Clay (2004) 74-76 and 87-89 for ‘Panhellenic’ 
(75) cults of Homer, which sometimes resemble those of gods rather than those of heroes. 
16 Cf. Zeitlin (2001) 204. 
17 D.Chrys. Or. 53.10: oJ de; ou{tw~ a[ra ejleuqevrio~ h\n kai; megalovfrwn w{ste oujdamoù fanhvsetai th̀~ 
poihvsew~ auJtoù memnhmevno~, ajlla; tẁ/ o[nti w{sper oiJ profh̀tai tẁn qeẁn ejx ajfanoù~ kai; ajduvtou poqe;n 
fqeggovmeno~. Cf. Hesychius on the life of Homer (Suda 3.525.10-11). 
18 See AP 16.293 (cf. 9.455), 16.295, 16.296, 16.301. See on Homer’s anonymity also D.Chrys. Or. 36.10-13.  
19 Graziosi (2002) 107 n.47. 
20 Plu. Mor. 431E is the only place I could find where Hesiod is called qeìo~ (interestingly enough, Hesiod is 
here cited on demons). See e.g. Galen 10.7.7 Kühn and Lucian Salt. 24 for passages where Hesiod comes close 
to divinity. 
21 Hesiod addressing his brother with dìon gevno~ (WD 299) may have given rise to the belief (perhaps already 
present in Pl. Ti. 40e) that Hesiod descended from Zeus. Others conjectured at the same time that Hesiod’s father 
was named Dios (see West 1978 ad loc.). Modern scholars generally take diòn gevno~ as an indication of nobility 
(and an exhortation to Perses to live up to the demands of his lineage); according to Marsilio (2000) 27 the 
phrase is ironical and meant to remind Perses to live according to the rules of Zeus.  
22 According to Allen (1915) 86-87 tradition represented Homer and his work ‘as one and indivisible’, which 
contributes to its divinely perfect status, while ‘the authorised view of Hesiod from the beginning was that the 
verses were not homogeneous’ (87). Allen is surely exaggerating, since there was in fact great uncertainty about 
the authenticity of the Homeric poems, that lasted till well into the fourth century BC (cf. e.g. Notopoulos 1964 
18-45 discussing Homer’s role in the context of the cycle, Nagy 1992a 36-37, Graziosi 2002 53). Nonetheless, 
the question was definitely settled around 350 BC (‘the Iliad and Odyssey only’), whereas the debate on the 
limits of the Hesiodic corpus never ceased to continue (Pausanias for instance voices serious doubt even about 
his authorship of the Th., see 8.18.1, 9.27.2, 9.31.4-5, and 9.35.5).   
23 Clay (2003) 72 sums it up nicely when she says that Hesiod in the WD does not sing of things ‘far beyond the 
normal ken of mortals’. 
24 Plu. Mor. 162C. 
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poet’s own efforts to create his own persona, Hesiod’s vita is only in part based on the 
supposedly autobiographical remarks in the Theogony and Works and Days. The legend of 
Hesiod depends for the other part on stories (related elsewhere) that deal with events beyond 
the ‘life’ in the strictest sense, i.e. his violent death and the fate of his body. These seem to 
have turned Hesiod into a superhuman or heroic figure. 
    The general outline of the story is the following:25 when Hesiod was travelling through 
Locrian territory, he was murdered by his hosts when they found out he was sleeping with 
their sister. His body was cast into the sea, but brought back to the shore by dolphins.26 The 
murderers were found (through the persistent barking of a dog, says Plutarch) and punished, 
by Zeus according to one version, by their fellow-citizens according to another. Hesiod was 
buried in Locris, but in order to ward off a plague his bones were transported by order of an 
oracle to Boeotian Orchomenus, where they were still on display in Pausanias’ days.27 
    The story contains so much that suggests a heroic status that Brelich concluded that  
‘Hesiodos ha assunto quasi completamente la forma tradizionale dell’eroe.’28 First, there is 
the violent death, which in itself could already be an indication of his status as a hero.29 
Moreover, Thucydides (3.95-96) tells us Hesiod’s death was predicted by an oracle and thus 
divinely ordained. Second, there is the seduction of the hosts’ sister. This supposedly 
‘sordid’30 particular of Hesiod’s life, which has always been problematic to modern scholars 
because of its incompatibility with Hesiod’s otherwise blameless reputation,31 is probably 
another sign of his heroic status. According to Brelich, there is usually something ‘mostruoso’ 
about heroes, which manifests itself in physical appearance (e.g. theriomorphism, gigantism) 
but also in ‘caratteri moralmente ‘indegni’ di un ‘ideale’.’32 Heroes often suffer from an 
                                               
25 See for the several versions and more details of this story Lefkowitz (1981) 4-7. 
26 Plutarch had trouble picturing this kind of transport and imagined that there were several groups of dolphins, 
each passing on the body of Hesiod to another group (Mor. 984D). 
27 Paus. 9.38.3-4; Lefkowitz (1981) 10. 
28 Brelich 1953 (321), cf. 322 ‘il poeta rientra perfettamente nella morfologia caratteristica dell’eroe’; he is 
followed by Nagy (1979) 296. Nilsson (1906) 383-384 suggests that the story may be an aetiological myth for 
the ritual in a Locrian Ariadne-festival. 
29 See Chroust (1973) 181 ‘a ‘hero’ or human benefactor is not supposed to die a natural or peaceful death’; cf. 
Burkert (1983) 39 ‘a slain man is easily made into a hero or even a god, precisely because of his horrible end’. It 
is usually the function of such a death to remove ‘all possibility of envy, human or divine, incurred in life by the 
poet as the result of his superior knowledge’ (Lefkowitz 1981 3). Graziosi (2002) 154 remarks that Homer 
‘resembles a god rather than a hero’ because his biography focuses on his birth (like hymns and other tales about 
the gods) and not on his death, as is usual in the case of heroes. 
30 Scodel (1980) 304; see further ch. 7, pp. 219-221. 
31 The problem was felt in antiquity as well; in Eratosthenes’ poem on Hesiod (fr. 19 Powell) it was not the poet 
but his travel companion Demodes who seduced the girl, cf. Paus. 9.31.6 (‘some say that the deed was Hesiod’s, 
and others that Hesiod was wrongly thought guilty of another’s crime’). 
32 Brelich (1953) 232. See his pages 233-248 for examples of physical aberration of heroes, and 248-268 for 
anomalous character traits. Brelich sees another monstruous aspect of Hesiod in the story (related by Ephorus fr. 
169 FHG) that his father had to flee his native country because he had killed a relative (321). 
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abnormally great sexual appetite, which causes them to transcend limits and enter ‘contatti 
illeciti’.33 I thus submit that the origins of the seduction-story should be sought in a heroic 
context rather than in folklore or in the Works and Days itself.34  
    Third and finally, there is perhaps the most strongly ‘heroic’ trait of Hesiod’s vita: the 
transportation of his body by dolphins, providing the combination of divine support with 
events of violence that is typical for the life of the hero as well. The Greeks told several 
stories about people riding dolphins, and they all enjoyed heroic status.35 The closest parallel 
is the tale of Melicertes, who is the only other person carried by dolphins while already 
dead.36 In all these cases, the curious behaviour of the animals is a sure sign of divine 
intervention; in the case of Hesiod in particular, the gods feel offended by the death of their 
servant and take steps to reward the poet and punish the wrongdoers.37 
    I am sure Hesiod’s posthumous dolphin-ride can help to explain another intriguing aspect 
of the ‘life’ that has always riddled scholars and is not yet fully understood: the ancient belief 
that Hesiod flourished twice. An epigram attributed to Pindar38 greets Hesiod with the words 
caìre di;~ hJbhvsa~ kai; di;~ tavfou ajntibolhvsa~ (‘hail, you who were young twice, and twice 
received a tomb’). Several explanations have in the past been put forward, but none very 
convincing: perhaps someone feigned that Hesiod had lived twice, or it may refer to Hesiod 
siring the poets Mnaseas when he was young and Stesichorus when he was (very) old; maybe 
it meant that Hesiod had undergone a spiritual rejuvenation by the Muses, or that the second 
life refers to his poetic fame.39 Scodel improved greatly upon these unsatisfactory theories by 
arguing convincingly that there existed a tradition of Hesiod having made a shaman-like 
return from the dead, comparing him to similarly catabatic figures like Orpheus, Pythagoras 
                                               
33 Brelich (1953) 253. 
34 So Hess (1960) 47 claiming that the ‘Interesse am Skandalösen’ is typical for ‘volkstümliche Legenden’; the 
connection suggested by Lefkowitz (1981) 4 to WD 270-274 is very tenuous. 
35 See Bowra (1963), who mentions Telemachus, Koiranos of Paros, Enalos of Lesbos, Melicertes of Corinth and 
Taras of Tarentum. Bowra suggests that the heroes are ‘in some sense substitutes’ (132) for Poseidon. See also 
Burkert (1983) 203-204 connecting Hesiod’s death to Poseidon. 
36 After the dolphins carried him to the Isthmus, he was buried by the ruler of Corinth, who afterwards celebrated 
the first Isthmian Games. Melicertes received heroic honours and became the marine deity Palaemon (cf. Phld. 
Epigr. 34 Sider (= AP 6.349) addressing Melicertes as a daìmon ajlexivkake). 
37 Compare the gods’ anger at the death of the hero Archilochus (see e.g. Plu. Mor. 560E, D.Chrys. Or. 3.11-12, 
Suda 1.376, and most notably Plu. Num. 4.6.3 comparing Archilochus and Hesiod because they were both 
honoured after death by ‘the demon’ (ajpevdwke dev tina timh;n kai;   jArcilovcw/ kai;   JHsiovdw/ dia; ta;~ Mouvsa~ 
to; daimovnion), and the cranes pointing at the murderers of the poet Ibycus (see AP 7.745, Suda 1.80). Hess 
(1960) 47-48 rightly remarks that we should not take the gods’ protection as a sign of the poet’s innocence.  
38 EG 428. Wilamowitz (1916) 407 n.2 believed it was Pindar’s, and Evelyn-White (1920) thought it could be; 
there is serious doubt in McKay (1959) and scepticism in Scodel (1980). 
39 These suggestions were made by Marckscheffel (1840) 28-29, Evelyn-White (1920) following Wilamowitz, 
McKay (1959), and Scodel (1980), who offers her poetic-fame hypothesis only to replace it later in the same 
article by her shaman-theory. I long believed that perhaps ‘Pindar’ meant to say nothing more than that Hesiod 
produced two very fine poems. 
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and Empedocles. It also explains the epigram praising Hesiod’s wisdom in particular, for 
‘nothing is greater proof of wisdom or a more impressive sign of power than a successful 
catabasis or remembered metempsychosis’.40  
    Scodel is probably right here because Hesiod was certainly thought of as a person with 
knowledge from the world beyond.41 The only problem with her argument is that it is largely 
circumstantial; there are no stories of Hesiod actually descending into the underworld. But 
perhaps the dolphins can come to the rescue here as well. In myth and ritual, a plunge into the 
water, the so-called katapontismos, usually constitutes ‘le moment d’un passage, d’une 
transformation vers une personnalité plus divine’42 and could also signify the cathartic 
movement from life to after-life.43 I suggest that the story of Hesiod’s plunge and subsequent 
transportation by dolphins is a mythical expression of his death and rebirth. Like the dolphin-
carried hero Melicertes (on whom see note 34 and 35), Hesiod after this transformative event 
lived a second life as a hero of great power and especially wisdom.44  
    I believe that the information contained in the anecdotes surrounding Hesiod’s death are 
sufficient proof for his ancient status as a hero. Other indications, such as Hesiod’s 
description of himself as a Mousavwn qeravpwn,45 the inclusion of his statue among those of 
other heroes on Mount Helicon,46 the fact that only heroes are said to have ‘been young 
twice’,47 and the care for Hesiod’s body described in AP 7.55,48 only further confirm this.49 It 
must be said, however, that despite all the evidence for heroization there is no definite 
(archaeological or literary) proof for a cult for Hesiod.50 Optimistic claims to the contrary by 
                                               
40 Scodel (1980) 317. She also points out that Hesiod was the author of a Catabasis of Theseus and Peirithous 
(fr. 280 MW). West (1966) 15-16 shows that theogony was generally associated with seers and wonder-workers. 
41 See for more on Hesiod’s wisdom in general ch. 5, pp. 139-142, and on Hesiodic eschatology and demonology 
in particular pp. 142-148. 
42 Beaulieu (2004) 107; cf. Gallini (1963) 67-68 and Rank (1990) 64.  
43 See Wallace (1999) 196 and 204. 
44 It strikes me as odd that Beaulieu (2004) 114-115 does not remark on the possible connection between 
Hesiod’s plunge and second youth, and in fact explicitly denies (in the face of all Scodel’s evidence) that his 
second youth is somehow tied to knowledge of the other side, preferring the explanation of McKay (1959).  
45 Nagy (1979) 292-293 and (1990) 48 argued that qeravpwn originally meant ‘ritual substitute’ and thus points 
to a cult hero (cf. the hero Archilochus, who was generally known as a ‘qeravpwn of the Muses’ and received 
cult worship, cf. Clay 2004 9-38). There was an annual festival of the Muses (Mouseia) at Helicon, with which 
Hesiod was probably connected: see further below. 
46 Esp. Thamyris, Arion, and Orpheus (cf. Paus. 9.30.2-4); Homer is conspicuously absent (cf. Hunter 2006 18). 
47 Scodel (1980) 307-308 names Jason, Aeson, Pelops, and Iolaus. 
48 Beaulieu (2004) 116 remarks that the mention of ‘goatherds pouring libations of milk mixed with golden 
honey’ (AP 55.3-4) may refer to the melivkraton-offerings made to heroes and other chthonian deities. 
49 It may be significant that the asphodel, associated with Hesiod because of WD 41, was called the ‘hero’s plant’ 
(heroion), cf. Plin. Mai. NH 22.67.  
50 The famous inscription on a Thespian boundary-stone (o{ro~ tà~ gà~ tà~ iJarà~ twǹ sunqutavwn tàm / 
Mwsavwn twǹ Eijsiodeivwn) offers nothing conclusive. The inscription should probably be translated ‘this is the 
boundary-stone of the terrain sacred to the Hesiodians who sacrifice together to the Muses’ (see e.g. Roesch 
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scholars like Notopoulos, Calame, and others51 should be mitigated: a cult is very likely, but 
(so far) not definitely proven. 
 
All things considered, it is rather difficult to fully agree with Lefkowitz’ concluding remarks 
on the life of Hesiod as whole - according to her, ‘the events of Hesiod’s ‘life’ are related to 
his poetry only in distant and general ways’.52 We have seen, however, that many of Hesiod’s 
autobiographical remarks from both the Theogony and Works and Days were taken very 
seriously and thus helped to shape the Hesiodic persona. Besides, the more general picture of 
Hesiod as a poor shepherd or farmer could generate more specific biographical information, 
such as when he is turned into the inventor of the obscure alimon- or ‘no-hunger’-drug, a 
magical medicine that keeps hunger away.53 Moreover, and this is most interesting, Hesiod’s 
superhuman qualities proven by his death, burial and possible rebirth are in perfect agreement 
with a well-attested tradition of the poet as the expert on demons, spirits and the afterlife. 
Hesiod obviously owes this reputation to his description of the underworld, and especially to 
his often-quoted words on the afterlife of the men of the Golden Race, who have transformed 
into demons guarding those alive today.54 But I hope to have shown that the great authority on 
demons is himself a hero with similar powers: he has gone to the other side and came back, 
like the guardian-daivmone~ still ‘watches over judgements and cruel deeds’ (cf. WD 124); and 
tradition has bestowed a beneficial power to the bones of the very poet who sang that the Men 
of Gold after their demise are taking care of mortals.  
    The biographical tradition of Hesiod, then, pictures him as something more human than a 
god (a description used for Homer) and more godlike than a man (like any shepherd or 
farmer). He was regarded as a hero, on account of his special connection to the Muses and his 
extraordinary wisdom. He was in some way seen as pro;~ hJma~̀ (‘close to us’), a benign spirit 
who could ward off disaster and advise mankind against evil deeds. It is obvious that much of 
this heroic image is based on his own work: it can hardly be a coincidence that the relics of 
                                                                                                                                                   
1982 162-166), but even if Eijsiodeivwn should go with Mousavwn (‘the Hesiodic Muses’, so e.g. Hurst 1996 64) 
there is no mention of a cult for Hesiod.   
51 Notopoulos (1964) 43 suggests (though without direct evidence) that there may have been ‘a cult center in 
Boeotia devoted to the propagation of Hesiodic poetry’; Calame (1996a) and others are probably too quick to 
take the lead tablet inscribed with the WD shown to Pausanias (9.31.4) as proof for a cult (see Beaulieu 2004 
112). Calame’s basic hypothesis that Hesiod’s biography ‘n’est que la trace langagière du culte rendu au poète 
héroïsé’ (1996a 48) is somewhat too simplistic and leads to the assumption of (at least) two different cults (one 
in Orchomenos, and one on Mt. Helicon, 50-51).       
52 Lefkowitz (1981) 11. 
53 See Pl. Lg. 677e and Plu. Mor. 157E-158B. 
54 WD 121-126. This tradition is well attested for the age of Plato and probably goes back even further. See ch. 5, 
pp. 142-148. 
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the poet typically warning against injustice are the only remedy against a pestilence in 
Orchomenos, the sort of calamity that Hesiod himself says is a divine punishment for ‘evil 
outrageousness and cruel deeds’ (u{bri~ ... kakh; kai; scevtlia e[rga).55 Nonetheless, it 
remains impossible to trace the exact development of the relationship between the poems and 
the vita. 
 
2 - The Mechanisms of Memory 
We have seen so far that the biographical tradition, which obviously plays a significant role in 
the ancient construction of Hesiod, is based to a significant degree on the poems themselves: 
most autobiographical remarks are taken seriously and are further elaborated, while other 
passages (like those on the demons and the plague) contribute to the ‘life’ in a less direct but 
nonetheless visible way. At the same time, however, some parts of the autobiography (such as 
the quarrel with Perses) are largely ignored, and the largest part of Hesiod’s poetry is not or 
only loosely tied to the vita. It is thus clear that the ‘life’ of Hesiod is just as much the product 
of the mechanisms of cultural memory as the rest of his ancient image. 
    The second part of this chapter is concerned with a close investigation of these 
mechanisms, and aims to find an answer to the question of why some passages from the 
Hesiodic corpus are favoured over others, and why some lines are quoted over and over again 
while others are wholly forgotten. In other words, I will attempt to specify the mechanisms 
that cause the ‘sacred mountains’ and ‘profane valleys’ of the Hesiodic commemograms 
printed in the introductory chapter.56 I have distinguished six of these factors; four of them 
account for the mountains, i.e. the fact that quotes and references tend to group around certain 
verses. These have been labeled the practice of assimilation, the catchword-factor, and the 
principles of snowballing and clustering. The fifth and sixth are factors explaining the valleys, 
i.e. the fact that whole groups of Hesiodic lines are not or not frequently referred to. These are 
called the Homeric factor and the persona’s paradox. 
 
2.1 - The Practice of Assimilation 
What later authors find (and focus on) in Hesiod is often determined by what they are looking 
for. Surely, this is an obvious observation, but nonetheless crucial to the understanding of 
                                               
55 WD 238. It is interesting that Pausanias describes the plague as affecting ‘both men and beasts’ (kai; 
ajnqrwvpou~ kai; ta; boskhvmata, 9.38.3) which reminds one of the pestilence destroying first beasts and then 
men in Il. 1.44-52. Could there be a trace of the Homer-Hesiod antinomy here, with Hesiod presented as ending 
a disaster that Homer takes as the starting-point for his tale of war and wrath? 
56 See Introduction, pp. 17-18. 
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Hesiod’s reception (or in fact that of any cultural icon). Later authors tend to reshape Hesiod 
in their own image. Natural philosophers, for example, are of course mostly interested in 
Hesiod’s theogony, and especially the passages that can be interpreted as referring to cosmic 
forces and elements; Theogony 116-120 on the birth of Chaos, Earth and Eros is thus very 
popular with them. Similarly, but more generally, Heraclitus has to turn Hesiod into a 
philosopher - albeit a failed one - or there would be no point in attacking him.57 Since the 
image of Hesiod apparently depends in part on the particular outlook of the recipient, I call 
this the principle of assimilation: there has to be some common ground between source and 
recipient, which allows them to become one to some degree. 
    The practice of assimilation can also explain less clear-cut cases. In order to demonstrate 
this, I will for the remainder of this subsection focus on the remarkable ‘mountains’ in the 
Works and Days-commemogram of the archaic period, and try to find an explanation for 
them.  
    The concentrated peaks in question are often connected to Hesiod’s misogynist comments 
on the deceptive and generally harmful nature of women (Works and Days 700-705), verses 
that are referred to by Archilochus (fr. 196), Semonides (fr. 6 and 7.110-111), Alcaeus (fr. 
347), Theognis (1.852 and 965-966) and Phocylides (fr. 2). Together, these references make 
up about a third of all 7th- and 6th-century references to Hesiod. The archaic poets’ narrow 
focus, and the fact that Hesiod’s misogynist verses become markedly less popular in later 
periods, suggest that these references are bound by some common factor; I suggest that we 
can find it in the archaic poems’ performance context and generic affinity.  
    Before we can look at the recipient poems themselves, however, there are two fundamental 
objections to my suggestion which I have to address. The first is that the five poets mentioned 
do not appear to be related by genre: Theognis and Phocylides wrote elegiac poetry, but the 
works of Archilochus and Semonides are usually categorized as iambic, whereas Alcaeus was 
a lyric poet. But this conventional separation, I submit, should not deter us from grouping 
them together. ‘Metre alone was not decisive in determining archaic genres’, as Fowler says,58 
and it appears that subject matter was not, either.59 Occasion, however, was of great 
importance, and Bowie argued rather convincingly that most of the poetry of the poets 
                                               
57 Or perhaps it is better to say that the very fact that Heraclitus attacks Hesiod turns the latter into a philosopher. 
See ch. 6 on Hesiod’s reception by the natural philosophers (pp. 164-172) and Heraclitus (pp. 179-181). 
58 Fowler (1987) 89. 
59 See Fowler (1987) chapter 3 (‘Elegy and the Genres of Archaic Greece’, 86-103), West (1974) 14-18 on the 
wide range of elegy’s subject matter and Bowie (1986) 13-15 on generic distinctions in the archaic period. 
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mentioned could be roughly called sympotic.60 I follow his argument61 and situate the 
references to Hesiod’s misogynist remarks in a sympotic context.  
    The second objection is a pertinent warning by Fowler (and others)62 against an overly 
enthusiastic Quellenforschung that detects epic reminiscences everywhere in archaic poetry: 
the use of traditional epic verses, he points out, does not necessarily entail references to 
Hesiod (or Homer), and certain ideas are more often than not merely commonplaces instead 
of imitations. Single words cannot be meant to recall whole epic passages, and ‘adaptations’ 
of epic phrases belong to a ‘Virgilian technique’ that is ‘inappropriate’ for early Greek lyric.63 
Fowler’s wise words notwithstanding, I believe the references I have incorporated into the 
commemogram can still count as such because 1) it is never just a single word that triggers 
the reference; 2) the passages recalled are relatively small, i.e. the focus is rather narrow; 3) 
the references were meant to be recognized as such since quoting from Homer and Hesiod 
was a popular game at symposia;64 and 4) the way the reminiscences are adapted to their new 
context (see further below) makes it very plausible to take Hesiod as a subtext. 
    With these two crucial objections met, I will now discuss a few of the references to 
Hesiod’s misogyny to explain the ‘mountain’ around Works and Days 700-705. It is 
convenient to turn to Theognis first, for even though he does not refer to these verses in 
particular, his reference to Hesiod’s misogyny serves as a good example of my approach. One 
of the recurrent themes in the first book of Theognis’ elegies is that of loyalty among friends 
and the difficulty of finding out if people are really to be trusted or not.65 In 1.965-6 he says 
that ‘many indeed have a false, thievish character / and keep it hidden, taking on an attitude 
appropriate to the day’ (polloiv toi kivbdhlon ejpivklopon h \qo~ e[conte~ / kruvptous’, 
ejnqevmenoi qumo;n ejfhmevrion). This, in my view, is a clear reference to Works and Days 67, 
where Hesiod tells how Hermes was ordered ‘to give [Pandora] a doggish mind and a thievish 
character’ (ejn de; qevmen kuvneovn te novon kai; ejpivklopon h \qo~). There are several words here, 
not just one, triggering the reference; moreover, the passage referred to is both well-known 
                                               
60 Bowie (1986); he concludes (contra West 1974) that elegiac poetry (which includes Archilochus, Semonides 
and Alcaeus) ‘in its shorter form was so closely associated with the symposium that no clear evidence remains to 
attest any other context of performance’ (34). 
61 Bowie (1986) distinguishes between the shorter poems, meant for performance at symposia, and the longer 
ones that were performed at public festivals. Of our five poets only Semonides wrote such a long one, a story on 
the foundation and early history of Samos, and it is very unlikely that fr. 7.110 was part of that poem. 
62 So already Davison (1955b) 139-140. 
63 Fowler (1987) 8-9. This is why he disqualifies the fragments of Archilochus and Semonides as references (30-
31); it is unclear to me, however, why then the Alcaeus-fragment is ‘undoubtedly an imitation’ (37). He does not 
mention the other references, maybe because he believes that ‘by the time we reach Anacreon and Simonides, 
the lyric genres have come into their own and their debt to epic is virtually non-existent’ (50). 
64 See DuPont (1999) ‘a symposium (…) particularly welcomed citations’ (35, cf. 84-85). 
65 See e.g. 1.77-78, 119-124, 299-300, 599-600. 
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and recalled in a general way, so there is no question of a ‘Virgilian’ alertness supposed in the 
audience. And lastly, the relevance of the Hesiodic line to the new context is so pertinent that 
a conscious adaptation is obvious: it makes excellent sense to compare the pleasant exterior 
and deceptive interior of people with the prime example of outward beauty covering inner 
evil, Pandora. Incidentally, there is another passage in Theognis equating the deception of 
friends with the behaviour typical of womankind, which also refers to Hesiod.66 
    I will turn now to Works and Days 700-705, which the archaic poets understood as a 
comment not on woman’s deceitful nature but on her lustfulness. In the Hesiodic passage, 
Perses is advised to be careful in choosing a bride, ‘lest your marriage cause your neighbors 
merriment’ (mh; geivtosi cavrmata ghvmh/~); there is nothing better than a good wife, but a bad 
one ‘singes her husband without a torch’ (a[ndra ... eu{ei a[ter daloìo). Semonides (who also 
refers to Works and Days 702-703 in fragment 6) picks up the warning of the laughing 
neighbours in fr. 7.108-111: ‘I tell you, the woman who seems most respectable, she’s the 
very one who commits the greatest outrage. For while her husband stands open-mouthed, the 
neighbours delight in seeing how he too is mistaken’ (h{ti~ dev toi mavlista swfroneìn 
dokeì, / au{th mevgista tugcavnei lwbwmevnh: / kechnovto~ ga;r ajndrov~ oiJ de; geivtone~ / 
caivrous’ oJrwǹte~ kai; tovn, wJ~ aJmartavnei). The worst of women is apparently she who 
cannot swfroneìn, a word probably meant in its sexual sense as Semonides may have 
interpreted Hesiod’s words on ‘the singing of a husband without a torch’ sexually.67 This is 
less than the far stretch it might first appear, for it is exactly the ‘sex-mad woman’ (mainovli~ 
guvnh) that Archilochus will avoid for fear of being laughed at by his neighbours (geivtosi 
cavrm’ e[somai, fr. 196). Alcaeus fr. 94D, which contains an obvious reference to Hesiod’s 
comment on the increased sexual appetite of women during summer-time, is a confirmation of 
the archaic poets’ concern with women’s lusty behaviour - a concern they saw foreshadowed 
in Hesiod.68 
    It is not difficult to see why sympotic poetry deals with the supposed destructiveness of 
women. The symposium (as Greek commensality as a whole) was an all-male occasion.69 
Cautionary reflections on the other sex are a natural topic in such a context, especially since 
                                               
66 Compare Thgn. 1.851-852, ‘May Olympian Zeus utterly destroy the man who is willing to deceive his 
comrade with gentle blandishments’ (Zeu;~ a[ndr’ ejxolevseien  jOluvmpio~, o{~ to;n eJtaìron / malqaka; kwtivllwn 
ejxapatàn ejqevlei) with WD 373-374, ‘Do not let an arse-fancy woman deceive your mind by guilefully cajoling 
you while she pokes into your granary’ (mh; de; gunhv se novon pugostovlo~ ejxapatavtw / aiJmuvla kwtivllousa, 
teh;n difẁsa kalihvn). The recurrence of (a participle form of) the rare kwtivllw is a dead give-away (cf. 
Anacreon fr. 453). See for the idea of woman as a kakon sent by Zeus also Semonides fr. 7. 
67 Pace Rademaker (2005) 97 n.45. 
68 See also Phocylides fr. 2. 
69 See Murray (1983) and his introduction to the collection of articles Sympotica (1990). 
INTRODUCTION: SEARCHING FOR HESIOD 
 123
the institution of the symposium was meant to be of educational value for the boys present.70 
Hesiod, for the archaic poets, was clearly the expert on misogyny par excellence: his Pandora-
myth and pertinent warnings concerning women did not go unnoticed.71 Because of their own 
focus and interest, the sympotic poets found in Hesiod what they were looking for.72 
Incidentally, it should be noted that Homer, in this period, is not at all associated with that 
particular topic.73 
    We should conclude, therefore, that the picture of Hesiod is to a considerable degree 
formed through ‘assimilation’ by his recipients. What they are searching for and what 
passages of Hesiod’s works they select, is in part dictated by their own genre and outlook. 
The short digression on the archaic poets made it clear that this principle is valid even in less-
than-obvious cases.74 Theoretically, the practice of assimilation would make the development 
of the Hesiodic persona dependent on the development of genres in subsequent periods: what 
will not be looked for, will never be found. But there are other factors as well. 
 
2.2 - The Catchword-Factor  
One of those other factors is concerned more with the work itself, perhaps, than with its 
recipients. One could argue that some of Hesiod’s verses were bound to receive a rich afterlife 
because of their own quote-worthy nature; I call this the catchword-factor. In order for a line 
to develop into a slogan, it should ideally possess a number of qualities. First of all, it should 
address a subject of considerable interest to the Greeks; second, there should be something 
new and original to it, either with regard to form or to content (and preferably to both). These 
two qualities will allow the verse in question to be noticed and stick in one’s memory. The 
third requirement is a broad scope, so that the verse can be adapted and made to apply to 
many different contexts.  
                                               
70 Bremmer (1990). Incidentally, West (1966) 45-46 rather fancifully takes Hesiod’s ‘earnestness’ concerning 
marriage as an indication that he was about 30 when singing the Th.  
71 According to Servius (in Verg. Ecl. 6.42, Thilo-Hagen 3.9), Sappho too treated the Pandora-myth. 
72 This principle is at work in modern scholarship as well. To stay with the topic: feminist readers tend to focus 
on and so blow up Hesiod’s misogyny; see e.g. Hathaway (2001) 59 introducing Hesiod in a non-specialist book 
on mythology as ‘a dour man and a misogynist’. An extreme example is provided by DuBois, who ends her 1992 
article on Hesiod’s misogyny supposedly permeating the entire corpus with a personal touch, admitting she ‘so 
much dislikes the author in question’ (113), whose very name ‘summons up dread in me’ (114). See Van 
Noorden (2007) 170 on Hesiod’s misogyny as a modern construct; Kirk (1970) 229 believes Hesiod in his 
description of women in the Th. is actually ‘moderating’ the traditionally misogynistic myth of Pandora. 
73 See the overview of lyric imitations of (Hesiodic and) Homeric poetry in Fowler (1987) 20-52. In later times, 
Homer is also believed to have known about the destructive nature of women (see AP 9.165). 
74 We should note, incidentally, that this limitation in genre sometimes entails a limitation in time as well: 
sympotic poetry, for instance, had its heyday in the archaic period; interest in themes fluctuates over time. 
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    It is not a coincidence that all three qualities are present in the Hesiodic passage quoted 
most often in antiquity: Works and Days 287-292, on the easy road leading to vice and the 
steep road to virtue.75 It is convenient to quote them in full: 
 
th;n mevn toi kakovthta kai; ijlado;n e[stin eJlevsqai 
 rJhi>divw~: leivh me;n oJdov~, mavla d’ ejgguvqi naivei: 
 th̀~ d’ ajreth~̀ iJdrẁta qeoi; propavroiqen e[qhkan 
290 ajqavnatoi: makro;~ de; kai; o[rqio~ oi\mo~ ej~ aujth;n 
 kai; trhcu;~ to; prẁton: ejph;n d’ eij~ a[kron i{khtai, 
 rJhi>divh dh; e[peita pevlei, calephv per ejoùsa. 
 
‘Misery is there to be grabbed in abundance, 
easily, for smooth is the road, and she lives very nearby; 
but in front of Excellence the immortal gods have set sweat, 
290 and the path to her is long and steep, 
and rough at first - yet when one arrives at the top, 
then it becomes easy, difficult though it still is.’ 
 
That ajrethv and the way to achieve it are of of central interest to Greek thinking is obvious, 
and that Hesiod’s road image was original is beyond doubt.76 But it is especially the third 
requirement, that of a broad scope, that these verses fulfill in such an extraordinary way. A 
short (and non-exhaustive) overview of how this passage was used in new contexts will  
demonstrate this wide applicability.  
    First of all, it should be noted that the applicability of the passage in question derives for a 
large part from the interpretive scope offered by the terms kakovth~ and ajrethv. What Hesiod 
may have ‘meant’ originally is not something I would venture to discuss, but according to 
most scholars the terms deal with the concrete and material rather than with abstract concepts 
of ethical import - but this was a very easy step,77 taken as early as Theognis.78 We can 
                                               
75 I have found 26 references to the passage in later texts, the biggest number by far; see also the peak in the 
commemogram on p. 18. 
76 Panofsky (1930) 45-47, Becker (1937) 56-60, Hommel (1950). It is also telling that West (1978) ad loc. cites a 
Sumerian proverb and a Norse saying as the closest parallels. 
77 These verses are an excellent illustration of how ancient reception can influence modern interpretation; 
scholars used to interpret kakovth~ and ajrethv in moral terms until West (1978 ad loc.) argued that they ‘are not 
‘vice’ and ‘virtue’ but inferior and superior standing in society, determined principally by material prosperity’ 
(see also Verdenius 1985 ad loc). Compare also Most’s 2006 Loeb translation above with that of Evelyn-White 
(1914), who renders ‘Badness’ and ‘Goodness’ (note the capitals).  
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compare the extensive elaboration of Hesiod’s road image by Prodicus, who transformed 
kakovth~ and ajrethv into two women giving the young Heracles advice on which way to take 
in his life.79 It appears that this moral reading became the standard interpretation, which lasted 
throughout antiquity. Plutarch, for instance, is far from thinking of mundane matters like 
wealth and status when he says Works and Days 287-92 is one of those poetic sayings that 
‘one should immediately believe to relate to the best and godliest estate to which we can 
attain, which we think of as correctness of reasoning, the height of good sense, and a 
disposition of soul in full agreement with it.’80 
    As could be expected, the Hesiodic lines are often cited in the context of education,81 
especially philosophy. Not only is the passage believed to contain philosophical value by 
itself,82 but some also take it as a meta-comment on the very quest that is philosophy. Philo, 
for instance, claims the road to virtue is steep and hard for those who are a[frwn, and Plutarch 
compares the illumination brought on by philosophy with reaching the top after a tough 
climb.83 Furthermore, several remarks in Lucian strongly suggest that the Stoics used the 
verses to illustrate the difficult path of the proficiens (although the Hesiodic passage is not 
present in any of the extant Stoic fragments).84 It is perhaps relevant here that rhetoric, 
philosophy’s age-old enemy, is sometimes associated with the ‘easy road’ to quick success.85 
    It should be stressed again that the general acclaim for Hesiod’s words of wisdom is greatly 
facilitated by their vagueness: strictly speaking, Hesiod does not define ajrethv, but merely 
comments on its accessibility, and thus allows all readers to understand the notion itself in 
their own way. Nonetheless, some of those readers apparently engaged with the Hesiodic 
passage in order to discuss the concept of ajrethv. This is not a late practice; see, for instance, 
the end of a particularly martial fragment by Tyrtaeus: ‘Let everyone strive now with all his 
heart to reach this top of virtue, with no slackening in war’ (tauvth~ nùn ti~ ajnh;r ajreth̀~ eij~ 
a[kron iJkevsqai / peiravsqw qumw/̀ mh; meqiei;~ polevmou).86 We can compare a fragment of 
Simonides: ‘There is a tale that Virtue dwells on unclimbable rocks and (close to the gods?) 
                                                                                                                                                   
78 Thgn. 1.1027-1028. 
79 Prodicus DK B 2 (= X. Mem. 2.1.21-34). 
80 Plu. Mor. 24E: eujqu;~ oijevsqw levgesqai peri; th̀~ ajrivsth~ kai; qeiotavth~ e{xew~ ejn hJmìn, h}n ojrqovthta 
lovgou kai; ajkrovthta logikh̀~ fuvsew~ kai; diavqesin oJmologoumevnhn yuch̀~ nooùmen. 
81 Cf. Cic. ad Fam. 6.18.5, and Galen 5.89 Kühn in the context of medical training.  
82 As is shown by the above-mentioned reference in Plutarch; see also an approving quotation by Socrates (X. 
Mem. 2.1.20). 
83 Ph. De Ebr. 150; Plu. Mor. 77D; see also S Eur. Med. 296. Maximus of Tyre responds to this use of Hesiod’s 
lines by giving them a place in a plea for the vita activa (Or. 15.7). The earliest echo may be Pi. Ol. 9.107-108 
saying ‘the ways of wisdom are steep’ (sofivai me;n aijpeinaiv). 
84 Lucian Bis Acc. 21, Nec. 4, and Herm. 2.  
85 Pl. Phdr. 272b, and Lucian Rh.Pr. 3 and 7. 
86 Fr. 12.43-44 West. 
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tends a holy place; she may not be seen by the eyes of all mortals, but only by him on whom 
distressing sweat comes from within, the one who reaches the peak of manliness’ (ejstiv ti~ 
lovgo~ / ta;n   jAreta;n naivein dusambavtois’ ejpi; pevtrai~, / †nùn dev min qoan† cẁron aJgno;n 
ajmfevpein: / oujde; pavntwn blefavroisi qnatwǹ / e[sopto~, w|/ mh; dakevqumo~ iJdrw;~ / 
e[ndoqen movlh/, / i{kh/ t’ ej~ a[kron ajndreiva~).87 It is obvious that these recipients do assume 
that Hesiod has defined ajrethv, and they wish to respond:88 instead of trying to excel in the 
rather servile occupation of farming, they propose a more ‘manly’ type of virtue.89 
    The main reason for the scope of Works and Days 287-292, then, is the convenient 
vagueness of its principal terms. But the passage is also popular because its supposed content 
can vary greatly depending on the lines selected for quotation. When quoted as a whole, the 
verses seem to urge the audience to strive for ajrethv: although it is easier to reach kakovth~, 
‘virtue’ is not an impossible goal; moreover, once it is achieved, it is fairly easy to keep. But 
in most cases, the passage is not quoted in full, which (drastically) alters its meaning. 
Simonides, for instance, in the passage quoted above does not refer to lines 287-288 and 292 
(on ‘vice’ and the easiness of ‘virtue’ once it is achieved) because his focus is on the 
difficulty of reaching ajrethv (whatever he means by it) and the heroism of those who 
nonetheless did so. Plutarch in his treatise on how to reach virtue concentrates on line 292 
because he wants the students of philosophy to know they will in the end be rewarded for 
their efforts.90 Plato, on the other hand, leaves out 292 on purpose: he wants to picture Hesiod 
as actually encouraging vice for the reason that it is simply too hard to achieve excellence.91  
    It is important to note that the eclectic attitude of recipients, here demonstrated with the aid 
of Works and Days 287-292, is a widespread phenomenon for the entire corpus of Hesiod 
(and perhaps even all of Greek poetry). Taking lines out of context, sometimes even altering 
them a little to make them fit the new context better,92 belongs to the standard repertoire of 
                                               
87 Fr. 579 Page. 
88 Simonides is hinting at his literary debt by introducing his image by ejstiv ti~ lovgo~; Munding (1984) has 
demonstrated how Tyrtaeus alerts his audience to the reference.     
89 Tyrtaeus’ addition not to leave off war may be a ‘correction’ to Hesiod’s oft-repeated advice never to stop 
working (perhaps his qumẁ/ also helps to identify the subtext as Hesiod often warns his brother to store his advice 
in his qumov~, see WD 27, 297, 491, 797). There could be an aristocratic ring to Simonides’ fragment since the 
‘sweat from within’ may have to do with inborn qualities. See for aristocratic interpretations of the road-image 
also Pi. Nem. 6.23 and fr. 108ab. 
90 Plu. Mor. 77D. 
91 Pl. R. 364c. Lucian in his many references to the passage (see e.g. n.84) consistently leaves out line 292, either 
to make the passage more ‘Stoic’ or because the Stoics used to quote it without 292 in the first place.    
92 I will give just one example of such practice, comingfrom the work of Plato. Plato quotes Hesiod’s words on 
the demise of the golden race twice, WD 121-123 in Cra. 397e and WD 122-123 in R. 468e. His quote in the 
Cratylus-passage runs as follows: Aujta;r ejpeidh; toùto gevno~ kata; moir̀’ ejkavluyen, / oiJ me;n daivmone~ aJgnoi; 
uJpocqovnioi kalevontai (R.: televqousin) / ejsqloiv, ajlexivkakoi, fuvlake~ qnhtẁn (R.: merovpwn) ajnqrwvpwn. 
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quoting authors. Differences between ancient citations and the reading of our critical texts can 
of course be due to the forgetfulness or sloppiness of ancient authors, but are just as often the 
result of willful manipulation and adaptation.93 Such manipulation naturally occurs most often 
with verses that possess the ‘catchword-factor’, because it is most useful to appropriate a 
poet’s most popular lines.94 
    The example of Hesiod’s most often-quoted lines shows what happens when all three 
catchword qualities - pertinence, originality and applicability - are so generously present in 
one and the same passage; such verses are bound to be noted, imitated and adapted. There are 
also some less extreme examples of lines that for the same reasons seem to invite treatment by 
successors, such as Works and Days 25 (on envy and friendship), 40 (on the dangers of 
greed), 372 (on trust and distrust), and 763-764 (on the power of Rumour). Nonetheless, there 
are still many quoteworthy verses that are (so far as we know) devoid of any afterlife, while 
some verses that lack the qualities described above do receive attention by later authors. As an 
explanation for the mountains and valleys, the catchword-factor is not enough by itself.  
 
2.3 - The Principle of Snowballing 
Sometimes, quotes evoke quotes, and a reference to (or a particular use of) Hesiod can be 
seen to trigger further reference(s) to the poet. I call this the principle of snowballing, and this 
is how it works: author A employs a Hesiodic reference in his own text and is later followed 
by author B who quotes the same passage. In such a case, author B does not (only) refer to 
Hesiod, but also to author A’s use of him. What is interesting about snowballing is that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
There are considerable differences with our text of Hesiod (I will focus on two, marked in bold): aujta;r ejpei; dh; 
toùto gevno~ kata; gaià kavluyen, / toi; me;n daivmone~ eijsi Diov~ megavlou dia; boula;~ / ejsqloiv, ejpicqovnioi, 
fuvlake~ qnhtẁn ajnqrwvpwn. These differences are not due to inadvertence or forgetfulness on Plato’s part (so 
e.g. West 1978 ad loc., claiming that Plato was ‘quoting from memory’ and therefore ‘went wrong’), but 
conscious alterations (cf. Labarbe 1949 devoting p. 257-383 to demonstrating ‘comment Platon, par occasion, 
violentait des vers homériques et les adaptait à sa phrase’ (257), and Benardete 1963 demonstrating that ‘some of 
these misquotations could be deliberate’ (173)). Plato wants to get rid of ‘the will of great Zeus’ in line 122 
because he interprets the demons as the spirits of the citizens that were most valuable to the polis; after they die, 
they are rewarded because of their goodness and not because of the will of a god. Plato subsequently writes 
ajlexivkakoi, ‘averters of ills’, instead of ejpicqovnioi, ‘dwellers on the earth’ in WD 123, in order to avoid the 
contradiction with uJpocqovnioi, ‘dwellers below the earth’, in the line above (and perhaps ajlexivkako~ was a 
normal adjective for a demon, cf. Phld. Epigr. 34 n.36 above). Furthermore, Plato leaves out line 121 in the 
Republic because the demonification he speaks of is a continuing process and not a singular (quasi-)historical 
moment. (Incidentally, I suspect that the different ending of line 122 - Cra. kalevontai, R. televqousin - is not a 
mistake or a coincidence either: after all, Cratylus focuses on how things are named, while in the passage from 
Republic the focus is on the death and subsequent honour of the guardians.)  
93 A third explanation, of course, is the absence of authorized editions, which allows for the side-by-side 
existence of different versions. The impact of this factor, however, is difficult to assess. 
94 It is hazardous, because of the manipulative nature of ancient citation, to use quotes for textual criticism. 
Jacoby (1926) 169-170 used citations by Aristotle to conclude that in Th.-passage 115-122 only lines 116, 117 
and 120 were authentic; but the citations prove only that Aristotle found them most interesting. Cf. Pl. Smp. 
178b, who quotes only those three lines because he needs only those three in that particular context. 
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second reference is not primarily occasioned by the author’s own interest in Hesiod or the 
pertinence of Hesiod’s text, but caused by the way the verse was used - and interpreted - by 
the earlier recipient. It is a reference to a Hesiodic reference. The principle of snowballing 
applies to the use and re-use of individual lines, which thus gain a considerable extra load of 
meaning through time, much like a snowball running down a hill. 
    A very straightforward example of this principle is provided by Aeschines’ and 
Demosthenes’ use of Works and Days 763-4, ‘no talk is ever entirely gotten rid of, once many 
people talk it up: it too is some god’ (Fhvmh d’ ou[ti~ pavmpan ajpovllutai, h{n tina polloi; 
laoi; fhmivxwsi: qeov~ nuv tiv~ ejsti kai; aujthv). Aeschines quotes these verses in his Against 
Timarchus (346 BC), a speech designed to prove that Athenian law forbade Timarchus to 
hold office. Part of the character assassination in this speech was based on rumours about 
Timarchus’ private vices that supposedly made him unfit to be a public servant. The quote 
from Hesiod is used to show that persistent rumours are always true:95 in the goddess Fhvmh, 
Timarchus thus finds a ‘deathless accuser’, kathvgoron ajqavnaton (Tim. 129). 
    Demosthenes defended the case of his political ally Timarchus at the time, and lost. Three 
years later, however, when charging Aeschines for high treason, he returns to the matter. In 
his speech On the False Embassy (343 BC) he accuses Aeschines of having used the state 
embassy to king Philip of Macedon for personal gain, a claim backed up by countless 
rumours. It is at this point in the speech, of course, that Hesiod’s lines on Fhvmh are quoted, 
and Demosthenes vilely adds ‘that for the veracity, and even the divinity, of rumour, and for 
the wisdom of the poet who composed these verses, we have your own assurance.’96 It is 
obvious that Demosthenes is not quoting the Hesiodic lines for their own sake:97 the relevance 
of the citation (and - in this case, more importantly - its rhetorical power) does not primarily 
derive from the Hesiodic passage itself, as in the speech of Aeschines,98 but from the fact that 
Aeschines used them already. 
                                               
95 The passage was usually taken to mean something along the lines of our ‘where there is smoke there is fire’ 
(cf. e.g. Arist. EN 1153b). 
96 Dem. Fals.Leg. 243-244: o{ti pisth;n ei\nai deì kai; ‘qeov~ nuv tiv~ ejsti kai; aujthv’, kai; o{ti sofo;~ h\n oJ 
poihth;~ oJ taùta poihvsa~, su; diwvrisa~ aujtov~. 
97 Demosthenes disliked referring to the ancients. Apart from this citation there are no explicit references to 
either Hesiod or Homer in his speeches. 
98 Aeschines quotes Hesiod twice more. In both cases he refers to Hesiod’s verses on how a corrupt civil servant 
can bring about the destruction of the polis (WD 240-247), applying them once to Demosthenes (Fals.Leg. 158) 
and once to Ctesiphon (Ctes. 135-136). 
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    Aeschines did not give in and obviously wanted the last say, since he referred to the 
question of Fhvmh again in his response,99 but the basic idea is clear: the example provides a 
clear-cut case of a Hesiodic reference evoking not so much Hesiod’s text itself but rather the 
earlier reference, a link that should be recognized in order to fully understand it. Behind this 
process of snowballing, we can see a particular tradition of Hesiod’s reception given shape in 
a relatively conscious manner. It is not, of course, always this evident. Aeschines quotes 
Hesiod fully, and so does Demosthenes, who moreover explicitly says he is referring to 
Aeschines - it goes without saying that snowballing is often more hidden than this. It is 
usually more difficult to prove there is really a chain of references; one example is the 
reception of  Theogony 27-28, on the Muses’ capacity to either tell the truth or speak untruths 
that resemble the truth (further discussed in chapter 6). At other times, it is impossible to see 
where the snowball begins; this is the case with the reception of Works and Days 311, which 
claims that ‘work is no disgrace’ (see also chapter 6).  
 
2.4 - The Principle of Clustering 
Another way of accounting for ‘sacred mountains’ is clustering, a process that most often 
takes place inside the corpus of a recipient author. Clustering occurs when an author connects 
Hesiod to a certain theme or view, and associates several Hesiodic verses (which are ususally 
scattered through the works of the recipient author) with that particular theme. It is a more or 
less conscious way of creating a consistent-looking Hesiod by bringing previously 
unconnected lines together under one common denominator. 
    The principle is applied by Plato, for instance, who in several passages in his work credits 
Hesiod with knowledge about elements, or the smallest constituents of reality.100 In this 
section, however, I will focus on another example, provided by Aristotle. Aristotle seems to 
have believed that Hesiod was responsible for the initial impetus to philosophical speculation, 
but should nonetheless not be considered a philosopher or scientist. Instead, he ranks among 
the early ‘theologians’ (qeologhvsante~) and, as a ‘thinker in mythical terms’ (muqikẁ~ 
sofizovmeno~) belongs to a non-philosophical genre.101 Moreover, his more practical 
contributions to Greek thought, represented by the many pieces of advice in the Works and 
Days, are dismissed as mere popular wisdom. 
                                               
99 Aeschin. Fals.Leg. 144. He distinguishes between rumour, when through divine intervention a whole group of 
people suddenly all say the same thing, and mere slander, when malicious individuals like Demosthenes 
insinuate accusations in the minds of the masses. See on this distinction further ch. 6, pp. 196 n.148. 
100 The argument is somewhat too complex to be summarized here; see for a full discussion ch. 6, pp. 193-202. 
101 Metaph. 983b27-32, 1000a18-19. See also ch. 9, pp. 315-316. 
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    Aristotle’s view of Hesiod as a basic and incipient thinker is reflected in the way he is 
employed in his treatises. As could be expected, the Theogony’s lines on the beginning of the 
cosmos are often quoted as the beginning of cosmogonical thinking - see, for instance, the 
start of Physics book 4, when Aristotle begins to discuss ‘place’ (tovpo~), a concept aligned 
with Hesiod’s Cavo~.102 This almost ‘iconic’ use of Hesiod at the beginning of the treatise is, 
interestingly enough, extrapolated to other issues. At the start of the Oeconomica, Works and 
Days 405 is quoted (‘a house first of all, a woman, and an ox for ploughing’, oi\kon me;n 
prwvtista gunaik̀av te boùn t’ ajrothr̀a) as a short introduction to the basic components of 
the household; the same verse is cited at the beginning of the Politica, to illustrate the first 
and most rudimentary form of man’s associations.103 Similarly, Works and Days 25 is quoted 
at the beginning of book 8 of the Nicomachean Ethics, and in the same work verse 715 is 
mentioned when Aristotle starts to address the question of whether or not one should make as 
many friends as possible.104  
    The most telling example, however, comes from the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics 
as a whole, where the very question of how an enquiry or treatise should begin is addressed. 
Aristotle suggests that the ‘starting-points’ (a[rcai) are the facts themselves (to; o{ti), and that 
any well-educated man either knows them already or can get them easily. He continues: ‘And 
as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod: ‘Far best is he 
who knows all things himself; / Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right; / But he who 
neither knows, nor lays to heart / Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight’.105 Hesiod is quoted 
in a passage where ‘starting’ itself is problematized; when we add this reference to those we 
mentioned already, we may surmise that there is an Aristotelian connection between Hesiod 
and beginnings. As Hesiod’s thinking represents, in Aristotle’s eyes, the starting-point of  
philosophy, his logical place is at the start of a philosophical account. When we are alert to 
the principle of clustering, we can see the logic behind the references. 
    Some final comments should be made with regard to clustering. First, it is relatively 
infrequent. As it is generally impossible (and undesirable) for a recipient author to subsume 
all his references to Hesiod under one unifying theme, a rather large and diverse corpus with a 
considerable amount of references to Hesiod is necessary in order to detect the principle; 
                                               
102 Ph. 208b27-33. See also Metap. 984b23-31, Xen. 975a7-14 and 976b14-18. 
103 Oec. 1343a21, Pol. 1252b11-12. 
104 EN 1155b15 and 1170b21-22; WD 25 is also quoted at the start of book 7 of the EE (1235a18). 
105 w/| de; mhdevteron uJpavrcei touvtwn, ajkousavtw tẁn   JHsiovdou: ou|to~ me;n panavristo~, o}~ aujto;~ pavnta 
nohvsei, / ejsqlo;~ d’ au\ kai; keiǹo~, o}~ eu\ eijpovnti pivqhtai: / o}~ dev ke mhvt’ aujto;~ noevh/ mhvt’ a[llou ajkouvwn / 
ejn qumw/̀ bavllhtai, oJ d’ au\t’ ajcrhvio~ ajnhvr (EN 1095b8-13, WD 293 and 295-297). 
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hence the examples from Plato and Aristotle (who refer to Hesiod 39 times and 28 times, 
respectively). Many authors do not refer to Hesiod that often, or have left us smaller corpora, 
or both. Second, clustering is not per se a strictly ‘synchronic’ process (occurring only within 
the corpus of one author), but appears to develop through time as well. Even though all 
authors have their own view of Hesiod and the themes that are connected to him, it is clear 
from the examples of Plato and Aristotle that Hesiodic themes can be passed on. For instance, 
there is a strong resemblance between Plato’s Hesiod (with his arcane knowledge of 
elements) and Aristotle’s Hesiod (with his ancient wisdom of basic starting-points). That is 
the power of tradition, which is also clearly visible in the Homeric factor. 
 
2.5 - The Homeric Factor 
So far, we have been concerned with mechanisms of memory accounting for the mountains in 
the commemogram, i.e. the reasons why some passages or verses from the Hesiodic corpus 
are referred to in later times. In this paragraph, however, we will try to reveal why some 
passages are rejected instead of received. As was noted above, it is not enough to simply 
negate the reasons for remembering certain verses and claim that all others are forgotten 
because they are not assimilated, do not qualify as ‘catchy’, are not selected for snowballing 
and are not involved in clustering. There are also mechanisms that positively rule out certain 
Hesiodic lines or passages for remembrance. The most important one is the so-called Homeric 
factor. 
    It goes without saying that in the ancient imagination Homer too, just like Hesiod, was 
associated with certain themes, especially that of war. Such themes are then already ‘spoken 
for’106 and subsequently help to erase comparable Hesiodic verses and passages from 
memory. This explains why it was stated earlier that Hesiod is never really alone. This 
principle of ‘claiming’ themes is made explicit by a scholiast:  
 
Meta; th;n hJrwi>kh;n genealogivan kai; tou;~ katalovgou~ ejpezhvthse kainourghs̀ai 
pavlin eJtevran uJpovqesin: kai; dh; katacrhsqevntwn tẁn eij~ polevmou~ kai; mavca~, 
kai; th̀~ gewrgiva~ didaskalivan eijsfevrei kai; twǹ hJmerwǹ th;n kras̀in... 
 
‘After the genealogy of the heroes and the catalogues Hesiod sought to begin yet 
another, new subject (for poetry); and since the themes connected with wars and 
                                               
106 I do not mean that such a division of themes was chronologically determined; Homer did not have ‘first pick’. 
CHAPTER 4 
 132
battles had of course been fully worked out, he introduced the instruction on 
agriculture and the combination of the days…’107 
 
Note that the poet himself is here pictured as making the conscious choice to stay away from 
war poetry and choose a subject that was not already extensively covered, while it is of course 
to a large degree the collective forgetting of heroic and martial passages in Hesiod that has 
turned him into the peace-loving farmer poet. 
    I will illustrate this process with a fairly straightforward example. There is a remarkable 
valley in the Works and Days where Hesiod speaks of the fourth Race, that of the heroes who 
fought in Thebes and Troy (WD 156-173). Both the Golden (first) and Iron (fifth and last) 
Race are often referred to, and later imitations of the passage name all the metals - but the 
heroes are almost completely left out.108 It is somewhat of a commonplace among modern 
scholars that the insertion of the Heroic Race into an originally metallic scheme was a truly 
Hesiodic touch,109 but this was clearly not how he was remembered in antiquity. I suggest that 
since warfare among heroes was such an obviously Homeric theme, no-one quotes Hesiod on 
the subject. 
    Someone might object that this argument is hardly convincing since Hesiod’s twenty 
verses-passage on heroes is rather insignificant anyway. That is true, but Hesiod has written 
considerably more about the heroes and their exploits (notably of Heracles) in the Catalogue 
and elsewhere. Moreover, Hesiod does speak often of war and conflict, especially in the 
Theogony: the struggle of Zeus, his peers and the Hundred-handers versus the Titans (617-
731), and the duel between Zeus and Typhoeus (820-880) are unmistakably epic battle-
scenes.110 Nonetheless we find valleys here, too. Apparently, the war-theme in general is so 
inextricably linked to Homer that martial scenes among the gods are usually believed to be 
Homeric as well.111 Homer’s mountains, then, explain Hesiod’s valleys. 
    Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the Homeric factor is active in modern scholarship 
as well: we too usually are blind to martial scenes in Hesiod and thus turn him into a non-
heroic poet of peace, simply because we are taught by tradition to think he is one. I will give 
                                               
107 S Prol. WD B. 
108 There are some exceptions, however, notably Catullus 64 and Virgil Ecl. 4 (I thank Helen van Noorden for 
bringing these passages to my attention). 
109 E.g. Griffiths (1956) 109 and 118, Von Fritz (1962) 33-34, Fontenrose (1974) 3-4. 
110 In the Theogony, I counted 119 lines (12%) dealing with war, and another 218 (21%) with other acts of 
violence and conflict, together making up 33 per cent of the poem. It thus seems incorrect to state with Wade-
Gery (1949) 91, voicing a very common view, that ‘Hesiod practically never mentions war.’        
111 See e.g. Pl. R. 377d. The denial of martial themes to Hesiod was so strict that it is sometimes played with, see 
e.g. Manilius describing Hesiod’s main subject as ‘man’s warfare with the soil’ (militiam soli, Astr. 20). See for 
more on the war-peace distinction between Homer and Hesiod ch. 8. 
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just one example, that deals with the Titanomachy, one of the few war narratives in the 
Theogony (617-720). It has often bothered scholars that the all-powerful Zeus needs the 
Hundred-handers to defeat the Titans, a fact that seems to run counter to the general trend in 
Hesiod to idealize Zeus and his regency.112 In an intriguing article on the Titanomachy as a 
whole, Mondi attempts to solve this (supposed) incongruence by suggesting Hesiod ‘recast[s] 
the Titanomachy, and especially Zeus’ role in it, in the mold of heroic epic’113 - hence all the 
Homeric elements he detects in what we can only describe as an aristeia of Zeus, designed to 
overshadow the crucial role played by the Hundred-handers. Although his argument is cogent, 
and the parallels from the Iliad are striking, it is of course only after we have tacitly assumed 
that Hesiod is only a poet of genealogies and agriculture that we can say he switches to 
another tradition, i.e. true epic, for the description of Zeus’ exploits. In so doing, we - just like 
the ancients - keep our own traditional view of Hesiod alive.114 
 
2.6 - The Persona’s Paradox 
When we take another look at the Works and Days-commemogram, especially for the archaic 
and classical period, we can discern other curious valleys. For instance, there is a large gap 
between lines 456 and 582 (a valley of 125 verses), which becomes even greater (456-654, 
coming to 197 verses) if we leave out the peak connected to the passage on lustful women 
(582-587). Furthermore, there are no references to verses after line 764. These two valleys are 
so remarkable because they roughly cover the sections on the Works and the Days, 
respectively, i.e. those passages that are believed to have been so typical of the poem that they 
brought forth its name.115 See the commemogram below: 
                                               
112 See Blaise and Rousseau (1996) 214-218 for a short overview. 
113 Mondi (1986) 32. 
114 See also Clay (2003) 165 saying that the rejection of Hesiodic authorship for the Catalogue derives from the 
‘unspoken premise’ that ‘if Hesiod’s poetry constitues an implicit polemic against heroic epic, then we should 
not assign to Hesiod a composition dealing with the heroic tradition.’ 
115 It is unknown when the title came into existence. Stanford (1968) 163 says Aristophanes, describing Hesiod’s 
poetry as dealing with gh̀~ ejrgasiva~ and w{ra~ in Ran. 1034 ‘paraphrases’ the title (incidentally, Stanford might 
have mentioned Prodicus’ Hesiod-like book   {Wra~ as well, cf. O’Sullivan 1992 76-77); but the description is no 
proof that the title as such actually existed. West (1978) thinks it likely to be in use by the time of Callimachus; 
he believes the sections on the works and days were ‘picked out [for the title], perhaps by sellers, as representing 
what was of most practical value in the poem’ (136). I think this is highly unlikely, especially since the practical 




     Works             Days 
 
Figure 3: Works and Days, archaic and classical period (peak in 582-587 left out) 
 
A hypothetical explanation is what I call the persona’s paradox: the passages are so well-
known that they are not mentioned, and so obviously Hesiodic that they are not connected to 
him explicitly. According to this hypothesis, the Greeks were so thoroughly familiar with (the 
existence of) both passages that the sections on the Works and the Days did contribute to the 
Hesiodic persona (turning him into the traditional farmer-poet with good advice), but were 
only rarely referred to explicitly. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that Hesiod’s 
treatment of farming and the calendar is almost unique in Greek literature: we have only very 
few later texts that could naturally present Hesiod as a source on these particular subjects - as 
if the poet was generally believed to have dealt with the theme in a definitive way.116 I 
suggest that these two hypotheses account for the small number of references to either the 
Works or Days. 
    We should beware, however, of relying too much on numbers and figures, and jumping to 
conclusions. It should be remembered that only word-by-word citations or references that are 
substantiated by identical words are incorporated into the commemogram, which means that 
more general references to Hesiodic passages or ideas do not show in the figure. Heraclitus, 
for instance, refers to Hesiod’s section on the days as a whole when he jeers at the poet for 
claiming there are good and bad days; Herodotus too presumably thinks of Hesiod when he 
says that the Egyptian system of connecting days to certain gods and fates was taken up by 
‘Greeks who deal in poetry’ (twǹ  JEllhvnwn oiJ ejn poihvsi genovmenoi).117 Nonetheless it 
                                               
116 See Osborne (1987) 16-21 on ‘the concealment of agriculture’ in Greek literature; he further suggests that the 
countryside in general may have been taken for granted ‘because it was so universally important’ (16). 
117 Heraclitus DK B 106, Hdt. Hist. 2.82. 
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appears that, apart from these two, there are no more general references to the Days in the 7th 
to 4th century BC, and there are no such references to the section on the Works. 
    The hypothesis of the persona’s paradox is admittedly weak since it argues e silentio and 
cannot prove that unmentioned passages were thought to be very Hesiodic;118 furthermore, its 
corollary that the passages that are referred to are not or not wholly regarded as Hesiodic, is 
obviously untrue. Still, there is some circumstantial evidence for the hypothesis, which is 
provided by the Romans. When Hesiod is mentioned in Latin literature, we do often find 
references to the Works and his advice on agricultural matters. The Romans generally 
describe him and his work in very similar (and stereotypical) ways: according to Cicero, he is 
the doctus who ‘wrote on agriculture’, Virgil says his Georgics are an Ascraeum carmen, the 
Culex speaks of a ‘shepherd vying with the bard of Ascra’ (aemulus Ascraeo pastor ... 
poetae), Propertius calls Virgil’s Georgics ‘the precepts of the old bard of Ascra’ (Ascraei 
veteris praecepta poetae), Ovid describes Hesiod as ‘the teacher of ploughing’ (praeceptor 
arandi) and the ‘old farmer’ (senex agricola), and Pliny the Elder names Hesiod several times 
as the first to have put forth praecepta on agriculture.119 The Romans obviously make the 
‘typical’ Hesiod, i.e. the wise farmer-poet, far more explicit than the Greeks (of the classical 
period), perhaps because they are not so much affected by the persona’s paradox: they are 
considerably less familiar with the Works and Days, and agriculture to them is much less a 
strictly Hesiodic subject; this is also shown by the fact that (in contrast to what we find in 
Greece) there are quite a few Roman treatises on the subject.  
 
3 - Conclusion 
This chapter was concerned with investigating the ways in which the ancient Greeks 
constructed Hesiod; its main question was why certain parts of him are remembered while 
others are forgotten. It has been clearly shown by the first section, dealing with the 
biographical tradition, that this question depends on several ‘agents’. First of all, Hesiod’s vita 
and persona are informed by autobiographical remarks, i.e. ‘constructive’ elements suggested 
by the source text itself. These remarks can be regarded as the artist’s way of influencing his 
own reputation, and in fact most of them are used by later authors. Second, there is the 
recipients’ creative use of other (that is, non-autobiographical) material in the poems; and this 
                                               
118 Such proof is very rare anyway. One example is Hesiod’s catalogue of Nereids (Th. 240-264); it is never 
referred to, but Zenodotus deleted Homer’s catalogue of Nereids (Il. 18.39-49) for being too Hesiodic (see 
scholia ad loc). 
119 Cic. Cato 15.45, Verg. Georg. 2.176, [Verg.] Culex 96, Prop. 2.34.77, Ovid Fasti 6.13 and Pont. 4.14.32, 
Plin. Mai. e.g. NH 14.3 and 18.201. It seems that in late(r) antiquity such stereotypical descriptions of Hesiod 
occur in Greek literature as well (cf. e.g. D.Chrys. 2.8, Lucian Sat. 5.22, and Nonnus D. 13.76.) 
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factor can be just as influential. I have tried to argue, for instance, that the story of Hesiod’s 
double burial and posthumous protection is an imaginative reworking of his own statements 
on demons and their powers. Third and last, there is an agent I will call tradition, which 
determines the possibilities of Hesiod’s construction, for instance by setting him off against 
(the construction of) Homer. These three agents naturally work together and have resulted in 
the picture of Hesiod as a hero, a superhuman figure with less-than-divine powers, who stays 
close and gives aid to us mere mortals.  
    The second section, on the mechanisms of memory, provides further proof against 
monocausality. The six mechanisms (assimilation, the catchword-factor, snowballing, 
clustering, the Homeric factor and the persona’s paradox), that were discussed separately only 
for convenience’s sake, can in reality be seen to work together. For instance: Hesiod’s tale of 
divine inspiration is copied by Empedocles, not only because he wishes to ‘assimilate’ Hesiod 
to some degree, but also because he wishes to refer to other thinkers who copied it;120 here, 
the principles of assimilation and snowballing are both present. Similarly, Hesiod’s words on 
demons, or on justice in the polis, are referred to not only because they are memorable, but 
also because there is not much on this in Homer;121 here the catchword- and Homeric factor 
are combined.  
    The six mechanisms are combined so easily because they all function from different 
perspectives. The Homeric factor, for instance, involves the tradition of epic reception as a 
whole, whereas the catchword-factor works only when the author has provided his audience 
with sufficiently ‘catchy’ lines. The principle of clustering, on the other hand, depends mostly 
on the recipient, who bundles together lines in accordance with his own individual view of 
Hesiod. Interestingly enough, the six mechanisms of memory can be aligned rather well with 
the three agents that made up the biographical tradition (as described above): the source text, 
the recipient’s efforts, and tradition. See the illustration below: 







                                               
120 See further ch. 6, pp. 185-188. 
121 See further ch. 5, pp. 142-152. 





          Assimilation  Homeric factor 
 
 
           Persona’s paradox      Snowballing  
   
       Source Text        Catchword Clustering       Recipient 
 
Figure 4: Agents and mechanisms making up the memory of Hesiod 
 
Obviously, a schematic view like this does not do full justice to the complexity of the 
dynamics behind Hesiod’s reception (especially since I do not wish to claim that the list of 
mechanisms is exhaustive).122 It is rather meant to illustrate that any construction of Hesiod 
(or any author) is always caused by a combination of factors ultimately deriving from three 
different constructive ‘agents’: 1) the source text (and/or the author presented by it), 2) the 
recipient author (and his particular aims and views), and 3) the framework provided by the 
tradition as a whole. The precise interplay between the different mechanisms varies in each 
particular context. Hesiod can be remembered and forgotten for different reasons. 
                                               





Chapter 5  
 
Ethics and Politics: the Common and the Arcane 
 
 
0 - Introduction: Hesiod the Wise 
This chapter is the thematic sequel to chapter 2 and thus deals with reception in the sphere of 
ethics and politics; but whereas chapter 2 is concerned with Hesiod’s reception when 
presented together with Homer, the present chapter focuses on the ethico-political image (or 
construction) of Hesiod without the other poet. It is the chief purpose of this chapter to 
compare findings, so I will briefly recapitulate the three main conclusions of the earlier 
chapter. First of all, we have seen that there is a very strong prescriptive or normative quality 
attributed to the poets when they appear together; they are often put on a par with law-givers 
and philosophers, the other two guidelines for life. Second, the most typical subjects of the 
poets’ teachings are the gods and the afterlife (obviously things it is impossible to gain sure 
knowledge of). And third, the evaluation of the poets’ influence is often very negative - it is 
especially their detrimental effect on the polis and the behaviour of its inhabitants that is 
commented upon. 
    This chapter is also connected to the previous one (4), a link which becomes clear when we 
consider what ethico-political themes are particularly associated with Hesiod when he is 
alone. Judging from the number of references, there are four themes - drawn, as could be 
expected, more or less exclusively from the Works and Days - that seem most specifically 
Hesiodic: demonology and the afterlife, political justice, human interaction in the city, and 
moderation. These themes are obviously connected to the persona of Hesiod as found in the 
vita, i.e. a superhuman or ‘demonic’ power warning against wrongdoing and injustice (see 
chapter 4.1).  
    The Hesiodic themes will be discussed in four sections below. An analysis of the sources 
will show not only how these Hesiodic themes are employed, but also how Hesiod’s solitary 
image relates to that of chapter 2. As it turns out, Hesiod’s knowledge on gods and the 
underworld is further specified as arcane wisdom concerning demons, mortality and the 
afterlife. Furthermore, his destructive influence on life in the city, which is at the center of 
attention when he is mentioned together with Homer, changes radically into much-appreciated 
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advice on political justice and valuable comments on the ideal form of human interaction (a 
change in attitude which of course annuls any problem with his nomothetical status).  
 
It should be noted beforehand that throughout this chapter we will find that Hesiod is rather 
consistently depicted as ‘wise’, sofov~. This may strike one as less than remarkable since the 
chapter will focus only on subjects on which Hesiod was already considered to be some sort 
of expert in the first place. It appears, however, that Hesiod’s connection to sofiva or 
‘wisdom’ far exceeds the contexts discussed here, and should rather be seen as part of a 
general and widespread notion in antiquity: stating the case with some exaggeration, Hesiod is 
typically ‘wise’ almost to the degree that sofov~ is his epitheton ornans. 
    Naturally, Hesiod’s status as a wise man derives for a considerable part from the pose he 
assumes in the Works and Days, where he contrasts himself to the ‘great fool’ Perses1 and  
constantly deals out advice that one should ‘store up in one’s heart’;2 it is obvious that Hesiod 
himself should be regarded as ‘the man who thinks of everything by himself, considering 
what will be better, later and in the end - this man is the best of all.’3 Hesiod’s self-
representation as a sofov~ caught on so well that in antiquity ‘wisdom poetry of various sorts 
was considered Hesiodic.’4 Consequently, Hesiod is called ‘wise’ and associated with 
‘wisdom’ from Pindar’s times to the Roman age.5 
    Hesiod, of course, is not the only poet called sofov~; the epithet is also regularly applied to 
Homer.6 Moreover, there are plenty of references to Hesiod and Homer together as ‘wise’.7 
Still, it appears that the use of sofov~ for Hesiod is remarkably frequent, which makes one 
suspect that Hesiod in particular was regarded as such. Two other considerations further 
strengthen this suspicion. One is the epigrammatic evidence.8 Tradition has preserved two 
epitaphs for Hesiod, one of which runs thus:  
 
                                               
1 Cf. WD 131, 397, 456. 
2 Cf. WD 27, 491. 
3 WD 293-294: ou|to~ me;n panavristo~, o}~ aujtw/̀ pavnta nohvsei, / frassavmeno~ tav k’ e[peita kai; ej~ tevlo~ 
h\/sin ajmeivnw. Cf. e.g. Jensen (1966) 23-25 on Hesiod posing as the panavristo~ towards the ‘fool’ Perses. 
4 Lamberton (1988) 135. 
5 See e.g. Pi. Paean 7b; Pl. Prt. 341a, Cra. 396c (perhaps ironically) and R. 466c; Dem. Fals.Leg. 243, D.Chrys. 
7.110 and 12.23; Plu. Mor. 562A, 969E, fr. 178.88 Sandbach, Jul. 387d, Nicolaus 1.332 Walz. Aulus Gellius 
calls Hesiod the ‘wisest of poets’ (poetarum prudentissimus, NA 1.15), the term prudens pointing to his practical 
wisdom and thinking ahead. 
6 See Verdenius (1970) 9 for some of the most interesting references; these do not prove, however, that Homer 
‘was regarded as the wise poet par excellence.’ 
7 See e.g. Pl. R. 600d (where the common notion is denied), D.Chrys. 14.12, Clem.Al. Strom. 5.4.24. Of course 
sofov~ was also used for other poets than Hesiod and Homer. 
8 See on the epigrams mentioned here and their connection to Hesiod’s sofiva also Skiadas (1965) 41-44. 
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   [Askra me;n patri;~ polulhvio~, ajlla; qanovnto~ 
      ojsteva plhxivppwn gh ̀Minuẁn katevcei 
   JHsiovdou, toù pleìston ejn   JEllavdi kùdo~ ojreìtai 
      ajndrwǹ krinovmenwn ejn basavnw/ sofivh~. 
 
 ‘Ascra rich in corn was his fatherland, but when he died, 
      the land of the horse-striking Minyans holds the bones 
 of Hesiod, whose fame will be greatest in Greece 
      when men are judged by the touchstone of wisdom.’9 
 
This is an intriguing epigram, the second part of which is of greatest interest here.10 We 
should note that a) Hesiod’s fame is celebrated in universal terms (ejn  JEllavdi);11 b) the poet 
is obviously reckoned among men (ajndrwǹ),12 in contrast, perhaps, to the godly nature 
attributed to Homer in his epitaph; and c) the quality he is praised for - and this is most 
relevant here - is his ‘wisdom’ (sofivh), emphasized by its position. It is highly remarkable 
that the same elements are present also in the other version of his epitaph: ‘Hail, you who 
were young twice, and twice received a tomb, Hesiod, who among men holds the measure of 
wisdom’ (Cair̀e di;~ hJbhvsa~ kai; di;~ tavfou ajntibolhvsa~, /   JHsivod’, ajnqrwvpoi~ mevtron 
e[cwn sofivh~).13 Here again we find a universal scope, human status, and an emphatic 
position for his wisdom, which appears as his defining characteristic.14  
    The second consideration confirming Hesiod’s special connection to wisdom is the fact that 
authors not only call him wise (and thus add to his reputation of wisdom), but actually refer to 
the reputation itself. Aristotle, for instance, says that Hesiod belongs to ‘those who are looked 
upon as wise men’ (twǹ doxavntwn ... sofwǹ tine~) because of his cosmogonical 
                                               
9 Own translation. The inscription is mentioned by Pausanias (9.38.4), who says the Boeotians ascribe it to the 
Orchomenian poet Chersias (who is unknown but for a brief appearance in Plutarch’s Dinner of the Seven Wise 
Men, Mor. 156F); in the AP (reading klevo~ ejsti;n instead of kùdo~ ojreit̀ai), the inscription is ascribed to 
Mnasalces (7.54).  
10 See for the first two lines ch. 8, p. 244 n.63. 
11 Most (2006) 235 rightly translates ejn  JEllavdi ‘among human beings’; cf. Hdt. Hist. 2.53 (cf. ch. 2, pp. 54-62). 
12 The curious expression ajndrẁn krinovmenwn may seek to vindicate Hesiod’s own suffering at the hands of 
unjust judges; the bavsano~ (‘touchstone’) is already used metaphorically by Pindar (Pyth. 10.67). 
13 EG 428; see for this version ch. 4, pp. 116-117. 
14 See for the central position of Hesiod’s wisdom (not explicitly mentioned) on the Helicon-stèlè Hurst (1996). 
Heldmann (1982) 66-70 discusses Hesiod’s reputation as a wise man; oddly enough, he cites the heavily ironic 
D.Chrys. 77.1 as one of the passages proving his point (68-69). He believes Hesiod’s alleged wisdom is one of 
the two main reasons that Hesiod wins the contest with Homer, the other being that Homer was supposedly 
much younger at the time of their meeting (cf. ch. 7, p. 214 n.31).  
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speculations, whereas according to Dio it was because of his inspiration that ‘Hesiod came to 
be regarded as a wise man among the Greeks’ (ejnomivsqh sofo;~ ejn toi~̀  {Ellhsin        
JHsivodo~).15 Plutarch makes the rather general claim that Hesiod is famous for his ancient 
wisdom.16 Admittedly, this consideration is not very significant in itself, but added to the 
remarkable use of the adjective sofov~ for Hesiod, and the emphasis on the poet’s sofiva in 
his epitaphs it provides considerable evidence for Hesiod being regarded as typically ‘wise’.17  
    This being said, we should turn to the several areas of expertise to which Hesiod’s reputed 
wisdom was most specifically related: demonology (section 1), justice in the polis (2), social 
interaction (3), and moderation (4). 
 
1 - Hesiod’s Demons  
As we have seen, there appears to be a particularly demonic quality to both Hesiod and his 
poetry. In this section, I will demonstrate how Hesiod’s relatively few words on daivmone~ 
turned him into an expert on spirits of all kinds. We will first try to establish how and when 
Hesiod’s reputation as a demonologist became fixed, and then attempt to briefly follow its 
development throughout antiquity. A comparison with Homer forms the end of this section. 
    Modern scholars have often commented on Hesiod’s peculiar use of the term daivmwn. In 
the Homeric poems, it is generally agreed that the plural daivmone~ is used in much the same 
way as qeoiv (‘gods’), and despite an ongoing debate, there appears to be no very significant 
difference in the use of the singular either.18 In Hesiod, however, the daivmone~ are clearly 
                                               
15 Arist. Xen. 975a10, D.Chrys. 7.1. 
16 Plu. Thes. 3.2: ‘Now the wisdom of that [= ancient] day had some such form and force as that for which 
Hesiod was famous, especially in the sententious maxims of his Works and Days’ (h\n de; th̀~ sofiva~ ejkeivnh~ 
toiauvth ti~, wJ~ e[oiken, ijdeva kai; duvnami~, oi{a/ crhsavmeno~  JHsivodo~ eujdokivmei mavlista peri; ta;~ ejn toì~  
[Ergoi~ gnwmologiva~). 
17 His reputation as a wise man is further confirmed, I believe, by reactions that try to downplay his wisdom. 
There is a certain tendency in Aristotle to qualify Hesiod’s knowledge as popular wisdom instead of 
philosophical insight (see e.g. EN 1155a32-b8 and Metaph. 989a8-12; cf. [Pl.] Epin. 990a). See also Plutarch’s 
tell-tale defence of Hesiod’s (admittedly) somewhat obvious advice ‘to invite a friend to dinner, and not a foe’ 
(WD 342); he needs to go through some lengths to explain why ‘the advice of Hesiod is not absurd or silly, as 
some assert, but wise’ (ouj geloìon ou\n, w{~ fasiv tine~, oude; ajbevlteron, ajlla; sofovn, Mor. 530D). Perhaps 
Hesiod’s connection to the ai\no~ or fable (on which see e.g. Plu. Mor. 158b, Theon 2.74.16 (Spengel), 
Hermogenes 1.10 (Walz), and further ch. 9, pp. 300-302) contributed to this counter-trend, for fables ‘often 
attract the mind, particularly that of uneducated rustics, who listen to fiction in a simpler spirit’ (ducere animos 
solent praecipue rusticorum et imperitorum, qui et simplicius quae ficta sunt audiunt, Quint. Inst. 5.11.19, who 
also calls Hesiod the ‘first author’ of the fable). Dio, planning to attack Hesiod’s concept of envy (WD 25) first 
describes him in obviously ironic fashion as a broad-sweeping author who ‘speaks to those who read his poems 
as to intelligent persons’ (wJ~ pro;~ sunievnta~ levgei tou;~ ejntugcavnonta~ toì~ poihvmasin, 77.5). Hesiod’s 
proud boast when introducing his fable, to speak to ‘kings who themselves too have understanding’ (basileùsin 
fronevousi kai; aujtoì~, 202), is thus poked fun at almost a millennium later. 
18 ‘The demon acts very much like a god, except that it tends to be unidentifiable and evil’, Brenk (1986) 2074. 
See also Chantraine (1954) 51-53, Vrugt-Lenz (1974), Neue Pauly s.v. ‘Dämonologie’ (3.265-268), and De Jong 
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defined and set apart from the gods; according to Hesiod’s tale of the Five Races, the men of 
the First or Golden Race are covered by the earth, and 
 
toi; me;n daivmonev~ eijsi Dio;~ megavlou dia; boulav~ 
ejsqloiv, ejpicqovnioi, fuvlake~ qnhtẁn ajnqrwvpwn. 
  
 ‘… by the plans of great Zeus they are fine demons  
upon the earth, guardians of mortal human beings.’19 
  
Obviously, these lines nowadays are often understood as a definition of demons as the earth-
dwelling spirits of the departed;20 but this clear statement has encouraged scholars to find 
other hints of demonology in Hesiod as well, for instance on the demon as an avenging 
spirit.21 We will focus, however, on the concept of the demon as a guardian spirit from the 
other world, and see how the Greeks connected that concept to Hesiod.  
    Although Hesiod does not explicitly say that the golden race dies (his only comment is that 
‘the earth covered them’),22 this interpretive step was taken very early, perhaps as early as 
Pythagoras. Detienne argued forcibly for such a Pythagorean interpretation (and for a more 
general connection of Hesiodic and Pythagorean thought), claiming that Hesiod’s description 
of demons and the Golden Age was of great eschatological value for the early Pythagoreans’ 
belief in the immortality of the soul.23 Although Detienne’s argument is not always 
                                                                                                                                                   
- Van der Ben (1984). According to Laín Entralgo (1970) 34-35 the belief in demons is a more typically post-
Homeric phenomenon.  
19 WD 122-123 (transl. slightly altered). This is the reading of the mss; for significant variations in antiquity see 
West (1978) ad loc.  
20 Although the Myth of the Races was not ‘invented’ by Hesiod, he is generally credited with some refinements 
of his own, such as the insertion of the Race of Heroes into the metallic sequence (cf. e.g. ch. 4, p. 132), and the 
different types of afterlife for the races (Solmsen 1962 183-184). 
21 The primary source for the demon as the prototype for the avenging spirits called ajlavstwr and ejrinuv~ 
(popular in tragedy, see Vrugt-Lentz 1974 607) is WD 252-255, dealing with the ‘thrice ten thousand immortal 
guardians of Zeus’ who roam the earth and keep watch on mortal humans; and even though there is no explicit 
mention of the word daivmwn (except for one reading), the beings described strongly resemble those mentioned in 
WD 122-123. Vrugt-Lentz (1974) 604 sees so-called ‘Schadensgeister’ in the many personifications of mainly 
evil forces in both the WD and Th. (although Hesiod would never call them daivmone~). Cf. Krafft (1963) 116-
117 following Wilamowitz’ belief that the term ‘hero’ only means ‘lord’ in Homer while it has its later meaning 
of benign cult figure in Hesiod. 
22 WD 121. The removal of the entire Golden Race by Zeus is quite different from normal death; see the sensible 
discussion of the myth of the Five Races by e.g. Fontenrose (1974). In the only comparable passage in Hesiod, 
Th. 991, Phaethon too becomes a demon but there is no explicit mention of death either. 
23 Detienne (1963a), esp. pp. 93-117. See also Detienne (1963b) 35-36 for the connection between Pythagorean 
and Hesiodic thought. 
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persuasive,24 the book is interesting and suggestive, and certainly hits the mark where the 
early link between Hesiod and demonology is concerned. 
    That this link existed as early as the fifth century, is obvious from the Purifications of 
Empedocles, a mystical poem in which Empedocles describes himself as a daivmwn 
condemned to mortality;25 he has been banished by the gods and must pass through a long 
series of incarnations in order to return to his earlier state of divinity. It has long been 
recognized that this eschatological comment on the pitiful condition humaine (presumably all 
men are such fallen daivmone~) and the true nature of religion is ‘heavily indebted’ to 
Hesiod;26 according to Zuntz ‘the word through which this myth could be perceived and 
conveyed was Hesiod’s’.27 To give just some examples: the denizens of Empedocles’ 
underworld are creatures very reminiscent of Hesiod’s personifications; the primal state of 
bliss resembles Hesiod’s portrayal of the Golden Age; and the instructions on ritual (the 
actual ‘purifications’) have an esoteric flavour comparable to Hesiod’s rules of proper 
conduct.28  
    The strongest Hesiodic influence, however, is to be found in DK B 115, the fragment on 
the actual banishment of the demon Empedocles: he has broken his oath never to shed blood, 
and must now wander apart from the blessed for ‘thrice ten thousand years’ (tri;~ muriva~ 
w{ra~). During this time he will pass through many incarnations and can never rest, being 
tossed hither and thither by the elements - and so he is punished for putting his trust in raving 
Strife (Neivkei> mainomevnw/). There is obvious borrowing from Hesiod here, since he in 
Theogony 775-806 speaks of a special rule among the immortals: if any god breaks the oath 
he took to desist from ‘quarrel and strife’ (e[ri~ kai; neik̀o~, 782), he must suffer years of 
absence from the gods’ company as a penalty, until he is at last allowed again to join their 
assemblies and feasts. Empedocles’ dependence on Hesiod is confirmed by many verbal 
similarities,29 the most remarkable of which is B 115.4, ‘who by his error made false the oath 
he swore’ (o{~ ken th;n ejpivorkon aJmarhvsa~ ejpomovssh/), which strongly resembles Theogony 
                                               
24 Detienne is quick to call a source Pythagorean, and relies too heavily on material that is both late and scanty 
(one passage from Plato and one from Plutarch form the core of his argument, see Detienne 1963a 93-117). 
Moreover, he does not consider the possibility of both Hesiod and Pythagoras going back to an even earlier 
source. See for more detailed critique the reviews by Kerferd (1965) and Burkert (1964), and the scepticism 
expressed by Ter Vrugt-Lentz (1974) 613 and Brenk (1986) 2097-2098. 
25 This is the common (and most obvious) interpretation; see e.g. Detienne (1959). 
26 So Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983) 283; see also Hershbell (1970) and Zuntz (1971), esp. pp. 266-269. 
27 Zuntz (1971) 266. Zuntz goes very far in speaking of ‘the younger and the elder prophet’ (266), and ‘the 
master and the disciple’ (267-268). Cf. Most (2007) 289 describing Empedocles’ philosophy in some features as 
a ‘profoundly original interpretation and further elaboration of Hesiod’s cosmology.’ 
28 DK B 118/122 and e.g. Th. 228-232; B 129-130 and WD 109-120; B 140/141 and WD 724-764. 
29 See Hershbell (1970) for an (almost) exhaustive list. 
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793 ‘who after pouring a libation made false the oath he swore’ (o{~ ken th;n ejpivorkon 
ajpolleivya~ ejpomovssh/).30  
    Another probable reminiscence of Hesiod, to my knowledge not commented on before, is 
the pinball-like state of the exile, who is thrown around by the elements in B 115.8-12. His 
fate reminds one of the unfortunate person ending up inside the ‘great chasm’ in Theogony 
736-744. The influence of the Hesiodic model is clearest when the texts are quoted in full: 
 
Hesiod Theogony 736-744 Empedocles DK 31 B 115.8-12 
  
e[nqa de; gh~̀ dnoferh̀~ kai; Tartavrou hjerovento~ 
povntou t’ ajtrugevtoio kai; oujranoù ajsterovento~ 
eJxeivh~ pavntwn phgai; kai; peivrat’ e[asin, 
ajrgalev’ eujrwventa, tav te stugevousi qeoiv per: 
cavsma mevg’, oujdev ke pavnta telesfovron eij~  
                                                                       ejniauto;n 
ou\da~ i{koit’, eij prẁta pulevwn e[ntosqe gevnoito, 
ajllav ken e[nqa kai; e[nqa fevroi pro; quvella quevllh~ 
ajrgalevh: deino;n de; kai; ajqanavtoisi qeoìsi 
toùto tevra~: 
ajrgaleva~ biovtoio metallavssonta keleuvqou~. 
aijqevrion me;n gavr sfe mevno~ povntonde diwvkei, 
povnto~ d’ ej~ cqono;~ ou\da~ ajpevptuse, gaìa d’ ej~ 
                                                                            aujgav~ 
hjelivou faevqonto~, oJ d’ aijqevro~ e[mbale divnh/~: 
a[llo~ d’ ejx a[llou devcetai, stugevousi de; pavnte~. 
  
‘That is where the sources and limits of the dark earth 
are, and of murky Tartarus, of the barren sea, 
and of the starry sky, of everything, one after another, 
distressful, dank, things which even the gods hate: 
a great chasm, whose bottom one would not reach in  
a whole long year, once one was inside the gates, 
but one would be borne hither and thither by one 
distressfull blast after another - it is terrible even  
for the immortal gods, this monstrosity.’ 
[The demon goes through many incarnations…] 
‘interchanging the distressful paths of life. 
For the strength of aither pursues him into the sea, 
and the sea spits [him] onto the surface of the earth 
                                                and earth into the beams 
of the blazing sun, and it throws him into the eddies of                  
                                                                            the air; 
and one after another receives [him], but they all hate  
                                                                         [him].’31 
 
Admittedly, the exact verbal similarities are less than impressive; but on a more abstract level 
the influence is clear. Hesiod tells of a prison-like place hated by the gods, close to the four 
main elements of the cosmos (earth, Tartarus, sea and heaven), where an unlucky person 
could be endlessly tossed hither and thither by stormwinds - Empedocles then transforms this 
tale into his picture of the punishment of the fallen god, imprisoned in human bodies for a 
                                               
30 See on this passage also Most (2007) 284-293. Perhaps the ‘thrice ten thousand’ years of banishment go back 
to Hesiod’s ‘thrice ten thousand’ immortals watching over mankind. The expression is unique for Hesiod; 
Empedocles is the first to use it after him (cf. West 1966 ad loc.). 
31 Transl. Inwood (2001), slightly adapted. Most (2007) 286-289 discusses Hesiod’s influence on Empedocles on 
the basis of these two passages, but misses this one.  
CHAPTER 5 
 146
sheer endless period of time, and pushed around again and again by the elementary forces of 
nature. And although Hesiod does not say so explicitly, his text certainly allows for the idea 
that the person locked up in the chasm is a god (743-744), and that he wound up there because 
he broke an oath.32 
    For his tale of the godlike state of man, his fall from grace, the long way of redemption and 
the world beyond, Empedocles looked to Hesiod’s description of Tartarus, the secret rule of 
the gods, and the fate of the Golden Men.33 Perhaps Hesiod’s attraction as a model was 
increased by his demon-like status (as a hero who came back with knowledge from beyond),34 
although we cannot be sure of its precise influence on Empedocles’ own self-description as a 
demon who has been on the other side. That Hesiod was not Empedocles’ sole example is 
beyond doubt,35 but it is obvious that in the first half of the fifth century Hesiod’s words on 
demons could be taken to mean much more than was explicit: in fact, they turned him into an 
authority on eschatology and, more specifically, daivmone~. 
    Hesiod’s reputation as an expert on demons is firmly established by Plato (to whom later 
sources on Hesiodic demonology are often indebted). When discussing the meaning of the 
word daivmwn in the Cratylus, Socrates mentions Hesiod and quotes Works and Days 122-123; 
the Golden Men are interpreted metaphorically as the good and noble people among us, who 
because of their wisdom become demons both in life and death.36 In the Republic, the 
particularly brave fuvlake~ (‘guardians’) of the Ideal State become demons in death (and thus 
remain fuvlake~); here too, Hesiod is quoted. The demons are also fuvlake~ of individual 
souls in Republic 620d, and the ‘kings and magistrates’ (basileva~ te kai; a[rconta~) of men 
in Laws 713c-e, appointed by Cronus in the Golden Age.37 In Plato, more obviously so than in 
Empedocles, the demons are ‘phylactic’, though of course in a strictly Platonic sense: 
                                               
32 It is not unlikely that Empedocles combined the Hesiodic notions of the ‘chasm’ and the nine-year long 
banishment of an oath-breaking god (Th. 793-804), and thus located the punishment for perjury in a chasm-like 
maelstrom of elementary forces. This connection could be encouraged by Hesiod’s statement that the gods ‘hate’ 
(stugevousi, 739, also 810) the chasm, just as they ‘hate’ Styx (stugerhv, 775 - obviously, the Styx is often 
‘hateful’ or ‘hated’ for reasons of etymology), the goddess of the oath. Could Empedocles’ stugevousi be a sign 
of this connection? Such allusions are not impossible: see Most (2007) 288, who rather brilliantly noted that 
Empedocles is referring to his debt to Hesiod with the expression a[llo~ d’ ejk a[llou devcetai (‘and one after 
another receives’, 115.12), which is not only a quote from Hesiod (Th. 800) but also points to Empedocles 
‘receiving’ from Hesiod.  
33 The highest possible incarnations according to Empedocles, ‘prophets, bards, doctors, and princes’ (DK B 
146/7), are probably selected because of their healing, balancing, or more generally ‘phylactic’ quality - in 
Hesiod, both bards and princes avert evil and cure (mental) suffering; see also Østerud (1976) 24-29. 
34 Cf. Philodemus describing the dead-and-reborn hero Melicertes as a daivmwn (see ch. 4 n.36). 
35 Much of Empedocles’ thought is Pythagorean; see e.g. Zuntz (1971) 264-265 and Inwood (2001) passim. 
36 Pl. Cra. 397e-398c; the name ‘daemon’ itself is there said to derive from dahvmwn, ‘knowledgeable’. 
37 Hesiod is not explicitly mentioned here. See also Phd. 107d, where the demons guide the soul to the afterlife. 
The most famous (and influential) Platonic treatment of the daivmwn-concept is its picture of an intermediate 
figure between men and gods (Smp. 202d-203a; see Zintzen 1974); this idea is not explicit in Hesiod, either. 
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intellectually superior, and thus fit to rule. Moreover, Plato’s tone is decidedly less mystical 
than that of Empedocles: he tells his audience he understands the Hesiodic passage 
allegorically, and uses the myth as an illustration to his philosophy.38 This difference is partly 
due to genre, but may also point to an increase in the familiarity with Hesiod as a 
demonologist.39 
    It is uncertain what happens to Hesiod the demonologist during the Hellenistic Age, 
although there are some clues that at least the Neopythagoreans and Stoics continued to 
associate the poet with demons.40 In Roman times, there is much evidence for the belief in his 
expertise,41 mainly provided by Plutarch (who seems to have been particularly interested in 
the subject). In his On the Obsolescence of Oracles, for instance, it is said that ‘Hesiod was 
the first to set forth clearly and distinctly four classes of rational beings, gods, demons, heroes 
and, last of all, men, who are apparently presented as the start of the transformation, from the 
golden race to many good demons and from the selected demigods into heroes…’.42 
Furthermore, according to Plutarch Hesiod supposedly ‘hinted at’ (aijnittovmeno~) the lifetime 
of demons, knows about the different functions of demons, tells us how they appear on earth, 
defines them as departed souls, is quoted as part of a tradition of demonology, and defines 
them as bodiless and free souls.43 Plutarch also makes various speakers comment variously on 
Hesiod’s demons, which implies that Hesiod was central to discussions on demonology; 
furthermore, he seems to seek confirmation in Hesiod for his own ideas.44  
    There is ample evidence for Hesiod’s demonology in the scholia on the Works and Days. 
For instance, the scholiast on 122 tells us that ‘those who are released from life, and who are 
guardians of human life, he calls demons … while the divine is unmixed with us, the demons 
oversee the human affairs, as Plato says too.’45 The Neoplatonist Proclus, who wrote a 
                                               
38 Plato thus demystifies Hesiod, turning him into a philosopher. His ‘mystical’ image as the keeper of arcane 
knowledge, however, turns up again at Ti. 40e, where Socrates implies that Hesiod’s knowledge on the origin of 
gods is beyond proof but should be believed anyway (cf. Arist. Metaph. 1000a9-15).  
39 See also Soury (1942) 23 for Hesiod as ‘une autorité en la matière’. 
40 See Brenk (1986) 2094-2098 on the Neopythagoreans; the Stoic Strabo also refers to Hesiod’s authority on 
demons (10.3.19).  
41 Cf. Clemens targeting Hesiod in particular as propagating the pagan belief in demons (Protr. 2.41.1-2). 
42 Plu. Mor. 415B:  JHsivodo~ de; kaqarw~̀ kai; diwrismevnw~ prẁto~ ejxevqhke tẁn logikwǹ tevssara gevnh, 
qeou;~ ei\ta daivmona~ ei\q’ h{rwa~ to; d’ ejpi; pàsin ajnqrwvpou~, ejx w|n e[oike poieìn th;n metabolhvn, toù me;n 
crusoù gevnou~ eij~ daivmona~ pollou;~ kajgaqou;~, tẁn d’ hJmiqevwn eij~ h{rwa~ ajpokriqevntwn. 
43 Plu. Mor. 415C-416B, 417B, 431B, 431E; 361B; 593D. 
44 Brenk (1986) 2117-2130, esp. 2129-2130. In Plutarch’s time there was a debate on whether demons could be 
evil; whatever Plutarch may have thought of this, he seems eager to point out that the demons described by 
Hesiod are good ones, cf. Mor. 415b and 361b.   
45 S WD 122: tou;~ meqistamevnou~ toù zh̀n, o[nta~ de; fuvlaka~ toù bivou twǹ ajnqrwvpwn, daivmona~ kaleì (...) 
to; me;n qeìon hJmìn ajnepivmikton, daivmona~ de; tou;~ ejforẁnta~ ta; ajnqrwvpina, wJ~ kai; Plavtwn fhsivn. Cf. S 
WD 123 and 124. 
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commentary on the Works and Days, also understands Hesiod’s demonology in Platonic 
fashion. According to his reading, Hesiod’s tale of the Five Races actually means that all men 
partake of all metals at the same time; this explains why earthly evil is ultimately 
indestructible. Anyone leading a golden (i.e. intellectual) life will become younger instead of 
older by letting go of the body, and will eventually be turned into a demon by the gods, a 
guardian spirit that will help the mortals relieve the pain caused by their bodies.46  
    That demonology is a distinctly Hesiodic theme seems to be confirmed by Homer’s near-
absence in discussions on the subject. This is probably largely due to the fact that Homer does 
not distinguish clearly between gods and demons, a thing noted not only by modern scholars 
but by the ancients as well: Plutarch explicitly contrasts Hesiod’s clarity with the blurriness in 
the other poet: ‘Homer appears to use both names in common and sometimes to speak of the 
gods as demons.’47 Similar comments can be found in the scholion on Works and Days 122 
and some of the Homeric scholia.48 It is perhaps significant that Plato, when discussing the 
honour due to the good citizens of the Ideal State, cites Homer when illustrating the honour 
for those alive, and Hesiod for those who died.49 
    One final thing remains to be said on this topic. Some scholars have suggested that the 
belief in demons belonged to the ‘low’ culture of the uneducated many, which raises the 
interesting possibility that Hesiod’s demonology links him to the lower classes (presumably in 
contrast to the ‘higher’ audience addressed by the anthropomorphic gods Homer’s epics).50 
But such a hypothesis can hardly stand, since 1) there are no clear indications that popular 
expressions of such a belief (e.g. in comedy) refer to Hesiod, and 2) clear references that we 
do have are mostly derived from high culture texts (e.g. philosophical treatises). If the link 




                                               
46 See the scholia on 109-110, 111, 113-115, 116-117, and 121-124 (all by Proclus). 
47 Plu. Mor. 415A-B:   {Omhro~ me;n e[ti faivnetai koinẁ~ ajmfotevroi~ crwvmeno~ toì~ ojnovmasi kai; tou;~ 
qeou;~ e[stin o{te daivmona~ prosagoreuvwn. In the same treatise (Def. Or.), Homer is mentioned twice more in a 
slightly derogatory manner, as a poet with a mythical and thus a-philosophical outlook (423A and 426C-D). 
Brenk (1986) 2072 adduces no proof whatsoever to support his suggestion that demons are specially connected 
to Homer; there is certainly no truth in his statement that ‘authors such as Plutarch began their discussions of the 
daimones with Homer’ (ibid.).   
48 See S Il. 1.222 (D): ‘he calls the gods demons like this … Hesiod however uses the name demons for those 
who are released from life’ (ou{tw~ de; daivmona~ kalei ̀tou;~ qeou;~ ...   JHsivodo~ de; daivmonav~ fhsi tou;~ ejk 
toù zh̀n metastavnta~) and perhaps S Il. 17.98-9a-d (A and T, equating the Homeric demon with a qeov~) and S 
Od. 10.323 (‘Homer is used to calling a demon ‘god’’). 
49 Pl. R. 468d-469a. 
50 See Chantraine (1954) 53, Ter Vrugt-Lentz (1974) 601, Brenk (1986) 2081.  
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2 - Justice and the City  
The second of the Hesiodic themes to be discussed in this chapter is justice, which is 
generally regarded as one of Hesiod’s central concerns by modern scholars as well.51 It is the 
goal of this section to demonstrate that Hesiod’s remarks on justice in the Works and Days 
were much appreciated in antiquity, as both wise and of great use for the city-state. Such a 
positive evaluation is in marked contrast with the negative influence on the polis ascribed to 
Hesiod when coupled with Homer (see chapter 2); we will see that this remarkable difference 
can be explained by the fact that Hesiod’s advice on divkh, originally meant for a small 
farming community, could be rather easily transferred to the new context of the polis. This 
process of transferral can be witnessed most clearly in Solon’s adaptation of the Hesiodic 
theme, to which most attention will be paid in this section; some other examples from the 
classical period complement the picture. 
    Hesiodic influence runs deep in the poems of the Athenian lawgiver and poet Solon, whose 
fragment 13 has been called ‘Solon’s own comment on the Works and Days’.52 Of greater 
interest to us, however, is fragment 4, in which Solon sings of the evil that unjust people can 
bring to the city, and the benefits bestowed by Eunomia (‘Good government’); the idea that an 
entire city can suffer for the wrongs of few persons, the personification (and importance) of 
Divkh and Eujnomiva, the misery deriving from skoliai; divkai (‘crooked judgements’), and the 
antithetical formulations to indicate the god’s power (traceva leiaivnei, ‘she makes the rough 
smooth’ etc.),53 have long been recognized as borrowing heavily from the first part of the 
Works and Days.54 
    Several scholars have commented on the relationship between Hesiod and Solon 4, and 
their focus has understandably been on the development of the concept of justice; 
consequently, much has been said on the extent and manner in which Solon has furthered the 
                                               
51 The scholarly discussion on the central theme or unity of the WD is long and complex; for an overview of the 
search for unity in the WD see Hamilton (1989) 47-52. There seems to be some agreement among scholars that 
the poem is primarily concerned with two central issues, justice and work; see e.g. Fontenrose (1974) and Clay 
(2003) 31-48 et passim. Detienne (1963b) was one of the first to argue that they are the same: ‘Pour le paysan, la 
justice, c’est de travailler sa terre’ (60).  
52 Gagarin (1974a) 190; most of its ideas, however, are probably more generally Greek than specifically 
Hesiodic. 
53 Fr. 4 lines 17/27, 14/32, 36, 34-37 refer more or less specifically to WD 240-241, 220-221, 248-273, 5-8.  
54 See e.g. Solmsen (1949) 107-123 on what Solon did (justice, eunomia) and did not (original context, emphasis 
on hard work) take over from Hesiod; Havelock (1978) 256-258 discussing Hesiod as Solon’s ‘model’, and 
Rousseau 1996, who concludes that Solons reworks the Hesiodic theme because ‘les projets du poète et du sage 
seraient convergents sur le fond’ (167). Lloyd-Jones (1983) 44-45 argues that Solon was also heavily influenced 
by the Odyssey. 
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ideas he found in Hesiod.55 This type of analysis, however, informed by the a priori 
assumption that such a development must have taken place (because of the hundred years 
separating them),56 tends to focus on the differences between Hesiod and Solon,57 and 
presents Solon either implicitly or explicitly as a conscious innovator.58 Such reasoning, I 
suggest, should be treated with caution - it was presumably not Solon’s primary concern to 
think on how he should improve on his model. Obviously, he saw the Hesiodic paradigm as 
useful, and seems to have been especially interested by his ideas on the shared, polis-wide 
responsibility for justice (since it is also the polis as a whole that is punished for wrongdoing): 
the ‘citizens themselves’ (4.5-6) destroy the great city because of their ‘foolishness’ 
(ajfradivh/sin, 5), the ‘mind’ of the leaders is ‘unjust’ (a[diko~ novo~, 7), their misbehaviour is 
coming upon the ‘whole city’ (pavsh/ povlei, 17), there is ‘civil strife’ (stavsin, 19), and the 
‘public evil comes home to each man’ (dhmovsion kako;n e[rcetai oi[kad’ eJkavstw/, 26) - only 
Eunomia can put an end to ‘the anger of grievous strife’ (ajrgalevh~ e[rido~ covlon, 38).59 
Solon found Hesiod’s advice directly relevant, and did not, for instance, conceive of his 
Eunomia and Dysnomia as ‘personifizierte menschliche Verhaltenweisen’ to contrast them 
with Hesiod’s ‘Personen mit göttlicher Abstammung’.60 The point is that, from the 
perspective of the present study, Solon’s reworking of Hesiodic justice does not so much 
constitute a ‘breakthrough in Greek thought’, but rather updates Hesiodic thinking, makes him 
ready for use in the new polis which is (admittedly) so different from Hesiod’s farming 
community. Hesiod is not ‘written off’ (in an almost literal sense), but rather reborn as an 
authority on polis-bound justice. 
                                               
55 The central questions to this line of investigation, started by Jaeger (1960) 326-337, have been: ‘What did 
Hesiod mean by divkh? What did Solon mean by divkh? What do those differences tell us about the way the idea 
of justice developed?’ Almeida (2003) 70-118 gives an extended and up to date overview of the scholarly 
debate, and the relevant literature; see also Manuwald (1989) 1-9. 
56 See Almeida (2003) 100-101 for the minority standpoint regarding Solon ‘as a mere recycler of Hesiod’. 
57 Results vary from rather obvious remarks (such as those of L’Homme-Wery 1996 146-149 and Blaise 1995 
35-36, who claim that Hesiod’s framework is mythical or theological, but Solon’s political) to interesting 
insights (such as that Hesiod conceives the punishment for the unjust city in terms of plague and infertility, 
whereas in the poem of Solon wrongdoing results automatically in dysnomia which is the punishment, cf. 
Manuwald 1989 7-8). 
58 See for similar critique Irwin (2005) 161-162. 
59 The ajfradivh/sin probably refer to WD 134, where the people of the Silver Race are said to wrong each other 
through ‘foolishness’ and are punished accordingly by Zeus (contra Jaeger 1960 322 and Almeida 2003 73, who 
regard Od. 1.34 as the primary source); the a[diko~ novo~ is present in WD 260 (nowhere in Homer); in WD 240-
241 it is stated that ‘often even a whole city suffers for a bad man who wrongs people and devises foolish 
things’; the evil Strife is discussed in WD 11-16. The focus of Solon’s referenes is rather narrow, which has also 
been noted by Irwin (2005) 163 (‘the overwhelming majority of Hesiodic resonances in Solon 4 are derived 
primarily from two sections of the WD: lines 213-326 and the Hymn to Zeus (1-10)’; according to her, this very 
fact ‘suggests that Hesiod is already by the early sixth century a definitive authority on divkh’ (163 n.22).  
60 A difference as formulated by Manuwald (1989) 8. 
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    The rest of this section will demonstrate, by means of examples from various genres, how 
strongly the concept of justice was tied to Hesiod, and how widely his authority was 
recognized. Thucydides, for instance, modelled his general description of stavsi~ or civil 
strife in a Greek city (3.82-83) on Hesiod’s description of the unjust people of the Iron Race; 
Edmunds has shown how closely Thucydides’ rhetoric of inversion, according to which all 
normal ethical conduct in the polis is turned upside down, sticks to Hesiod’s verses 174-201.61 
Another example can be found in Isthmian 6, where Pindar praises a certain Lampon, the 
father of the victor in the boys’ pancratium, and says that he, ‘in devoting industry to his 
deeds, holds in particular honor that saying of Hesiod,62 which he quotes and recommends to 
his sons, as he brings to his own city an adornment all share and is beloved for his acts of 
kindness to foreigners, pursuing due measure in judgment and holding fast to it; his tongue 
does not stray from his thoughts’.63 Hesiod can apparently inspire behaviour in individuals 
that brings kovsmo~ to the city as a whole. This kovsmo~ xunov~ is of course primarily linked to 
the glory of the boy’s victory, but also to Lampon’s ‘richtige Lebenshaltung’64 - he is honest, 
fair, and treats foreigners well;65 this is also an ‘adornment all share’.66  
    There are also more explicit references to Hesiod. When Aeschines was accused of treason 
by Demosthenes, for instance, he defended himself by turning the tables; according to 
Aeschines, it was better to throw Demosthenes out. ‘Will you’, he says to the jurors, ‘harbour 
longer in your midst guilt that is so fraught with doom to itself - God grant it be not to the 
city!’ And a citation of Works and Days 240-241 follows: ‘often even a whole city suffers 
because of an evil man who sins and devises wicked deeds.’67 Aeschines points to the danger 
Demosthenes poses to society again in Against Ctesiphon, arguing that the miserable state of 
                                               
61 Edmunds (1975) 82-88. 
62 Presumably a reference to WD 412, melevth dev toi e[rgon ojfevllei (‘industry advances work’). 
63 Pi. Isthm. 6.66-72: … melevtan / e[rgoi~ ojpavzwn   JHsiov- / dou mavla timà/ toùt’ e[po~, / uiJoìsiv te fravzwn 
paraineì, / xuno;n a[stei kovsmon eJw/̀ prosavgwn / kai; xevnwn eujergasivai~ ajgapàtai, / mevtra me;n gnwvma/ 
diwvkwn, mevtra de; kai; katevcwn: / glẁssa d’ oujk e[xw frenẁn.  
64 Thummer (1969) 110. 
65 These characteristics may refer back to the Hesiodic source as well; Bury (1965) 118 links Pindar’s remark on 
‘due measure’ to WD 639, and the kindness to foreigners perhaps echoes WD 225-227. 
66 See also Bacchylides 5.191-197, connecting a Hesiodic saying (Fr. 344 M-W) to truth and ‘the path of justice’ 
(keleuvqou ... divka~, following Jebb’s conjecture). See further Thgn. 1.792-794, who also connects the theme of 
kindness to foreigners with divkh: ‘may I have noble thoughts in company with the noble, harming with hurtful 
deeds neither foreigner nor citizen, but living righteously’ (meta; tẁn ajgaqẁn ejsqlo;n e[coimi novon, / mhvte tina; 
xeivnwn dhleuvmeno~ e[rgmasi lugroì~ / mhvte tin’ ejndhvmwn, ajlla; divkaio~ ejwvn). This passage, I believe, refers 
to Hesiod too: ‘But they who give straight judgements to foreigners and to citizens, and go not aside from what 
is just, their city flourishes, and the people prosper in it’ (oi} de; divka~ xeivnoisi kai; ejndhvmoisi didoùsin / 
ijqeiva~ kai; mhv ti parekbaivnousi dikaivou, / toìsi tevqhle povli~, laoi; d’ ajnqeùsin en aujth/̀, WD 225-227). 
This time, the beneficial effect of Hesiod’s divkh to the polis is transferred by Theognis to the individual citizen 
living in it. 
67 Aeschin. Fals.Leg. 158; these verses were also referred to by Solon, see note 69 below. 
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Athens was caused by Demosthenes: ‘Well does the poet Hesiod speak concerning such men; 
for he says somewhere, instructing the people and advising the cities not to take to themselves 
corrupt politicians’; and then Works and Days 240-243 and 246-247 are quoted.68 Aeschines 
claims these verses are so appropriate that they seem ‘to be not a poem by Hesiod, but an 
oracle directed against the politics of Demosthenes’ (ouj poihvmata   JHsiovdou ei\nai, ajlla; 
crhsmo;n eij~ th;n Dhmosqevnou~ politeivan, 136).69 
    As for Homer, it appears that the subject of ‘political justice’ was not associated with his 
figure; I found only a few references that only remotely link him to the idea (although my 
grasp of the Homeric material is admittely incomplete).70 Perhaps this is because ‘divkh is an 
insignificant word in Homer’,71 or perhaps the Homeric poems were generally regarded as so 
full of violence and injustice that Hesiod could actually be opposed against ‘what might 
gloriously be called the Iliadic temper’.72 The idea that justice is a responsibility shared by all 
the citizens in the polis is an idea, it seems, regarded as specifically Hesiodic. 
    Finally, it remains to be said that the references to Hesiod’s political justice are rather 
restricted in time: they appear only in the (pre-)classical age, but almost disappear in later 
periods. It is obvious to attribute this to the radical changes in the political situation of the 
Greeks themselves; when they became part of larger states governed by either Macedonians 
or the Romans, the idea of justice as a shared concern of all citizens lost most of its value. 
Apparently, there was no new Solon to update Hesiodic thought to fit an empire. 
 
 
                                               
68 Aeschin. Ctes. 134-135: eu\ ga;r peri; twǹ toiouvtwn   JHsivodo~ oJ poihth;~ ajpofaivnetai. levgei ga;r pou, 
paideuvwn ta; plhvqh kai; sumbouleuvwn taì~ povlesi tou;~ ponhrou;~ tẁn dhmagwgẁn mh; prosdevcesqai. As 
always, it is interesting to see what is left out of the citation. Here it is Hesiod’s remark that the punishment from 
above comes through the ‘contriving of Olympian Zeus’ (Zhno;~ fradmosuvnh/sin   jOlumpivou). 
69 Apart from acknowledging Hesiod’s authority on justice in the polis, these passages from Aeschines are 
interesting for at least two reasons. First of all, they throw an interesting light on the connection between 
Hesiodic and Solonic thoughts on justice (as discussed above), for Solon fr. 4 is actually preserved in 
Demosthenes’ speech On the False Embassy, and is quoted by him to show how one man (Aeschines, in this 
case) can do damage to an entire city (Dem. Fals.Leg. 255-256). Aeschines returns the favour by quoting Hesiod 
on the same subject, which indicates that at least Aeschines thought that Solon and Hesiod were comparable - 
perhaps Aeschines wanted to outdo his opponent by going back to Solon’s source. Second, Aeschines attributing 
oracular value to Hesiod’s poihvmata implies that he presents his verses as laws, for elsewhere in Aeschines, 
ancient (Solonic) laws are sometimes said to be so pertinent to a case that they seem to be like oracles; this 
seems to be a typical rhetorical strategy (see Ford 1999a, esp. 242 and 247-248). These considerations again 
indicate that Hesiod was of some nomothetical importance when it came to justice in the polis, which contrasts 
markedly with the critique on the supposedly polis-disruptive quality of Hesiod and Homer together (see ch. 2).   
70 Aristotle associates Homer with the idea of ‘civic courage’ (politikh; ajndreiva) in EN 1116a15-26, EE 
1230a16-21, and MM 1191a5-9, and attributes a notion of citizenship to him (Pol. 1253a1-9 and 1278a34-38), 
but this does not come anywhere near the Hesiodic involvement with the topic of political justice. 
71 Gagarin (1973) 87. 
72 Irwin (2005) 196 on Solon’s appropriation of Hesiod’s Eunomia. 
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3 - People and their Dealings 
The third of the Hesiodic themes is the interaction between humans. Of course it is true that 
Hesiod and Homer together were generally regarded as authorities ‘on how people deal with 
each other in society - good people and bad, ordinary folks and craftsmen’;73 but there are 
several indications that the image of Hesiod changes in this respect when he is alone. The 
concept of divkh, which was rather firmly (and more or less exclusively) connected to Hesiod, 
plays an important role here as well as in the previous section: whereas Solon cum suis 
recreated Hesiodic justice as a reciprocal relationship between polis and individual citizen (as 
we have seen above), the Hesiodic idea of human interaction is also understood and explained 
in terms of balance and reciprocity.74 Obviously, some interpretive and re-creative effort by 
the recipients was necessary here, too. 
    The first indication for this particular concept of Hesiod’s ‘sociology’ can be witnessed in 
the reception of his verses on the difference between beasts and men. In Works and Days 274-
280, Hesiod tells us that Zeus allowed animals to devour each other (since there is no divkh 
among them), but that he gave divkh to men.75 These verses are now generally believed to 
contain the moral of the fable (very popular in antiquity) of the hawk and the nightingale, 
related some 60 verses earlier, and are supposed to impress on us the idea that only in the 
animal kingdom might is right.76 Archilochus was quick to use the idea in a fable of his own, 
in which a fox is wronged by an eagle and then appeals to Zeus, saying that ‘you oversee 
men’s deeds, wicked and lawful, and both the violence and the justice of beasts are your 
concern’ (su; d’ e[rg’ ejp’ ajnqrwvpwn oJra/̀~ lewrga; kai; qemistav, soi; de; qhrivwn u{bri~ te 
kai; divkh mevlei).77 It is part of the joke, of course, that in the fable’s world of 
anthropomorphic animals Hesiod’s distinction does not apply anymore;78 all the same, the 
                                               
73 peri; oJmiliẁn pro;~ ajllhvlou~ ajnqrwvpwn ajgaqwǹ te kai; kakwǹ kai; ijdiwtẁn kai; dhmiourgẁn, in the words 
of Socrates (Pl. Ion 531c, see also p. 209). 
74 Cf. Segal (2001) 58 interpreting divkh as ‘path of retribution’, making explicit the notion of balance that is 
inherent in the term. 
75 An idea hailed by Solmsen (1949) 96 as ‘Hesiod’s great contribution to (…) Greek humanism’. 
76 WD 202-212 (but see the cautionary words of Nelson 1998 78). Most modern scholars agree on the fable’s 
function as an ‘illustration of the ruthless exercise of might’ (Daly 1961 50), but quarrel endlessly over who the 
hawk and the nightingale are meant to represent. The most obvious interpretation (hawk = kings, nightingale = 
Hesiod) is usually cast aside for more creative solutions, such as that of Ford 1965 (hawk = necessity, 
nightingale = human condition), Jensen 1966 (hawk = Zeus, nightingale = unthinking people), Tandy/Neale 
1996 (hawk = kings, nightingale = Perses), and Steiner 2007 (hawk = Homeric epic, nightingale = Hesiodic 
poetry). According to Clay (2003) 40, the point of the tale is that ‘if the poet can manage to ally himself with the 
demos, those who depend on the kings, the contest may even out’; Mordine (2006) connects the fable to the 
story of Zeus and Prometheus. See for the latest interpretation Zanker (2009), which involves the Mahabharata; 
he also provides a useful bibliography, but see for the most complete overview Van Dijk (1997) 127-134. 
77 IEG 177. 
78 Irwin (1998) describes Archilochus’ ‘reformulation’ of Hesiod as ‘pointed, almost polemical’ (181).  
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reference does make clear that Hesiod’s ‘rule’ is there to protect the weak against the strong. 
Similarly, in pseudo-Lysias’ Funeral Oration the (ancestors of the) Athenians are continually 
praised for their willingness ‘to do battle for the weaker on the side of right, rather than favour 
the powerful’, and they too ‘deemed that it was the way of wild beasts to be held subject to 
one another by force, but the duty of men to delimit justice by law’79 - an attitude 
characterized as democratic, for obvious reasons.80 In this admittedly still somewhat faint and 
implicit manner, Hesiod is referred to as an authority on social balance, whose words provide 
a check on the overpowering greed of the mighty. 
    Another indication for Hesiod’s authority on social behaviour is his apparent reputation as 
an expert on ‘friendship’ (filiva), a term indicating an affective and mutually beneficial bond 
not only between friends, but also between parents and children, husbands and wives, and 
even among neighbours.81 It appears that Hesiod was thought to have a say concerning all of 
those relationships. In Plato’s Lysis, for instance, Socrates presents an anonymous source who 
believed that nothing was so hostile to like as like, and presents Hesiod’s Works and Days 25-
26 (‘potter is angry with potter, and singer with singer, and beggar with beggar’) as a witness 
(mavrtu~).82 Plato’s ironic treatment of this theory suggests it was commonly linked to Hesiod 
in his time, and this is in fact affirmed by a passage in Aristotle, who treats the Hesiodic 
saying as an anonymous proverb which is set against the more ‘profound and scientific’ 
(ajnwvteron kai; fusikwvteron) explanations of named thinkers like Euripides, Heraclitus and 
Empedocles.83  
    Aristotle links Hesiod to the theme of filiva again when he applies the poet’s advice that 
one should be ‘neither a man of many guests nor a man with none’ to friendship, and agrees 
with Hesiod that marrying a young girl will be conducive to a relationship that is filikovn.84 
Plutarch connects Hesiod to filiva several times,85 but the connection goes back as far as 
Theognis, referring to Hesiod when he compares the fake friend (eJtair̀o~) to Pandora,86 and 
again follows him in his warning against disrupting another filiva- relationship, i.e. that 
                                               
79 [Lys.] 2.12: uJpe;r twǹ ajsqenestevrwn meta; toù dikaivou diamavcesqai màllon h] toì~ dunamevnoi~ 
carizovmenoi. [Lys.] 2.19: hJghsavmenoi qhrivwn me;n e[rgon ei\nai uJp’ ajllhvlwn biva/ krateìsqai, ajnqrwvpoi~ de; 
proshvkein novmw/ me;n oJrivsai to; divkaion. 
80 Cf. Plu. Mor. 1125A, where anti-social pleasure-seekers are compared to wild animals with no sense of 
justice; they too are to be prevented by law from devouring their neighbours. 
81 See Blundell (1989) 39-49 for this inclusive view of filiva (that appears to represent the majority view of 
modern scholars); for a more restricted view, see e.g. Konstan (1996).  
82 See ch. 2, pp. 64-65 for the implications of this term. 
83 EN 1155a32-1155b8; WD 25 returns in EE 1235a18, this time without any comment on its lack of profundity.  
84 EN 1170b20-23 (WD 715), Oec. 1344a15-18 (WD 699).  
85 See Mor. 49F, 92A, 473A, and 491F. 
86 Theognis 1.851-852; see also 1.963-970 (and ch. 4, pp. 121-122). 
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between parents and children: there is little esteem, he says, for those ‘who dishonour parents 
when they are growing old’ (oi{ k’ ajpoghravskonta~ ajtimavzwsi tokh̀a~)87- a reference to 
the ethical inversion of the depraved Iron Age where men ‘will dishonor their parents at once 
when they grow old,’ ai\ya de; ghravskonta~ ajtimhvsousi tokh̀a~ (WD 185).88 Similarly, 
Hesiod’s Works and Days 342-351 proved the ancient locus classicus for advice on how to 
establish a friendly relationship with neighbours.89 
    It seems, then, that Hesiod is connected to a very particular type of human interaction: he 
stresses those values that promote a harmonious cohabitation in the polis,90 values that we 
might call ‘co-operative’ or ‘quiet’ in Adkinsian terms.91 It is useful, in this light, to 
remember that filiva is a concept governed by the principle of reciprocity. According to 
Sahlins’ convenient model, there are three degrees of reciprocity: 1) altruistic giving (giving 
with no obligation to return), 2) balanced reciprocity (giving and returning), and 3) negative 
reciprocity (taking without returning).92 Type two, as could be expected, is the most common 
one and the one most conducive to valuable, long-term relationships between individuals and 
groups. Hesiod gives us several warnings against types one and three, and urges us to pursue 
type two; see, for instance, Works and Days 352-369, especially 354, ‘give to him who gives, 
and do not give to him who does not give’ (dovmen, o{~ ken dẁ/, kai; mh; dovmen, o{~ ken mh; dw/̀,) 
and 356, ‘Give is good, Grab is bad, a giver of death’ (dw;~ ajgaqhv, a{rpax de; kakhv, qanavtoio 
dovteira,). Millett in a discussion on Hesiod’s community concluded that ‘reciprocity turns 
out to be one of the central institutions of the Works and Days’.93 
    Advice of this sort was originally meant in the context of a small farming community 
whose members (despite the ideal of complete autarky) depended on each other for survival;94 
its recipients however, living in the new context of the full-fledged city, interpreted it as semi-
philosophical speculation on correct behaviour among citizens. Like the Hesiodic concept of 
                                               
87 Theognis 1.821; there is another reference to Hesiod (WD 372) in Theognis’ remarks on trust and distrust 
(1.831-832). 
88 Interestingly enough, Hesiod himself presents the ungrateful attitude towards parents as one way of expressing 
the attitude of ‘might-is-right’ (WD 189). 
89 Especially WD 348 (‘not even a cow would be lost, if the neighbor were not bad’) seems to have risen to 
proverbial heights. See e.g. Arist. fr. 611.38 Rose (tracing the origin of the Hesiodic saying), D.Chrys. 77.5, Plu. 
Mor. 34B, Jul. Ep. 409b. 
90 Cf. Aristid. 24.13, who understands Hesiod’s division of the two Strifes (WD 11-24) as promoting concord in 
the city, and later (15) says of Hesiod that ‘there is no poet (…) who begins with any other point or honors 
anything more than friendship and trust in one another’ (ouj ga;r e[stin ouj poihthv~, o{sti~ a[lloqevn poqen 
a[rcetai, oujd’ a[llo ti màllon presbeuvei th̀~ pro;~ ajllhvlou~ filiva~ kai; pivstew~). 
91 See for the distinction between competitive values (which dominate the Homeric poems) and co-operative 
ones e.g. Adkins (1960) and (1972). 
92 This summary of Sahlins’ theory comes from Donlan (1998) 51. 
93 Millett (1984) 100. 
94 Cf. e.g. Millett (1984) 93-103, Tandy/Neale (1996) 37, and esp. Edwards (2004) ch. 3. 
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justice, his idea of filiva was thus transformed and updated. On occasion, this could mean 
that Hesiod’s wisdom was integrated into the age-old behavioral code of ‘help your friends 
and harm your enemies’.95 Most of the time, however, Hesiod is presented as promoting 
social balance and warning against the negative spiral of mutual enmity. This picture is 
consistent throughout antiquity. Hesiod’s saying that one should listen to both sides of the 
story, for instance, is referred to by Aristophanes, occurs in pseudo-Plato’s Demodocus, and is 
adapted by Zeno.96 Cicero mentions Works and Days 350, on returning favours with interest, 
no less than three times, two of which concern the return of kindness or goodwill.97 Perhaps 
the most interesting reference, however, comes from the beginning of the Ethica Nicomachea, 
where Aristotle discusses the theme of justice, and claims that some believe justice to be 
reciprocity (to; ajntipeponqov~): ‘people want even the justice of Rhadamanthys to mean this: 
‘Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done’ (ei[ ke pavqoi tav t’ ejprevxe, 
divkh k’ ijqeìa gevnoito)’.98 Evidently, this Hesiodic phrase figured as a common guideline on 
social interaction, and even though Aristotle himself believed it too simple a picture, he does 
admit that ‘in associations for exchange this sort of justice holds men together (…), for it is by 
proportionate requital that the city holds together.’99 
    The Hesiodic idea of social balance may also serve as a warning never to initiate any kind 
of wrongdoing. Alcaeus was inspired by Works and Days 721 (‘if you speak evil, you will 
soon be worse spoken of’, eij de; kako;n ei[poi~, tavca k’ aujto;~ meiz̀on ajkouvsai~) when he 
wrote that ‘if you say what you want, you will hear what you do not want’ (ai[ k’ ei[ph/~, ta; 
qevlh/~, <kaiv ken> ajkouvsai~, tav k<en> ouj qevloi~).100 Callimachus seems to have regarded 
the notion that ‘causing evil to another man causes evil to his own heart’ (teuvcwn wJ~ eJtevrw/ 
ti~ eJw/̀ kako;n h[pati teuvcei) as so central to Hesiod’s message that he listed it right next to 
the birth of Chaos as one of the things the Muses taught him.101 Callimachus’ addition ‘to the 
                                               
95 See Archilochus, who in fragment 23.14 says he knows how ‘to love those who love him’ (to;n filevonta 
fileìn, copying WD 353) and then adds ‘and how to hate my enemy’ (to;n d’ ejcqro;n ejcqaivrein, cf. Phld. 
Epigr. 23, which probably refers to Archilochus); see also Thgn. 1.1090, who refers to Hesiod’s advice to pay 
back double the man who hurts you (WD 710-711). 
96 Ar. V. 725, [Pl.] Demod. 383b, Zeno SVF 1.78. The saying is perhaps not Hesiod’s; it was also attributed to 
Phocylides and Democritus. 
97 Cic. Att. 13.12, Brut. 4.15, Off. 1.15.48. 
98 EN 1132b25-26 (fr. 286 MW); Detienne (1962) 23-24 believed that the ‘people’ mentioned by Aristotle refer 
to the Pythagoreans. See also Jul. Conv. 314a. 
99 Arist. EN 1132b31-34: ejn me;n taì~ koinwnivai~ taì~ ajllaktikai~̀ sunevcei to; toioùton divkaion (...), tẁ/ 
ajntipoieìn ga;r ajnavlogon summevnei hJ povli~. 
100 Alc. fr. 341 Voigt (= 134 D); Proclus already saw the reference (S WD 721). 
101 Call. fr. 2.5 Pf., referring to WD 265 (oi| g’ aujtw/̀ kaka; teuvcei ajnh;r a[llw/ kaka; teuvcwn). Pfeiffer ad loc. 
already drew the logical conclusion that the Muses in this version taught both the Th. and WD to Hesiod near the 
Heliconian Hippocrene; but it is perhaps more remarkable that Callimachus chose verse 265 to represent the WD.  
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heart’ (h[pati)102 suggests that Hesiod’s advice, originally prompted by strictly economic 
motivations, is in the meantime understood (or re-created) as an ethico-philosophical 
statement on keeping oneself pure and unpolluted by crime. This is certainly Plutarch’s 
interpretation of this Works and Days-passage; he believed that Hesiod meant that any 
criminal damages his own soul, and so by committing a crime is ipso facto punished by it, 
since he will for the rest of his life be haunted by feelings of remorse. Hesiod, as the argument 
goes, is thus even stricter than Plato, who said that punishment follows (instead of being 
coeval with) crime.103 
    It is difficult to see how Homer related to the theme of social balance. His poems are 
mainly about heroes performing extraordinary feats outside a strictly ‘political’ framework, 
and scholars have noted that Homer does not describe and perhaps does not know the city.104 
And even though it is not true, as Adkins claimed, that only the competitive values are praised 
in his poems,105 it can still be argued that Hesiod’s embrace of the victim’s perspective is 
‘refreshingly antithetical to Homer’s’.106 The question remains to what degree (if any) the 
Greeks were alive to this difference. Since a complete overview of all the Homeric material is 
impossible (or at least far beyond the scope of this section) we can only say that ‘socio-
political’ references to Homer are relatively few.107 In some of the most important authors we 
have discussed here, such references are either absent (Theognis), less frequent than 
references to Hesiod (Aristotle),108 or outweighed by references to ‘competitive’ values 




                                               
102 The addition is presumably the work of Callimachus, see Pfeiffer ad loc.; it was copied in that form by 
Lucillius (AP 9.183). 
103 Plu. Mor. 553F-554A; the comparison with Plato is a sure sign that Plutarch believed Hesiod was speaking of 
the condition of the soul.  
104 See Morris (1986) 96-97, referring esp. to several publications of Finley. Cf. Goldhill (1991) 126, who 
demonstrates that excellence (ajrethv) from the sixth century onwards is more and more ‘sited within the context 
of the polis’, and that there is progressively less honour (timhv) for the individual heroics of Homer’s 
protagonists. Hunter (2004) 249 rightly argues that Homeric values too ‘had been subsumed into, rather than 
erased by, the values of the polis’, thus warning us against a too dichotomous view. 
105 Adkins (1960); see the critique by e.g. Long (1970) and Rowe (1983b). Donlan (1998) demonstrated that all 
the degrees or kinds of reciprocity are present in Homer. 
106 Lamberton (1988) 66, calling it ‘Hesiod’s most characteristic perspective.’ 
107 A notable exception being Homer’s reputed expertise on xeniva (‘the treatment of guests’), a theme of central 
importance in the Odyssey. Still, it should be noted that xeniva is a social institution that primarily involves two 
(or more) individuals from different cities, and is less concerned with behaviour inside the polis. 
108 Aristotle (in EN and EE) couples Homer to the theme of friendship three times, but only once to friendship 
among equals (EN 1155a); the other two cases refer to the filiva of father to his children, which is likened to 
that of a king to his subjects (EN 1160b26 and 1161a14). 
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4 - Moderation and Simplicity  
The fourth and final Hesiodic theme discussed here concerns moderation and simplicity, 
concepts obviously connected to the previous themes. Hesiod, it seems, was from early times 
onward connected to present poverty, resulting from the tragically lost days of bliss and 
comfort. Although this status occasionally made him the target of (mildly) ironic jests, 
especially in Roman times, it was far more often employed in a positive sense. So, Hesiod 
could become the champion of frugality, warning against the corruptive power of greed and 
money. In this case too, it is especially the polis as a whole that could benefit from his advice. 
    Theognis is the first to refer to poverty in Hesiodic terms: he deplores ‘accursed poverty’109 
twice in contexts clearly reminiscent of Hesiod, and wishes for a wealthy and youthful life not 
dissimilar to that of the Golden Age. Poverty, as in Hesiod, is accepted as a godgiven fact of 
the human condition, and thus should not be held against the poor: ‘never, pray, out of anger 
at a man throw heart-rending poverty and accursed indigence in his face’.110 Wealth may be a 
highly desirable thing, but Theognis knew it did not always indicate a person’s goodness, ‘for 
some keep their baseness hidden by wealth and others their merit by accursed poverty’ (oiJ 
me;n ga;r kakovthta katakruvyante~ e[cousi / plouvtw/, toi; d’ ajreth;n oujlomevnh/ penivh/); 
there is a reference here to Hesiod’s gods who ‘keep livelihood hidden’ (kruvyante~ e[cousi 
bivon) from men so that they need to toil111 - these are dreadful circumstances the immutability 
of which must simply be accepted. 
    It follows naturally that Hesiod’s poverty appears favourably in contexts that regard little 
means as a sign of moral decency, and wealth as a source of corruption. Democritus criticizes 
the ‘evil gain’ of the nouveau riche in Hesiodic terms,112 and comments on Hesiod’s famous 
words that ‘work is no disgrace’ with his own maxim that ‘wealth acquired by bad deeds 
makes the disgrace more apparent’.113 In this type of discourse wealth can even, from a 
certain point of view, be regarded as a bad thing itself. Plutarch describes the Hesiodic idea on 
the evil effects of wealth in Hesiodic fashion when he says that ‘wealth, overwhelming and 
                                               
109 Thgn. 1.155-156 and 1062: oujlomevnh penivh (WD 717). 
110 Thgn. 1.155-156: mhvpotev moi penivhn qumofqovron ajndri; calefqei;~ / mhd’ ajcrhmosuvnhn oujlomevnhn 
provfere. The passage continues with ‘be assured that Zeus inclines the scales now on this side, now on that; 
now to be wealthy, now to have nothing’; cf. WD 717-718 ‘do not ever dare to reproach a man with baneful, 
spirit-destroying poverty, the gift of the blessed ones that always are’ (mhdev pot’ oujlomevnhn penivhn 
qumofqovron ajndri; / tevtlaq’ ojneidivzein, makavrwn dovsin aije;n ejovntwn). 
111 Thgn. 1.1061-1062, WD 42; the parallel is not recorded by Young (1971) or West (1978).  
112 DK 68 B 220: kaka; kevrdea (cf. B 221), WD 352. See for the connection between poverty and work 
Desmond 27-103 (esp. 72-76 for the traditional work-ethic as exemplified by the WD). 
113 WD 311: e[rgon oujde;n o[neido~, echoed by DK 68 B 218: ploùto~ ajpo; kakh̀~ ejrgasivh~ perigenovmeno~ 
ejpifanevsteron to; o[neido~ kevkthtai. Many Democritean fragments remind one of Hesiod’s ethical teachings, 
see e.g. DK 68 B 3 (WD 689-691), 204 (WD 291-292), 238 (WD 210-211), 252 (WD 11-26).  
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overpowering you, like the woman in Hesiod ‘singes without a brand and ages ere your time’, 
bringing upon the mind like premature winkles and grey hairs the cares and distractions that 
come from avarice.’114 
    The worst thing about wealth is apparently that it inspires greed. Hesiod is often cited to 
warn against its pernicious effects; the powerfully paradoxical Works and Days 40, ‘the half 
is more than the whole’ (plevon h{misu pantov~) became somewhat of a slogan in these 
contexts. It seems that the Suda’s explanation of this verse (‘that the little bit with justice has 
much more profit than the greater with injustice’)115 was the standard one in antiquity.116 It is 
of interest that the greed Hesiod warned against was thought to be particularly dangerous to 
society as a whole. This idea is brought forward quite clearly in Plato: when a guardian in 
Plato’s State will use his power to appropriate everything in the city for himself, he will ‘find 
out that Hesiod was indeed wise, who said that the half was in some way more than the 
whole.’117 Similarly, in Laws, the kings of Argos and Messene are said to have destroyed 
themselves and Greece by forgetting ‘the solid truth of Hesiod’s saying.’118 Dio Chrysostom 
too stresses that despite Hesiod’s warning kings or the people themselves have in the past 
‘attempted to transgress the principle of justice and grasp at the greater share,’119 thus causing 
their own ruin. Dio also states that it was Hesiod who warned us that kings are particularly 
open to the seductive power of money, which ‘drags generals of cities to the gates, so as to 
                                               
114 Plu. Mor. 526F-527A: oJ ploùto~ pericuqei;~ kai; krathvsa~, w{sper hJ par’   JHsiovdw/ gunhv ‘eu{ei a[ter 
daloù kai; wjmẁ/ ghvrai> dẁken’, w{sper rJutivda~ ajwvrou~ h] polia;~ ejpagagw;n th̀/ yuch̀/ ta;~ frontivda~ ejk th̀~ 
filarguriva~ kai; ta;~ ajscoliva~, quoting WD 705. 
115 Suda 3.569: to; ojlivgon meta; dikaiosuvnh~ toù polloù meta; ajdikiva~ pleivona e[cei th;n o[nhsin. 
116 See also West (1978) ad loc. It seems to be the standard interpretation of modern scholars as well, although 
there are some interesting alternative interpretations. According to Gagarin (1974b) 110-111 Hesiod is saying to 
Perses that ‘a simple but adequate livelihood is preferable to the risk that dire poverty may follow from excessive 
greed’, while Nettel (1976) and Rousseau (1996) focus on the mallow and asphodel mentioned as a ‘great boon’ 
in the next line (WD 41). Both note that these are plants that grow by themselves, without cultivation, a quality 
they associate with the aujtovmato~ bivo~ of the Golden Age. Nettel takes the link to mean that in the Golden Age 
people were happy with mallow and asphodel, and so that half was enough for them. Rousseau, however, 
believes that the link functions as an ironic foil, and that people nowadays can only come close to a life 
resembling the Golden Age when they work hard and live in a good city; under kings that rule badly, people will 
have to be satisfied with mallow and asphodel, a ‘non-bios’, ‘une alimentation qui n’en est justement pas une’ 
(156). Miller (2001) 273-275 interestingly connects the saying with the conduct of Uranus and Cronus in the Th.; 
both were punished for trying to keep everything for themselves, while Zeus neatly distributes all honours 
among the gods. There seems to be less textual support for the interpretations of Verdenius (1972) ad loc. (‘poor 
food is a boon compared with no food at all’) or Tandy/Neale (1996) 56, who think that ‘the half’ refers to a 
toilsome life, while ‘the whole’ represents an ‘utterly untroubled life such as gods enjoy, but which is fraught 
with danger for mortals’, quoting Crotty (1982) 43. 
117 Pl. R. 466c: gnwvsetai to;n   JHsivodon o{ti tẁ/ o[nti h\n sofo;~ levgwn plevon ei\nai pw~ h{misu pantov~. 
118 Pl. Lg. 690e: ajnohvsante~ to;n   JHsivodon ojrqovtata levgonta. The ruler’s lack of moderation leading to evil 
is denounced in Hesiodic terms again in Lg. 713c-714a (on the present deviance from the age of Cronus).  
119 D.Chrys. 17.12: ejpiceirhvsa~ uJperbh̀nai to; divkaion kai; toù pleivono~ ojrecqh̀nai. 
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open them and act the traitor.’120 In all these cases, greed is in Hesiodic fashion presented as 
something that upsets the balance of justice and disrupts the community as a whole.121 
    Hesiod figures more often in contexts that condemn (the trouble deriving from) wealth than 
in those actually praising poverty. I could find only one such passage, provided by Plutarch, 
arguably Hesiod’s greatest fan in antiquity. In the Dinner of the Seven Wise Men, the poet is 
praised for advocating frugality and the benefits of simple foods;122 he is also believed to have 
invented the no-hunger drug alimon, presumably of particular use to people who cannot 
afford food.123 His modest outlook on life is further reflected in his knowledge of health and 
medicine, as he is said to know about ‘the daily course of life, the mixing of wine, the value 
of water, the bathing of women, the right time for intercourse, and the way in which infants 
should sit’.124 For the belief that Hesiod himself was poor, just like his original audience, see 
further chapter 9. 
    It is obvious that the Hesiodic theme of moderation is closely connected to that of justice 
and social balance. In this case too, the advice from the Works and Days is interpreted in a 
context it was not originally meant for, i.e. that of polis, and so again Hesiod is transformed 
and updated. The relation of Homer to this subject is a question too large to deal with here; 
suffice it to say, with Donlan, that only a developed community can produce critique on the 
excesses of typically epic-heroic values, such as ‘arrogance, (…) luxury, (…) mere 
appearance’.125 Hesiodic values thus seem to fit the polis better than Homeric ones, and there 
is reason to think the two poets were employed as icons of contrasting ideologies; this, 
however, will be further discussed in chapter 8. 
 
5 - Conclusion 
In this chapter we have taken a look at the four ethical themes most associated with Hesiod in 
antiquity: 1) demonology, concerned with the care for one’s soul and its fate in the afterlife; 
2) justice in the polis, on the individual’s responsibility for the well-being of the city as a 
                                               
120 D.Chrys. 80.12: suvrei de; povlewn strathgou;~ ejpi; puvla~, w{ste ajnoivgein kai; prodidovnai. 
121 It is easy to see how the Hesiodic concept of the ‘gift-eating kings’ destroying society with their ‘crooked 
judgements’ (WD 220-221, 263-264) could have promoted this image, although there are no explicit links. See 
D.Chrys. 7.110-111 and Plu. Mor. 527B for a Hesiod-related rejection of luxury in the city, and Thgn. 923-924 
warning Democles in Hesiodic terms to be thrifty and careful.  
122 Plu. Mor. 157F. 
123 Plu. Mor. 157F (where Hesiod’s status as the inventor is doubted by an interlocutor), and Mor. 940C; see also 
Pl. Lg. 677e. 
124 Plu. Mor. 158A-B: peri; diaivth~ kai; kravsew~ oi[nou kai; ajreth̀~ u{dato~ kai; loutroù gunaikwǹ 
dialegovmeno~ kai; sunousiva~ kairoù kai; brefẁn kaqivsew~. The references are to WD 405-821, 744-745, 
737-741, 753-755, 735-736 and 750-752, respectively. Hesiod seems to be connected to a rudimentary way of 
living again in Plu. fr. 157.124-129 Sandbach, but the context is unclear. 
125 Donlan (1973) 149; ‘the focal point (…) is now the community not the individual’ (ibid.). 
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whole; 3) human interaction, on the value of reciprocity; and 4) moderation and simplicity, 
dealing with the dangers of greed and the benefits of a simple life. Central to all four is the 
concept of balance or proportionate compensation: keep your soul clean, and become a good 
spirit; act justly, and live in a flourishing polis; give, and get something in return; overstretch, 
and punishment will follow.  
    Hesiod’s message of balanced reciprocity was thought to be particularly appropriate for the 
community of people living together in the polis. Early sources, especially the elegiac poets 
Solon and Theognis, use Hesiod to comment on the relatively new phenomenon of the city 
and its proper social code. It is wrong to cast such reception in terms of linear development; 
rather, there exists a form of ‘reciprocity’ between the source and the recipient as well: Solon, 
for instance, appropriates Hesiod’s authority, borrows ideas, and enjoys the safety of 
grounding his innovations (whether conscious or not) in a familiar framework - in return, 
Hesiod is rejuvenated and made ready for contexts that his poem was not originally designed 
for.126 In later and more systematic treatments of social behaviour, such as Plato’s Lysis and 
especially Aristotle’s Ethics, we find sure traces of a widespread and popular notion of 
Hesiod as an authority on reciprocity (while the philosophers themselves out of professional 
rivalry sometimes emphasize Hesiod’s lack of intellectual depth).127 The interest in Hesiod as 
a ‘political’ writer is reflected in the distribution of references to the Works and Days: many 
to the first part, that deals with the polis, and few to the second part, which focuses more 
narrowly on the oikos.128  
    The creation of Hesiod as a political thinker shows us how easily the past is adjusted to fit 
the present. The original context of borrowing and lending in a small village of farmers is 
completely forgotten as Hesiod’s advice turns out to be equally applicable to the new context 
of the nascent polis in its classical sense. When politics and just leadership become less of an 
issue in post-classical times, the theme of reciprocity is again transformed, this time into a 
more personal code on how to behave in order to be rewarded after death. Incidentally, this 
                                               
126 As Svenbro (1976) 92 puts it, the songs of Homer and Hesiod are ‘enracinés dans un monde avec lequel la 
Cité a dû rompre pour s’établir’. But even though this is probably true in its own right, Hesiod can survive 
because of his recreation ‘in a Solonian image’ (Irwin 2005 163). 
127 There thus seems to be little truth in the claim of Fakas (2001) 101 (and others like him) that Hesiod was 
rather regarded as a teacher on agriculture than that he was associated with an ethical message. The claim is 
based on the modern-day stereotype of Hesiod as a grumpy old farmer; Fakas refers to none of the material 
discussed in this chapter (moreover, of the 9 references to Hesiod’s agricultural teaching he mentions, 5 are 
Roman).  
128 When we apply the caesura of Hamilton (1989) 58 at verse 286 (and leave out the immense mountain of lines 
287-292), I count 55 references to the first part on the polis and 54 references to the second part on the oikos in 
archaic and classical times. Since the second part (543 lines) is almost twice the size of the first (285), the 
density of the references to the first part is almost twice as large as that to the second part. See also the 
commemograms on pp. 17-18. 
CHAPTER 5 
 162
chapter (like chapter 4) further illustrates how easily the persona of the poet was equated to 
the content of his works: the teacher of simplicity and moderation can be pictured as poor and 
practical himself, just as the expert on demons became a beneficial presence after his death. 
    It is interesting to compare this picture of Hesiod with the evaluation of the ethics of 
Hesiod and Homer together. We have seen, in chapter 2, that Hesiod’s teaching was either 
rejected or at least believed to sit uncomfortably with the precepts of philosophers and law-
givers. When Hesiod is alone, on the other hand, his verses meet with almost universal 
approval. I do no wish to claim that this radical change is unique for Hesiod; when he is 
alone, there is plenty of praise for Homer as well - as we have seen, Hesiod and Homer are 
often grouped in order to represent the potentially false or detrimental nature of poetry as a 
whole, and this notion of collectivity is absent when they are cited individually. It is 
remarkable, however, that Hesiod alone receives praise for his teaching on the exact same 
subjects he was attacked for when combined with Homer: proper behaviour in the polis, and 
stories about the afterlife.  
    This conclusion will also look ahead, for it is interesting to consider what we have not seen 
in this chapter. Take, for instance, the conventional picture of Hesiod, the old farmer, the 
people’s prophet, the pacifist - this side of the Hesiodic persona did so far not come to the 
fore. Surely, the association with the theme of peace could be deduced from his warnings 
against arrogance, greed, and other transgressive behaviour, but it remains far from explicit. 
Similarly, there is a certain connection between Hesiod and the people, because of his popular 
wisdom and firm rejection of the aristocratic principle of ‘might is right’; but it would be 
overly bold to describe Hesiodic thought as democratic. And finally, although we have seen 
some agricultural qualities of Hesiod in this chapter, his polis-related sofiva makes him more 
of a politically-minded citizen than a secluded farmer. I am not suggesting here that the 
traditional picture of Hesiod is not grounded in antiquity; it definitely is. But when Hesiod is 
alone, he is a different person, and we can see only a dim outline of the figure drawn in vivid 











Chapter 6  
 
Philosophy: Great and Small 
 
 
0 - Introduction 
This chapter is the last to focus on Hesiod without Homer, and will deal with the 
philosophical qualities ascribed to the poet. As in chapter 3, philosophy is to be understood 
here as covering thought and speculation on natural philosophy, the way to acquire 
knowledge, and the relation between language and truth (for the sake of convenience, ethics 
was treated separately in chapter 5). In chapter 3 we have seen that Hesiod and Homer 
together were generally not regarded as philosophers in this more limited sense. As a team, 
they are not appropriated by individual thinkers or specific schools of thought to propagate 
specific ideas. 
    When Hesiod is alone, things are very different. From its earliest reception onwards, the 
Greeks regarded the Theogony as a textbook of great philosophical import (comparable to the 
Works and Days in the field of ethics).1 Its relevance to cosmology and physics was realized 
immediately, and early thinkers from Anaximander to Empedocles saw Hesiod as their 
predecessor on the path to the great theory of everything. But we should note beforehand that 
it was not just the bare fact that Hesiod had described the cosmos that made him so appealing 
to later philosophers; of considerably greater importance (at least to the history of Hesiod’s 
reception) was the way he was believed to have done so: meticulously collecting as many data 
as possible, searching for the smallest building-blocks of the world, and explaining the total of 
reality through the sum of its constituent parts. Hesiod, as we will see, was thus credited not 
only with a world view that could be called philosophical, but with a genuinely philosophical 
method as well. It is one of the main theses of this chapter that this was the reason that 
Hesiod, when the interest in natural philosophy had waned somewhat, remained greatly 
relevant to thinkers in the classical period and beyond. 
    This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section will present an overview of 
Hesiod’s reputation as a natural philosopher, given shape by thinkers from Anaximenes to the 
Stoics. Its main goal is to establish Hesiod’s image as a philosopher combining a cosmic 
scope with a preoccupation with elements. Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of the 
                                               
1 See ch. 5, esp. pp. 149-160. 
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reception of Hesiod’s Dichterweihe, the introductory scene from the Theogony which many 
philosophers interpreted as a statement on epistemology, and an indication of the poet-
philosopher’s methodology. We will see how recipients adopted the topos of revelation to 
elucidate their own philosophical method, comparing and contrasting their method to those of 
previous thinkers. Finally, in the third section, we will see how Hesiod’s reputation as a 
speaker of truth and a thinker of elements made him useful to certain philosophers exploring 
the correspondence between language and reality, and the capacity of language to convey 
truth.  
 
1 - Natural Philosophy  
There is a trend, in both ancient and modern doxography, to rank Hesiod among the earliest 
philosophers. In modern scholarship, Snell claimed that Hesiod’s Götterwelt testifies to 
serious philosophical speculation, Fränkel wrote that ‘the history of Greek philosophy as 
literature begins not with Anaximander but with Hesiod’, and Wade-Gery called Hesiod the 
first presocratic.2 Such qualifications, even in some more extreme forms (in which Hesiod is 
turned into a culture hero ushering in mankind from the out-dated world of mythos into the 
modern one of logos),3 are by no means extraordinary. Hesiod is nowadays almost universally 
regarded as a formidable thinker sometimes tied to archaic modes of expression but otherwise 
way ahead of his time: he is defining, organizing, classifying, conceptualizing; systematic, 
rational, abstract, intellectual, analytical, even scientific.4 This particular view of the poet is in 
fact one of the very few constants in modern Hesiodic scholarship. 
 
                                               
2 Snell (1955) 65-82 (esp. 78 ‘Vorläufer der Philosophen’), Fränkel (1975) 515 speaking of ‘profound 
ontological speculations’, Wade-Gery (1949) 81.  
3 See Kirk (1970) 226-251 discussing the modern concept of the ‘Hesiodic Revolution’ (247, and concluding that 
Hesiod was a great organizer of the mythical tradition, but not the first); cf. e.g. Burn (1936) 73 who describes 
Hesiod as ‘a worthy member of the band of Greek thinkers (…), a true forerunner of those Ionians who almost in 
one stroke cut away from their lives the whole mass of the old irrational terrors of ‘natural man’.’ 
4 Cf. e.g. Sellschop (1934) 99-101 (despite Hesiod’s Gebundenheit an die epische Formel he is still on the way 
to philosophische Begriffssprache), 104 (Hesiod’s Intellektualismus sets the tone for Greek philosophy); Diller 
1946 (Hesiod rejects coincidence in favour of nature’s Gezetzmässigkeit); Baldry (1952) 91 saying Hesiod was 
not only a farmer-poet, but a thinker as well; Angier (1964) 329 on Hesiod’s ‘organizing and classifying mind’; 
Sinclair (1966) xxvii Hesiod ‘deserves to be considered as a poet and philosopher’; Philips (1973) on Hesiod’s 
‘speculation’ and ‘abstract reasoning’ (300) and his conflicting roles as philosopher and story-teller (302); Most 
(1991) 86 on Hesiod’s ‘selective, analytic approach’; Bowie 1993 (21) characterizing Hesiod’s poetry as 
‘philosophical’; Clay (2003) 50 suggests Hesiod is a presocratic because ‘he too seems obsessed with the 
question of beginnings’. Rowe (1983a) presents a slightly different view since he qualifies Hesiod’s thinking as 
‘unscientific’ rather than ‘pre-scientific’ (135). 
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    In antiquity, Hesiod is often called a philosopher, but rather implicitly than explicitly;5 his 
classification as such is perhaps more obvious from his association with ‘real’ philosophers. 
Plato, for instance, compares him to Parmenides, and so does Aristotle, who also associates 
Hesiod with ‘the first natural philosophers’ (oiJ prwt̀oi fusiologhvsante~);6 both Plutarch 
and Diogenes Laertius put Hesiod next to Parmenides, Xenophanes and Empedocles.7 
Interestingly enough, Homer, despite his great reputation as a philosopher in antiquity, is 
often absent from ancient ‘lists’ of the earliest philosophers; there are, at any rate, no 
instances of Hesiod and Homer together being ranked among the presocratics - as a team, they 
can be wise men, authorities on ethics, sophists even, but not natural philosophers. This is 
perhaps a first indication that the subject of natural philosophy could be used to distinguish 
Hesiod from Homer.8 Incidentally, this distinction from Homer can also be witnessed in 
modern scholarship.9  
 
This section deals with the ancient concept of Hesiod as a natural philosopher. I will first 
demonstrate how the earliest Greek thinkers on science and cosmogony created a Hesiod after 
their own image, by examining the passages they borrowed from and the way they interpreted 
their source text. I will then proceed to investigate how this picture of Hesiodic physics 
influenced later conceptions of the poet as a natural philosopher (in fact, the post-classical 
views of Hesiod on this particular subject are remarkably similar to those of the earlier 
period). The subject of Hesiod’s influence on later physiology is a vast subject on which 
much has been said and written. The overview presented here must therefore necessarily be 
selective and sketchy, highlighting only those characteristics of Hesiod-the-natural-
philosopher that were useful to other areas of philosophy - the most interesting part of this 
chapter, described in sections 2 and 3. 
                                               
5 Nowhere in antiquity, at least so far as I know, is Hesiod explicitly called a filovsofo~; he is said to have 
spoken ‘most philosophically’ (pavnu filosovfw~) in the scholia (S WD 130-131 and 130a, and less directly 286, 
cf. Aphthonius Progymn. 1.66 Walz; Nicolaus Progymn. 1.281 Walz). Plutarch claims that Hesiod demonstrates 
‘a better understanding than some philosophers’ (ejnivwn filosovfwn bevltion dianohqeiv~, Mor. 433E), and 
Sextus Empiricus explicitly bans Hesiod from the field of filosofiva (Pyrrh. 3.123).  
6 Pl. Smp. 178b; Arist. Metaph. 984b and Cael. 298b. 
7 Plu. Mor. 402E, 756F and 927E; D.L. 9.22.  
8 See Clay (1992) 138, who notes the same ‘segregation’ (though on the basis of little evidence). See also 
Lamberton (1986) 28 who suggests that Homer does not belong to Aristotle’s class of ‘Hesiod and his school 
and all the theologians’ (Metaph. 1000a9). 
9 See, e.g. Gigon (1945) 13-21, who opposes ‘Hesiodic truth’ to ‘Homeric myth’ and thus begins his book on the 
origins of Greek philosophy with Hesiod, and Jaeger (1947) 9-11, who calls Hesiod a precursor of philosophy 
and then explains why Homer cannot be classified as such. But perhaps this distinction is somewhat outdated: it 
seems that the importance of Homer as a precursor of natural philosophy is more and more recognized (see for 
instance how Homer is included among ‘the forerunners of mythical cosmogony’ in Kirk-Raven-Schofield 
(1983), right next to Hesiod, while Homer is absent from Diels-Kranz, who include Hesiod). 
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    The first recipients of Hesiodic cosmogony were the Milesians.10 Anaximander postulated 
the Apeiron (‘Infinite’) as the ultimate origin, from which the hot and cold came to be, 
creating ‘a kind of sphere of flame’ around the air surrounding the earth; then, the flame ‘was 
broken off’ into circles of fire which made up the heavenly bodies. Anaximenes believed air 
to have produced earth through a process of condensation; from the earth then arose a rarefied 
form of air called fire, creating the ‘sun and moon and remaining heavenly bodies’.11 
Cornford argued for a strong Hesiodic influence on the Milesian cosmogonies,12 and pointed 
to several striking similarities in their proposed sequence of cosmogonical events: first there 
is primal unity, followed by separation, and this process enables the separated opposites to 
interact and generate more life. The opening of the primal gap also causes light to enter, and 
then pieces of the earth break off to form the stars. The sequence then ends with the 
separation of the dry land from the sea. Stokes further developed and somewhat modified 
Cornford’s ideas in two influential articles.13 He convincingly argued that Anaximenes, 
though later than Anaximander, actually follows Hesiod more closely.14 More importantly, 
however, he complemented Cornford’s findings with an investigation of the primary entities 
proposed by the three thinkers: Chaos, Apeiron and Air. Many of their characteristics were 
found to correspond: immense size, internal motion, divinity, and (probably) homogeneity. 
These similarities were often noted and further elaborated by later scholars.15  
    Three relevant points emerge. The first and rather obvious one is that it is indeed Hesiod 
rather than Homer to whom the earliest cosmologists turn,16 and to the Theogony rather than 
to the Works and Days.17 The second is that Anaximander and Anaximenes apparently 
thought of Hesiod as a natural philosopher, that is, as someone engaged in the same enterprise 
as they were: according to the principle of assimilation, they downplayed differences and 
focused on what (they believed that) they and Hesiod had in common. This is perhaps less 
                                               
10 I will only discuss Anaximander and Anaximenes because almost nothing is left of the Thales’ cosmogony. 
For the same reason, I leave out theogonists like Acusilaus, Orpheus and Pherecydes. 
11 DK 12 A 10 (Anaximander) and DK 13 A 6 (Anaximenes), following the interpretation of Kirk-Raven-
Schofield (1983). 
12 Cornford (1950) and (1952) 187-201. 
13 Stokes (1962) and (1963). 
14 In fact, Stokes in general makes a better case for the connection between Hesiod and Anaximenes (which he 
proves beyond any doubt, cf. Wöhrle 1993 14) than that between Hesiod and Anaximander.  
15 See e.g. Clay (1992), who discerns in both Hesiod and Anaximander a tendency to present the primeval state 
of the world in all its confusion as an inverted projection of the well-differentiated present state of affairs. See 
Wöhrle (1993) 11-19 on Anaximenes and Hesiod. 
16 Some of the Milesians’ ideas, most notably the symmetrical shape of the cosmos, could be derived from 
Homer as well (cf. Il. 8.16). Moreover, Anaximander is called an expert on Homer by Xenophon (Smp. 3.6). 
17 Anaximander may have been inspired by the WD’s description of Hephaestus creating Pandora from earth and 
water when he claimed man originated from a combination of earth and water, heated to a certain temperature 
(DK 12 A 30, see Guthrie 1957 55 speaking of ‘the ‘Pandora’ theory’). 
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obvious than it seems: it is worth emphasizing that the Theogony is actually about gods, and 
not about condensating elements, vortexes of water or circular bits of fire breaking off from 
the earth. Nevertheless, where Hesiod says Chaos, they see a first principle; where Hesiod 
says Gaia, they understand ‘earth’. This is allegory in its strictest sense, i.e. reading something 
else than it actually says.18 This almost escapes our notice since Hesiodic theogony is so 
remarkably close to Milesian cosmogony - the leaps of interpretation are relatively small and 
easy,19 especially when compared to the allegorization of Homer: Theagenes, for instance, 
explained the Iliad’s theomachy as the interaction of elements, Pherecydes perhaps 
interpreted Homer’s Zeus and Hera as god and matter, and Metrodorus explained Homer’s 
heroes as parts of the universe, and his gods as parts of the body.20 It may very well be that 
the ease of physical allegorization of Hesiod facilitated that of Homer, which is more 
elaborate and more sophisticated; it may also be that the obviousness of Hesiod’s supposedly 
‘real’ message caused more interpretive effort to be spent on Homer.21 The third point 
relevant to us is that the early cosmologists’ interest in Hesiod focuses almost exclusively on 
three things: Chaos, Eros, and his (supposed) theory of elements - that is, presumably, what 
they believed to be most cosmological or physical about him. 
    These three points are so relevant because they return in later cosmological or more 
generally physical accounts influenced by Hesiod: these refer mainly to the Theogony, 
unabashedly understand this poem allegorically, and focus on Chaos (as a receptacle or the 
‘void’), Eros (as a unifying force binding principles often regarded as opposites), and the 
elements (as the constituents of the visible world). 
    The cosmological thinking of Parmenides and Empedocles serves as a good example. 
Parmenides’ first principles are light and night (DK B 8.53-61), referring to the opposition 
between Erebus / Night and Aether / Day in Theogony 123-125.22 The prominent position of 
Eros in Parmenides’ cosmogony (‘She [perhaps the goddess of necessity] created Eros first of 
all the gods’, DK B 13) is the most obvious of all borrowings from Hesiod, and was already 
                                               
18 In terms of Long, ‘weak allegory’ (see ch. 2, p. 52 n.8). It is impossible to know if Hesiod actually intended 
Chaos etc. to be taken allegorically (‘strong allegory’, so Sihvola 1989 95 Hesiod ‘clearly and intentionally 
presented his myths as allegorical examples illustrating his main message, they were not intended as literal 
truths’). 
19 Cf. Cornford (1950) 96 on Th. 116-132: ‘the veil of mythological language is so thin as to be quite 
transparent.’ 
20 Tate (1927) and (1929), Richardson (1975). 
21 Cf. Tate (1934) 105: ‘The attempt of Hesiod to be more didactic than Homer merely encouraged the notion 
that Homer intended to be as didactic as he’. 
22 Parmenides may have had Th. 282 in mind (‘the shining stars with which the heaven is garlanded’) when he 
described the stars as ‘garlands’ or ‘rings’ of fire; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983) 258-259 on DK 28 A 37. 
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recognized as such in Plato’s times (Symposium 178b).23 Similarly, in the cosmology of 
Empedocles, which is ‘in broad outlines still dominated by Hesiod’,24 the cosmic force of 
‘Love’ (Filiva) evidently recalls Hesiod’s Eros, while its opposite, ‘Strife’ (Neik̀o~), has a 
constructive and destructive power perhaps partly derived from Eris’ dual nature in the Works 
and Days.25 Furthermore, the four basic elements governed by Empedocles’ principles are 
conceived as ‘roots’ (rJizwvmata) divine in nature,26 just as the most important constituents of 
Hesiod’s universe (earth, sea, heaven) are all gods and have their ‘roots’, too (rJivzai, 
Theogony 728).27 We should perhaps also mention the positive evaluation of Strife in 
Heraclitus, who in fr. 80 says e[ri~ is the same as divkh. Similarly, there may be a Hesiodic 
justice of transgression and punishment underlying Anaximander’s view of the interaction of 
the elements as well, as they ‘pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice 
according to the assessment of Time’.28 
    Of the three ‘Hesiodic’ concepts of cosmology (Chaos, Eros, and the elements), Chaos 
seems to have been the most interesting to the Greeks, and the most prominently Hesiodic; 
there is an immense mountain in the commemogram of the Theogony, centered around verse 
116 (‘In truth, first of all Chaos came to be’). I will focus, therefore, on the afterlife of Chaos, 
and then turn only very briefly to Eros and the elements.  
    The first thing that should be said about Chaos is that it was a widespread and very popular 
notion.29 There are, for instance, two references to it in Old Comedy: Epicharmus has one of 
                                               
23 See Dolin (1962), Schwabl (1963), Pellikaan-Engel (1974) and Most (2007) 280-284 for more elaborate 
comparisons between Hesiod and Parmenides with regard to content. See also Böhme (1986) 35-85 for an 
extended enumeration of poetic parallels in general (including Hesiod and Homer); his list, however impressive, 
suffers from serious flaws (cf. Heitsch 1988). Scholars disagree on whether the Th. or the Od. was Parmenides’ 
primary source text. According to Jaeger (1947) 92 Parmenides’ ‘epic is by no means so closely akin to Homer 
as it is to Hesiod’s Theogony’, but Mourelatos (1970) concluded that ‘the relation with Hesiod is strongest at the 
level of import and overall structure, but weakest at the level of verbal detail’ (34). Some other scholars taking 
Homer as Parmenides’ primary model are Havelock (1958), whose argument to take Parmenides’ kouros as a 
copy of Odysseus is stretched too far to be credible, and Vos (1963). Deichgräber (1958) defended the extreme 
(and untenable) view that Hesiod was the only real Vorbild for Parmenides, who wished to oppose ‘alles 
Homerische und Homerisierende’ (652). Robbiano (2005) 35-66 takes up a most sensible middle position and 
takes both Hesiod and Homer and other predecessors (such as Xenophanes) as creating a context against which 
Parmenides’ poem should be understood. 
24 Hershbell (1970) 157; cf. Schwabl (1957). 
25 WD 11-42; see Inwood (2001) 49 and 23 n.48. Empedocles, like Hesiod, believed that in his age the power of 
(bad) Strife was increasing (see DK 31 B 20, 22, and 30). 
26 DK 31 B 6 and Wright (1981) 22 on the divinity of Empedocles’ roots; Inwood (2001) 34-42 raises the 
possibility that Love and Strife are more divine than the basic elements.  
27 Cf. Stokes (1962) 30-32 interpreting Hesiod’s phgaiv in Tartarus in terms of cosmogony. See for more 
similarities between Hesiod and Empedocles Hershbell (1970) and Schwabl (1957), and ch. 5, pp. 144-146). 
28 DK 12 B 1: didovnai ga;r aujta; divkhn kai; tivsin ajllhvloi~ th̀~ ajdikiva~ kata; th;n toù crovnou tavxin (transl. 
Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983). Diller (1946) first saw the connection; see also Gagarin (1973) and (1974a). 
29 Cf. Plu. Mor. 678F (speaking of Th. 116): ‘this line of Hesiod is amazingly popular’ (eujdokimeì de; 
qaumastẁ~ kai;  JHsivodo~ eijpwvn). 
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his characters doubt the primacy of Chaos as ‘it would possess nothing from which or to 
which it might first come forth’,30 and Aristophanes makes the cosmogony of the birds begin 
with ‘Chaos, Night, black Erebus and broad Tartarus’.31 The concept is thus obviously 
mainstream enough to be parodied, in classical times and later; this is shown by Plutarch, who 
applies the ancient cosmic wisdom to something as trivial as a party: there too, it is necessary 
to have some ‘room and place’ (cwvran kai; tovpon), for it is an insult to the guests to fill up 
the room in Anaxagorean fashion.32 However mainstream, Chaos remained closely tied to 
Hesiod: Callimachus, referring to Hesiod at the beginning of the Aetia, speaks of the 
inspiration-scene and then immediately mentions the birth of Chaos - apparently something 
that strongly ‘defines’ Hesiod.33 
    That Chaos was a concept well-known, popular, truly Hesiodic, and generally taken to 
mean ‘void’ is all confirmed by Aristotle. See, for instance, this passage from the Physics:  
  
o{ti me;n ou\n ejstiv ti oJ tovpo~ para; ta; swvmata, kai; paǹ sẁma aijsqhto;n ejn tovpw/, 
dia; touvtwn a[n ti~ uJpolavboi: dovxeie d’ a]n kai;   JHsivodo~ ojrqw~̀ levgein poihvsa~ 
prẁton to; cavo~. levgei goùn ‘pavntwn me;n prwvtista cavo~ gevnet’, aujta;r e[peita 
gai’̀ eujruvsterno~’, wJ~ devon prwt̀on uJpavrxai cwvran toì~ ou\si, dia; to; nomivzein, 
w{sper oiJ polloiv, pavnta ei\naiv pou kai; ejn tovpw/. 
 
‘These considerations [on the concept of direction, just mentioned] then would lead us 
to suppose that place is something distinct from bodies, and that every sensible body is 
in a place. Hesiod too may be held to have given a correct account of it when he made 
chaos first. At least he says: ‘First of all Chaos came to be, and then broadbreasted 
Earth’, implying that things need to have space first, because he thought, with most 
people, that everything is somewhere and in a place.’34 
 
                                               
30 K-A I.275.4: mh; e[con g’ ajpo; tivno~ mhd’ ej~ o{ti pràton movloi. 
31 Ar. Av. 693: Cavo~ h\n kai; Nu;x   [Erebov~ te mevlan prẁton kai; Tavrtaro~ eujruv~. Cf. Th. 123 ejk Caveo~ d’   
[Erebov~ te mevlainav te Nuvx ejgevnonto (‘from Chaos came black Erebus and Night’). 
32 Plu. Mor. 678F; the reference is to Anaxagoras’ dictum that at the beginning ‘all things were one solid mass’ 
(pavnta crhvmata h\n, DK 59 B 1). Hesiod’s Chaos was also well-known in Rome, see e.g. Varro LL 4.20 and 
Manilius 1.125-127. 
33 Call. Aet. Fr. 2 Pf. 
34 Arist. Ph. 208b27-33 (transl. slightly altered). 
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Hesiod thus occupies a solid place in cosmogonical thinking, representing the common (and 
commonsense) theory positing some sort of emptiness before creation could take place.35 
Elsewhere Aristotle makes it clear that it is not just him making the connection between 
Hesiod and the opinion of hoi polloi, but that the masses themselves credit Hesiod with the 
theory of Chaos as an empty receptacle as well.36 This image of Hesiod may also have made 
him useful to Epicurus, though there are no explicit links between these two.37 
    It is particularly interesting to see how the Stoics treated Hesiodic chaos. They felt obliged 
to incorporate the concept,38 but were troubled by its common interpretation: the Stoics’ view 
of the cosmos leaves no place for a vacuum, but instead they conceive the universe as a 
plenum.39 What they do allow for in their system, however, are the four elements, and this 
provides the solution: chaos is turned into one of the elements. Zeno apparently believed 
chaos was derived from cevesqai (‘to flow’ or ‘to stream’) and thus represented water, which 
could turn into earth when it ‘hardens’ (steremnioùtai).40 This idea was widely followed: it 
turns up in the other Stoics and the scholia as well. Thus the Hesiodic idea on the primacy of 
chaos could be used by the Stoics too, since (as a Stoic source explains) water was the first of 
the elements to come into being;41 perhaps it was also the last element to disappear before the 
                                               
35 Cf. e.g. Plu. Mor. 374C; S.E. Pyrrh. 3.121, Adv. Phys. 2.11 (granting to discovery of the void to Hesiod). In S 
Th. 116c1 Chaos is identified with Plato’s ‘all-receiving nature’ (pandech;~ fuvsi~, cf. Pl. Ti. 50b and 51a). 
36 Arist. Xen. 976b14-19 (cf. 975a7-14). The connection of Hesiod to the masses is perhaps a strategy to 
downplay his importance as a thinker; generally speaking, Aristotle does not think highly of Hesiod as a 
physiologist (cf. n.40 below). He mostly connects Hesiod and his ‘school’ with thoughts on generation and 
destruction, a rather old-fashioned discipline in philosophy. By counting him among the qeolovgoi, he contrasts 
him sharply with the oldest ‘real’ physicists, but still seems to regard him as a forerunner of philosophy (cf. 
Jaeger 1947 4-5, 10). 
37 All we have is the anecdote related by Diogenes how Epicurus ‘took to philosophy because he despised the 
teachers of literature, since they were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod’ (ejlqeìn 
aujto;n ejpi; filosofivan katagnovnta tẁn grammatistẁn ejpeidh; mh; ejdunhvqhsan eJrmhneùsai aujtẁ/ ta; peri; 
toù par’   JHsiovdw/ cavou~, 10.2). The story classifies Hesiod as a philosopher, since the schoolteacher (treating 
the text as poetry) could not answer Epicurus’ philosophical question. The anecdote was taken from a biography, 
a genre that often tries to discern the germs of a person’s later interests and character traits in the period of his 
childhood. The Hesiod incident in the classroom should probably be understood as a sign that Epicurus would 
later develop a theory concerning the void and the elements.  
38 Cf. Algra (2001) 576 ‘… in Zeno’s days Hesiod’s Theogony still proved the most authoritative version of 
mythical cosmogony’. See Long (1996) 80-81 for Zeno’s (and Cornutus’) focus on Hesiod instead of Homer. 
39 According to the Stoics, the cosmos, from its beginning as pure fire and throughout its ever more intricate 
development (fire eventually turning into other elements), is completely full; there is a vacuum, but it exists 
outside the cosmos and serves as the necessary room for the cosmic fire at the world’s end. 
40 SVF 1.104; this may have been a way of linking the two ‘passive’ elements of water and earth opposed to the 
‘active’ elements fire and air (cf. SVF 1.103-105). See also Arist. Metaph. 989a5-12, where Aristotle wonders 
why earth was the only element never to have been picked as a first principle by the natural philosophers. As a 
concept both ancient and popular, he argues, it is such a likely candidate: both ordinary people say ‘everything is 
earth’, and Hesiod said ‘earth was generated first of corporeal things’ (th;n gh̀n prwvthn genevsqai tẁn 
swmavtwn).    
41 See SVF 2.565. The Hesiodic story of Styx being the first god to offer her allegiance to the new ruler Zeus 
(Th. 397) was also explained as water being the first element to be separated (SVF 2.573 = S Th. 397). 
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cosmic ecpyrosis.42 Hesiod’s reputation as an authority on the beginning of the universe could 
thus be saved and used by the Stoics as well. 
    What goes for Chaos also goes for the second concept of Hesiodic cosmology: Eros. It is a) 
well-known and of central importance, b) commonly understood as a scientific notion, and c) 
closely connected to Hesiod. Some examples will suffice to demonstrate this. Its central 
importance, for instance, is shown by the remarkable fact that in the many passages quoting 
Hesiod on the origin of the universe, not only Chaos but also Eros is mentioned, and the 
intervening verses of the Theogony are usually left out.43 That it was taken as a concept of 
physics is made clear by Aristotle, who said that Eros could be understood as Hesiod’s 
attempt to formulate the causa efficiens, the ‘cause to move things and combine them’ 
(aijtivan h{ti~ kinhvsei kai; sunavxei ta; pravgmata);44 moreover, it was Eros’ prominent place 
in Hesiod’s cosmogony that made Plutarch say that Hesiod was more ‘scientific’ 
(fusikwvteron) than Parmenides.45 The connection to Hesiod is obvious as early as Plato’s 
times; see, for instance, how the poet Agathon in the Symposium discusses Eros and explicitly 
counters Hesiod’s authoritative statement that the god is ancient. According to Agathon, Eros 
is the very epitome of youth and delicacy, and needed a Homer to describe him correctly - but 
alas, the poet of Eros is harsh Hesiod.46   
    Eros, like Chaos, is turned into one of the elements by the Stoics; this time, that of fire.47 
This interpretation is hardly coincidental. We have already seen above that philosophers like 
Anaximenes and Empedocles, obviously encouraged by the prominent place of earth in 
Hesiod’s cosmogony,48 took the Theogony as dealing with nature’s elements, and there is 
ample evidence (especially in the scholia) that allegorical interpretation such as theirs 
continued and was elaborated further in later times, so that eventually many parts of the poem 
were understood as imparting knowledge on the physical components of the universe. The 
                                               
42 One of the speakers in Plutarch’s On the Obsolescence of Oracles (Mor. 415F) says the Stoics believed Hesiod 
to have hinted at the ecpyrosis and the world cycle: apparently Hesiod’s verses on the age of nymphs (here 
apparently interpreted as water-nymphs, see fr. 304 MW) were taken to indicate the duration of the cosmic cycle: 
when the water-nymphs die, the world ends. 
43 See Pl. Smp. 178b and 195c, Arist. Metaph. 984b and Xen. 975a, Zeno SVF 103-105, and S.E. Adv. Phys. 1.7 
quoting Th. 116-117 and 120; Plu. Mor. 374C and Paus. 9.27.2 quote Th. 116-117 and 119-120; Corn. Epidr. 17 
cites Th. 116-117, 119-120 and 123-124. Against these 9 quotes, Th. 120 is quoted 4 times without 116-117. 
44 Arist. Metaph. 984b23-31. 
45 Parmenides pictures Eros as an early god, but says he was created by Aphrodite: ‘… but Hesiod, in my 
opinion, was more scientific when he depicted Eros as the first-born of them all, in order to make him 
indispensable for the generation of all things’ ( JHsivodo~ de; fusikwvteron ejmoi; dokeì poieìn   [Erwta pavntwn 
progenevstaton, i{na pavnta di’ ejkeìnon metavsch/ genevsew~, Mor. 756F). See also Plu. Mor. 927A and 374C. 
46 Pl. Symp. 195c7-d1: ‘It takes a poet as good as Homer to show how delicate the god is’ (poihtoù d’ e[stin 
ejndeh;~ oi|o~ h\n   {Omhro~ pro;~ to; ejpideìxai qeoù aJpalovthta). 
47 SVF 1.104; this was probably a more common Stoic view (cf. SVF 2.445). 
48 See n.40 above on the importance of Earth (Th. 117) in Hesiod’s earliest stage of cosmic development. 
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Titans Coeus, Creus and Hyperion, for instance, are supposedly meant to be interpreted as 
quality, separation and heaven (as the scholia on Theogony 134 claim); the Meliae stand for 
the creatures without reason (187); Nereus represents the downward flow of matter (233); 
Perseus killing Medusa stands for the sun evaporating the sea (276); Iapetus is the movement 
of heaven (507), etc.49 Little wonder, then, that one Stoic, presumably Chrysippus, ranked 
Hesiod among the ‘ancients who organized the entire universe’ (palaioi; kai; ta; o{la 
diakosmhvsante~).50 This is perhaps the neatest description of Hesiod the natural 
philosopher: a meticulous organizer who has categorized and ordered the entire cosmos.  
    The earliest recipients of the Theogony saw Hesiod as a respectable authority on natural 
philosophy, and thanks to his concepts of Chaos, Eros, and the elements, he managed to hold 
on to this reputation throughout antiquity, remaining highly influential.51 We will see, in 
section 3, how his image as a collector and organizer of the universe spilled over into other 
areas of philosophical inquiry. First, however, we will turn to an interesting (if perhaps 
unexpected) branch of philosophy on which Hesiod, through the principle of assimilation, 
also came to be seen as an expert: epistemology.  
 
2 - The Problem of Revelation 
As we have seen above, Hesiod’s status as a natural philosopher was widely acknowledged: 
the earliest physiologists and their immediate successors shaped him after their own image, 
and so created a long-lasting tradition. Obviously, the principle of assimilation allows for 
smaller and bigger leaps of interpretation. To understand ‘broad-breasted Earth’ as the 
element with the same name is relatively easy, but once this step has been taken, the sky is the 
limit, so to speak. And it appears that such an initial step opens up not only different degrees 
of the philosophical assimilation of Hesiod, but also different kinds. Once established as a 
source-text on natural philosophy, the Theogony came to be investigated on other questions 
that concerned the earliest philosophers as well. Some of the most important questions related 
to (what we see as the distinct field of) epistemology: 1) how can we attain knowledge?, and 
2) how can we be sure if we have it? 
    Hesiod’s own solution to this problem was as easy as it was well-known: he was inspired 
by the Muses, an event (as we have seen in chapter 4) that was central to the Hesiodic 
                                               
49 There are also examples from the Stoa, see e.g. SVF 1.100 and 1.118. 
50 SVF 2.501. It is interesting that Zeno used the verb diakosmeìsqai for the cosmos ‘re-establishing’ itself after 
the ecpyrosis (SVF 1.27; see also 1.28 et passim for the noun). The use of the same word implies that the 
cosmos’ own structure is in perfect accord with Hesiod’s description of it.  
51 It is thus quite wrong to claim, as does Kassies (1989) 28, that ‘as the poet of the Theogony, Hesiod is 
condemned and reviled again and again, but never as the poet of the Works and Days’ (my translation). 
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persona. Divine inspiration answered both difficult questions: it accounted for the way Hesiod 
got his information, and at the same time guaranteed its truth. It is useful to quote the 
inspiration-scene from the Theogony in full (Th. 22-34): 
 
ai{ nuv poq’   JHsivodon kalh;n ejdivdaxan ajoidhvn, 
 a[rna~ poimaivnonq’   JElikẁno~ u{po zaqevoio. 
 tovnde dev me prwvtista qeai; pro;~ mùqon e[eipon, 
25 Moùsai   jOlumpiavde~, koùrai Dio;~ aijgiovcoio: 
 “poimevne~ a[grauloi, kavk’ ejlevgcea, gastevre~ oi\on, 
 i[dmen yeuvdea polla; levgein ejtuvmoisin oJmoià, 
 i[dmen d’ eu\t’ ejqevlwmen ajlhqeva ghruvsasqai.” 
 w}~ e[fasan koùrai megavlou Dio;~ ajrtievpeiai, 
30 kaiv moi skh̀ptron e[don davfnh~ ejriqhlevo~ o[zon  
 drevyasai, qhhtovn: ejnevpneusan dev moi aujdh;n 
 qevspin, i{na kleivoimi tav t’ ejssovmena prov t’ ejovnta, 
 kaiv m’ ejkevlonq’ uJmneiǹ makavrwn gevno~ aije;n ejovntwn, 
 sfa~̀ d’ aujta;~ prẁtovn te kai; u{staton aije;n ajeivdein. 
 
‘One time, they taught Hesiod beautiful song  
while he was pasturing lambs under holy Helicon.  
And this speech the goddesses spoke first of all to me,  
25  the Olympian Muses, the daughters of aegis-holding Zeus:  
“Field-dwelling shepherds, ignoble disgraces, mere bellies:  
we know how to say many false things similar to genuine ones,   
but we know, when we wish, how to proclaim true things.”  
So spoke great Zeus’ ready-speaking daughters,  
30  and they plucked a staff, a branch of luxurious laurel,  
a marvel, and gave it to me; and they breathed a divine voice  
into me, so that I might glorify what will be and what was before,   
and they commanded me to sing of the race of the blessed ones who always are, 




This is a passage as interesting as it is difficult, perhaps even the most intensively studied and 
most widely interpreted lines in the history of modern Hesiodic scholarship.52 The Greeks, 
however, seem to have read it as a fairly straightforward statement: Hesiod narrates how the 
Muses made him their mouthpiece and so guarantee the truth of what the poet tells us. 
    In this section I will discuss the ways Greek thinkers reacted to Hesiod’s Dichterweihe, 
which they interpreted as a statement on his philosophical ‘method’. I will focus on four 
philosophers, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, who in early classical 
times stand out for their interest in Hesiod - they are the same four singled out by Lesher as 
the ‘four early thinkers in particular’ who ‘explored the conditions under which knowledge - 
especially in the form of a broad understanding of the nature of things - can be achieved by 
human beings’.53 The discussion will focus on two aspects of the reception of Hesiod’s 
encounter with the Muses: 1) the value of divine revelation as a mode of communicating truth 
and knowledge, and 2) the distinction between true things (ajlhqeva) and things that merely 
resemble true things (ejtuvmoisin oJmoià). We will see that the Theogony’s picture of a (divine) 
voice imparting knowledge about reality in a truthful way is attacked by some (2.1), but used 
by others, either as a topos to present a philosophical programme (2.2), or as a means to create 
an air of truthfulness (2.3, where the sophists Protagoras and Prodicus come in). 
 
2.1 - The Attack on Revelation (Xenophanes and Heraclitus) 
In the Professor of Public Speaking, Lucian satirizes the latest fashion in oratory, i.e. 
delivering speeches without first receiving the arduous training prescribed by authorities like 
Cicero and Quintilian. The treatise is cast in the form of a monologue by a ‘professor of 
public speaking’ who mocks traditional education and argues that there is a quick road to 
success, naming an illustrious precedent: 
 
 JHsivodo~ me;n ojlivga fuvlla ejk toù   JElikwǹo~ labw;n aujtivka mavla poihth;~ ejk 
poimevno~ katevsth kai; h\/de qeẁn kai; hJrwvwn gevnh kavtoco~ ejk Mousẁn genovmeno~, 
rJhvtora dev, o{ polu; e[nerqe poihtikh̀~ megalhgoriva~ ejstivn, ejn bracei ̀
katasth̀nai ajduvnaton, ei[ ti~ ejkmavqoi th;n tacivsthn oJdovn; 
 
‘Hesiod was given a leaf or two from Helicon, and at once he became a poet instead of 
a shepherd and sang the pedigrees of gods and heroes under the inspiration of the 
                                               
52 See for an elaborate treatment of scholarship on this passage ch. 9, pp. 260-263. 
53 Lesher (1999) 228. 
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Muses. Is it impossible, then, to become a public speaker – something far inferior to 
the grand style of poetry – in an instant, if one could find out the quickest way?’54 
 
During the Second Sophistic, Hesiod became the stock example of a verbal artist who had 
attained both knowledge and skill instantly. His encounter with the Muses is often referred to 
with admiration, but there is an occasional hint that one can hardly respect a person who 
skipped all ‘upbringing, training, and education’ (trofh~̀ kai; melevth~ kai; didaskaliva~) 
and ‘has taken refuge in the laurel of Hesiod, which easily gives poetic inspiration to 
shepherds.’55 
    The suspicion toward the quick and easy way of revelation, and toward the knowledge thus 
obtained, goes back many centuries. In fact, I believe that some of the earliest critics of 
Hesiod, i.e. Xenophanes and Heraclitus, focus on the famous Dichterweihe, understanding his 
inspiration as a way of attaining truth, as if it were his philosophical ‘method’. Their 
objections against revelation are strikingly similar, although there are some differences. For 
instance, it appears that Heraclitus (who was slightly later than Xenophanes) presents a more 
developed view, because his critique is more elaborated. Heraclitus also separates Hesiod and 
Homer with regard to the question of inspiration, whereas such a separation is hardly (if at all) 
visible in the critique of Xenophanes.  
    Xenophanes speaks out most clearly against divine revelation as an epistemological tool in 
fragment 18: ‘Indeed not from the beginning did gods intimate all things to mortals, but as 
they search in time they discover better’ (ou[ toi ajp’ ajrch~̀ pavnta qeoi; qnhtoìs’ 
uJpevdeixan, / ajlla; crovnw/ zhtoùnte~ ejfeurivskousin a[meinon).56 This is a couplet filled 
with oppositions, the clearest of which is that concerning the way we acquire knowledge: 
people do not passively ‘receive’ all there is to know, but only when ‘searching’ can we come 
closer and closer to knowledge.57 Revelation is rejected in favour of investigation, the new 
method of philosophy.  
    Xenophanes is arguing against poetic inspiration here, and more specifically, I think, that of 
Hesiod. He does not mention him explicitly, but an examination of the two other oppositions 
in the fragment makes it likely that the Dichterweihe should be considered the intended 
subtext. As the first of these oppositions, we see how revelation is described as taking place 
                                               
54 Lucian Rh.Pr. 4. 
55 Lucian Dem. 12: ejpi; th;n  JHsiovdou davfnhn katafugovnta, th;n rJa/quvmw~ kai; toì~ poimevsin tẁn ejpwǹ 
ejpipnevousan. Cf. Aristid. 2.97, and see on poetic inspiration further ch. 9, pp. 276-295. 
56 DK 21 B 18, transl. Lesher (1992). 
57 For the importance attached to ‘searching’ in Heraclitus see DK 22 B 22 (very similar to Xenophanes’ 
fragment 18) and 101. 
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ajp’ ajrch~̀, ‘from the beginning’, whereas proper investigation proceeds crovnw/, ‘in time’. 
Most scholars focus on the second line and take the couplet as a whole as ‘an early expression 
of a faith in human progress’.58 The first line is then regarded as presenting the ‘wrong’ view 
(presumably common in Xenophanes’ time) that once, long ago the truth was simply 
revealed. But it is worthwhile to examine the formula ajp’ ajrch̀~ in more detail. Scholars 
usually cite Xenophanes B 1059 as a parallel and then disagree whether ejx ajrch~̀ / ajp’ ajrch~̀ 
‘refers to the beginning of the whole of Greek culture or to the beginning of an individual’s 
education’60 - a discussion of relatively little interest.61 But even though I agree that ajp’ 
ajrch̀~ must surely refer to a process of learning, I think the expression can also refer to the 
poetic practice of asking the Muses for the ‘beginning’ of things. This is a practice most 
pertinent if one thinks of Hesiod, who learned the ajrchv of the entire universe from the gods.62 
In that case, crovnw/ in the second line perhaps points to the impossibility of discovering the 
very first beginning: mankind, situated ‘in time’ (crovnw/), may never reach knowledge 
concerning the primeval state of ajrchv. Such an interpretation would be in line with 
Xenophanes’ general scepticism. 
    The second opposition contrasts pavnta (the object of uJpevdeixan) with a[meinon (the object 
of ejfeurivskousin). In line with the interpretation set out above, I take this as a negative 
comment on the ‘method’ of revelation, criticizing its supposedly all-encompassing scope. 
The poets claim they know ‘everything’, and Hesiod’s claim to be singing ‘what will be and 
what was before’ (tav t’ ejssovmena prov t’ ejovnta, Theogony 32) is particularly inclusive. 
Xenophanes sets this poetic pavnta against something ‘better’ (a[meinon). Not only does this 
contrast the mythological cosmos with Xenophanes’ own view of ‘physical realities to be 
described and understood in terms of observable properties and familiar natural forces’;63 it 
also comments on the pretentiousness of the poets’ claims. To know or find out ‘everything’ 
is not a realistic aim for a sceptic like Xenophanes, who said that ‘no man knows, or ever will 
                                               
58 Lesher (1992) 150 indicating the traditional interpretation, which he himself opposes (150-155). 
59 Xenophanes DK 21 B 10: ejx ajrch̀~ kaq’   {Omhron ejpei; memaqhvkasi pavnte~ ... (‘Since from the beginning 
all have learned according to Homer...’, transl. Lesher 1992). 
60 Lesher (1992) 81. 
61 Lesher (1992) 81 (citing Gorg. fr. 11a as a parallel) seems inclined to the second view, which is defended by 
Verdenius (1970) 7. But neither considers Ar. Ra. 1030-1031, which greatly favours the first view. 
62 The expression ejx ajrch̀~ occurs nine times in the Th.; of special relevance are Th. 45 and 115, where the 
expression is used twice for the Muses singing of the origin of the gods and the universe. In Homer, ejx ajrch̀~ 
occurs only four times (only Od.), and is never connected to the Muses (in three cases, the expression indicates 
the old age of a xeniva). The expression ajp’ ajrch̀~ does not occur in either Hesiod or Homer. 
63 Lesher (1992) 154. 
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know, the truth about the gods and about everything I speak of’,64 since ‘seeming is wrought 
over all things’.65 It seems, then, that the ‘method’ of revelation criticized in fragment 18 is 
described in terms particularly applicable to Hesiod: in the proem to the Theogony, we find 
gods telling some rather passive human being ‘everything’ from its earliest beginning. 
    There are other passages in the poems of Xenophanes that single out Hesiod for critique. It 
is obvious that Xenophanes in fragment 1 is thinking primarily of the Theogony when he 
speaks of wrongful conduct at a symposium. After drinking, a man should sing of noble deeds 
that inspire virtue: ‘he deals neither with the battles of Titans nor Giants / nor Centaurs, 
fictions from men of old, / nor furious conflicts - for there is no use in these. / But it is good 
always to have forethought (promhqeivhn) of the gods.’66 Hesiod is employed here again as a 
negative foil, since he has made the battles of Titans and Giants the very subject of his 
poem;67 the Theogony’s tale of Prometheus has in fact demonstrated that Hesiod has no right 
‘forethought’ concerning the gods at all.68 The obvious pun in the last line leaves no doubt 
about Xenophanes’ opponent; only Homerocentrism of the most stubborn kind is able to 
suggest that someone other than Hesiod is the prime target.69 
    More directly relevant to us is the critique aimed at Hesiod in Xenophanes’ fragment 35. In 
this verse (perhaps originally placed at the end of his book) the philosopher says of 
(presumably) his own views that ‘these things should be opined as resembling the truth’ 
(taùta dedoxavsqw me;n ejoikovta toì~ ejtuvmoisi), a careful expression reminding his 
audience that it may be ultimately impossible to achieve absolute truth. It has long been 
recognized that this fragment contains a reference to Theogony 27, where the Muses say that 
‘we know how to say many false things similar to genuine ones (ejtuvmoisin oJmoià)’70 - even 
though the interpretation of the allusion is uncertain. In my view, Heitsch is right to stress the 
influence of Hesiod’s distinction between truth and apparent truth, but wrong to claim that the 
meaning of the fragment (‘daß nur unter Vorbehalt etwas als wahrheitsgleich gelten soll’) is 
                                               
64 DK 21 B 34.1-2: to; me;n ou\n safe;~ ou[ ti~ ajnh;r i[den oujdev ti~ e[stai eijdw;~ ajmfi; qewǹ te kai; a[ssa levgw 
peri; pavntwn (transl. Lesher 1992). 
65 DK 21 B 34.4: dovko~ d’ ejpi; pàsi tevtuktai (transl. Lesher 1992). 
66 DK 21 B 1.21-24: ou[te mavca~ dievpei Tithvnwn ou[te Gigavntwn, / oujdev <ti> Kentauvrwn, plavsmata tẁn 
protevrwn, / h] stavsia~ sfedanav~: toì~ oujde;n crhsto;n e[nesti: / qeẁn <de;> promhqeivhn aije;n e[cein ajgaqovn 
(transl. Lesher 1992, slightly adapted). 
67 The equation of these ‘fictions’ with the ‘furious conflicts’ in the next line points to the unedifying effect of 
such tales on society, an objection often levelled against Hesiod and Homer together, see ch. 2, pp. 67-74. 
68 The response to Hesiod is even clearer when one reads ajgaqhvn (thus commending a divinity as ‘good’, like 
Eris in the WD) instead of ajgaqovn, as does Scaliger, who is followed by Untersteiner (1955) 108. 
69 So Lesher (1992) - who is only one among many - who in his commentary on lines 21-22 (p. 50) refers his 
readers to Hesiod and a very brief summary of the battle between Lapiths and Centaurs in Od. 21.295-304; he 
concludes that Xenophanes’ targets of rebuke ‘almost certainly include Homer and Hesiod’ (53).   
70 See e.g. Guthrie (1962) 396 n.2, Heitsch (1966) 232-233. 
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directly derived from the Hesiodic Vorbild:71 Hesiod’s ejtuvmoisin oJmoià refer to ‘false 
things’ (yeuvdea), while Xenophanes’ ejoikovta toi~̀ ejtuvmoisi (in all likelihood) are the near-
truths of his investigation.72 This difference, however, should in no way disqualify Hesiod as 
a philosophical model altogether, as Lesher seems to think.73 I would rather say that 
Xenophanes deliberately describes his own findings in a phrase that Hesiod’s Muses use to 
indicate non-truth. As a full-blooded sceptic, Xenophanes would not presume that his words 
are absolutely true: for him, it is enough to state things that resemble the truth, the option 
scorned by Hesiod himself.74 And so he uses Hesiod’s own formulation against him, 
criticizing the poet for the way he received his knowledge, and for the pretentiousness of his 
claim to know everything.75  
    I have tried so far to demonstrate that Xenophanes, in certain fragments generally thought 
to attack the poets in general, in fact criticizes Hesiod in particular, and even more specifically 
his ‘method’ of revelation. I do not wish to imply that Hesiod is the only target in this respect. 
Obviously, Homer too appeals to the Muses when asking for ‘beginnings’ (although his scope 
is considerably smaller),76 and Homer is even explicitly connected to the ajrchv by 
Xenophanes.77 Moreover, that he thought of Hesiod and Homer as comparable is clearly 
shown by fragment 11.78 I suggest this ‘coupling’ is caused by Xenophanes’ explicit refusal to 
turn Hesiod into a natural philosopher: he shows none of the Milesian willingness to interpret 
at least part of the Theogony as allegorical. The Hesiodic gods are not regarded as principles, 
substances, or elements, for it is the anthropomorphism of the Hesiodic and Homeric gods 
that Xenophanes wishes to reject. Xenophanes thus deliberately avoids modernizing Hesiod 
by means of allegory, and thus presents him as a poet instead of a thinker, a poet belonging to 
the outdated paradigm of Muses and monsters. 
 
Xenophanes’ treatment of Hesiod and Homer seems to imply that there is a direct connection 
between Hesiod being presented as a poet and Hesiod being presented as comparable to 
                                               
71 Heitsch (1966) 232. 
72 See Lesher (1992) 172-176. 
73 Lesher (1992) 172-173, who assumes a ‘general improbability that Xenophanes took his cues to philosophical 
truth from anything Hesiod had to say.’ 
74 See also DK B 8, where Xenophanes is careful even about his age: after he has given an account of his years, 
he concludes: ‘if I know how to speak truly (ejtuvmw~) concerning these things.’ 
75 Cf. Morgan (2000) 51 ‘[Xenophanes] contrasts programmatically his own limited formulations with the claims 
made by the poets’. I would say that Xenophanes is thinking of one poet in particular here. 
76 See for Homer hailing the Muses and immediately asking for a beginning Il. 1.6-7, 11.218, and 16.112. Clay 
(1992) 132 contrasts Hesiod’s cosmic scope to the more limited one of Homer. 
77 DK 21 B 10, see note 58. 
78 See on this fragment ch. 2, pp. 70-72. 
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Homer. This is confirmed by the fragments of Heraclitus, who does separate them and treats 
only Homer as a poet, but Hesiod as a natural philosopher. Heraclitus mentions Homer 
together with Archilochus, whereas he lists Hesiod among thinkers like Pythagoras, 
Hecataeus and Xenophanes.79 It is also telling that Heraclitus, the most overtly polemical of 
all presocratics, who mentions both Homer and Hesiod three times, nowhere mentions them 
together.80 Although Heraclitus points to several similarities between the two - the most 
important one being their reputation for wisdom which so poignantly clashes with their 
inability to reach true knowledge81 - they do not belong to the same category: Homer is a 
poet, Hesiod a scientist or natural philosopher.82 
    That Hesiod is indeed understood as a philosopher is suggested by Heraclitus’ critique in 
fragment 106 (and 57). Hesiod, so the fragment runs, did not understand the ‘nature’ (fuvsi~) 
of day and night; whereas he sees two natural phenomena, they are in fact one.83 This 
comment is important, for it means that Heraclitus takes Hesiod more seriously than 
Xenophanes does, and interprets his poem as a cosmological allegory; but even at this deeper 
level, he finds fault with Hesiod. Despite this difference, however, Heraclitus’ criticism of 
Hesiod resembles that of Xenophanes very strongly with regard to the problem of revelation. 
Xenophanes, as we have seen above, objected to 1) passive reception instead of active 
                                               
79 DK 22 B 42 and 40. DK 22 B 42 runs thus: tovn te   {Omhron e[fasken a[xion ejk twǹ ajgwvnwn ejkbavllesqai 
kai; rJapivzesqai kai;  jArcivlocon oJmoivw~ (‘[Heraclitus] said that Homer deserved to be thrown out of the 
competitions and be beaten with a stick, just like Archilochus’). The agones mentioned are usually taken to be 
poetic competitions, from which the poets are to be ejected because they, as ‘princes de la poésie’, hold an 
eminent place in Greek culture and education (see e.g. Babut 1976 477). The beating with the stick 
(rJapivzesqai) may be a pun on the rhapsode’s usual attribute, the rJavbdo~ or ‘staff’ (cf. Graziosi 2002 29-31). 
Such an interpretation, however, perhaps downplays the significance of the stick, which was commonly used in 
ancient athletic competitions by the referees, to strike those who played against the rules (see e.g. Hdt. Hist. 
8.59). In that case, Homer has committed a foul, which means it can hardly be a poetic competition Heraclitus is 
talking about. It is therefore more likely that Heraclitus speaks of the very competition he is himself engaged in: 
the search for truth. Homer entered this competition on his claim to be wise (cf. DK B 56), but he, as a poet, 
does not belong there and should therefore be disqualified. That it is in fact Homer’s status as a poet that is 
stressed here is, I think, proven by his comparison with Archilochus (cf. D.Chrys. 33.11, who names Homer and 
Archilochus as the two greatest poets, the first praising everybody, and the second censuring everybody; and 
D.Chrys. 55.6, where Archilochus is called a follower of Homer). 
80 Hesiod DK 22 B 40, 57, 106; Homer DK 22 B 42, 56, 105. Heraclitus mentions Homer and Hesiod more often 
than all the presocratics taken together. One could rightly argue that these cases are too few to be significant, but 
this would be to take too little account of the doxographical tradition, which is usually eager to record polemics.  
81 Hesiod ‘does not know’ (oujk ejgivnwsken, DK 22 B 57) and is ‘un-knowing’ (ajgnooùnti, DK 22 B 106), and 
Homer does not attain ‘knowing’ (gnẁsi~, DK 22 B 56). 
82 Cf. Lamberton (1988) 148 stating that Heraclitus’ attack on Hesiod ‘is not directed toward a powerful poet but 
toward a purveyor of empty superstitions’; I agree with the first part.  
83 DK 22 B 106: ‘... Whether Heraclitus was right in upbraiding Hesiod ... for not knowing that] the nature of 
each day is one <and the same>...’ (ei[te ojrqw~̀   JHravkleito~ ejpevplhxen  JHsiovdw/ ta;~ me;n ajgaqa;~ 
poioumevnw/, ta;~ de; fauvla~, wJ~ ajgnooùnti fuvsin hJmevrh~ aJpavsh~ mivan ou\san, transl. Robinson 1987, slightly 
modified). Kirk (1954) 155-156 is right to say that this critique is probably not aimed at Th. 746-758 
(‘[Heraclitus] would surely have applauded Hesiod’s graphic account of their mutual succession’) but at Th. 123-
125, where Day is said to be born from Night. It is possible that Heraclitus’ critique is not limited to Hesiod 
alone but is aimed at Parmenides’ duality of Light and Night as well.  
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seeking, and 2) claiming to know everything. These points return in the particulars of 
Heraclitus’ critique - even though, of course, they are couched in the terms of his own distinct 
epistemology. Our key fragments are 40 and 57: 
     
B 40 Polumaqivh novon ouj didavskei:   JHsivodon ga;r a]n ejdivdaxe kai; Puqagovrhn au\tiv~ te  
Xenofavneav te kai;   JEkataìon.  
 ‘A lot of learning does not teach <a person the possession of> understanding; <could it  
do so,> it would have so taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, or for that matter Xenophanes 
and Hecataeus.’ 
 
B 57 Didavskalo~ de; pleivstwn   JHsivodo~: toùton ejpivstantai pleìsta eijdevnai, o{sti~  
hJmevrhn kai; eujfrovnhn oujk ejgivnwsken: e[sti ga;r e{n. 
‘For very many people Hesiod is <their> teacher. They are certain he knew a great 
number of things – he who continually failed to recognize <even> day and night <for 
what they are>! For they are one.’84 
 
Just like Xenophanes, Heraclitus responds here to Hesiod’s reputation of vast knowledge: he 
is ranked among the polymaths (B 40), and according to the many knows pleìsta (B 57). 
Heraclitus, however, is slightly more careful and chooses not to associate Hesiod with 
knowledge of ‘everything’ (pavnta), because this would blur his issue. According to 
Heraclitus’ system of oppositions, to know ‘everything’ would mean knowing that everything 
is one. But it is exactly the lack of this particular insight that is the core of his critique on 
Hesiod: he has brought together an impressive collection of information, but instead of 
investigating this leaves it as a heterogeneous mass of data.85 The actual investigation86 is left 
undone, and the facts are taken at face value, as if they speak for themselves.87 Heraclitus thus 
                                               
84 The translations are those of Robinson (1987). 
85 Polymaths are people who have gathered much data, through observation or otherwise, but are unable to see 
(as Heraclitus sees) that all these facts are connected through a deeper-lying unity. Heraclitus is not against 
gathering information per se, for this is a necessary part of philosophical investigation (cf. fragment 95, 123, and 
55, on which see Hussey 1982 58); but his point is that it is only a preliminary stage (cf. Granger 2004 250-252). 
On polymathy as a mere collection see fr. 129, where Pythagoras - connected to Hesiod in fragment 40 - is 
presented as piecing his own knowledge together from the books of others, a practice called polymathy. 
86 Heraclitus’ term for such an investigation is divzhmai (DK 22 B 22 and 101), cf. Xenophanes’ zhtoùnte~. 
87 This is the main point of DK 22 B 40. The four thinkers under attack all remain at the surface level of 
observable and sometimes apparently contradictory facts and thus fail to penetrate to the deeper-lying truth 
saying that everything is one. The four are carefully selected, not, I think, to cover all known branches of science 
(so e.g. Ferrari 1984 202) or to demonstrate ‘the oral situation in which the society of Heraclitus operates’ (so 
Havelock 1983 16), but rather because Hesiod, who obviously holds the most prominent position in the list of 
four (being first and rather apart from the rest), was a known polymath, and the three others, Pythagoras, 
Xenophanes and Hecataeus, all attacked him (this suggestion is put forward by Babut 1976 489). The supposedly 
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identifies Hesiod’s inspiration, so to speak, with polymathy or ‘much-knowing’: Hesiod got 
his knowledge from an accumulation of facts, and as a faithful mouthpiece only passes these 
facts on as a teacher in his turn. 
    It is also this very practice of ‘teaching’ that calls for critique. We have seen above that 
Xenophanes was already wary of an ‘easy’ transfer of knowledge: the gods did not simply 
‘intimate’ everything to mortals, but we have to find out for ourselves. Heraclitus is equally 
sceptical about such teaching: time and again he warns us to use the logos, which is common 
to all, to search for the truth.88 Teaching, on the other hand, will not lead to insight, and the 
verb ‘to teach’ is always associated by Heraclitus with the false beliefs of the many, who have 
no clue as to the true nature of the universe.89 It is obvious that the critique of teaching and of 
polymathy are two sides of the same coin, two aspects of an epistemologically faulty system - 
and Hesiod is apparently at the heart of it. 
    Heraclitus can thus be seen to take over and transform Xenophanes’ critique of Hesiod. 
Xenophanes pictured Hesiod’s method of revelation as too easy: receiving ‘everything’ 
without proper searching, and simply claiming it is all true. Heraclitus does ascribe a great 
deal of knowledge to Hesiod, but also criticizes the lack of active investigation. Both agree on 
Hesiod’s reputation for wisdom and both reject it, but Xenophanes does so out of a general 
(epistemological) scepticism and Heraclitus because he believes one can only really know that 
everything is one. Most importantly, however, Heraclitus shifts Xenophanes’ attack on the 
revelation-technique from Homer and Hesiod together to Hesiod alone: Xenophanes 
deliberately keeps the two together, whereas Heraclitus treats Hesiod as a philosopher like 
himself, but Homer as a poet or a wise man. It appears this distinction is part of a larger trend, 
since it was especially Hesiod who was among philosophers associated with revelation. This 
is an aspect we will further explore in the following section. 
 
2.2 - Revelation Modified (Parmenides and Empedocles) 
Despite the attacks of Xenophanes and Heraclitus, revelation remained an attractive mode of 
communicating truth and knowledge; both Parmenides and Empedocles inserted a revelation-
scene in their philosophical poems. Perhaps they included these encounters with the divine 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘modern’ thinkers are thus shown to be no better than the very man they attacked themselves, as polymathy leads 
only to an enormous amount of collected data and mutually exclusive theories (cf. Mackenzie 1988 22 who 
argues that Hesiod’s thinking exemplifies (in Heraclitus’ view) the ‘contradictory properties of the objective 
world’).  
88 A well-known tenet of Heraclitean philosophy; see e.g. DK 22 B 2, 22, 101, and 113. 
89 See DK 22 B 40, 57 (both connected to Hesiod) and 104. 
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because of the authority connected to revelation, as some scholars believe.90 I wish to argue, 
however, that Parmenides and Empedocles shaped their revelation-scenes in a way that shows 
that they were well aware of previous criticism. In their revelation scene, they adress the 
problems of its all-encompassing scope, of the passive recipient, of the value of data-
collection, and of the truth-guarantee by the Muses. By dealing with these points and adapting 
the traditional, Hesiodic setting, they can show to their audience that their respective 
philosophies are new and improved. It is thus not so much despite the attacks of Xenophanes 
and Heraclitus, but rather because of them, that revelation is retained. 
    In this section I will demonstrate how Parmenides and Empedocles modified the topos of 
revelation to turn it into a programmatic statement that defines their own methodology and its 
difference with other thinkers. Moreover, we will see how Hesiod, despite the many 
modifications, remains the model; his introduction to the Theogony was regarded as the first 
statement on epistemology, so the Hesiodic framework came natural to those who believed 
themselves to be his successors. 
 
    Parmenides most clearly presents his philosophical views through revelation. At the 
beginning of his poem we find a hero carried by mares past the gates of Night and Day to a 
mysterious goddess, who addresses him thus (DK 28 B 1.24-32):  
 
 w\ koùr’ ajqanavtoisi sunavoro~ hJniovcoisin, 
25 i{ppoi~ taiv se fevrousin iJkavnwn hJmevteron dẁ, 
 caìr’, ejpei; ou[ti se moìra kakh; prou[pempe nevesqai 
 thvnd’ oJdovn (hJ ga;r ajp’ ajnqrwvpwn ejkto;~ pavtou ejstivn), 
 ajlla; qevmi~ te divkh te. crew; dev se pavnta puqevsqai 
 hjme;n   jAlhqeivh~ eujkuklevo~ ajtreme;~ h\tor 
30 hjde; brotẁn dovxa~, taì~ oujk e[ni pivsti~ ajlhqhv~. 
 ajll’ e[mph~ kai; taùta maqhvseai, wJ~ ta; dokoùnta 
 crhǹ dokivmw~ ei\nai dia; panto;~ pavnta perẁnta. 
 
 ‘Young man, you who come to my house in the company  
25 of immortal charioteers with the mares which bear you, 
 greetings. No ill fate has sent you to travel  
this road (far indeed does it lie from the steps of men) 
                                               
90 See Robbiano (2005) 38-53 for a brief discussion of this view and related interpretations. 
PHILOSOPHY: GREAT AND SMALL 
 183
but right and justice. It is proper that you learn everything, 
both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, 
30 and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance. 
But nonetheless you shall learn these things too, how what is believed 
would have to be assuredly, pervading all things throughout.’91 
 
In this revelatory speech from the goddess to the kouros there are some references to 
Hesiod,92 the most important of which is the distinction between truth and non-truth, 
expressed in Theogony 27-28. Perhaps Parmenides was influenced by Xenophanes’ reference 
to these verses, since untruth is defined here as the brotwǹ dovxai, ‘opinions of mortals’ 
(30).93 Parmenides, however, is not a sceptic, and does not stop at the level of doxa - this is 
why his goddess can proclaim to teach pavnta (‘everything’) again (28). Moreover, this 
‘everything’ taught to Parmenides94 consists of two things: the truth (claimed by Hesiod) and 
the apparent truth (claimed by Xenophanes). And so Parmenides’ self-presentation as an all-
inclusive philosopher (going beyond what was done before) is stated at the beginning of the 
poem.95 
    Parmenides keeps the Hesiodic, problem-ridden mode of revelation but adjusts it to fit his 
own epistemological program. Two major departures from the Hesiodic model (as criticized 
by Xenophanes and Heraclitus) indicate how he upgraded his own revelatory tale. First of all, 
the appearing goddess does not move towards the initiate, but instead the young man comes to 
her. During his voyage, presumably in an upward direction towards the light,96 he has left the 
world of doxa, which not only shows that he is meeting the goddess in an untainted 
environment, but also that he has made a considerable intellectual effort by himself: he has 
left the world of ordinary experience97 and has gone beyond mortal opinion.98  
                                               
91 Transl. Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983), slightly modified. 
92 Such as the difficulty of the road just travelled, and the connection between qevmi~ and divkh (on which see 
Diller 1946 149-150). 
93 Cf. Xenophanes’ remarks in fr. 34 and 35 that dovko~ is all that can be achieved (see also above, p. 178).  
94 I am assuming that the kouros is to be understood in some way or another as Parmenides himself; cf. e.g. 
Granger (2002) 101 simply speaking of ‘the ‘youth’ Parmenides’. 
95 See also Most (2007) 283 on Parmenides presenting himself as going further than Hesiod. 
96 This is the communis opinio among scholars (cf. Granger 2002 112), although some believe it is the other way 
around (cf. Morrison 1955 59-60 who thinks the goddess is to be equated with the goddess Night from the 
Theogony). Others think the direction is deliberately left undefined. 
97 The world of doxa is characterized by duality, the escape from which is indicated at several points in the 
proem; see Morgan (2000) 73-81. 
98 I wonder whether this could be the reason why the goddess does not yell at him, which is what the Muses do 
when they meet Hesiod, wholly immersed in his mortal enterprise of ‘herding his sheep’ - instead, Parmenides 
tells us ‘the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand in hers’ (me qea; provfrwn uJpedevxato, ceìra de; 
ceiri; / dexiterh;n e{len, DK 28 B 1.22-23). 
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    Secondly, the actual reception of ‘all there is to know’ is not presented anymore as a 
straightforward transfer of knowledge from an authority that one cannot but put one’s trust in, 
as in the process of teaching attacked by both Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Parmenides’ 
goddess displays none of the ambiguity present in Hesiod’s Muses, who can tell the truth but 
also untruths, ‘when we wish’. This expression signifies a complete power over others99 
which is attacked by Heraclitus: as a ‘teacher of most’, Hesiod can determine what people 
believe - and this runs contrary to Heraclitus’ view that people should investigate by 
themselves and depend only on their own logos. Parmenides answered this critique by ruling 
out the element of choice, for the goddess too is ‘constrained by argument’.100 In fact, in 
fragment 7.5-8.1 the recipient of knowledge is actually encouraged to verify the account of 
the goddess: ‘judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation [= that things that are not are] 
/ spoken by me’ (kriǹai de; lovgw/ poluvdhrin e[legcon / ejx ejmevqen rJhqevnta). So here we 
have a truth-telling ‘Muse’ we can trust, and at the same time we are told to use our logos. 
    The mode of revelation was obviously important to Parmenides, since he decided to purge 
the Hesiodic prototype from its defects instead of simply rejecting it. Revelation was useful in 
several ways: it was a concept linked to power and authority, it could emphasize the 
‘objectivity of his method’,101 and it allowed Parmenides to situate his exposition of truth in a 
special, superhuman environment.102 But there is another important use to revelation: 
Parmenides’ radically new philosophy can only be appreciated as such when he takes up a 
traditional image and radically transforms it: this is why it is not the goddess but the kouros 
approaching the other, why the mutually exclusive parts of the truth-untruth dichotomy are 
both appropriated by Parmenides, and why the mortal through using his logos can come near 
the level of the revealing goddess. It is not enough to conclude that ‘Parmenides presents 
himself as one who followed in Hesiod’s footsteps and beat him at his own game’103 - it is 
supposed to be clear to everyone that Parmenides is in a different league. 
 
It appears, from what we have seen so far, that the early philosophers seized the Hesiodic 
model of revelation to make a statement on epistemology. Successive references to the 
initiation-scene from the Theogony create a snowball-effect: Parmenides, for instance, can 
                                               
99 Cf. e.g. WD 209, where the hawk holding the nightingale in its talons says he can eat the creature, ‘if I wish’ 
(ai[ k’ ejqevlw), or choose to let it go. For more on the expression, see ch. 9, p. 262 n.17. 
100 Morgan (2000) 75; cf. e.g. Mourelatos (1970) 219. 
101 Cf. Tarán (1965) 31. 
102 ‘Outside the realm of mortal enquiry’, Morgan (2000) 83. Morgan remarks that the goddess has powers we do 
not have, so that she can speak of the road of non-being, which can actually not be referred to. 
103 Dolin (1962) 94 citing Jaeger (1947) 93.  
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incorporate earlier critique on the implications of Hesiodic revelation while constructing his 
own imitation of Hesiod. This process of snowballing culminates in the relationship between 
Empedocles and his Muses, the description of which turns into a veritable battleground for 
contending philosophical notions. 
 
Empedocles’ epistemology is different yet again from that of the thinkers before him; his 
‘revelation’ is thus also different. What follows now is a citation from fragment 3, which 
combines an appeal to the Muses with a short explanation of Empedocles’ method, directed at 
his addressee Pausanias:104  
 
 ajlla; qeoi; tẁn me;n manivhn ajpotrevyate glwvssh~, 
 ejk d’ oJsivwn stomavtwn kaqarh;n ojceteuvsate phghvn 
 kai; sev, polumnhvsth leukwvlene parqevne Moùsa, 
 a[ntomai, w|n qevmi~ ejsti;n ejfhmerivoisin ajkouvein, 
5 pevmpe par’ Eujsebivh~ ejlavous’ eujhvnion a{rma. 
 ... 
 ajll’ a[g’ a[qrei pavsh/ palavmh/ ph̀/ dh̀lon e{kaston, 
10 mhvte tin’ o[yin e[cwn pisth;n plevon h] kat’ ajkouhvn 
 h] ajkoh;n ejrivdoupon uJpe;r tranwvmata glwvssh~, 
 mhvte ti tẁn a[llwn, oJpovsh/ povro~ ejsti noh̀sai, 
 guivwn pivstin e[ruke, novei d’ h|/ dh̀lon e{kaston. 
  
 ‘But gods! turn aside their madness from my tongue 
 and channel a pure stream from holy mouths. 
 And you, maiden muse of the white arms, much-remembering, 
 I beseech you: what is right for ephemeral creatures to hear, 
5 send [to me], driving your well-reined chariot from [the halls of] piety. 
 … 
 But come, consider, by every device, how each thing is clear 
10 not holding any vision as more reliable than what you hear, 
 nor the echoes of hearing than the clarities of the tongue, 
  
                                               
104 DK 31 B 3. The fragment of 14 lines is quoted in one piece by Sextus, but it is clear that there is a break after 
line 8, where the addressee changes. See Wright (1981) 157 and 160-161; Inwood (2001) also separates the 
lines. Nonetheless, the passages must have been close together.  
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and do not in any way curb the reliability of the other limbs by which there is 
 a passage for understanding, but understand each thing in the way that it is clear.’105 
 
Empedocles’ invocation of the Muses serves a programmatic purpose; for him, the topos of 
revelation provides an appropriate scene for both a statement on epistemology and a polemic 
against earlier thinkers.106  
    A brief summary of Empedocles’ epistemology, as we can gather from several fragments, 
is this: Empedocles held that the evidence gathered by the senses could lead to the insight that 
everything in this world consists of the four elements either held together by Love or divided 
by Strife. Our quest for truth is hindered by the fact that people die young and usually cannot 
gather enough data; wise men, however, can see all the things ‘which are in ten or twenty 
lifetimes’ (B 6.6). We can see these beliefs, together with responses to earlier thinkers, 
informing the scene featuring the Muse. There are references to Xenophanes in the notion of 
people as ‘ephemeral creatures’ (ejfhmerivoisin, 4)107 and in the idea of attaining knowledge 
through assiduous investigation - but in contrast to Xenophanes, Empedocles believes that 
men can attain knowledge, since it is apparently right for them to hear at least something from 
the Muse (i.e. what is ‘right’, qevmi~, 4). 
    The most serious disagreement, however, is with Parmenides and Heraclitus. In contrast to 
Parmenides, Empedocles believes that data gathered by the senses will lead to knowledge;  
but he is talking of knowledge of a world filled with mortal concepts like movement, mixing 
and separating.108 This radical departure from Parmenides’ views and interest is indicated by 
the inverted scene of the Muse driving her chariot towards us mortals, which is in obvious 
contrast to the Parmenides-like kouros who leaves our world and drives his chariot to meet 
the goddess in a different place. Contrary to Heraclitus, Empedocles does not believe in the 
unity of opposites or the truth being a hidden quality only attainable through the power of the 
mind; he states both objections at the end of the fragment: ‘understand each thing in the way 
that it is clear’ (novei d’ h|/ dh̀lon e{kaston).109 The rejection of Parmenides’ and Heraclitus’ 
                                               
105 Transl. Inwood (2001). 
106 The Hesiodic subtext (on which see further below) is less directly obvious here, but Empedocles implicitly 
refers to Hesiod’s inspiration elsewhere (see Most 2007 291-292 on DK 31 B 131). 
107 For the ephemeral nature of man see also DK 31 B 2 and 131 (where the ‘immortal muse’ is also invoked).  
108 See Empedocles’ insistence on the ‘reliability’ (pivsti~, 10) contained in the (data coming from the) senses, 
which contrasts with Parmenides’ goddess saying there is no ‘true reliance’ (pivsti~ ajlhqhv~, DK 28 B 1.30) in 
the opinions of mortals.  
109 Division instead of unification is again advocated by the Muses in Empedocles’ fragment 4: wJ~ de; par’ 
hJmetevrh~ kevletai pistwvmata mouvsh~ / gnẁqi, diatmhqevnto~ ejni; splavgcnoisi lovgoio (‘And you, know in 
the way that the assurances given by our muse urge, by dividing up the discourse in your heart’).  
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notions of (hidden) unity is accompanied by a re-appraisal of polymathy;110 that is also why 
the Muse is called ‘much-remembering’ (polumnhvsth, 3).111 
    It is clear that Empedocles’ treatment of the topos of revelation entails a further trans-
formation: the setting of the revelation is considerably less elaborate, the Muses are 
mentioned in several places in his poem(s), and since Empedocles presents himself as an 
omniscient god the distinction between himself and the Muses is somewhat blurry. Of greatest 
interest is perhaps that the polemical element, already (at least) implicitly present in the 
Hesiodic source-text, seems to have become most important - a development that we can 
clearly discern when retracing the track of the snowball. 
    There is, however, one other element of the original scene whose reworking by 
Empedocles deserves some attention, and that is the dichotomy between truth and untruth. In 
the Theogony, the Muses say they lie to some and tell the truth to others, apparently adapting 
their speech to the listener. Empedocles in his turn asks the Muse to tell him ‘what is right for 
ephemeral creatures to hear’ (w|n qevmi~ ejsti;n ejfhmerivoisin ajkouvein, 3.4). Obviously, these 
‘creatures’ are ordinary mortals who can only be enlightened by those who have a superior 
knowledge comprising data from several life times, i.e. the Muse and Empedocles himself. 
Empedocles thus creates a dichotomy between the knowers on the one hand and the 
ephemerals on the other. It is of great interest that the members of this second group use a 
different language; Empedocles often states that they cannot see the elements mixing and 
separating and thus mistakenly speak of things like ‘coming to be’, ‘life’, ‘death’ and ‘fate’.112 
In fragment 9 the dichotomy is emphasized when Empedocles first mentions some of those 
mistaken names and then concludes: ‘it is not right, the way they speak, but I myself also 
assent to their convention’ (ouj qevmi~ h|/ kalevousi, novmw/ d’ ejpivfhmi kai; aujtov~).113 Since 
Empedocles must speak to the day-creatures, he has to use their language. This is why he 
returns to mythological discourse, presenting his elements, for instance, as gods (epithets and 
                                               
110 Cf. Hershbell (1970) 161 who suggests that Empedocles DK B 17.14 (‘learning will increase understanding’, 
mavqh gavr toi frevna~ au[xei) is directed against Heraclitus’ critique of Hesiod in DK 22 B 40. 
111 We already saw that Empedocles praised the wise for seeing things ‘which are in ten or twenty lifetimes’. 
Perhaps this should be taken quite literally. Empedocles had gone through a long cycle of incarnation in plants, 
animals, and men, and so would count as ‘much-remembering’ himself.  
112 See DK 31 B 8, 9 and 15. The examples are taken to emphasize their quality as ‘ephemerals’ (who are thus 
presented as ignorant even of their own essence). 
113 The concept of qevmi~ is used in a relative sense in DK 31 B 3.4 (‘right for ephemeral creatures’) and in an 
absolute sense in DK 31 B 9.5 (plain ‘right’). 
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all): ‘Hear first the four roots of all things: / shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus / and 
Nestis who with her tears waters mortal springs’.114 
    This mythological discourse, as we have seen above, is largely Hesiodic. It is his cosmo-
logical language which is presented as the nomos.115 This allows for two conclusions. The 
first is the rather paradoxical one that Hesiod’s divine speech is taken by Empedocles as the 
prime example of an essentially mortal or ‘ephemeral’ way of expression. Of course this is 
hardly new, since Hesiod’s theogony was often interpreted as allegorical, apparently speaking 
of gods and their pedigrees but in fact referring to physiological principles underlying the 
cosmos - but the point is that Empedocles consciously constructs and places himself in this 
tradition of allegorical speech. He expresses himself again in the oft-attacked poetic language, 
doing what he no doubt believed Hesiod had done before him: practising strong allegory. The 
second point is that mythological language is thus used to point to the conventional nature of 
language in general. ‘Zeus’ and ‘Hera’ turn out to be as conventional as ‘life’ and ‘death’. The 
return to myth is a sign that language in itself is a problematic tool for expressing the truth.116 
We will see more of this particular problem in the next section. 
 
2.3 - The Use of Good Old-Fashioned Revelation (Protagoras and Prodicus) 
Empedocles’ concern about the possibilities of expressing truth in language was widely 
shared, not least by his predecessors Xenophanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus.117 The problem 
was of central importance to the sophists, who - somewhat like Empedocles - made use of the 
poetic tradition to alert their audience to the difficulty of expressing truth. The sophists, 
however, centered their attention on Homeric myth as language pointing to its own inherent 
untrustworthiness. The language of Hesiod, by contrast, seems to have been generally 
credited with an air of transparency and truthfulness. 
    In her admirable study on the interplay between myth and philosophy, Morgan has shown 
how the sophists manipulated myth in order to achieve their various goals. Particularly 
relevant to our case are two of her conclusions. The first is that the sophists in choosing 
mythological themes and settings for their speeches and arguments openly sought to connect 
with tradition and the traditional discourse of education in order to downplay any suspicion or 
                                               
114 DK 31 B 80: tevssara ga;r pavntwn rJizwvmata prẁton a[koue: / Zeu;~ ajrgh;~   {Hrh te ferevsbio~ hjd’  
jAidwneuv~ / Nh̀sti~ q’, h{ dakruvoi~ tevggei krouvnwma brovteion (transl. Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983). 
115 There is an interesting parallel from the Timaeus where Socrates speaks of those who have written on the 
origin of the gods; since their accounts are unfalsifiable, ‘we must conform to custom and believe them’ 
(eJpomevnou~ tw/̀ novmw/ pisteutevon, Pl. Ti. 40e). 
116 Cf. Morgan (2000) 60-62 and further below. 
117 See Morgan (2000) ch. 3. 
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hostility. Protagoras, for instance, explicitly says that he is in the same line of business as 
Homer and Hesiod to create an image of reassuring continuity with the past, instead of an 
alarming break.118 The second is that mythological material is regularly (more or less subtly) 
employed in speeches in order to indicate a certain tension between language and reality; the 
point of such speeches is often to demonstrate how such tension can be exploited by good 
speakers. One example is Antisthenes’ dialogue between Odysseus and Ajax, who both lay 
claim to Achilles’ weapons in front of a jury.119 Ajax represents the outdated hero who values 
deeds over words, and does not understand that words are deeds too; and so he loses to an 
Odysseus fully adapted to fifth-century rhetorical culture. Similarly, Gorgias’ Encomium of 
Helen, a defense speech for the mythical Helen who went to Troy, centers on the problems 
inherent in language: ‘the more successfully Gorgias argues that the magical power of speech 
compelled Helen to do what she should not have done, the less effective is his speech, for we 
become aware that he is exercising that same persuasion on us, to induce us to believe what 
we should not.’120 Myth is thus used to destroy the old-fashioned notion of truth as the 
straightforward relationship between words and things. 
    Morgan, however, does not distinguish between the reception of Hesiod and that of Homer; 
her study is concerned with myth in general and the response to the poetic tradition as a 
whole. She does not note, therefore, that the sophists treat Hesiodic myth and Homeric myth 
differently. One indication for this is that Hesiodic material is far less popular among the 
sophists.121 This is of course partly explained by Hesiod’s relative lack of heroes or role 
models, who so often feature as the main subjects of the sophists’ epideictic speeches.122 But 
the main difference is not quantitative but qualitative: while both Hesiodic and Homeric myth 
are employed to create a socio-politically desirable image for the sophist, Homeric material is 
used in speeches pointing to the problems of language, whereas Hesiodic myth seems to keep 
alive the belief in ‘truthful’ language consisting in a one-on-one correspondence between 
words and things. In speeches with a Homeric setting, traditional values are openly embraced 
but secretly subverted - the hidden message, which a smart audience is supposed to pick up, is 
that the old world is gone and those with ambition will need to adapt to new circumstances 
(cf. the dialogue between Odysseus and Ajax mentioned above). In speeches with Hesiodic 
elements, however, the traditional values advocated seem to be reinforced by an archaic 
                                               
118 Pl. Prt. 316d2-9. 
119 Morgan (2000) 115-119. 
120 Morgan (2000) 126.  
121 This is signaled by Morgan (2000), see pp. 96-97. 
122 Heracles and Prometheus (see further below) are notable exceptions; the WD was probably too ‘realistic’ or 
‘historical’ (as opposed to mythical) to allow for something like a Defence of Perses.  
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notion of truthfulness. We will now demonstrate this by turning to two examples of the 
sophists’ use of Hesiodic material: Protagoras’ myth in Plato’s Protagoras, and Prodicus’ 
myth of Heracles on the crossroads. 
    Protagoras’ myth (Protagoras 320c-323a) is a story of the birth of man and his 
development into a rational and social creature.123 When people and animals were first created 
by the gods, Epimetheus equipped all animals with suitable means of survival but forgot man, 
who was left naked and unarmed. Prometheus tried to compensate for his brother’s mistake 
by stealing fire and the arts, but because they still lacked ‘political skill’ (politikh; tevcnh, 
322b) men lived apart from one another and were easily attacked. When their race faced 
extinction, Zeus made Hermes distribute aijdwv~ (‘reverence’) and divkh (‘justice’) among all 
men so they could form cities and thus survive. 
    It must have been as obvious to an ancient Greek as it is to a modern scholar that 
Protagoras made use of Hesiodic material for his own mùqo~.124 It is also clear that this 
Hesiodic myth is employed to formulate a politically correct statement: its main point is that 
everybody is endowed with political skill, a welcome message in democratic Athens. We see 
here the sophists’ familiar trick of using myth to express values that they know are widely 
shared and appreciated.125 That Protagoras was attracted to the Hesiodic model can be easily 
explained: Hesiod had a reputation for speaking of beginnings (either of the universe or of 
man), and was usually interpreted allegorically. But I think that Protagoras had another reason 
for choosing Hesiod: he wanted to make use of Hesiod’s association with good old-fashioned 
truth, defined as the one-on-one relationship between words and things. This use of Hesiod 
comes to the fore if we consider more closely two things: the communication between Zeus 
and Hermes as presented by the myth, and the context of Protagoras’ myth in the dialogue. 
                                               
123 The question of authenticity is undecided and probably undecidable. There are some strong arguments in 
favour of Protagorean authorship (on which see Taylor 1991 78-79), and I am inclined to think the story was 
originally created by Protagoras. 
124 There are so many similarities between Protagoras’ myth and Hesiod’s account of the earliest stages of 
human history that Aelius Aristides even seems to confuse them (see Or. 26.106). Some of the most conspicuous 
similarities are that mankind is created by the gods from earth and fire (in WD 60-61 and 70-71 womankind is 
created by Hephaestus from earth and water); that the clever and compassionate Prometheus and the dull-witted 
Epimetheus play an important role in determining the human condition; that Epimetheus’ foolishness all but 
ruins mankind; that Prometheus in coming to man’s aid steals fire; that the political art comes from Zeus; that 
the supreme god has sentinels; that there exists a kinship between men and gods (Prt. 322a, WD 108); that aijdwv~ 
and divkh are qualities essential for living in a society (according to Taylor 1991 85-86, Protagoras used the 
words aijdwv~ and divkh instead of swfrosuvnh and dikaiosuvnh to recall the archaic personifications from the 
WD); and that these qualities come from Zeus. Sihvola (1989) also points to several agreements on ideological 
issues (esp. 148-150), but sometimes goes too far; Ferrarin (2000) downplays the Hesiodic influence.  
125 Cf. e.g. Adkins (1973) explaining how Protagoras manipulates and confuses terms in order to make the 
audience believe they all possess political skill. 
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    First, we will have a close look at the dialogue between Zeus and Hermes (Protagoras 
322c3-d5). When Zeus has decided to preserve the human race by sending Hermes with the 
gift of aijdwv~ and divkh, Hermes asks him how they should be distributed: like the crafts, in 
which case one specialist among many lay people will be enough? or should they be given ‘to 
all’ (ejpi; pavnta~)? ‘To all’ (ejpi; pavnta~), is the response of Zeus; and we are subsequently 
told that it was so: this is why the Athenians take advice on political matters from every man 
(a{panto~ ajndrov~, 323a2), because they think it belongs to all (pantiv, ibid.). The many 
repetitions of forms of ‘all’ (pa~̀)126 serve to drive home Protagoras’ main point, i.e. the 
universal distribution of political skill; but they also imply the possibility and value of 
felicitous, ‘truthful’ communication, exemplified by the exact repetition of Hermes’ words by 
Zeus and the succesful rescue of mankind resulting from it. The words and the things match 
perfectly.  
    This point emerges more clearly once we realize that the exchange between Hermes and 
Zeus is meant as a positive foil to the earlier meeting between Prometheus and Epimetheus 
(Protagoras 320d6-8), where we find the ultimate origin of the human predicament 
(eventually solved by Zeus). The communication between the two brothers is characterized by 
several flaws: only Epimetheus speaks, and there is no such ‘tautology’ as demonstrated by 
Zeus and Hermes, but persuasion instead (peivsa~, 320d7). Whereas both brothers were 
ordered to ‘divide’ (neim̀ai, 320d5) the qualities among the earthly creatures, Epimetheus sets 
to it alone (neivmanto~ dev mou, 320d7). Finally, the relationship between words and deeds is 
wholly distorted when Epimetheus gives Prometheus the task of inspecting his work 
afterwards (ejpivskeyai) - a complete upheaval of the correspondency between words and 
things, which we are meant to notice (see the paradox in 321c3-4: ‘to inspect came the Fore-
thinker afterwards’, e[rcetai Promhqeu;~ ejpiskeyovmeno~). This is an ominous start for 
mankind, and it need not surprise us that people initially had no skill whatsoever to work 
together. Only politikh; tevcnh, originating from the exemplary communication between 
Zeus and Hermes, will lead to cooperation in cities. The myth is thus also a cautionary tale 
warning against the distortion of the relationship between words and things, and advocates 
matching or ‘true’ speech instead. 
    We will see how emphasizing the Hesiodic notion of truth is important to Protagoras when 
we consider the context. The reason for Protagoras telling his myth is his claim to make 
                                               
126 There is also a subtle allusion (to my knowledge not noted before) to Hesiod’s Pandora here, also a gift 
devised by Zeus and sent by Hermes (WD 83-85). Her name was taken to mean ‘gifted by all (the gods), or ‘gift 
from all (the gods)’, see the scholia and West (1978) ad loc. Protagoras’ Pandora, however, is a ‘gift to all 
(people)’. Perhaps this is a correction of Hesiodic etymology. 
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people better; Socrates was sceptical about the possibility of virtue being taught, and had 
challenged Protagoras to prove it. At the start of his great speech, the sophist asks his 
audience whether he should put the explanation in the form of a ‘story’ (mùqo~) or an 
‘argument’ (lovgo~, 320c3-4); when the audience replies he can relate it in whichever form he 
wants, the sophist chooses the story because it is supposedly ‘more pleasant’ (carievsteron, 
320c6-7). But Protagoras, as has often been noted, is tricking the audience, for he knows that 
mythos and logos are not really equivalent options. That Zeus has given the art of politics to 
each and every man, the very point of the mythos, is a completely arbitrary element in the 
story which in fact cannot be proven by any logos he might think of. Protagoras needs the 
myth. Morgan rightly argues that the rest of the speech, which in fact is a logos, ‘will hold 
only if we presuppose the myth’.127 The myth, therefore, is a mode of expressing a supposition 
that should be taken as an absolute truth that ultimately legitimizes Protagoras’ work as a 
teacher of virtue. This unprovable truth, that the opinion of one man is as true as that of the 
other, is the only absolute truth Protagoras needs in his otherwise relativistic universe.128 It 
underlies the homo mensura-statement which, by allotting a partial truth to all private 
opinions and thus denying an absolute truth, is nonetheless absolutely true itself.129 In the 
myth of the Protagoras, this Truth is in Hesiodic fashion imparted by a god, no Muse but 
Zeus himself. There is a return to the divine plane for the expression of truth, a truth that may 
not be subject to the manipulative power of language that Protagoras exploits elsewhere. 
    We may compare Protagoras’ use of Hesiod to that of his fellow-sophist Prodicus. Prodicus 
also exploited the Hesiodic model of the decent myth, i.e. a myth characterized not only by a 
morally approvable content but also by the advertisement of straightforward language that 
does not allow for (willful) confusion and distortion. We can see this in Prodicus’ myth of 
Heracles at the crossroads, a story in which the young Heracles, thinking about which road to 
take in life, is approached by two women representing Virtue and Vice.130 Prodicus 
incorporated into this myth both Hesiod’s road-image and his work-ethic:131 as Virtue 
explains, the gods give nothing to man without toil, so one must work hard to achieve 
anything and be content with simple pleasures.  
                                               
127 Morgan (2000) 141; see her useful discussion on Protagoras’ choice of myth on pp. 138-147. See also 
Blumenberg (1979) 362-365 on Protagoras’ trick of his Kunstmythos.  
128 According to Bett (1989), Protagoras is the only real (or ‘deep’, as he calls it) relativist among the sophists 
(see further n.140 below). 
129 This is already pointed out in Plato’s Theaetetus, e.g. 170e-171a. 
130 The story is retold by X. Mem. 2.1.21-34. 
131 Cf. O’Sullivan (1992) 76-77. 
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    Prodicus thus created a morally acceptable story, for Heracles of course chooses Virtue: he 
learns to work hard and avoid evil and luxury. At the same time, the myth presents a rather 
straightforward (and archaic) stand on the matter of truth and language. After Vice has 
introduced herself and promised Heracles the world without ever having to work for it, Virtue 
steps up and says ‘I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the 
things that are, as the gods have ordained them.’132 As in the myth of Protagoras, reality (‘the 
way things are’) is created by a divinity, and perfectly communicable in words. Virtue 
represents this truth, whereas Vice stands for (pleasurable) falsehood. The message is that one 
can simply choose between them. There is the danger of lies, flattery, and falsehood, but 
language can be truthful. It is a matter of choice, just as Hesiod’s Muses proclaim: we know 
how to say many false things similar to genuine ones, / but we know, when we wish, how to 
proclaim true things’.   
 
Apart from the resemblances between Protagoras’ and Prodicus’ use of Hesiodic myth, there 
appears to be one striking difference. Protagoras is especially interested in Hesiodic truth for 
rhetorical purposes: his mythos (constructed from mainly Hesiodic material) serves to 
convince his audience of a truth that he could never prove. But there is nothing in the other 
fragments ascribed to him that suggests he really believed in an absolute truth, as the exact 
correspondence between words and things; quite the contrary. It is interesting to note that his 
tale is also the only fragment containing references to Hesiod. By contrast, his fellow-sophist 
Prodicus does seem to have held the view that words and things can match precisely. Hesiod, 
moreover, was of far more than fleeting interest to Prodicus. Their relationship calls for 
further investigation, which is one of the subjects of the next section.  
 
3 - Language and Truth133 
In section 2.1, I tried to show that Hesiod, largely because of his revelation scene in the 
Theogony, was in the early classical age taken to represent the view that a) there is an absolute 
truth and b) it is possible to express that truth in language. This view (and the polymathy that 
went with it) was attacked for its pretentiousness and naiveté by Xenophanes and Heraclitus, 
while the topos of inspiration was updated by Parmenides and Empedocles from an 
epistemological and polemical point of view. Protagoras and Prodicus, as we have seen, 
                                               
132 X. Mem. 1.2.27: oujk ejxapathvsw dev se prooimivoi~ hJdonh̀~, ajll’ h|/per oiJ qeoi; dievqesan ta; o[nta 
dihghvsomai met’ ajlhqeiva~. 
133 A large part of this section appeared earlier as ‘Plato’s Hesiod: not Plato’s alone’, in Boys-Stones and 
Haubold (2009), pp. 89-110. 
CHAPTER 6 
 194
regenerated the old-fashioned view for their own purposes. And so, Hesiod remained 
connected to (divine) truth and the possibility of communicating it with words. 
    In this section, we will see that some Greeks believed that this old, Hesiod-related idea 
could still somehow hold in the fifth- and fourth-century ‘new age’ of sceptics and relativists. 
They thought a careful investigation of the exact meaning of words would reveal the truthful 
relation between words and things, and would expose rhetoric and relativism for nothing more 
than the incorrect use of language.134 Here too Hesiod seems to have been the model for the 
‘scientific’ method that explains the whole of reality by beginning with an understanding of 
its smallest building-blocks; not the elements this time, but letters, syllables and words. This 
is the main example of the ‘spillage’ mentioned at the end of section 1: Hesiod’s earlier 
reputation for thinking in ‘elements’ was transferred from natural philosophy to the 
philosophers’ new field of interest: language. This transferral was facilitated by Hesiod’s 
manifest interest in language,135 especially concerning words that have an (apparently) double 
meaning.136 
    This section will focus on Prodicus and especially Plato, whose work provides the best 
proof for this particular Hesiod, i.e. the Hesiod of the ‘correctness of names’. 
 
The sophist Prodicus, as O’Sullivan noticed, seems to have had a particular interest in Hesiod. 
His cosmogony, for instance, strongly resembles that of Hesiod, and we have already seen 
how his myth featuring Heracles was indebted to the poet.137 Furthermore, and this is 
especially relevant here, Prodicus may have presented Hesiod as a thinker who foreshadowed 
Prodicus’ own theory concerning synonyms and ojrqovth~ ojnomavtwn or ‘correctness of 
                                               
134 Struck (2004) 58 formulates this one-on-one relationship between words and things most correctly by 
speaking of an ‘isomorphism between the taxonomy of language and the taxonomy of reality’.  
135 See e.g. Lamberton (1988) 80 on how ‘the Hesiodic voice insists on the centrality of language’.  
136 Cf. Claus (1977) on Hesiod’s interest in words that have a double, ‘potentially paradoxical’ meaning, and 
Kirby (1992) 44-46 briefly on Hesiod’s distinction between two types of Eris resembling the ojrqovth~ lovgou of 
the ‘Sophists’. Of course   [Eri~ (‘strife’, WD 11-26) and aijdwv~ (‘shame’, WD 317-319) are the most obvious 
examples (see Arrighetti 1996 66-67 on others, such as nevmesi~, fhvmh and o{rko~); oxymora like the kaka; 
kevrdea (WD 352) and the kalo;n kakovn (Th. 585)   betray a similar interest in the ambiguity contained in words. 
Hesiod was already in antiquity linked to the ‘doubleness’ of concepts: see e.g. Eur. Hipp. 385-386 copying 
Hesiod’s distinction between two types of shame (a reference noted by [Lucian] Am. 37), and Call. fr. 200a Pf. 
imitating the WD’s overture by distinguishing two Aphrodites; Thgn. 1.873-876 suggests, perhaps, that it was 
this particular knowledge that led to the praise of wisdom in Hesiod’s epitaph (‘having the measure of wisdom’, 
mevtron e[cwn sofivh~, Arist. fr. 565 Bekker). The scholion on Il. 24.45 considers the notion of the doubleness of 
shame Hesiodic enough to strike it out of Homer’s text; see also Aristarchus (in S WD 97a explaining away the 
well-known problem of   jElpiv~ by positing (in Hesiodic fashion) two types of ‘hope’.    
137 O’Sullivan (1992) 75-79. Interestingly, Prodicus was also considered a polymath (see e.g. Pl. Prt. 315e7-
316a1, ‘a man who in my opinion is godlike in his universal knowledge’, pavssofo~ gavr moi dokeì aJnh;r ei\nai 
kai; qeìo~). 
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names’.138 His theory, in short, holds that there is a one-on-one relationship between words 
and their referents, and that there are no real synonyms. Whenever two words appear to have 
the same meaning, it is the philosopher’s task to investigate their exact definitions and 
distinguish them accordingly - a process which reflects our organization of reality.139 Prodicus 
seems to have occupied a rather unique position, as most of his fellow-sophists believed that 
words exist ‘by convention’. Their rhetorical exercises, often featuring terms of ethical 
content, led to a ‘practical relativism’140 that Prodicus tried to oppose.  
    Plato refers several times to the way Prodicus reconstructed and used the ‘linguistic purist’ 
Hesiod. The most illustrative example comes from a passage from the Protagoras, which 
establishes a clear link between ojrqovth~ ojnomavtwn, Prodicus and Hesiod. In this passage 
(Protagoras 338e6-341a2) Socrates and Protagoras are discussing a poem by Simonides. 
According to Protagoras, Simonides is inconsistent since he in one and the same poem claims 
that it is hard to become good and easy to be good. Socrates, however, calls in the aid of 
Prodicus, and defends Simonides by pointing at the difference between ‘becoming’ and 
‘being’. It is at this point that Socrates suddenly quotes Hesiod’s verses on the tough road to 
virtue: ‘The gods put goodness where we have to sweat / to get at her. But once you reach the 
top / She’s easy to have as she was hard at first’.141 In this passage from the Works and Days 
Hesiod, we are supposed to infer, has taught us to differentiate between becoming virtuous 
and being virtuous. When Socrates immediately thereafter remarks that the ‘divine wisdom’ 
(sofiva qeiva, 341a1) of Prodicus is apparently as old as Simonides or ‘even earlier’ (e[ti 
palaiotevra), it is clear to whom that more ancient wisdom belongs: Hesiod. I believe it is 
very likely that Prodicus himself had actually used this very passage from Hesiod to illustrate 
his investigation into words.142  
                                               
138 Cf. Arrighetti (1996) 61-64 on Hesiod trying to make visible the ‘correspondance entre la réalité et le langage 
(62), and Too (1998) 24 describing Hesiodic language as ‘homonymous and to some degree coterminous with 
the world that it signifies’. 
139 There is independent proof of Prodicus separating alleged synonyms, but only Plato links Prodicus to a theory 
explicitly called ojrqovth~ ojnomavtwn (see Euthd. 277e, Cra. 384b; he can be seen practising his art in e.g. Prt. 
337a, 340a, 341, and 358a, where the theory is described in other words); we should therefore be careful not to 
attribute to Prodicus things that are part of the theory of ojrqovth~ as Plato conceived it (see Mayer’s warning in 
Untersteiner 1954 214, and Fehling 1965 - but against overmuch caution is the obvious connection between 
Prodicus and ojrqovth~ sec in Ar. Av. 690-692). Important to my argument, however, is the link to Hesiod.  
140 Momigliano (1929) 102. Bett (1989) further examined the relativism of the sophists and only regards 
Protagoras as a genuine or ‘deep’ relativist; he ascribed a ‘weak sense’ of relativism (i.e. ethical or evaluative 
relativism) to the other sophists.   
141 Prt. 340d1-5, WD 289 and 291-292. 
142 The likelihood of the historical Prodicus having used this passage increases considerably once one takes into 
account the preceding passage (Prt. 340a-b). Here, Socrates calls on Prodicus to help him against Protagoras and 
cites Il. 21.308, where the river Scamander asks his brother Simois to help him against the unleashed Achilles. 
We know from the scholia that Protagoras commented on this very passage from the Iliad (S Il. 21.240 = DK 80 
A 30; see also Capra 2005). When Protagoras’ attack on Simonides is accompanied by an allusion to his actual 
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    It seems that Plato wants to associate Prodicus with the investigation into the exact 
meaning of words. What is most interesting to us, however, is that this sort of investigation is 
firmly connected to Hesiod. In the Charmides, Critias says that Works and Days 311 (e[rgon 
oujde;n o[neido~, ‘work is no disgrace’) was composed by Hesiod to explain the difference 
between ‘working’ (ejrgavzesqai) and ‘doing’ (poieìn). Hesiod’s verse was apparently 
interpreted as a charter to engage in any kind of occupation, even indecent ones,143 but Critias 
explains that since Hesiod was obviously a wise and good person he must have meant by 
work only ‘things that are done in a good and useful way’.144 This notorious verse and a 
similar defence come back in a scene from Xenophon’s description of the trial of Socrates, 
where Xenophon tries to show that Socrates did not, as his accuser claimed, ‘select from the 
most famous poets the most immoral passages, and used them as witnesses to teach his 
companions to be criminals and tyrants’.145 Xenophon’s defence consists of giving two 
examples of Socrates’ alleged abuse of the poets, and then exonerating him in both cases. One 
of the examples comes from Hesiod (Works and Days 311 again), and the other one is from 
Homer146 - but interestingly enough, only Hesiod’s verse is neutralized by investigating the 
exact meaning of the words: since Hesiod’s e[rgon means ‘good work’, there is nothing wrong 
with the line.147 The Homeric passage, quoted for its (alleged) anti-democratic content, is in 
fact not defused at all; Xenophon suggests that Socrates interpreted the lines from the Iliad 
differently, but is especially eager to point to the non-aristocratic way of life of the actual 
Socrates.148 
                                                                                                                                                   
practice of Homeric criticism, it is not unlikely that Prodicus’ defence of Simonides refers to his actual use of 
Hesiod. There may be another hint at the association of Hesiod and Prodicus in Pl. R. 600d, where the wandering 
bards Hesiod and Homer are compared to the travelling sophists. The presence of the notoriously home-bound 
Hesiod here has often puzzled scholars (see e.g. Jowett and Campbell 1894 ad loc. for the easiest, Homerocentric 
solution of simply ignoring Hesiod), but may have to do with his connection to Prodicus: Socrates first mentions 
Protagoras and Prodicus, and then compares them to Homer and Hesiod.    
143 Prostitution and making shoes being the prime examples. Since both e[rgon and o[neido~ are neuter, the verse 
could also be read as ‘no work is a disgrace’. 
144 Pl. Chrm. 163c: ta; ga;r kalw~̀ te kai; wjfelivmw~ poiouvmena e[rga ejkavlei. 
145 X. Mem. 1.2.56: e[fh d’ aujto;n oJ kathvgoro~ kai; tẁn ejndoxotavtwn poihtẁn ejklegovmenon ta; ponhrovtata 
kai; touvtoi~ marturivoi~ crwvmenon didavskein tou;~ sunovnta~ kakouvrgou~ te ei\nai kai; turannikouv~. See 
on this passage also ch. 2, pp. 77-78. 
146 Il. 2.188-191 and 198-202; Odysseus, bringing the army back under control after Agamemnon’s confused 
speech, addresses the aristocracy with gentle words but is rude to the people of lower status. 
147 X. Mem. 1.2.57: ‘Interpreted like that, it can stand as correct’ (ejk de; touvtwn ojrqw~̀ a]n e[coi). 
148 See Aeschines’ Fals.Leg. for another link between Hesiod and the theory of ojrqovth~. As we have seen above 
(ch. 4, pp. 128-129), Aeschines had quoted Hesiod’s passage on the divinity of Fhvmh to show there had to be 
truth in all the rumours concerning the many excesses of Timarchus, a friend of Demosthenes’ (Aeschin. Tim. 
129). When Demosthenes re-used the Hesiodic passage to argue that the rumours of Aeschines’ treason would 
then have to be true as well (Dem. Fals.Leg. 243), Aeschines responded by distinguishing rumour and slander, 
placing Demosthenes’ accusations in the second category (Aeschin. Fals.Leg. 144). Aeschines thus brilliantly 
defuses the attack by replying in the manner of Hesiod, splitting words, at the same time showing his superiority 
over Demosthenes in Hesiodic matters.  
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    It appears, then, that Hesiod is connected to a ‘scientific’ method of understanding not only 
the physical world, but its representation in words as well, by separating and categorizing the 
constituent parts. This is an admittedly vague observation,149 but it can be further specified 
and elaborated. In order to do this, we will take a look at some passages in the Platonic corpus 
where Hesiod is associated with what might be called ‘scientific approaches’ that are similar 
to that of separation and categorization. I distinguish two of these approaches, which will now 
be briefly discussed. 
    The first of the approaches is etymology.150 In the Cratylus, the dialogue exploring the 
correctness of names and the reasons for why names are as they are, Hesiod is frequently 
mentioned. First of all, he features as a proto-etymologist: Socrates, for instance, makes fun of 
Hesiod’s own explanation of the name Aphrodite, which Socrates calls ‘child-like’ 
(paidikov~).151 Secondly, Hesiod supplies names on which the method of etymology can be 
practised.152 Of course this second qualification does not exclusively fit Hesiod, but Homer as 
well - but I believe it can still be maintained that etymology is a particularly Hesiodic 
practice.153 
    We can see such practice in action when Socrates is analyzing, for instance, the names of 
Zeus, Kronos, and Ouranos (Cratylus 396b-c). ‘Zeus’, it is claimed, means ‘he through whom 
there is life’.154 The supreme god is born from a mighty intellect, for contrary to what most 
                                               
149 It is deliberately vague because I wish to avoid connecting Hesiod to Plato’s method of diairesis. There are 
some superficial similarities that could lead to broad-sweeping equations (see Solmsen (1962) 179-181), but 
diairesis is - in contrast to Hesiod’s genealogies - not so much about categorization per se, but rather about 
definition. This can be clearly seen from the fact that the method of diairesis creates a ‘tree’ in which only one 
branch is followed to its end (the actual definition), whereas Hesiod’s genealogical tree tries to follow all its 
branches. 
150 Modern scholars typify Homer as a ‘keen etymologist and cultivator of word-play’ (Miller 2001 261, see also 
Leclerc 1993 272-278 and Joyal 1991 184-186). Incidentally, etymology was employed by Prodicus as well, 
though how exactly is uncertain, cf. Untersteiner (1954) 213. 
151 Cra. 406c. Why Hesiod’s explanation of Aphrodite, coming from ‘foam’ (ajfrov~), is called ‘child-like’ is not 
clear. It is presumably a sign of inexperience to hold on to the apparent root when searching for an etymological 
explanation; older and wiser etymologists look beyond the superficial to a word’s true root. I do not understand 
why Levin (1997) 49 n.21 claims Plato agrees with Hesiod’s etymology here; Herodian, on the other hand, does 
express his approval (2.367.27 Lentz). 
152 E.g. Cra. 397e (etymology of demons) and 414d (the Sphinx). 
153 Even though Homer is even mentioned more often than Hesiod in the Cratylus, there are some arguments for 
maintaining that etymology is particularly Hesiodic. For instance, Homer is in the Cratylus mentioned seven and 
Hesiod five times (a very un-Platonic ratio; the ratio of Homeric versus Hesiodic references throughout the 
Platonic corpus is roughly 3:1), and Homer is nowhere in the Cratylus said to have explained names himself. 
Moreover, since Homer was generally regarded as the founding father of practically all science and philosophy 
(see in this respect e.g. [Plut.] De vita et poesi Homeri and on a less serious note D.L. 9.71), it would be odd if 
the science of etymology was an exception. But I do not wish to press this point; it is the more specific 
combination of etymology and genealogy (on which see below) that I want to connect to Hesiod in particular. 




people believe the name Kronos signifies ‘the pure and clear mind’, and he is himself a son of 
Ouranos, ‘he who looks at the things above’ like a philosopher.155 He then continues: 
 
eij d’ ejmemnhvmhn th;n   JHsiovdou genealogivan, tivna~ e[ti tou;~ ajnwtevrw progovnou~ 
levgei touvtwn, oujk a]n ejpauovmhn diexiw;n wJ~ ojrqw~̀ aujtoi~̀ ta; ojnovmata keit̀ai...  
 
‘If I remembered Hesiod’s genealogy, who are the even earlier ancestors of the gods 
he mentions, I wouldn’t stop investigating how their names are correct…’156  
 
Hesiod’s genealogy is referred to because Socrates in etymologizing the names of Zeus, 
Kronos and Ouranos has followed the backbone of the succession myth in the Theogony 
(Ouranos-Kronos-Zeus), but in reverse order: he is retracing the origin and cause of all living 
creatures to an intellectual principle (‘the pure and clear mind’) which in turn derives from the 
study of astronomy (‘looking at the things above’, perhaps a less developed state).157 The 
etymology linking the three gods reaffirms their genealogical connection. We should compare 
this practice to a passage from the Theaetetus, where Socrates says (155d): 
 
mavla ga;r filosovfou toùto to; pavqo~, to; qaumavzein: ouj ga;r a[llh ajrch; 
filosofiva~ h] au{th, kai; e[oiken oJ th;n   \Irin Qauvmanto~ e[kgonon fhvsa~ ouj kakw~̀ 
genealogeiǹ. 
 
‘For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering 
(thaumazein): this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else. And the man who 
made Iris the child of Thaumas was perhaps no bad genealogist.’ 
 
Socrates means here that ‘speaking’ (ei[rw) is begotten by or comes after ‘wondering’ 
(qaumavzw).158 The genealogist referred to is, of course, Hesiod, who in fact calls Iris the 
daughter of Thaumas twice in the Theogony (266 and 780). 
    These two passages strongly imply that the practices of genealogy and etymology, both 
connected to Hesiod, are largely comparable. The similarity between the passages has also 
been noted by modern scholars such as Sluiter, who states that they are both ‘strategies to 
                                               
155 Krovno~ or Kovro~ is said to be not from kovro~ (‘child’) but from korov~ (‘pure’) and thus indicates to; 
kaqaro;n kai; ajkhvraton toù noù. Ouranos’ name is explained as coming from to; oJràn ta; a[nw. 
156 Pl. Cra. 396c (transl. slightly altered). 
157 See Sedley (2003) 91 for the wider resonance of this idea in the Platonic corpus. 
158 The etymology of Iris is mentioned in Cra. 408a (though without Hesiod). 
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gain control over the present’,159 or at least to gain knowledge of the present. Apart from the 
similar goal, however, their respective ‘methods’ (if I may call it so) can be compared in at 
least three other respects.  
    First, both attempt to organize and clarify the past. This is obvious for genealogy, but 
etymology too, though basically synchronic and without historical interest,160 often searches 
for an original namegiver and works on the assumption that names have become less 
perspicuous through time - it is the etymologist’s job to clear up the distortion and restore the 
original structures.161 Second, both practices are rather unsystematic and often serve an ad 
hoc purpose. The tree-like structure of genealogy (especially when executed so systematically 
as in the Theogony) may seem different from the ‘anything goes’-strategy of etymology, but 
this is only apparently so: in genealogy derivation is almost equally irregular, since children 
can be born from one or two parents, or none at all; moreover, different pedigrees can exist 
side by side, all grounding the present.162 And thirdly, and perhaps rather obviously, both 
genealogy and etymology are based on a preconceived notion of what the result will be: the 
outcome is usually known before the investigation. 
    The similarity between etymology and genealogy may have been even more visible in 
antiquity because the mythical data used for etymology are often genealogically structured; 
hence the implication in the passages from Cratylus and Theaetetus just mentioned that 
Hesiod had knowledge of both. The Benennungsgrund163 for the names of the gods featuring 
in the Theogony is given through their ancestry. It is etymology through genealogy, or the 
other way around. No matter what Socrates or Plato may have thought about it, the practice 
referred to was very real - and Hesiod is definitely connected to it. 
 
Apart from etymology, there is another ‘scientific approach’ connected to separation and 
categorization. This is a philosophical position I will call ‘atomism’ here (for lack of a better 
term); it operates on the basic assumption that the sum total of reality can be divided into and 
                                               
159 Sluiter (1997) 156. 
160 Cf. Herbermann (1991) 365-366. 
161 See e.g. Cra. 414c-d, where Socrates says that people kept embellishing the ‘first names’ (prẁta ojnovmata) 
until finally ‘a name is reached that no human being can understand’. The example he chooses is the word 
Sphinx, the original form of which is still visible in Hesiod’s Phix (Th. 326).  
162 One can think, for instance, of the theogonies of Hesiod, Orpheus, and Pherecydes, or of ad hoc theogonies 
like the birth of Eros from Poros and Penia in Pl. Smp. 203b-d. Here the link with etymology is especially 
apparent; see e.g. Cra. 404e-406a, where no less than four equally valid etymological explanations of the name 
‘Apollo’ are given (corresponding to the four powers of the god). The scholia abound with such multiple, co-
existing etymologies. 
163 The term is that of Herbermann (1991). 
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explained from its smallest parts.164 As has been shown in section 1, the natural philosophers 
attributed such a view to Hesiod with regard to cosmogony and cosmology. When the concept 
was applied to language, the link to Hesiod remained, and so he became associated with the 
hypothesis that knowledge was made up from the basic building-blocks of speech: letters, 
syllables and words. Evidence for this ‘atomistic’ Hesiod is scanty, but there are some traces 
of him in Plato. 
    One of these can be found in the Theaetetus. Near the end of this dialogue, knowledge is 
tentatively defined as a ‘true opinion with an account’ (meta; lovgou ajlhqhv~ dovxa, 201d-
202c). One of the three proposed ways of understanding this lovgo~ or ‘account’ is as an 
enumeration of all the elements of the thing known (206e-207a). Theaetetus, however, who 
does not immediately understand what Socrates means by this reference to ‘elements’, needs 
an example first. Socrates then cites Works and Days 456: ‘One hundred are the timbers of a 
wagon’ (eJkato;n dev te douvraq’ aJmavxh~, 207a). He explains: ‘Now I couldn’t say what they 
are; and I don’t suppose you could either. If you and I were asked what a wagon is, we should 
be satisfied if we could answer ‘Wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke’.’165 It is implied, of course, 
that Hesiod does know all the constituent parts of a wagon, and that Hesiod is ‘the man who 
can explore [the wagon’s] being by going through those hundred items (…), who has passed 
from mere judgement to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon; and has done so in virtue 
of having gone over the whole by means of the elements’.166 Hesiod is cited not only to 
illustrate this ‘atomistic’ interpretation of the logos, but also figures as a well-known 
supporter (or perhaps even the initiator) of this atomistic theory. 
    That this view is applicable to language is made clear by the other example given by 
Socrates, i.e. that of the grammarian: whereas we laymen understand names (such as that of 
Theaetetus) only ‘in terms of the syllables’ (kata; sullabhvn, 207a), a grammarian has in-
depth knowledge of the smaller elements that make up the name, and can thus provide a truly 
scientific account. The equation between Hesiod’s and the grammarians’ theory of knowledge 
is obvious from Socrates’ summary of their atomistic view: ‘that going through the elements 
                                               
164 This notion is vaguely reminiscent of Jaeger (1947) 16 ascribing to Hesiod a ‘method of mythical hypostasis’ 
(by which a primal abstract deity creates a number of more specific and concrete gods), which became ‘a 
particularly important device for explaining the world in the theological cosmology of post-Hesiodic times.’ 
165 Pl. Tht. 207a; cf. Galen 15.103 referring to this passage in Plato when explaining what an element is. 
166 Pl. Tht. 207c: to;n de; dia; tẁn eJkato;n ejkeivnwn dunavmenon dielqeìn aujth̀~ th;n oujsivan (...) ajnti; 
doxastikoù tecnikovn te kai; ejpisthvmona peri; aJmavxh~ oujsiva~ gegonevnai, dia; stoiceivwn to; o{lon 
peravnanta. See Tht. 207b for a similar explanation of this theory, according to which ‘it is not possible to give 
an account of a thing with knowledge till, in addition to his true judgement, he [the unnamed supporter of the 
theory] goes right through the thing element by element…’ (oujk ei\nai ejpisthmovnw~ oujde;n levgein, pri;n a]n 
dia; tẁn stoiceivwn meta; th;~ ajlhqoù~ dovxh~ e{kaston peraivnh/ ti~). 
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of any given thing is an account, whereas a description in terms of syllables or anything larger 
is not an account yet.’167 In terms of the wagon, Hesiod knows of all its timbers whereas we 
only see the larger components; in terms of names, grammarians know the smallest 
constituents whereas we can only discern the syllables.168 Hesiodic atomism is apparently a 
model for an atomistic approach to language, as practised by the alleged linguistic experts the 
grammarians.169 
    Another example, coming from the Cratylus, shows how interconnected the several aspects 
of Hesiod ‘the intellectual’ are. Somewhere in the dialogue, Cratylus is invited to join the 
discussion so far conducted by Socrates and Hermogenes alone. Cratylus, an etymologist 
himself, who believes that the correctness of names is determined by nature, at first declines 
the invitation: surely Hermogenes and Socrates do not presume to understand everything 
about such a large and important subject so quickly? ‘No by god, I don’t’, Hermogenes 
replies, ‘but I think that Hesiod is right in saying that ‘If you can add even a little to a little, 
it’s worthwhile’.170 It is not a coincidence that Hesiod is cited here; the quote, I submit, is 
effective on at least three levels. First, it is there for the obvious purpose of inviting Cratylus 
to join them and not be shy: even if he can add only a little, his contribution is welcome. 
Second, it is also a comment on the conversation since Socrates and Hermogenes were 
engaged in a discussion of the meaning of letters, the smallest elements of language. And 
third, Hesiod, who could be interpreted as an etymologist associated with the theory of the 
correctness of names, may have been particularly appealing to Cratylus - at any rate, he 
eventually agrees to participate. 
 
It is somewhat beside the point of the present investigation to find out what Plato’s reasons 
were for referring to this atomistic Hesiod; obviously, ‘Plato manipulates Hesiod to present 
both his own ideas and to critique his predecessors’.171 The main point of this section as a 
whole is concerned with the recycling of Hesiod the archaic truth-teller. We have seen how, in 
                                               
167 Pl. Tht. 207c: th;n dia; stoiceivou dievxodon peri; eJkavstou lovgon ei\nai, th;n de; kata; sullaba;~ h] kai; kata; 
meìzon e[ti ajlogivan. 
168 Throughout the Platonic corpus, the grammatikh; tevcnh is characterized as the art of understanding how a 
limited set of letters makes up the endless mass of individual words; see Pl. Cra. 431e, Sph. 253a, Plt. 285d, and 
esp. Phlb. 17b and R. 402b.  
169 In the end, however, this proposed interpretation of logos is rejected because of the analogy with the smallest 
elements of language, i.e. its letters: it does not follow that someone who can spell (and therefore has knowledge 
of letters), also has knowledge of either the syllables or the entire name (Pl. Tht. 207c-208b). Similarly, 
knowledge of timbers will not lead to knowing a wagon. 
170 Pl. Cra. 428a: ajlla; to; toù  JHsiovdou kalw~̀ moi faivnetai e[cein, to; eij kaiv ti~ smikro;n ejpi; smikrẁ/ 
kataqeivh, prou[rgou ei\nai (referring to WD 361). 
171 In the words of Edmonds (2001), but replacing ‘the myth’ by ‘Hesiod’. See for Plato’s goals in employing 
Hesiod the etymologist and atomist Koning (2009). 
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the fifth and fourth century BC, relativists and rhetoricians denied the necessity of absolute 
truth and exploited the gap between words and their referents; language did not need to be 
true but only convincing. Thinkers like Gorgias had no use for the age-old image of truth-
telling Hesiod, who believed in an absolute truth which he separated from an untruth that 
merely resembled it, and who organized reality by carefully collecting, labeling, and 
categorizing all its parts. Prodicus, however, and (probably) other thinkers like him, continued 
to see Hesiod as a model since they believed that the elements of speech corresponded to the 
elements of reality. Through a careful investigation of the smallest components of language, 
and meticulous research into the exact meaning of words, truth was possible again. There was 
thus still use for Hesiod’s method, which remained essentially the same; only the object of 
inquiry changed, from the universe to language.172 
 
4 - Conclusion 
Hesiod was from his earliest reception onwards considered as a (natural) philosopher credited 
with a distinct view on a wide range of important questions. In the three sections above, I 
have discussed the nature of Hesiod’s philosophy from three different points of view. It 
should be clear, however, that Hesiod’s thoughts on matters of physics, his mode of revelation 
and his belief in truthful language are complementary; when understood together, they present  
a very coherent picture of Hesiod as a thinker. In this conclusion, I will point out the three 
qualities that are most characteristic of Hesiod as a philosopher.  
    The first quality is the immense magnitude of Hesiod’s scope, as demonstrated in his 
Theogony, where he describes nothing less than the complete history of the entire universe, 
from primal Chaos to present day processes of condensation and evaporation. This is what 
attracted the first cosmologists and physical theorists, as is clear from the writings of 
Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Empedocles. The ambitious claim to know everything, 
however, also triggered the first critique, coming from Xenophanes and Heraclitus, who both 
believed Hesiod’s knowledge of pavnta or pleìsta was fake in some sense (either because 
knowledge of everything was unachieveable, or because being a polymath was not enough to 
attain true knowledge). 
    Second, there is Hesiod’s method of acquiring - and passing on! - knowledge through 
enumeration; this is the ‘atomist’ approach of meticulously collecting and categorizing all 
                                               
172 As was noted before, evidence for the atomistic Hesiod is rather scarce, and it is hard to determine how 
widespread this notion was. We do know, however, that Plutarch still needed to defend Hesiod against those who 
made fun of him for his smikrologiva (‘talking about small things’, S WD 423-427).  
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constituent parts that together account for the whole. We have seen this approach to a lesser 
or larger degree in all three sections. It may appear, at first, that the method of enumeration is 
in conflict with the mode of revelation, which implies a sudden breakthrough of insight 
instead of a slow process of collecting data. This conflict is in fact notable in the two earliest 
responses described in section 2, i.e. those of Xenophanes and Heraclitus. As we have seen 
above, Xenophanes deliberately archaized Hesiod, rejecting an allegorical interpretation of his 
gods and attacking the surface reading; in keeping with this approach, he ignored Hesiod’s 
atomism (which does not seem incompatible with Xenophanes’ belief in slow progress) and 
focused on the absurdity of revelation. Heraclitus did the exact opposite and focused on 
Hesiod’s reputation as a polymath, insisting that knowing much is not enough to attain true 
knowledge, implicitly rejecting Hesiod’s truth-claim resulting from revelation. Parmenides 
and Empedocles, however, bypassed the conflict and understood the mode of revelation as a 
topos belonging to philosophical discourse: contact with the divine thus became compatible 
with a rational method for acquiring and verifying knowledge. 
    It is obvious that the method of enumeration ascribed to Hesiod was to a large degree 
suggested by the Theogony itself, a work filled with catalogues and genealogies. On the other 
hand, the method was also given shape (and evaluated) by the recipients themselves. 
Heraclitus, for instance, turns Hesiod into a polymath who endlessly collects data but does not 
come to real knowledge since he fails to look beyond the superficial many to the underlying 
one. Empedocles, however, considers Hesiod as a forerunner of his own theory that reduces 
all of physical reality to a limited number of building-blocks; enumeration is a prelude here, 
necessary but not final. Other variations of Hesiod’s method appear, but they all share the 
atomist perspective. 
    Third, there is the assumption that straightforward and unproblematic communication is 
possible, and results from a fairly transparent relationship between words and things, or an 
‘isomorphism between the taxonomy of language and the taxonomy of reality’.173 This 
philosophical quality of Hesiod is obviously connected to the method of enumeration, since 
enumeration presupposes that the things indicated are separate entities with distinct 
denotations. It is also connected to Hesiod’s reputation as a truth-teller who can distinguish 
between true things and things that only look like them. The Hesiodic belief in the one-on-one 
correspondence between words and things is particularly highlighted through investigation 
into the exact meaning of words by Prodicus and his followers. It was already foreshadowed, 
                                               
173 See above, p. 194 n.134. 
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I believe, by the Milesians, who could see the physical phenomena behind the ‘thin veil of 
mythological language’. Of course, there were also hints in Hesiod’s work itself, for instance 
through the etymologies he gives. 
    In conclusion, I wish to emphasize again that the qualities described above are only 
separated for the sake of convenience; in texts, they are usually interlocked and so form a 
coherent whole. As we have seen, tradition is an important factor here: the early construction 
of Hesiod as a (natural) philosopher is in its essence taken over by later recipients: examples 
are the snowball-like recurrence of the mode of revelation, or the new appliance of Hesiod’s 
elementary thinking to language instead of physics. Furthermore, it is clear that Hesiod’s 
philosophical reputation rests mainly on the Theogony, and that it is through the principle of 
clustering that parts of the Works and Days are occasionally brought in. Plato’s use of 
Hesiod’s verse on the wagon is a good example: a simple piece of technical advice is re-
interpreted to fit and propagate an atomistic philosophy (that was, of course, attributed to 
Hesiod in the first place). It is worth noting that such re-interpretation only happens when 
other lines can reinforce the existing picture - Hesiodic lines that could distort it (such as 
those on the dual nature of strife and shame), seem to be carefully avoided in these contexts. 
Several mechanisms of memory thus work together to preserve a consistent and univocal 










































Introduction: The Contest of Hesiod and Homer 
 
 
0 - Introduction 
This chapter forms the introduction to the final part of the book, dealing with the opposition 
of Hesiod and Homer in the Greek imagination. In the following two chapters (8 and 9), we 
will explore the main areas in which Hesiod and Homer were employed to illustrate and 
represent opposing views and values. By way of introduction, this chapter will focus on a 
traditional story that in a most explicit way presents the two poets as opposites, i.e. as actual 
opponents in a legendary singing ajgwvn or ‘contest’. 
    In the first section, we will hark back to chapter 1 and discuss the valuable concepts of 
assimilation (lumping) and differentiation (splitting) again. Naturally, we will now be mostly 
concerned with the second one (splitting), i.e. with the way Hesiod and Homer were 
distinguished and separated. We will see how differences between the poets that were 
marginalized before (see chapters 2-3) can also be blown up in order to create the largest 
possible ‘watersheds’.1 Of greatest interest, however, is the observation that such differences 
are very often conceived as polar opposites, so that Hesiod and Homer frequently come to 
represent the two utmost extremes of several evaluative measure-scales.  
    In the second section, we will examine the story of the contest between Hesiod and Homer 
at some length. We will compare the most interesting versions of and references to the ajgwvn, 
with particular attention to the most extended one, the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi. The main 
concern of this somewhat elaborate discussion will be to stress the traditional nature of the 
story and to demonstrate that the tale and its polar presentation of Hesiod and Homer can be 
shaped in several ways, creating several oppositions of the two poets. This comparatist 
approach is different from that of most modern scholarship, which often focuses mainly on 
the Certamen and its compositional problems, and tends to view the other versions as 
derivative and therefore insignificant. 
    In the third section, the results of this approach will be briefly analyzed in order to gain a 
clear view of the three main watersheds that separate Hesiod and Homer: the content of their 
                                               
1 See on this term ch. 1 and further below. 
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poetry, the socio-political orientation of their poems, and their impact on the audience. These 
are the themes that will then be further examined in the next two chapters. 
 
1 - Lumping and Splitting Again: Polar Opposition 
In Part One, we have seen that it was in many ways natural for the ancient Greeks to take 
Hesiod and Homer together and think of them as a more or less exclusive combination.2 This, 
I have shown, is a trend in more recent scholarship as well: whereas scholars in the greatest 
part of the last century used to focus on differences in the quality, outlook, genre, and subject 
matter of the poems of Hesiod and Homer, and were keen to point to Hesiod’s supposedly 
greater individuality, the pendulum has now swung to the other side, and it is more en vogue 
nowadays to emphasize the similarities.3 It is now cogently (and commonly) argued, for 
instance, that both poets represent an oral tradition going back hundreds of years, and that 
their poems complement each other in such a way as to express an archaic world view that is 
essentially the same. 
    In antiquity, this practice of ‘lumping’ can be clearly discerned. As we have seen in chapter 
1, Hesiod and Homer were viewed as contemporaries (according to some even relatives) and 
the only significant poets of the archaios or palaios age. They were both primary school 
material, and were often sung at symposia and recited at public festivals. Their language was 
thought to display great similarities, so that words and expressions from Homer’s poems 
could be explained by comparison with those of Hesiod (and vice versa). Furthermore, as 
chapter 2 has demonstrated, both poets were seen as mythographers telling (largely similar) 
stories of a bygone legendary era. At the same time, they were regarded as the two greatest 
authorities on Greek ethics and paideia in its broadest sense, and credited with an almost 
nomothetical status. And finally, as a team of two, they could represent a certain genre and be 
contrasted to other types of texts, like tragedy or historiography (chapter 3). 
    Despite the fact that it may seem obvious or natural to lump Hesiod and Homer together, 
we must remember that their togetherness is a construction, not essentially different from the 
construction of a ‘conventional block of history’ like the Middle Ages.4 We should note dat 
such (anachronistic) organizations of the past also construct the present: the term ‘Middle 
Ages’, for instance, was invented by later historians aiming to designate the long slumber of 
mankind before it was reborn into a state of intellectual and cultural elevation comparable to 
                                               
2 See esp. ch. 3, pp. 92-107. 
3 See ch. 1, pp. 30-34. 
4 Zerubavel’s example; see ch. 1, p. 25. 
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that of ancient civilization - and so their present was also defined. Similarly, the statement of 
Herodotus, grouping Hesiod and Homer together and placing them around four hundred years 
before his own time, organizes the past and informs the present: it makes Greek religion a 
relatively young phenomenon, and installs the poets as the most important authorities on the 
subject in the present (i.e. the time of Herodotus). Time and again, we can see how the poets 
of the past are shaped in accordance with present goals. See, for instance, Socrates’ famous 
claim in the Ion that Homer and Hesiod sing of subjects that are essentially the same: it is part 
of an argumentation leading up to the conclusion that the knowledge of rhapsodes and poets 
rests on maniva.5 In similar fashion, Strabo coupled Hesiod and Homer in order to defend 
Homer against charges of ignorance, while Plutarch did so in order to create a unified picture 
of Greek education, and Hippias as part of a demonstration of the all-inclusive scope of the 
tevcnh of the sophists.6 The ‘lumping’ of Hesiod and Homer thus depends to a large degree on 
purposes in the present. 
 
Different authors, however, have different purposes at different times. It is thus not surprising 
that on numerous occasions Hesiod and Homer are in fact presented as ‘split’ instead of 
‘lumped’. In Time Maps, where these terms are used for the process of periodization, 
Zerubavel vividly describes the mechanism behind the technique of splitting: ‘In order to 
promote the sociomnemonic vision of two contiguous yet conventionally ‘different’ chunks of 
history as actually discrete, we tend to inflate the imaginary divides supposedly separating 
them from each other. As a result, crossing such ‘historical Rubicons’ transforms metrically 
small steps in physical time into topologically giant leaps in social time’.7 What we do when 
we ‘split’, therefore, is to focus on ‘watersheds’ and make them as large as possible.8 
    This process can mutatis mutandis also be seen at work where the sociomnemonic 
construction of Hesiod is concerned. The small gaps separating Hesiod and Homer can be 
blown up into giant ravines by searching for and emphasizing the differences between them.    
But instead of focusing on watershed moments in time, like the Battle of Marathon (or the 
discovery of America, the example Zerubavel himself employs), the splitting of Hesiod and 
Homer employs watersheds of a different kind. These ‘imaginary divides’ could be (and 
                                               
5 Pl. Ion 531c; see ch. 5, p. 153. 
6 Strabo 1.2.13-14 and 1.2.35 (ch. 3, pp. 103-107), Plu. Mor. 36A-B (ch. 2, pp. 85-86), Hippias DK 86 B 6 (ch. 
3, pp. 95-96). 
7 Zerubavel (2003) 88. 
8 ‘In order to help maintain the illusion of wide historical gaps actually separating ‘different’ periods from one 
another, we thus mnemonically inflate the distance between everything that happened prior to the particular 
‘watersheds’ marking their boundaries and everything that has happened since’, ibid. 
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were) found in the poems themselves, and to a considerable degree in the traditions 
surrounding both the poems and their authors. The watersheds are concerned with differences 
of style, content, socio-political orientation and philosophical attitude that are believed to be 
present in the poems.9 And so the notion of Hesiod and Homer as two distinct and separate 
entities could emerge. 
    Very often (though by no means exclusively so) watersheds are marked by opposites on 
either side. The following dichotomies, somewhat exaggerated for the sake of clarity (and 
which do not necessarily reflect my views on the matter), are familiar to everyone: before 490 
the Greeks were strictly polis-minded, but after the Persian Wars acquired a sense of 
nationalism; hellenistic literature, in contrast to classical, is not creative but imitative; Rome 
was a republic before the battle of Actium, and an empire after; with the fall of Rome, 
Western Europe descended from high culture into barbary; the discoveries of Galileo turned 
our world-view from geocentric to heliocentric, etc. This recurrent polarizing characteristic of 
the watershed calls for two relevant observations. First, there is the rather obvious one that 
such contrasts are greatly oversimplifying - but this is exactly what is necessary for cutting up 
the past into convenient ‘chunks’: the simplification makes it understandable and useable in 
the present (i.e. the time in which the splitting takes place). The second is that the oppositions 
are framed in ‘modern terms’, by which I mean terms of the present. Splitting uses 
oppositions that are ‘actual’, i.e. relevant to this day and this world. Nationalism, for instance, 
was a term unknown to the Greeks, and the scholar-poets of Alexandria would not apply the 
creative-imitative dichotomy to their own work. It is present-day interests that create the 
watersheds, and we use present-day terminology for framing the oppositions that we project 
back into the past.10 
    These two observations can also be made with regard to texts in which Hesiod is opposed 
to Homer. First of all, in focusing on differences and downplaying similarities, the Greeks 
considerably oversimplified matters. But the skewed relation between reality and imagination 
does not disqualify the imaginary divide, for ‘neither whatever is out there in reality nor 
actual linguistic usage as a dynamic semantic system of continuums and networks can prevent 
imaginary binary constructions from being developed and meaningfully deployed’;11 it is the 
construction of Hesiod with which I am concerned. And second, the Greeks used their 
                                               
9 Criteria in fact not unlike those used by modern scholars up to the 1970s (and sometimes beyond) to separate 
and oppose the two poets. 
10 I leave aside the observation that the opposites are in most cases not opposites in a strict sense, i.e. exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive. See on this e.g. Needham (1987), esp. his chapters on lexicology and complementarity. 
11 Sluiter and Rosen (2006) 5 on the ancient representation of city and countryside. 
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present-day oppositions to set Hesiod and Homer against each other. This can clearly be 
demonstrated (as we will see in the next chapters) by their employment of such well-known 
oppositions as ruled versus ruler or ars versus ingenium when framing the opposition of 
Hesiod versus Homer.  
    Our specific interest, the opposition of Hesiod and Homer by the Greeks, makes it 
necessary to further consider - if only briefly - this notion of polarity (which is of less interest 
to Zerubavel). Whether or not the Greeks, as a people, really entertained a more than average 
propensity toward polar, binary thinking, as is often maintained,12 it nonetheless remains true 
that they did apply such polarity in their construction of Hesiod and Homer.13 
    Two characteristics of polar thinking are particularly relevant to us. First, there is the 
strategy of defining one pole in terms of the other, i.e. through denying or inverting qualities 
that belong to the one. Hesiod, as we will see later, is often described as the anti-Homer, that 
is, a poet with qualities opposite to those of Homer, or the non-Homer, that is, a poet without 
any Homeric qualities - and it can be the other way around. Here too we perhaps encounter 
the Greek ‘ideological habit of polarization that was a hallmark of their mentality and 
culture’.14 Hesiod is thus often (negatively) defined by Homer.15 Second, it should be noted 
that polarization is subject to change over time: since oppositions are projected backwards (as 
described above), different present-day dichotomies cause oppositions that are framed in a 
different way; this peculiar characteristic can perhaps be most clearly demonstrated with the 
Greek view of the inspiration of Hesiod and Homer, as described in chapter 9.16 
                                               
12 See e.g. Lloyd (1966) 7 ‘Few of those who study early Greek thought can fail to be struck by the recurrent 
appeal to pairs of opposites of various sorts both in general cosmological doctrines and in accounts of particular 
natural phenomena’ (cf. Philippson 1966 685); Cartledge (1993) 16 ‘the hypothesis of structural dualism does 
(…) have a peculiar purchase on the culture of the ancient Greeks’; Clay (2003) 9 ‘the Greeks (…) seem to 
construct their views of the world in terms of binary oppositions’. 
13 Oppositional thinking may be even stronger in the case of the poets. Needham (1987) believes that thinking in 
oppositional schemes may be ‘a propensity of the human mind’ (29), though he also suggests that ‘the concept 
may respond to an intellectual necessity in coming to terms with representations (ibid., italics mine).’ 
14 Cartledge (1993) 11. He continues: ‘Moreover, [the Greeks] pressed polarization to its (ideo)logical limits. 
Thus whereas Greeks were ideally seen as not-barbarians, barbarians were equally envisaged as being precisely 
what Greeks were not’. 
15 The dynamics of polar thinking are strongly reminiscent of the theory of alterity, according to which one 
group, also called the Subject or the Self, describes and visualizes the unknown and alien group, also called the 
Object or the Other, in terms of polar opposition: the Object is given shape by denying or inverting the 
characteristics the Subject ascribes to itself - hence ‘othering’ also shapes and informs the identity of the Self. 
Just as in the process of periodization, the complexity of reality is thus greatly reduced (see on this last point 
Kommers 1991 111). The concept of the Other is of course of limited applicability since we are not dealing with 
a subject-object relationship but one that involves three parties: a) the Greeks opposing b) Hesiod and c) Homer. 
16 Again, one is reminded of the theory of alterity, since the Other can develop over time; see e.g. McGrane 
(1989), who has shown that different times produce different Others: from the Renaissance onwards, he argues, 
the other developed from infernal pagan to potential Christian to ignorant savage to a representation of historical 
evolution. Historical developments change the views of Self and Other (cf. also Fabian 2002), and this 
mechanism can also be seen in the splitting of Hesiod and Homer. 
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    Oppositions between Hesiod and Homer in the Greek imagination are not, as some scholars 
would have it, scarce or exceptional;17 they recur often throughout antiquity, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, whether as a casual remark or an elaborate treatment. The most 
elaborate and most explicit of them all is the so-called Certamen, an account of the story in 
which Hesiod and Homer are actual opponents facing each other head on in a poetic 
competition. A close investigation of this story will not only illustrate the polar construction 
of Hesiod and Homer by the Greeks, but also indicate the watersheds that will be further 
examined in the two following chapters. 
 
2 - The Tradition of the Contest  
It is extremely likely that stories of a contest between Hesiod and Homer emerged at a rather 
early date, i.e. the sixth century or even earlier.18 Circumstantial evidence is all we have, but 
its cumulative power seems decisive. First of all, we have already seen that Hesiod and 
Homer were both enshrined in an archaios age, and that most Greeks believed them to have 
been (at least roughly) contemporary;19 it is only natural, then, that the Greeks at a certain 
point in time started wondering about how to imagine this historical coexistence, and - equally 
natural, perhaps - that they conceived this coexistence in terms of competition.20 Second, 
there is some (early) evidence for rivalry between Hesiodic and Homeric rhapsodes, for 
instance in Plato’s Ion, which might have given rise to a story of contest.21  
    Third, there are numerous suggestions in the work of Hesiod itself. It has been noted that 
Hesiod himself had described a competition in wisdom between two seers,22 but it is far more 
                                               
17 Cf. e.g. Latte (1946) 163 claiming that Hesiod ‘bleibt noch so stark in der bunten Welt des Mythos befangen’ 
that later Greeks did not notice the ‘grundlegende Unterschied’ between Hesiod and Homer. 
18 Among scholars pushing the origin of the story back to the sixth century are Schmid-Stählin (1929) 254, who 
believes that the story was originally in poetic form, invented by Hesiodic poets fighting for Anerkennung, 
Skiadas (1965) 41 speaking of ‘allgemeines Erzählgut’, Froleyks (1973) 59, Richardson (1981), and Lamberton 
(1988) 6 ‘the story is (…) doubtless to be traced right back to the archaic period’; others think a fifth-century 
(Athenian) origin is more likely: see e.g. Graziosi (2002) 102. I strongly reject the view advocated by Nietzsche 
(1873) and Busse (1909), later reinvigorated by Hess (1960, though he is more dogmatic in some places than in 
others), that the fourth-century rhetorician Alcidamas had invented the contest of the two poets (see on 
Alcidamas further below).  
19 See ch. 1, pp. 35-40. 
20 On ‘the pervasive Greek impulse towards competition’, see Griffith (1990) 188 with the bibliography 
contained in notes 9 and 10. 
21 In Pl. Ion 531a-e Ion claims he knows only Homer’s poetry and not that of Hesiod; in his opinion, Homer 
wrote ‘better’ (a[meinon, 531d). Perhaps the rivalry between Hesiodic and Homeric rhapsodes was exploited in 
Cratinus’ Archilochoi as well (see Whittaker 1935 185-186); in Teleclides’ Hesiodoi, the chorus may have 
consisted of Hesiodic rhapsodes (cf. Kassel-Austin IV p. 121).  
22 This is the riddle-agon between Calchas and Mopsus, described in Hesiod’s Melampodia. In this version of the 
agon, Hesiod has Calchas ask Mopsus about the amount of figs in a wild fig tree. When Mopsus names the exact 
number (999), Calchas dies (MW 278 = Strabo 14.1.27). Maehler (1963) 16 already pointed out that Homer too 
refers to aoidoi competing (see the story of Thamyris in Il. 2.594-600). 
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interesting that there are some potentially rivalrous references to the poems of Homer in both 
the Theogony and Works and Days.23 Furthermore, Hesiod himself claims that kovto~ 
(‘anger’) and fqovno~ (‘spite’) exist between people of the same profession, and explicitly 
states that that maxim holds true for his own trade as well.24 Moreover, he gives us an account 
of his own victory at a poetic competition (Works and Days 654-659); and even though the 
opponent is not named, Hesiod nonetheless may suggest that it was Homer.25 Finally, in a 
fragment attributed to Hesiod, the poet speaks of a rhapsodic event in which both he and 
Homer participated: ‘In Delos for the first time Homer and I, bards, / sang, stitching together 
our song with new hymns, / of Phoebus Apollo with his golden sword, whom Leto bore’.26 
The ‘first time’ even suggests that the paths of the poets had crossed more often.27 
Incidentally, Graziosi’s important remark that in the biographical tradition Hesiod and Homer 
never exchange gifts or favours between them (whereas they do appear as friends or 
benefactors towards other poets) may also be an indication of a long tradition of rivalry. The 
cumulative weight of the observations above makes it likely that the story of a contest goes 
back to the fifth or sixth century at least.28 
    Many Greek authors refer to the legendary duel of Hesiod and Homer, especially in late 
antiquity.29 The numerous versions that have come down to us show some interesting 
differences, but they all have one thing in common: Hesiod beats Homer. The decision to 
                                               
23 One of those can be found in the enigmatic claim of the Muses to speak both truth and falsehood (Th. 27-28); 
see for a discussion of the anti-Homeric reading of these verses ch. 9, pp. 262-263. See also Rousseau (1996) on 
the ‘polémique’ (166) between the Homeric and Hesiodic traditions present in the proem of the WD. 
24 WD 26: ‘… and beggar begrudges beggar, and poet poet’ (kai; ptwco;~ ptwcẁ/ fqonevei kai; ajoido;~ ajoidẁ/).  
25 Heldmann (1982) 18 is sceptical because Homer is not explicitly named, but he ignores the several (potentially 
polemical) references to the Iliad in this particular passage (the so-called nautilia) of the WD; see on these e.g 
Nagy (1990) 77-78, Rosen (1997) 477-479 and Steiner (2007) 182-185 (Thalmann 1984 153 rather oddly 
believes the reference is meant to assimilate rather than contrast, and ‘gives [Hesiod’] something of the aura of 
the epic hero’); to these should be added the obviously Hesiodic reference in Thgn 1.1197-1202 who opposes 
nautilia to agriculture. Notopoulos (1960) on the other hand believes (though for what reasons in unclear) that 
the song Hesiod performed in Chalcis was Homer-like both in length (‘the average length of a Homeric aristeia 
episode’, 182 n.18) and subject (the glorious deeds of the hero Amphidamas, ibid.). 
26 Fr. 357 MW: ejn Dhvlw/ tovte prẁton ejgw; kai;   {Omhro~ ajoidoi; / mevlpomen, ejn nearoì~ u{mnoi~ rJavyante~ 
ajoidhvn, / Foìbon   jApovllwna crusavoron, o}n tevke Lhtwv. 
27 The fact that Hesiod and Homer are working on one song together (as has been stressed most recently by 
Collins 2004 181) does not mean they were not opponents (as e.g. Heldmann 1982 16-17 seems to think): ‘relay’ 
performances were just as competitive as the duel we see in the Certamen (cf. Nagy 2002 18-22). Graziosi 
(2002) 34 rightly remarks that the epigram may have been the result of an ‘attempt, on the part of the rhapsodes 
themselves, to represent Homer and Hesiod in their own image.’ 
28 See for other arguments against the position of Nietzsche c.s., such as the earlier attestation of motifs present 
in the Certamen, and its resemblance to Aristophanes’ Frogs, e.g. Vogt (1959) and Rosen (2004). 
29 I have been able to find thirteen references in total: 1) the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi (Allen V 225-238); 2) 
S Pi. Nem. 2.1 (Philochorus); 3) Plu. Mor. 153F - 154A; 4) Plu. Mor. 674F; 5) D.Chrys. 2.2-13; 6) Lucian VH 
2.22; 7) Philostr. Her. 18.2; 8) Them. Or. 30 348; 9) Lib. Decl. 1.65 (Ap. Socr.) Foerster 5 50; 10) Procl. Vit. 
Hom. 27.11-19 Wil.; 11) Tz. Vit. Hes. p. 48.26-49.11 Wil.; 12) five short references in Tzetzes’ scholia on the 
WD (Gaisf. III 144.31-146.6; 159.1; 161.1-8; 164.2-12; 304.19-27); 13) Eust. 1.6.38 Van der Valk. Most of these 
texts are collected by Allen (V 218-221). On the contest’s popularity in later antiquity see below, pp. 223-230. 
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proclaim Hesiod the victor was considered highly remarkable, and could still move Tzetzes to 
exclaim ‘O, what insanity! O, what folly! O, what lack of education! Excellence of words, and 
education, aren’t you crying?’30 There can be no doubt that the surprising outcome is by far 
the most important element of the story: if Homer had beaten Hesiod, there would be no story 
at all. What is of greatest relevance to us, however, is that most of the writers reporting the 
contest feel that the ajprosdovkhton of Hesiod’s victory needs an explanation in some form or 
another31 - and this makes them shape the contest in a way that suits them best, adapting, for 
instance, the course of the duel or the identity of the judge. It is these explanations that cast an 
interesting light on the opposition between Hesiod and Homer. 
    We will now, in the following two sections, proceed to a brief discussion of the most 
interesting versions of the contest. The first and most elaborate section will deal with the 
Certamen, and the second with the other accounts. This is not to imply that the Certamen is 
the most important or most authoritative version, and that the others are in some way 
derivative and less interesting. On the contrary: in my view, all versions contribute equally to 
the tradition of the contest and are equally significant in shaping the opposition between the 
poets. The special treatment of the Certamen is chosen only for reasons of convenience, since 
it is by far the most complete and detailed version; a somewhat longer summary of the work, 
followed by a brief analysis, makes it possible to treat the others in a more cursory way. 
 
2.1 - The Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi 
The date and authorship of the Certamen are unknown. The terminus post quem of the text as 
it has come down to us must be around 160 AD, since emperor Hadrian is mentioned              
(  jAdrianoù, line 33).32 However, since the text is an obvious compilation,33 much work has 
been done to trace its sources. As early as 1873 Nietzsche suggested that the Certamen goes 
back to a 4th-century work called Mouseion, authored by the Gorgias-trained rhetor 
Alcidamas. He made a good case,34 which was later considerably strengthened by the find of 
                                               
30 Gaisf. III.164.10-11:  ]W th̀~ ajbelteriva~!  ]W th̀~ ajnoiva~!   ]W th̀~ ajpaideusiva~!   ]W  lovgou ajreth; kai; 
paideiva, oujci; dakruvete;  
31 As does Heldmann (1982) 64, who (apparently in defense of Homer) thinks the victory can be partially 
explained by Homer’s relatively young age. 
32 The lines refer to the edition by Allen. 
33 The first to use the term for the Certamen was Wilamowitz (1916a) 396, and he is almost universally followed 
(cf. e.g. Hess 1960 53 ‘ein blosser Kompilator’, West 1967 esp. 444-449 and again in 2003 299: ‘he was no more 
than a compiler’). It is unclear to me why Lefkowitz (1981) 8 n.27 believes it is ‘misleading to think of [the 
author of the Certamen] simply as a ‘compiler’’; perhaps it is because she does not want us to ‘regard his work 
as naïve’ (19). But in principle the work can be both a compilation and sophisticated at the same time.  
34 The main arguments for Alcidamantine authorship, that still hold today, are 1) Stobaeus’ comment ejk toù   
jAlkidavmanto~ mouseivou on Cert. 78-79 (Stob. 120.3); 2) the fact that the Certamen itself mentions Alcidamas’ 
INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEST OF HESIOD AND HOMER 
 215
two papyri.35 It is therefore now commonly (and I think rightly) assumed that at least part of 
the Certamen derives from a very similar-looking work composed by Alcidamas.36 As I have 
argued above, Alcidamas in turn probably used a tradition that is considerably older still. 
    The text now known as the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi is far more accurately described 
by its Greek title, peri;   JOmhvrou kai;   JHsiovdou kai; toù gevnou~ kai; ajgwǹo~ aujtwǹ (‘On 
Homer and Hesiod and their descent and contest’), for it deals with more than a poetic contest 
alone. The work begins with an introduction about the origin of the poets (focusing on parents 
and place of birth, lines 1-53), then proceeds to the actual contest (54-214), and ends with an 
account of the rest of the life of both Hesiod and Homer, fitted to a roughly similar story-
pattern (oracle, death, epitaph, 215-338).37 We will later see how the first and last part relate 
to the middle piece, and first briefly describe the course of the contest and its most interesting 
peculiarities. 
    The ajgwvn narrative begins with some remarks on the occasion of the contest - the funeral 
games of Amphidamas, king of Euboea (62-66) - and on the installment of the jury, which 
consists of some anonymous men of distinction and the new king Panedes, brother of the 
deceased (68-70). This particular contest is said to be not about strength and speed but about 
sofiva (65), a notion neatly described by Griffith as covering three categories: ‘knowledge 
and factual accuracy’, ‘moral and educational integrity’, and ‘technical skill and 
aesthetic/emotional impact’.38 It is important to note that the very sentence introducing the 
contest proper immediately gives away the outcome: ‘they say that after both poets had in a 
                                                                                                                                                   
Mouseion as a source (w{~ fhsin   jAlkidavma~ ejn Mouseivw/, 239-40); 3) certain ideological connections between 
the text and Alcidamas, esp. the emphasis on spoken, extemporaneous speech (cf. e.g. Richardson 1981 5 on the 
‘prominence to the value of improvisation’). Alcidamas, pupil of Gorgias, was a great proponent of the spoken 
versus the written style; see for his debate with Isocrates on this matter O’Sullivan (1992) ch. 2, esp. 23-31.  
35 One is the anonymous Flinders Petrie Papyrus (P. Petrie 1.25.1, published 1891) that contains - in more or less 
recognizable state - Cert. 72-101 and is dated to the third century BC. The other is the Michigan-papyrus 
(Michigan 2745, published 1925), dated to the 2nd or 3rd century AD, which contains the whole of the Certamen 
and ends with the remark ]damanto~ peri omhrou. 
36 Cf. e.g. Kirk (1950) arguing carefully that Alcidamas ‘may have transmitted’ certain parts of the contest but 
did not invent it (155), Renehan (1971) 103-104 preferring to see Alcidamas as the author over pronouncing the 
Michigan-papyrus an ‘obscure piece of Greek of unknown authorship’, O’Sullivan (1992) 64. Despite the 
evidence, however, difficulties remain. One minor problem concerns the title of Alcidamas’ work, which is 
given as Mouseion or On Homer, although it may be the same. A major problem is the exact relation of the 
Certamen to Alcidamas’ composition; there is (so far) no way of knowing how it has changed, although the 
rather poor quality of the Certamen (which seems unworthy of Alcidamas, cf. e.g. Kirk 1950 and Dodds 1952) 
suggests it must have changed considerably. Still, it is over-cautious to state that the ‘theory that Alcidamas’ 
Mouseion was the basic source for the Certamen is a mere possibility’ (Koniaris 1971 129).  
37 Cf. West (1967) 447, who attributes the pattern to Alcidamas. 
38 Griffith (1990) 188-189; according to Snell (1955) 414 the term sophos was used by ancient Greeks for 
anyone who could reach his goal by certain means.  
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wonderful way contended for the prize, Hesiod won in the following manner.’39 The narrator 
obviously knows he cannot surprise the audience with the outcome, so he concentrates on the 
spectacular course of the contest (qaumastẁ~) and the way (trovpo~) Hesiod’s victory came 
about. That is what makes his story interesting. 
    Hesiod takes the initiative for the actual contest. He simply ‘walks up to the middle’ 
(proelqovnta eij~ to; mevson, 72)40 and begins (apparently sua sponte) to present his opponent 
with some riddles and questions.41 Homer then answers these questions successfully, that is to 
say, in a way that wins favour with the audience.42 This pattern - Hesiod starts asking 
questions - Homer answers them - approval of Homer - repeats itself five times, each time 
with a different type of riddle.43 This cycle forms the backbone of the ajgwvn, so that it is 
convenient to present an overview of it: 
 
Round Type of riddle Hesiod takes initiative Approval of Homer  




answer’ (2 x) 
proelqovnta eij~ to; 
mevson... (72) 
sfodrẁ~ fasi qaumasqh̀nai 
tou;~ stivcou~ uJpo; tẁn   
JEllhvnwn w{ste crusoù~ aujtou;~ 
prosagoreuqhǹai... (90-92)44 




ajpovrwn (1 x) 
oJ de;   JHsivodo~ ajcqesqei;~ 
ejpi; th̀/   JOmhvrou eujhmeriva/ 
w{rmhsen... (94-95) 
kalw~̀ de; kai; ejn touvtoi~ 
ajpanthvsanto~... (102) 





w{rmhsen oJ   JHsivodo~...  
(103) 
pro;~ pavnta de; toù   JOmhvrou 
kalw~̀ ajpanthvsanto~... (138) 




logistikovn (1 x) 
pavlin fhsi;n oJ   JHsivodo~... 
(138-139) 
kata; pavnta de; toù   JOmhvrou 
uJperteroùnto~... (148-149)  
                                               
39 Allen 70-72: ajmfotevrwn de; tẁn poihtẁn qaumastẁ~ ajgwnisamevnwn nikh̀saiv fasi to;n  JHsivodon to;n 
trovpon toùton: 
40 The standard expression for those who wish to speak in public on topics of common interest (on to; mevson see 
Détienne 1990 83-98). 
41 According to Rosen (1997) 475 Hesiod ‘orchestrates’ the contest, which ‘seems to imply that his poetry was 
felt to be inherently didactic and philosophical, whereas Homer’s was less explicitly so, and so had to prove 
itself on this score’. But this does not explain the preponderance of Homeric themes, nor the attention paid to the 
ajmfivboloi gnwvmai which test poetic skill instead of wisdom. Hesiod probably goes first for narratological 
reasons (see further below).  
42 An unspecified group, called oiJ   {Ellhne~ pavnte~ (176) and oiJ   {Ellhne~ (205). They are presumably just a 
crowd of people come to see the spectacle, called ‘Greeks’ because they came from different poleis. On the other 
hand, the author may imply that we need to broaden our scope and understand ‘all Greeks’ of all times and 
places.  
43 Usually, in verbal duels, the future loser is the first to take the floor, and the future winner plays his part more 
fittingly (see Froleyks 1973 385). It may be that the author reversed roles to (further) indicate the remarkable 
course of the contest, or that he made use of a version of the contest in which the outcome was not revealed 
beforehand (so that he could still surprise his audience). 
44 This is the only case in which the author reports the approval on hearsay (‘they say the lines were so intensely 
admired…’).  
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wisdom’ (8 x) 
fqonwǹ oJ   JHsivodo~ 
a[rcetai pavlin... (149-
150) 
oiJ me;n   {Ellhne~ pavnte~ to;n    
  {Omhron ejkevleuon 
stefanoùn... (177-178) 
 
The author is remarkably faithful to his own scheme;45 keeping to the pattern was apparently 
the only way to impose some sort of unity on the heterogeneous material.46 It is obvious that 
the author, in trying to make his story as ‘wonderful’ as possible, collected all the riddles and 
questions he could think of47 and presented them together in the new context of the Certamen, 
taking very little trouble to connect the different rounds in an organic fashion.48 Nonetheless, 
we can find a modest crescendo in the series of riddles. From kata; pavnta de; toù   JOmhvrou 
uJperteroùnto~ (‘Homer was superior in everything’, round 4) we can deduce that Homer 
proved himself better than Hesiod during the entire contest,49 and it is this remark that paves 
the way for the even stronger oiJ me;n   {Ellhne~ pavnte~ to;n   {Omhron ejkevleuon stefanoùn 
(‘all the Greeks said that Homer should be crowned’) after round 5. Evidently, the story 
reaches some kind of climax here. 
    It is at this point of the story that king Panedes interferes with the proceedings and the 
pattern described above is abandoned. It is the king’s role in the story to counterbalance the 
opinion of the crowd, since he is only mentioned in those instances where the audience 
attempts to usurp the function of judge.50 The king (it is unclear what has happened to the 
                                               
45 A division in five parts, with an additional part consisting of the recital, is the most obvious and natural one 
(cf. Hess 1960 2-7). I do not understand Busse’s quadripartite division, nor do I see how the reductionism of 
Wilamowitz (1916a) 403 and Froleyks (1973) 54, who both assume an (originally) tripartite division (so that the 
poetic contest matches that of a wrestling match), can help to understand the Certamen better.  
46 The structure is crude, but it is surely over-critical to say here that ‘the compiler of the Certamen fails to 
subordinate his material to any consistent plan’ (West 1967 449, see also Heldmann 1982 36 ‘Ein Kompositions-
prinzip fehlt in dem uns erhaltenen Certamen’). 
47 Cf. Froleyks (1973) 58, who recognizes almost all of the elements of the traditional Weisheitsagon in the 
Certamen. 
48 There are at least four signs of his carelessness: 1) eye-catching word-repetition (though not a symptom of 
sloppiness per se): in rounds 2 and 3 the same phrases are used for both initiative and approval; 2) the 
disproportional distribution of the questions: the rounds consist of 2, 1, 14, 1, and 8 specimens of the different 
types of riddles; 3) the heterogeneity of the riddles itself, ranging from the ‘questions of wisdom’ from round 
five to the ‘twofold sentences’ from round three; 4) general sloppiness: in round 2 an ejperwvthsi~ tẁn ajpovrwn 
is announced (line 95), but only one a[poron is in fact treated; the provblhma logistikovn is a bit of an odd one 
out since it presents the only instance where the author interrupts the narrative to doubt the quality of Homer’s 
answer, even though the audience continues to admire Homer (but this could be a Byzantine addition, as West 
2003 335 n.13 suggests); and in round five we meet a question that we had already encountered in the first round 
(tiv qnhtoì~ kavlliston, 85 = ti dh; qnhtois̀i kavlliston, 153-154). 
49 kata; pavnta cannot refer to the fourth round alone, since there is only one question being answered there. 
50 After the fifth round, ‘the Greeks all called for Homer to be garlanded as victor’ (oiJ me;n   {Ellhne~ pavnte~ 
to;n   {Omhron ejkevleuon stefanoùn, 176-177), but Panedes then decides the poets should perform their finest 
passage; after that, again ‘the Greeks … called for him [Homer] to be awarded the victory’ (oiJ   {Ellhne~ ... 
ejkevleuon didovnai th;n nivkhn, 205-207), and Panedes chooses to award Hesiod the prize. The differing opinions 
of the crowd and the king reflect an age-old discussion about who is more able to judge poetry, cf. Pl. Lg. 659a 
‘… a judge won’t be doing his job properly if he reaches his verdict by listening to the audience and lets himself 
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other judges appointed in line 68-70)51 now asks the contestants to recite ‘the very best piece 
of their work’ (to; kavlliston ejk tẁn ijdivwn poihmavtwn, 178). For the first time, Hesiod is 
now acting on another’s impulse; ironically enough, it is this part of the contest that will lead 
to his victory. 
    Hesiod picks as his finest Works and Days 383-392, a poetic piece of advice about the right 
time and modus operandi in the business of ploughing, sowing, and harvesting.52 The passage 
underlines like no other Hesiod’s image of the peace-loving farmer poet; it is difficult to find 
another passage in his work that is so quiet and peaceful. We should note that this passage, 
which was very well-known in antiquity, represents in a sense a new beginning in the Works 
and Days, since it appears at the head of the section actually dealing with works and days;53 
the selection of these lines suggests that we are dealing here with the essential Hesiod.54 
Homer cites a passage from Iliad 13, describing the two Ajaxes and their close-knit battle-
ranks, eager for war.55 The contrast between the content of the two recitals could not be 
greater: whereas Hesiod sang of the calm serenity of agriculture, Homer’s words almost 
explode with imminent violence.56 Whereas the efforts of the farmer are aimed at preserving 
life, the povno~ (‘toil’, Cert. 204) of the warriors is to destroy it (mavch fqeisivmbroto~, 199). 
The farmer works alone, naked, in all his freedom; the warriors on the other hand are covered 
in bronze from tip to toe and packed together so tightly that their bodies, helmets and shields 
                                                                                                                                                   
be thrown off balance by the yelling of the mob and his own lack of training…’. Panedes’ role in the Certamen 
and the parallel from the Laws (as well as the variant readings Panides in Philostr. Her. 43.7 and Paneides in Tz. 
Vit. Hes.) make it clear that his name means ‘he who knows all’, not ‘he who pleases all’ (so Clay 2004 76) - it is 
his very function not to please all. I do not agree with Heldmann, who believes the Panedes-scene did not form 
part of the Certamen in its earliest form (the so-called ‘Urcertamen’) because he thinks the figure of the judging 
king was only introduced as a response to the contest-version of Dio (on which see further below).  
51 As the new king and the brother of the deceased, it is natural enough for him to take the initiative; still, the 
disappearance of the other judges suggests an oversight by the compiler. 
52 The second half of the last line (Cert. 189) deviates a little from our WD-text. The selected verses are cut off 
somewhat prematurely, presumably to prevent Hesiod from starting to address Perses in the ajgwvn. 
53 Line 383’s appearance as a ‘first line’ is stressed by the OCT printing an extra space between lines 382 and 
383. In the edition of West (1978) line 383 is (by chance or not) at the top of a new page. See also Tsagalis 
(2007) 95 and Lucian Hes. 1 for the Pleiads marking the start of the agricultural section in the WD. 
54 There appears to be little support in the text for the claim of Graziosi (2002) 175 that the ancients (like the 
moderns) regarded the Th. as Hesiod’s most important work.  
55 The song of Homer in the Certamen is actually made up of two passages from Il. 13.126-133 and 339-344. 
That is what inspired Nietzsche (1870) 528-532, who thought the recitals in the Certamen were rather short, to 
claim that the actual recital would have covered all of Il. 13.126-344, and Hesiod’s piece would have been about 
300 lines as well. Tzetzes too (on whose version see p. 230 below) assumed that the original recitals would have 
been considerably longer than in the Certamen. 
56 It is interesting to mention, in this respect, the oft-heard claim (exemplified by Allen 1915 95) that the Iliad 
and the Th. are so alike (a claim often based on Hesiod’s supposed ‘borrowing’ of epic diction from the Iliad), 
whereas ‘points of contact between the WD and Homer are few’ (96); see also Sellschop (1934) for such claims 
on the basis of stylistic analysis, and Edwards (1971) 23-39 demonstrating that of Hesiod’s poems the Th. is 
closest to Homeric language. See also Clay (2003), who argues throughout her book that the WD characterizes 
itself in opposition to the Th. (itself an older notion, cf. e.g. Sihler 1902 xxvi ‘Theogony and Opera illumine one 
another’). 
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are in constant contact with each other. Moreover, the universal and timeless ‘law of the 
plains’ (pedivwn novmo~, 185) laid down by Hesiod represents the reassuringly unchanging 
ways of the fields and their workers, whereas an uncertain and dire fate hangs over the head 
of Homer’s heroes.57 
    Like the previous five, the sixth (and last) round comes to an end with a positive evaluation 
of Homer by the audience: ‘in this round too did the Greeks praise Homer, holding him in 
great admiration’ (qaumavsante~ de; kai; ejn touvtw/ to;n  {Omhron oiJ   {Ellhne~ ejphv/noun, 205-
6). Panedes, however, grants Hesiod the victory, saying that ‘it is right for someone making a 
case for farming and peace to win, and not someone expounding on wars and slaughter’ 
(divkaion ei\nai to;n ejpi; gewrgivan kai; eijrhvnhn prokalouvmenon nikaǹ, ouj to;n polevmou~ 
kai; sfaga;~ diexiovnta, 208-210).58 It is not surprising that Panedes, whose brother has just 
been killed in war, should make such a decision; or perhaps the newly appointed king uses the 
contest to announce a change of politics: during his reign, Euboea will promote peace and 
avoid war.59 However that may be, Hesiod wins. He inscribes his prize, a bronze tripod, with 
a victory epigram and dedicates it to the Muses on Helicon (210-214). And so the ajgwvn ends.  
 
In order to fully understand what the Certamen can tell us about the relationship between 
Hesiod and Homer, I believe it should be compared to other stories of the contest, which all 
together make up the tradition of the story. Before we proceed to have a look at the other 
versions, however, there are two points to be made beforehand: one deals with the way the 
two poets are ‘typical’, i.e. recognizable as the two poets with their traditional characteristics; 
the other is concerned with the Homerocentric interpretation of the text. 
    To start with the latter: almost all scholars studying the Certamen believe the work is more 
about Homer than about Hesiod. There is some reason for this: the work may go back to a 
treatise called On Homer, and the first and the last parts of the Certamen (those dealing with 
the origin and life of the poets) pay considerably more attention to Homer than to Hesiod.60 
More importantly, however, most scholars believe that the author was pro-Homer: Homer is 
                                               
57 The many oppositions between the two passages indicate that there is more going on than the mere antithesis 
war - peace; Homer’s passage is, I suggest, a specific response to Hesiod’s lines (which is the usual practice in 
verbal contests, see Froleyks 1973 392). 
58 According to Graziosi (2002) 182, it is only at the end of the contest that Homer is defined as a war-poet. But 
this is only true in an explicit sense, for Homer has throughout the contest been seen to be especially 
knowledgeable about the Trojan War (see further below) - his characterization as a war-poet has thus been 
foreshadowed. 
59 Busse (1909) was the first (of many) to see Alcidamas’ pacifism reflected in Panedes’ judgment (cf. Dornseiff 
1944 10). Incidentally, it is atypical for a judge in a verbal contest to clarify his decision (cf. Froleyks 1973 392). 
60 Hesiod’s origin is discussed in 5 lines (2-6), Homer’s in 37 (7-43); Hesiod’s life and death are covered in 45 
lines (210-254), Homer’s in 85 (254-338). This amounts to a disproportional 50 versus 122 lines. 
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credited with several mythical and divine ancestors, during the contest is ever more 
abundantly complimented after every round, and after the contest makes a glamorous tour 
through all parts of Greece, producing new poems and reaping admiration everywhere. 
Hesiod, by contrast, grew up in a sad little town, during the contest is childishly annoyed by 
his opponent’s success, and after the ajgwvn gets himself killed on the suspicion of adultery. 
These points taken together strongly indicate, according to most scholars, that Panedes’ 
decision was wrong: it was a Fehlurteil, and we are supposed to see it.61 
    This view, however, is far too one-sided and should be abandoned. The brevity of Hesiod’s 
genealogy, for instance, is caused by his own explicit autobiography: since he tells us where 
he came from, the narrator - who is only aiming to be complete - can hardly list all the 
possibilities of his origin, as he did in the case of Homer. Furthermore, his so-called ‘sordid 
end’62 is followed up by a rather marvellous tale: Hesiod’s drowned body was brought ashore 
by dolphins, and his murderers were punished by none other than Zeus himself;63 his bones 
are later moved from Locris to Orchomenus, because they possessed beneficial powers. This 
is a death fit for heroes, considerably better than that of Homer, who slips on some mud and 
falls on his side, and dies two days later.64 I would suggest that this could well be the author’s 
way of compensating for the pre-agonic part of the Certamen, where Homer’s birth was 
described in mythical terms, and attention was paid to the many cities that claimed him. Most 
importantly, however, there is no explicit indication that Panedes’ judgement is a bad one:65 
there is no protest from Homer,66 the author does not offer any comment, and the audience at 
the scene, previously quite eager to vent its opinion, does not fight the decision. Apparently, 
sofiva is in the end defined as knowing what is beneficial to the polis, a type of wisdom with 
                                               
61 As far as I can see, the term was first used by Schadewaldt (1942) 81, but the idea is widespread. According to 
Nietzsche 1870 539, ‘der Sinn der Erzählung ist: der Nichtstegreifredner kann nur durch Ungerechtigkeit 
siegen.’ Busse (1909) speaks of Homer’s ‘unbedingte Ueberlegenheit’ (118); Vogt (1959) says the author wishes 
to make the decision of Panedes appear as ‘flagrantes Unrecht’ (199) and speaks of an ‘unverdienten Sieg’ (200); 
Heldmann (1982) 21-31 detects a far-going ‘Hesiodfeindlichkeit’ in the ajgwvn-part of the story (but a more 
neutral Tendenz in other parts); Rosen (2004) claims that Panedes’ ‘unwelcome’ (304) decision was ‘contrived 
and tendentious’ (302); see also Rosen (1997) on the Certamen’s supposed ‘anti-Hesiodic bias’ (476). 
62 Rosen (2004) 303 citing O’Sullivan (1992) 98, in turn perhaps echoing Scodel (1980) 304 referring to the 
same affair as a ‘sordid anecdote of illicit sex’. 
63 A story that the second-century compiler actually took from the Mouseion of Alcidamas, mentioned as the 
source in Cert. 238-240. 
64 The stories of their deaths proper (leaving out the ominous oracles to both of them) cover 26 lines for Hesiod 
(229-254) and 7 lines for Homer (332-338). 
65 Cf. West (1967) 443 ‘there is not a word to suggest that the decision was unjust’; so Koniaris (1971) 120 and  
Heldmann (1982) 27. 
66 The loser of an ajgw;n lovgwn is usually upset and complains about the unjust verdict (Froleyks 1973 396); it 
could be that Homer is silent because he agrees, or because picturing him as a bad loser would detract too much 
from his status in antiquity. 
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which Hesiod was traditionally associated (see chapter 5);67 his victory thus remains 
unchallenged. The text, then, shows no obvious preference for either Hesiod or Homer, and its 
interpretation suffers from a Homerocentric approach.68 
    The other point is concerned with the Certamen’s presentation of Hesiod and Homer as 
distinct and recognizable characters. On the one hand, it has recently been suggested that 
throughout the contest the poetry of Hesiod and Homer is framed as complementary; when 
taken together, the poets depict several aspects of the ‘well known and familiar world’ of 
epic.69 This is true, to some degree: both poets speak of ancient myth and lore, and ‘display an 
unrivalled mastery of the hexameter verse’70 - if not, they could not compete in the first place. 
Moreover, the pieces they have selected, one on peace and one on war, can be said to form a 
complementary picture of the cosmos.71 On the other hand, modern scholars always focus on 
the last round to point out how different the two poets are, since it is here that the qualities of 
the farmer-poet and the singer of war are most clearly opposed. 
    It will be worth our while to discuss briefly some other ways in which the author tries to 
stress the individuality of the poets, for it seems that in the earlier part of the contest (i.e. the 
first five rounds) they display certain typical characteristics as well.72 In the first two rounds, 
for instance, Hesiod quotes from his own work and Homer from his.73 I suggest that this is a 
way of introducing the two contenders: the pieces are in place and the game can begin. The 
neat distinction, however, soon becomes somewhat blurred when in the following three 
rounds Hesiod starts asking questions on Homeric subjects, and Homer even succeeds in 
                                               
67 Cf. Hesiod asking questions about the metron and what is best for the city (cf. n.74 below). There is an 
interesting parallel to the introductory remark that the contest will not be about ‘strength’ (rJwvmh) and ‘speed’ 
(tavco~) but about sofiva (Cert. 65) in Xenophanes DK 11 B 2. In this fragment, the philosopher complains 
about the competitions in rJwvmh (11, 14, 18) and tacuthv~ (17), and claims that it would be better to honour (his) 
sofiva (12, 14), which aims at a ‘better government’ (eujnomivh) of the polis.  
68 Rosen (2004), who compares the Certamen with the poetic contest in Aristophanes’ Frogs, maintains that ‘the 
narrative [of the Certamen] strongly implies that the wrong person was chosen’ (309). I think, however, that the 
parallels between the Certamen and Frogs should not be overestimated. The dynamics of the two contests are 
widely different: Frogs presents an exciting ajgwvn with two well-matched contestants who are both criticized, 
whereas the Certamen pictures a struggling underdog who against the odds in the end achieves victory. 
69 Graziosi and Haubold (2005) 31. 
70 Ibid. 
71 An opposition visible in both Hesiod’s and Homer’s description of the city in war- and peacetime on the 
shields of Heracles (Sc. 237-285) and Achilles (Il. 18.490-540). 
72 See Graziosi and Haubold’s clever reading of Cert. 94-101 (2005 30-31) on the tomb of Zeus, which they are 
rightly offering with some caution. See for the Hesiod- and Homer-like quality of some of the questions and 
answers already Wilamowitz (1916a) 401, and West (1967) 442.  
73 Homer’s second answer in round 1 (Cert. 84-89) is Od. 9.6-11; his answer to Hesiod’s question how many 
Greeks went to Troy resembles Il. 2.123-128 (on the number of Greeks and Trojans). Hesiod in phrasing his 
question in round 2 refers to the Muses in a way very reminiscent of Th. 38. 
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giving some Hesiodic answers, almost as if he is defeating Hesiod on his own terrain.74 
Perhaps this part of the contest reflects the ancient belief in the encyclopaedic knowledge of 
Homer, who was generally thought to be able, as Richardson writes, ‘to answer questions on a 
wide range of subjects, and to solve all ajporivai or problems’75 - much as Homer himself 
indicates in Certamen 156-157: ‘I am willing to say what you bid me; I will tell you very 
gladly’ (eJkovnta me taùta keleuvei~ / eijpeìn: aujta;r ejgw; mavla toi provfrwn ajgoreuvsw). 
Homer thus assumes a very Homeric role in the contest. 
    This does not mean, however, that Hesiod is a mere puppet, and that ‘anyone else might 
have taken his place as questioner’.76 Hesiod refers to his own work, as has been noted above, 
but the author does so as well. Take, for instance, Hesiod’s becoming jealous at Homer 
(fqonwǹ, 149). This is usually understood as an indication of Hesiod’s childishness and 
ultimate inferiority.77 But such an interpretation is mistaken, for two reasons: first, because it 
is based on an anachronistic (Christian) notion of jealousy,78 and second, because it misses the 
reference to Works and Days 26, where Hesiod says that ‘beggar is jealous at beggar and 
singer at singer’ (ptwco;~ ptwcẁ/ fqonevei kai; ajoido;~ ajoidẁ/). Hesiod in the contest is 
following his own advice to be encouraged by the good Eris, and in the end this leads to 
success (just as he predicted in the WD).79 Hesiod is typified by the emotion that is of great 
importance in his Works and Days.80 Furthermore, Panedes too alludes to Hesiod’s work. He 
calls his own judgement ‘just’, and Graziosi rightly reminds us here that ‘the Works and Days 
opens with a complaint against an unjust verdict issued by kings’81- perhaps we should 
understand that Hesiod inspires a just verdict here as well, and Panedes is a king after his 
liking. 
                                               
74 In the third round, six of the fourteen ajmfivboloi gnẁmai link up with Homeric material (119-120; 121-123; 
124-126; 127-128; 133-134; 135-137), and eight cannot be easily assigned (107-108 ≈ Ar. Pax 1282-1283; 109-
110; 111-112; 113-114; 115-116; 117-118; 129-130; 131-132). The sole question of the fourth round (‘how 
many Achaeans went to Troy?’) has a distinctly Homeric flavour, whereas Homer manages to answer some 
questions of round 5 in a Hesiodic fashion (esp. the first one, where Homer warns agains evil profit and speaks 
of punishment for wrongdoers). Too (1998) 37 argues against Hesiodfeindlichkeit in the contest by interpreting 
Hesiod’s asking about the metron and the best thing for the city (Cert. 153 and 161) as demonstrating his ‘right 
priorities’; it is better, however, to take these passages as indicating the blurring of categories. See for Homer 
beating Hesiod on his own turf the contest-version by Dio Chrysostom, discussed further below, pp. 226-229. 
75 Richardson (1981) 8. 
76 West (2003) 300. 
77 See e.g. Clay (2003) 179 claiming that Hesiod ‘behaves like a bad sport by envying Homer’s success.’ 
78 See Gill (2003) 30-33 on jealousy as a Christian sin, and Most (2003) 139 on the positive evaluation of envy 
in antiquity as a ‘necessary concomitant to great deeds’. 
79 See WD 21-24, where the idle man sets himself to work because he sees his rich neighbour. 
80 Most (2003) notes that Homeric poetry, though full of strife and rivalry, ‘never uses the language of jealousy 
and envy’ (129), whereas Hesiod ‘puts envy into the very centre of the account of the fundamental conditions of 
human existence he provides in the Works and Days’ (130). 
81 Graziosi (2002) 174. 
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We may conclude, so far, that the Certamen is a story that ‘matches’ the two poets in several 
ways. First, they are lumped inasmuch as they are both masters of the hexameter who sing of 
the same world of gods and heroes. Second, however, they are also split into perfect 
opposition, especially with regard to their biography (the narrator focusing on Homer’s birth 
and Hesiod’s death, but neglecting Homer’s death and Hesiod’s birth) and of course their 
‘best’ and most representative verses. Most importantly, they are presented as equal, that is, 
the narrative itself does not present one as better than the other. Such symmetry naturally 
shifts the interest of the story to the criteria of the judge, i.e. the ‘how’ (the trovpo~, Cert. 72) 
of the contest and Hesiod’s victory. The Certamen, therefore, is for a large part about judging 
poetry, the contest of Hesiod and Homer being the most convenient vehicle to do so. A 
legendary contest opposing the two icons of Greek poetry is used to expound the many factors 
(such as the three types of sofiva: ‘knowledge and factual accuracy’, ‘moral and educational 
integrity’, and ‘technical skill and aesthetic/emotional impact’, and the person of the judge: 
uneducated masses or appointed expert) to be taken into account when judging poetry. In this 
case, Hesiod wins because an appointed judge lets the moral value of the poem’s subject 
matter prevail over all other considerations.82 When we consider the other versions of the 
contest, we will encounter again the Certamen’s function as a text concerned with the 
evaluation of poetry.  
 
2.2 - Other Contests 
It is important to remember that the Certamen is only the most elaborate version of a story 
that is amply attested elsewhere in Greek literature. Other versions can be remarkably 
different or strikingly similar. Two of the most interesting ones, coming from Plutarch’s 
Dinner of the Seven Wise Men and Dio Chrysostom’s Second Oration on Kingship, will be 
briefly discussed here, with some references to the others. A complete overview of the most 
relevant information of all the versions can be found in the table at the end of the section.  
 
The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men tells the story of several great sofoiv from the Greek past 
discussing all kinds of matters over dinner. At a certain point in the conversation, the subject 
of riddles presents itself, and the company is for some time engaged in ‘questions of wisdom’. 
                                               
82 It is too reductionist, therefore, to conclude that the Certamen is simply moralizing, told in order ‘to illustrate 
the moral value of the works of Hesiod and Homer’ (Richardson 1992 34). 
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When one Cleodorus expresses his contempt for the game of questions and answers, 
Periander interrupts: 
 
‘ajlla; mhvn,’ e[fh, ‘kai; toì~ palaioì~   {Ellhsin e[qo~ h\n, w\ Kleovdwre, toiauvta~ 
ajllhvloi~ ajporiva~ probavllein. ajkouvomen ga;r o{ti kai; pro;~ ta;~   jAmfidavmanto~ 
tafa;~ eij~ Calkivda tẁn tovte sofwǹ oiJ dokimwvtatoi poihtai; sunhl̀qon: h\n d’ oJ   
jAmfidavma~ ajnh;r polemikov~, kai; polla; pravgmata parascw;n   jEretrieùsin ejn 
taì~ peri; Lhlavntou mavcai~ e[pesen. ejpei; de; ta; pareskeuasmevna toi~̀ poihtaì~ 
e[ph caleph;n kai; duvskolon ejpoivei th;n krivsin dia; to; ejfavmillon, h{ te dovxa twǹ 
ajgwnistẁn,   JOmhvrou kai;   JHsiovdou, pollh;n ajporivan met’ aijdoù~ toi~̀ krivnousi 
pareìcen, ejtravponto pro;~ toiauvta~ ejrwthvsei~, kai; proevbal’ oJ mevn, w{~ fhsi 
Levsch~, 
  Moùsav moi e[nnepe keìna, ta; mhvt’ ejgevnonto pavroiqe  
  mhvt’ e[stai metovpisqen, 
ajpekrivnato d’  JHsivodo~ ejk toù paratucovnto~ 
  ajll’ o{tan ajmfi; Dio;~ tuvmbw/ kanachvpode~ i{ppoi 
  a{rmata suntrivywsin ejpeigovmenoi peri; nivkh~. 
kai; dia; toùto levgetai mavlista qaumasqei;~ toù trivpodo~ tuceiǹ.’83 
 
‘Nevertheless it is a fact, Cleodorus, that the ancient Greeks also had a habit of 
propounding such perplexing questions to one another. For we have the story that the 
most famous poets among the wise men of that time gathered at Chalcis to attend the 
funeral of Amphidamas. Now Amphidamas was a warrior who had given much 
trouble to the Eretrians, and had fallen in one of the battles for the possession of the 
Lelantine plain. But since the verses composed by the poets made the decision a 
difficult and troublesome matter because they were so evenly matched, and since the 
repute of the contestants, Homer and Hesiod,84 caused the judges much perplexity as 
                                               
83 Plu. Mor. 153F-154A. The question is a slight adaptation of the first line and a half from the Ilias parva, fr. 1 
Bernabé (Moùsav moi e[nnepe e[rga, ta; mh;t’ ejgevnonto pavroiqe / mhvt’ e[stai metovpisqen). Hesiod’s answer is 
very similar to Homer’s answer to the a[poron posed in the Certamen: oujdev pot’ ajmfi; Dio;~ tuvmbw/ 
kanachvpode~ i{ppoi / a{rmata suntrivyousin ejrivzonte~ peri; nivkh~.  
84 Wilamowitz in 1879 deleted   JOmhvrou kai;   JHsiovdou (which is in all the mss.), and he is followed by the most 
recent editors Paton-Wegehaupt (Teubner 1974) and Defradas-Hani-Klaerr (Budé 1985). There are three reasons 
for this deletion: 1) Plutarch himself rejected the story of Chalcis, Amphidamas, and the entire competition as an 
interpolation (it says so clearly in S WD 650-662 (fr. 62 Bernardakis), referred to by Wilamowitz (1916b) 55 and 
mentioned also by Teubner and Budé); 2) The alleged reason for Plutarch’s rejection of the story is that he 
believed that Amphidamas died in a seabattle against the Eretrians and thus bellum gestum esse credebat diu post 
Hesiodi et Homeri aetatem (Wilamowitz 1916b 55); 3) Mor. 674F is another place where Plutarch rejects the 
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well as embarassment, the poets resorted to questionings of this sort, and Homer, as 
Lesches85 asserts, propounded this: 
  ‘Tell me, o Muse, of events which never happened aforetime, 
  Nor in the future shall ever betide’, 
And Hesiod answered quite off-hand: 
  ‘When round Zeus in his tomb rush the steeds with galloping hoof beats, 
  Crashing car against car, as they eagerly run for a trophy.’ 
And for this it is said that he gained the greatest admiration and won the tripod.’ 
 
There are some striking similarities with the Certamen, such as the answer to the question86 
and the name of the game.87 But of far greater interest are the differences, which amount to an 
almost complete reversal of the contest we have seen in the previous section. In the Certamen, 
the contest consists of riddles; the round of recitals, the obvious climax of the story, is 
necessary for a decision. In Plutarch’s version, the competition consisted of a recital of poems 
briefly referred to as ta; pareskeuasmevna toi~̀ poihtaì~ e[ph (‘the verses composed by the 
poets’),88 and the riddle is the exceptional addition necessary for a decision.89 Furthermore, in 
                                                                                                                                                   
story of the contest as ‘une invention de grammairiens’ (Defradas-Hani-Klaerr 1985 334). The conclusion is, 
according to Wilamowitz (and his followers), that  JOmhvrou kai;   JHsiovdou must be a gloss from a later reader: 
‘diese ganz entbehrlichen Worte muss man tilgen, dann ist Satz und Sinn in Ordnung’ (Wilamowitz 1890 217). 
But the reasons for deletion are not in Ordnung at all. Argument 2 is in part caused by a different reading of the 
scholia (compare Gaisford ad WD 648, which Wilamowitz used, with Pertusi ad WD 650-662), but it still makes 
no sense whatever to argue that the battle was diu post Hesiodi et Homeri aetatem and then nonetheless allow 
Hesiod to contend: in Wilamowitz’ text, Hesiod is still the person answering the riddle. Argument 3 is simply 
wrong since the speaker at Mor. 674F does not reject the story of a contest between Hesiod and Homer because 
it is untrue but because it is so hackneyed; it is repeated ad nauseam by the grammarians. And then there is 
argument 1, which is the most important one. Of course the scholion is perfectly clear about Plutarch’s deletion, 
but this deletion comes from a totally different context. In the scholion we see the textual critic Plutarch at work, 
making a note in his commentary on the WD. But this is something else entirely from the character Periander in 
the Dinner referring to a story; a story, moreover, the truth of which he does not dare vouch for himself 
(ajkouvomen, ‘we have the story’). I conclude that there is no reason to doubt the mss:  JOmhvrou kai;   JHsiovdou 
should be in the text. 
85 Wilamowitz (and Teubner and Budé) read fasi instead of fhsiv (both have mss. support), turning Lesches 
into Hesiod’s opponent. Two arguments can support this: 1) it is improbable for Lesches to merely report a 
contest of two poets; 2) the question is derived from the Ilias parva (see note 79) attributed by some to Lesches. 
But (ad 2) the Ilias parva was attributed to Homer as well (see Graziosi 2002 53), and (ad 1) it is far more 
improbable for Lesches to be counted among tẁn tovte sofẁn oiJ dokimwvtatoi poihtaiv, ‘the most famous 
poets among the wise men of that time’, or to be of such dovxa (‘repute’) so as to embarass the judges. Hess 
(1960) 19-20 believes that Plutarch refers to an ajgwvn with more than two contestants, where Lesches happened 
to ask a question which was successfully answered by Hesiod. West (1967) 438-440 on this problem curiously 
dismisses both fasi and fhsiv, presenting no alternative. 
86 See n.83 above.  
87 Plutarch calls this an ajporiva and also uses the word for ‘questioning’, ejrwvthsi~, whereas the Cert. speaks of 
an ejperwvthsin tẁn ajpovrwn (95). There is an even greater resemblance to the Flinders Petrie papyrus, which 
uses the words ajporiva (line 36 and probably 42) and ejrwvthsi~ (36) as well. 
88 What this means precisely is not clear. Do they recite a (well-known) piece of their work, or are these e[ph 
composed for the occasion? What is clear, however, is that the verses are created beforehand (pareskeu-
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the Dinner it is Homer who asks the question, and Hesiod who answers - consequently, it is 
Hesiod who wins admiration (mavlista qaumasqeiv~). Another reversal is Plutarch’s emphasis 
on the improvisational skills of Hesiod, who answers ejk toù paratucovnto~ (‘quite off-
hand’), whereas the Certamen supposedly focuses on Homer’s talent for extemporaneous 
speech. Apart from these obvious reversals, there are some other differences: in the Dinner, 
the reason for calling for an extra round is made explicit (the competitors are evenly 
matched),90 and there is more than one judge (whose names we do not learn). 
 
The version of the contest preserved in Dio Chrysostom’s Second Oration on Kingship is 
again significantly different from both the Certamen and Plutarch’s version. The oration 
presents a dialogue between Alexander the Great and his father Philip, who discuss several 
aspects of kingship. When Alexander expresses his admiration of Homer and Homeric poetry, 
Philip asks him what he thinks of Hesiod. Alexander replies he values Hesiod very highly, 
although he feels that Hesiod’s poetry is of little interest to generals and kings; his advice is 
more useful to shepherds, carpenters, and farmers, that is, people who live a life of slaves, not 
leaders (2.3-8). But then Philip decides to put his son’s convictions to the test (9-12): 
 
‘Oujde; ta; peri; to;n spovron’, e[fh, kai; to;n ajmhtovn’, oJ Fivlippo~, ‘ajrevskei soi toù   
 JHsiovdou megaloprepẁ~ ou{tw~ eijrhmevna; 
  Plhiavdwn   jAtlagenevwn ejpitellomenavwn 
  a[rcesq’ ajmhtoù, ajrovtoio de; dusomenavwn.’ 
‘Poluv ge mal̀lon’, ei\pen oJ   jAlevxandro~, ‘ta; par’   JOmhvrw/ gewrgikav.’ ‘Kai; pou ̀
peri; gewrgiva~ ei[rhken  {Omhro~;’ h[reto oJ Fivlippo~. ‘h] ta; ejn th/̀ ajspivdi 
mimhvmata levgei~ tẁn ajrouvntwn kai; qerizovntwn kai; trugwvntwn;’ ‘  {Hkistav ge, 
ei\pen oJ   jAlevxandro~, ajlla; ejkeìna polu; mal̀lon: 
  oiJ d’ w{st’ ajmhth̀re~ ejnantivoi ajllhvloisin 
  o[gmon ejlauvnousin ajndro;~ mavkaro~ kat’ a[rouran 
  purwǹ h] kriqẁn: ta; de; dravgmata tarfeva pivptei: 
  w}~ Trẁe~ kai;   jAcaioi; ejp’ ajllhvloisi qorovnte~ 
  dhv/oun, oujd’ e{teroi mnwvont’ ojlooiò fovboio.’ 
                                                                                                                                                   
asmevna); there is no mention of improvization here. Incidentally, in Plu. Mor. 674F Hesiod and Homer are also 
said to contend ‘in epic verse’ (e[pesi). 
89 According to Heldmann (1982) 53-63, the Urcertamen must have been shaped like this as well; he argues that 
the Zusatzagon must be caused by aporia on the part of the judge(s). 
90 It is interesting to see that it is in fact the judges who are facing an ajporiva, which they try to solve by letting 
the competitors deal with one. 
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Taùta mevntoi poiẁn   {Omhro~ hJttat̀o uJpo;   JHsiovdou,’ oJ Fivlippo~ ei\pen: ‘h] oujk 
ajkhvkoa~ to; ejpivgramma to; ejn   JElikẁni ejpi; toù trivpodo~: 
    JHsivodo~ Mouvsai~   JElikwnivsi tovnd’ ajnevqhken 
  u{mnw/ nikhvsa~ ejn Calkivdi qeìon   {Omhron;’ 
‘Kai; mavla dikaivw~’, ei\pen oJ  jAlevxandro~, ‘hJttat̀o: ouj ga;r ejn basileùsin 
hjgwnivzeto, ajll’ ejn gewrgoi~̀ kai; ijdiwvtai~, màllon de; ejn ajnqrwvpoi~ filhdovnoi~ 
kai; malakoi~̀...’ 
 
‘But do you not like these magnificent lines of Hesiod about seed-time and harvest?’ 
said Philip: 
  ‘Mark well the time when the Pleiads, daughters of Atlas, are rising; 
  Then begin with the harvest, but do not plough till their setting.’’ 
‘I much prefer what Homer says on farm-life’, said Alexander. ‘And where’, Philip 
asked, ‘has Homer anything to say about farming? Or do you refer to the 
representations on the shield of men ploughing and gathering the grain and the 
grapes?’ ‘Not at all’, said Alexander, ‘but rather to these well-known lines: 
  ‘As when two lines of reapers, face to face, 
  In some rich landlord’s field of barley or wheat 
  Move on, and fast the severed handfulls fall, 
  So, springing on each other, they of Troy 
  And they of Argos smote each other down, 
  And neither thought of ignominious flight.’’ 
‘And yet, in spite of such lines as these’, said Philip, ‘Homer was defeated by Hesiod 
in the contest. Or have you not heard of the inscription which is inscribed upon the 
tripod that stands on Mount Helicon: 
  ‘Hesiod offered this gift to the Muses on Helicon’s mountain 
  When at Chalcis in song he had vanquished Homer, the godlike’?’ 
‘And he richly deserved to be defeated’, rejoined Alexander, ‘for he was not exhibiting 
his skill before kings, but before farmers and plain folk, or, rather, before men who 
were lovers of pleasure and effeminate…’91  
 
I have quoted the passage in full instead of only the last part of it (as Allen does),92 because I 
think Dio does not just provide us with a reference to the Certamen but with a full re-
                                               
91 The lines quoted are WD 383-384 and Il. 11.67-71. 
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enactment, Philip playing the part of Hesiod and Alexander that of Homer. The fact that 
Philip quotes Works and Days 383-384, the lines traditionally sung by Hesiod,93 and ends 
with the epigram of Hesiod’s victory (as does the Certamen), is a sure indication of this. What 
changes, of course, is the content of Homer’s song. Instead of the two Ajaxes and their tight 
formations ready for combat (the traditional ajgwvn-piece),94 Homer sings of the Greeks and 
Trojans in the midst of battle - a grandiose Überbietung of Hesiod’s lines since he uses a 
reaping-metaphor to describe the grim cruelty of war. This magnificent reply not only 
demonstrates Alexander’s mastery of Homer, as he manages to surprise his father with a 
Homeric passage on ta; gewrgikav, but also Homer’s mastery over Hesiod - Homer moves on 
a higher, i.e. metaphorical, level, and is thus able to ‘beat’ Hesiod on his own field.95 
    Dio, however, naturally conforms to the traditional outcome of the story and hence Hesiod 
must win, the difficulty being solved by a very negative characterization of the crowd judging 
the poets.96 This description of the audience is of course meant to reflect on Hesiod: just as 
Homer’s poetry was earlier defined as ‘kingly’ (basilikhv, 2.6), Hesiod’s poetry is defined as 
suited for farmers and simpletons, or ‘rather’ (mal̀lon) for effeminate hedonists.97 This 
curious correction is probably caused by Alexander’s later reference to Hesiod’s inferiority to 
Homer: ‘… while Homer wrote of heroes, Hesiod composed a Catalogue of Women, and in 
reality made the women’s quarters the subject of his song, yielding to Homer the eulogy of 
men’.98 The poet is thus defined by the content of his song, and the audience preferring 
Hesiod must be similarly soft and weak. It is explicitly stated that Hesiod achieved his victory 
                                                                                                                                                   
92 Allen V 218; cf. the note of Cohoon (1932) on this passage, who refers to the Certamen for ‘the account of 
this mythical contest’. But no: this is actually a version of the contest. 
93 See Certamen and Tzetzes; perhaps Philostratus and Themistius (table below). 
94 See Certamen, Philostratus, Themistius, and Tzetzes (table below). 
95 Cf.  Homer’s Hesiodic answers in the Certamen discussed above, p. 221-222. Heldmann (1982) 43 argues that 
the ‘Gegenüberstellung [of Hesiod and Homer] keineswegs polemisch gemeint ist und daß Homer und Hesiod 
damit nicht gegeneinander ausgespielt werden sollen’, but I detect no such mildness in this passage. 
96 Cf. the strategy of Tzetzes, who describes the judges as mequvsoi (‘drunkards’) ajgoraiòi (‘commoners’) and 
suvrfake~ (‘rabble’), who picked someone ‘of their own company’ (th̀~ aujtẁn summoriva~); or half-blind 
people with ‘styes as great as pumpkins’ (see Gaisf. II.161.1-8 and 164.2-12). 
97 It is Dio’s explicit statement that there were no kings present when Hesiod won that convinces Heldmann 
(1982) that the figure of Panedes in the Certamen was created as a ‘Gegenkönig’ to Dio’s Alexander. When we 
accept this thesis, then ‘lassen sich mit einem Male alle wesentlichen Anstöße und Widersprüche in der 
Komposition des Certamen erklären’ (46). It is unfortunate that the many astute comments on the Certamen in 
Heldmann’s book are somewhat overshadowed by this totally unfounded notion that can be countered by several 
serious objections, of which I will only mention the fact that Panedes is already mentioned on the Flinders Petrie 
papryus. 
98 D.Chrys. 2.13: ejkeivnou peri; twǹ hJrwvwn poihvsanto~ aujto;~ ejpoivhse Gunaikẁn katavlogon kai; tw/̀ o[nti 
th;n gunaikwnìtin u{mnhse, paracwrhvsa~   JOmhvrw/ tou;~ a[ndra~ ejpainevsai (transl. slightly altered). Clay 
(2003) seems to agree with Alexander, saying that ‘the Catalogue of Women (…) constitutes a perfect 
complement to heroic epic with its narrative form and concentration on the male’ (166). 
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in a way that is divkaio~, but the achievement is at the same time downplayed by disqualifying 
the judges. 
 
Even though the three versions of the contest between Hesiod and Homer discussed so far - 
the anonymous Certamen and the stories of Plutarch and Dio - show some remarkable 
similarities, it is obvious that they are fundamentally different. The texts do not agree on the 
number and order of the rounds, the capacities or the order of the contestants, the content of 
the songs recited, and the identity and criteria of the judge(s). There are more variations in 
these and other versions - the most important ones are listed in the overview on the next 
page.99 It seems that the only thing they have in common is the fact of Hesiod’s victory; 
everything else can be changed and remodelled. 
    The legendary story of the contest, therefore, because of its undefined and flexible nature, 
makes an excellent vehicle for observations on how to judge sophoi or poets.100 We have seen 
that the criteria used are widely divergent: the contestants can be evaluated not only by their 
strictly poetical merits, but also on qualities that we might call social, political and 
philosophical.101 The different versions thus tell us much about the way the opposition 
between Hesiod and Homer was constructed. In the next section, I will try to isolate the three 








                                               
99 In the overview are missing the references made by Philochorus, Eustathius, and Proclus, who do not say 
anything on the course of the contest or on the reason of Hesiod’s victory. 
100 Cf. Lefkowitz (1981) 19 ‘the ambivalence of [the narrative of the Certamen], with its alternating successes 
and failures, balances fourth-century concern about the content of poetry against the poems’ continued 
popularity and cultural importance’, and Rosen (1997) 473 ‘The story of a contest (...) represents an early 
attempt to confront several fundamental questions (...), namely how a common epic tradition could produce such 
different poets as Homer and Hesiod, and how the distinctive character of each poet’s work might reflect a 
difference in moral value and utility within an evolving canon’. I cannot agree with the overly reductionist 
reading of Heldmann (1982) 85, who claims that the story of the Cert. is ‘motiviert durch den Wunsch nach 
grösserer Anerkennung für Hesiod’. 
101 There is a very close (though late) parallel offered by Vitruvius (De Arch. 7.4-7), who produced yet another 
decisive criterion, i.e. that of originality. In his story of a literary contest, one of the judges (Alexandria’s head 
librarian Aristophanes) counters the vote of the audience, the other judges and the king himself by crowning the 
least popular poet because he was the only one presenting an original composition instead of plagiarized texts, 
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3 - Hesiod versus Homer: Points of Divergence 
Minor details and differences aside, I would suggest that there are basically three major 
watersheds between Hesiod and Homer in the tradition of the contest, that translate into three 
different aspects of their poetry: 1) the content of their poems; 2) the ethico-political 
orientation of the poets; and 3) the effect of their performance on the audience. I will now 
briefly elucidate these three points, with particular attention to the fact that in all three cases 
the tradition plays with the position of Hesiod and Homer on either side of the watershed. 
 
1) Content: fighting versus farming. In five of the extant versions of the contest, there is an 
opposition between the martial verses picked by Homer and the agricultural theme chosen by 
Hesiod. We may thus safely conclude that this opposition is very characteristic, and also quite 
‘total’, as especially the Certamen-version shows. Boundary-crossing, such as Hesiod asking 
some war-related questions and Homer giving some Hesiodic answers in the Certamen, and 
Homer encroaching on Hesiod’s terrain when he sings of battle in terms of ta; gewrgikav in 
the Oration on Kingship, seems to confirm their strict opposition in this respect.  
 
2) Ethics and politics: king versus people. In the tradition of the contest special attention is 
given to the judge; in some stories he is a king (Certamen, Philostratus, Tzetzes’ Vita), and it 
is essential for the narrative of the Certamen that this king counters the opinion of the crowd; 
other versions however explicitly state that the judge was not a king (Dio) and ascribe the 
decision to (someone from) the common people (Dio, Philostratus, Tzetzes’ scholia). Hesiod 
thus sometimes owes his victory to a king, and sometimes to the lowest rabble; and this means 
that Homer too is alternately associated with either the king or the people.  
 
3) Effect on the audience: reason versus emotion. In the Certamen, Hesiod’s victory depends 
on moral reasoning by the judge, whereas Homer inspires ‘an immediate and universal 
reaction of wonder and admiration’,102 which is further increased by his talent for extempore 
speech. Traces of such a dichotomy can be detected throughout the tradition of the contest 
(e.g. Philostratus’ vine-dresser calling Hesiod ‘simpler’, faulovtero~, Her. 43.9; and 
Tzetzes’ remarks on the judges being completely insensitive to poetry). But occasionally, 
Hesiod too can achieve wonder: Plutarch says he was ‘admired’ for his reply to Homer’s 
question (mavlista qaumasqeiv~), which he answers ‘quite offhand’ (ejk toù paratucovnto~). 
                                               
102 Graziosi (2002) 174. 
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In Plutarch’s version, both recitals were prepared in advance (ta; pareskeuasmevna ... e[ph), 
and the Certamen states that both contestants contended ‘in a wonderful way’ (qaumastẁ~). 
 
It is my general thesis that these three watersheds make out the most important distinctions 
between Hesiod and Homer not just in the tradition of the contest, but in the ancient reception 
of the poets as a whole. The crucial role of the judging authority and its socio-political 
orientation, for instance, reflect the appropriation of the poets by all layers of society 
throughout antiquity. The distinction between the morally sound (but poetically poor) Hesiod 
and the sweeping power of Homer’s poetic genius, moreover, is arguably the greatest 
watershed between the poets as they were constructed by the Greeks.  
    In the following chapters, this thesis will be closely examined. In chapter 8, I will 
investigate the first two watersheds: those of content and ethico-political orientation. In 
chapter 9, we will see how Hesiod and Homer were opposed with regard to strictly ‘poetical’ 
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0 - Introduction 
In the previous chapter we analyzed the tradition of the contest between Homer and Hesiod, 
and found three areas in which the ancient world opposed the two: the content of their poems 
(fighting versus farming), their political orientation (king versus people), and the effect on the 
audience (reason versus emotion). This chapter will be concerned with the first two of these 
oppositions, which are obviously related. The third area of opposition will be the subject of 
the next chapter. 
    The first section of the present chapter consists of a brief overview of modern scholarship 
concerning the socio-political orientation of the poems of Hesiod and Homer. It is interesting 
to see that despite many recent studies arguing for qualification, the communis opinio stated at 
the beginning of the 20th century still holds: Homer is generally regarded as aristocratically 
minded, whereas Hesiod is associated with the lower classes. This common view is more 
implicit nowadays than a century ago, but it is still alive and fairly widespread. The most 
striking aspect of this modern dichotomy, however, is that it resembles the ancient one so 
closely: the Greeks too thought of Homer as a figure of nobility and Hesiod as a peasant, even 
though such views were occasionally qualified. 
    Section 2 deals with the poets’ role in the ancient opposition of fighting and farming. Both 
Homer’s dominant image as the poet of war and Hesiod’s agricultural theme in the Works and 
Days made the Greeks see Hesiod not merely as an expert on farming, but as a peasant 
himself. Despite the self-proclaimed status as a ‘servant of the Muses’, Hesiod was often 
pictured as a poor farmer, and moreover generally credited with a commoner’s outlook on all 
kinds of matters. That is how collective memory works: a present need produces a certain 
image of the past (in this case, a particular person from the past), and the image is further 
strengthened or justified by reinterpreting other elements from the past to confirm with it - 
and so a poet who never said he even had a farm could become an utter peasant. Homer, I 
suggest, is the great foil further reinforcing this process.  
    Section 3 continues the discussion of the opposition between Hesiod and Homer, but from 
another perspective, focusing on a political instead of a social criterion. We will see that 
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Homer was often associated with monarchy or aristocracy, while Hesiod could be constructed 
as the dissenting voice, speaking for the ruled and oppressed. Evidence for this particular 
opposition is often indirect or implicit, for Hesiod and (more obviously) Homer are also 
panhellenic symbols exceeding all partiality1 - but this does by no means preclude their 
appropriation by either side.  
    In section 4, we will examine some cases of ‘boundary-crossing’, i.e. instances where 
Hesiod and Homer are presented a-typically: Homer singing of agriculture, for example, and 
Hesiod displaying a kingly character. It will be argued that even though such anti-traditional 
pictures are drawn of both poets, their import is not the same. In the case of Hesiod, 
boundary-crossing is mostly playful and reminds one of how un-Homeric he really is. In 
Homer’s case, by contrast, the crossing of boundaries is indicative of his ever-greater 
presence - he never crosses back again.  
 
1 - Modern Scholarship 
This section will present a brief overview of modern scholars’ opinion on the socio-political 
stand of Hesiod and Homer and their poems. Obviously, this is a much-debated question 
(especially in the case of Homer), and it is far beyond the scope of this book to provide a 
detailed and exhaustive discussion. Instead, I will concentrate on some of the most relevant 
trends in recent scholarship. 
    I will begin with Homer. Homer is generally associated with the Oberschicht of society and 
aristocratic or monarchic sentiments. It is important to note that this association is to a large 
degree implicit: modern scholars often more or less tacitly assume that Homer belonged in 
some sense to the upperclass of his day because the protagonists of his poems are kings and 
nobles displaying their valour in all kinds of heroic and martial exploits. Almost all scholars 
at least agree to this last fact. To give just a few examples: Schmid-Stählin said that the heroes 
in the Homeric poems strongly resemble the Ionian aristocracy, while Martin argued that the 
Iliad ‘is a poem almost wholly about kingship and its abuse’; Finley claimed that Homer 
informs us only about the nobility, some ‘stage props or stock types’ aside.2  
    It is only a small step to claim that Homer actually promotes aristocratic values. Beye in a 
very general introduction on Homer writes that ‘the reader can project certain values from the 
Iliad and the Odyssey onto the putative narrators of the poems. These values are an allegiance 
                                               
1 E.g. Robb (1994) 159 ‘Hellenes at all levels of society had heard Homer’s language and had absorbed it’; 
Zeitlin (2001) 203 on the ancient claim that ‘he belongs everywhere and to everyone’. 
2 Schmid-Stählin (1929) 79; Martin (1984) 43; Finley (1979) 53.  
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to hierachy, the absolute superiority of the male sex, and the overriding obligation to pursue 
glory.’3 According to Finley, Homer ‘makes no secret of his own preference for kingly rule’; 
Finley also speaks of ‘Homer’s indifference to the common people’.4 It follows that many 
scholars assumed that the poems of Homer were ‘originally’ performed in front of aristocratic 
audiences,5 or that Homer had aimed his poetry especially at the nobles,6 or that Homer in 
some way or another formed part of an aristocratic entourage.7 This image has doubtlessly 
been much encouraged by the fact that Homer himself presents the singers in his own poems 
as court poets as well.8 The final step, i.e. that Homer was himself an aristocrat, is usually not 
explicitly taken. Latacz is one of the very few who dares to make the suggestion.9 
    Other voices have of course been heard. Burn noted that the Homeric heroes are craftsmen 
and farmers as well, and thus relatively close to peasants.10 Donlan investigated political 
reciprocity in Homer and concluded that where decisions are concerned, ‘evidence (…) is 
overwhelming that in the long run the demos has the final say’.11 Duchemin deduced from 
Homeric similes drawn from nature that Homeric poetry reminds one of ‘la vie pastorale’;12 
Dalby argued that Homer’s inconsistent and problematic depiction of the daily life of the rich 
                                               
3 Beye in Briggs (1997) 230. 
4 Finley (1979) 106, 113. Adkins argued time and again that positive value-terms like esthlos and agathos are in 
the Homeric poems also used to commend men who are prosperous and of high birth (1960 30-60, see also 1972 
10-21), cf. Long (1970) 137 ‘Homer speaks primarily from the perspective of the ajgaqov~, Morris (1986) 123-
125, Heubeck (1988) 21, and recently Marks (2005) 5, speaking of the ‘poem’s [= Iliad’s] unmistakable 
sympathy for a rigid system of social ranking and for the group that occupies the top position in this system.’  
5 Schmid-Stählin (1929) 79 ‘Das Publikum… war zweifellos die Aristokratie’, Burn (1936) 73 Homer sang for 
‘chiefs’; Maehler (1963) 34 ‘Gemeinsam ist beiden Epen [sc. Il. and Od.], daß sie für eine aristokratische 
Geselschafft gedichtet sind, deren Anforderungen sie erfüllen, deren Anschauungen und Interessen die Dichter 
jeweils teilen’; Sinclair (1966) xxvii; de Ste. Croix (1981) 413. Countervoices, such as that of Levy (1954) or 
Thalmann (1988) 3, are few. 
6 See for instance Ford (1999b) 43, who suggests that the theomachy in the Iliad functioned as a warning against 
strife among the nobles. 
7 Svenbro (1976) argued that the oral poet was always ‘attaché à un seul groupe social’ (6), for which he adapted 
his song. That Homer sang so much of kings and princes could therefore be an indication that he performed for a 
similar social stratum. See also e.g. Bowra (1952) 489, who names Homer as an example of ‘aristocratic’ poetry;  
Germain (1961) 470 on Homeric bards being connected to ‘seigneurs’ and having a ‘vive conscience de leur 
dignité’; Sihvola (1989) 9 voices the common idea that warrior epic was performed during aristocratic banquets, 
while didactic poetry featured at public festivals. 
8 See e.g. Svenbro (1976), who assumes that Demodocus, Phemius, Agamemnon’s singer and Thamyris together 
form the ‘conception homérique de l’aède’ (35), and that such singers resided at the royal court. This is still the 
majority view; there are some countervoices, such as that of Walcot (1970) 31, who believes that the audience of 
Demodocus and Phemius were popular rather than aristocratic. 
9 See Latacz’ entry for Homer in the Neue Pauly (5.687): ‘Der Autor steht auf einem gedanklich, sprachlich, 
ästhetisch, wertethisch, emotional und geschmacklich so hohen Niveau und reflektiert so dominant und zugleich 
affirmativ die Weltsicht einer Oberschicht, daß er innerhalb der von Bowra [Heroic Poetry, 1952] aus dem 
Vergleich mündlicher Dichtung aller Völker und Zeiten abgeleiteten sozialen Hierarchie von Sängerdichtern auf 
der obersten Stufe angesiedelt werden muß: Er hat wohl - als Aoide wie Achilleus in Il. 9.186-8 - dem Adel 
selbst angehört oder ständig in seinem Umkreis gelebt.’  
10 Burn (1936) 12-13; cf. Murnaghan (2006), who is more interested in the rhetorical benefits of the aristocrat’s 
pose as a farmer. 
11 Donlan (1998) 69. 
12 Duchemin (1960) 390; the pastoral aspects of Homeric similes are her main focus. 
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and famous demonstrates that both poet and audience were ‘relatively unfamiliar with the 
houses and ways of contemporary aristocrats or kings’.13 Griffin pointed to many unheroic 
attitudes in Homer and actually claimed that Odysseus’ behaviour somewhat resembles ‘the 
tight-fistedness of Hesiod’.14 On the whole, however, studies like this, despite their decent 
arguments, cannot counter the age-old and general assumption that Homeric poetry is 
aristocratic in origin and in nature. Nonetheless, it is important to note again, with Graziosi,15 
that most scholars are not too explicit about it: they mostly take Homer’s aristocratic 
connection for granted and generally do not venture into statements concerning Homer’s own 
social status or that of his audience. 
 
Generally speaking, scholars tend to be more outspoken where the political orientation of 
Hesiod is concerned. Most of them not only agree that Hesiod sings about farming, but also 
that he sang to farmers and actually was one himself. Rose, for instance, tells us that 
‘Hesiod’s poem looks at life through the eyes of a peasant, not of a noble, and its ethics are 
narrow’, and Millett too concludes that the Works and Days is ‘a detailed account of the 
practical working of a peasant society.’16 More than forty years ago, Sinclair stated the (then 
already) age-old truism that Hesiod wrote for the farming community in his neighbourhood,17 
to which he himself belonged18 - and at the begining of the 21st century, scholars still feel the 
same way: ‘aufgewachsen in einem bäuerlichem Milieu (…) hat der Dichter der Erga seine 
Standesgenossen nicht nur zum Publikum, sondern auch zum Gegenstand seiner Poesie 
                                               
13 Dalby (1995) 278; he claimed that we should find ‘a model for the epic poets not so much in Phemius and 
Demodocus’ but ‘more in Odysseus, who told his tales to king and swineherd and earned what he needed from 
each’ (279). 
14 Griffin (1986) 8; see also Heiden (2008) 127 finding in the Iliad’s Catalogue of Ships a ‘democratic 
commemoration that privileges the common soldiers and the communities back home as a whole rather than an 
aristocracy of military leaders.’ 
15 Graziosi (2002) 134. 
16 Rose (1961) 60; Millett (1984) 106; cf. Trever (1924) 167 saying ‘Hesiod presents (…) an accurate picture of 
the rural life of his Boeotian community’. Sinclair (1966) xi-xii believes Hesiod did his fellow countrymen ‘a 
great practical service’ by collecting all kinds of lore and practical information concerning the art of agriculture; 
cf. Howe (1958) 64, who describes the WD as ‘a manual for the newly created economy of the tillers of the soil 
who were beginning to practice independent agriculture full-time and in great numbers.’ The ‘farmer’s almanac’ 
theory, however, has been mostly (and rightly) abandoned; see e.g. Osborne (1987) 17, ‘it would be an 
exaggeration to call it a practical manual for arable farming’, and for a more detailed discussion Stoddard (2004) 
27-33. 
17 According to Sperduti (1950), Hesiod figured that the Boeotian peasant would not be interested in heroes à la 
Homer, and therefore chose a different subject, ‘prompted by the untutored tastes and straitened exigencies of his 
hearers’ (230). Cf. Latte (1946b) 161 claiming (mistakenly) that Hesiod’s aetiological tales were of no concern 
to the ‘ritterliche Gesellschaft’ but do fulfill the ‘primitives Kausalitätsbedürfnis’ of poor farmers who ‘fragten 
kummervoll, warum die Lose gerade so verteilt sein mußten.’ 
18 Sinclair (1966) xvii-xxv. 
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gemacht.’19 Jaeger expressed in almost lyrical turns how in the Works and Days ‘we smell the 
rich fragrance of the earth freshly turned by the plough; from the bushes we hear the cuckoo 
calling the countryman to work’.20 
    Both classicists and anthropologists (who appropriated the Works and Days as a document 
on early lower-class mentality), from the beginnings of Hesiod-Forschung to the present day, 
claim that Hesiod was a peasant: according to Wade-Gery, Hesiod ‘was certainly a 
professional farmer’;21 Will put him in the ‘classe du petit et moyen propriétaire’, and Tandy 
and Neale qualified him as a ‘typical peasant’.22 Many focused on the anti-aristocratic tone of 
certain parts of the Works and Days, and concluded Hesiod was the first ‘spokesman of the 
common people’.23 Provoked by his litigious brother and the unjust behaviour of ‘gift-eating’ 
kings, we are to picture Hesiod ‘stumping the country (…) making agitation’,24 using his 
‘poetry as a vehicle of protest for the common folk’,25 singing ‘un chant révolutionnaire’.26 In 
one of the most recent monographs on Hesiod, Clay too remarks that Hesiod ‘seems to invert 
Odysseus’ strategy, reserving his most violent threats for the kings’.27 No doubt, Hesiod’s 
autobiographical comments were (and still are) of great importance in forming this extremely 
wide-held opinion, against which other voices are of little consequence.28 
                                               
19 Fakas (2001) 100. Compare, too, Sikes (1931) 6 writing that Homeric bards belonged in the royal courts, 
while Hesiod counts as ‘essentially a poet of the people’, with Most only a couple of years ago (2003) 
characterizing Homer as writing for ‘wealthy aristocrats’ and Hesiod for ‘small landowners (131).’ 
20 Jaeger (1945) 73. 
21 Wade-Gery (1949) 87; cf. Nelson (1998) 37 et passim.  
22 Will (1965) 555; Tandy/Neale (1996) xiv, 82. See further e.g. Walcot (1970), esp. 1-24, Gagarin (1973) 94, 
Forrest (1982) 287 (‘Hesiod was of the commons’), and West (1996) 700 (a ‘surly, conservative countryman’). 
Edwards (2004) presents the latest in-depth study of Hesiod’s status and describes the WD as ‘the expression of 
the values and experiences of the rural population’ (26), coming from a ‘very small world’ (166) even less 
developed and complex than hitherto assumed (see esp. his ch. 5). 
23 Sinclair (1966) xix; he further describes the WD as a ‘poem of growing discontent’ (xvii); cf. Solmsen (1962) 
178 speaking of Hesiod’s ‘concern for the common man and his work.’  
24 Wade-Gery (1949) 90. 
25 Zanker (1985) 236. 
26 Detienne (1963b) 9, referring to Von Pöhlmann’s book on ancient socialism, which characterizes Hesiod’s 
‘Lied von der Arbeit’ as ‘das erste Symptom des Erwachens der Masse’ (143), ‘die Stimme des Volkes’ (145), 
etc.; cf. e.g. Schmid-Stählin, who claim Hesiod’s reason for composing the WD were ‘persönliche Erlebnisse 
[i.e. maltreatment by corrupt kings] und das Mitgefühl mit dem gedrückten Volk der Hirten und Bauern’ (248). 
27 Clay (2003) 75; cf. Millett (1984) 103 who notes that modern scholars often regard the WD as ‘a half-way-
house between the apparently unchallenged aristocratic rule of Homeric society, and the overthrow of 
aristocracies in the later archaic period.’ 
28 Such other voices include Østerud (1976) 25-28 pointing out that kings and singers are equated by Hesiod; on 
this telling equation see also e.g. Van Groningen (1957) 165-166, Walcot  (1963) 10-15, Roth (1976) assuming 
that there is an ancient connection between the Muses and the kings which (oddly enough) Hesiod did not fully 
understand (338); Nagy (1990) arguing that the WD assumes an authority ‘that replaces and transcends that of 
kings’ (64), Kirby (1992) 54-55, Clay (2003) 74-75, Stoddard (2004) 176-188. According to Nagy (1996) 44, a 
theogony is by its very nature a ‘poème d’autorité a l’appui du pouvoir royal’, cf. Athanassakis (1983) saying 
that the Th. keeps close to the ‘elevated tenor’ of heroic epic (while there is a ‘complete’ break with the values of 
heroic epic in the WD). Adkins (1972) 23-35, Bravo (1977) 10-12, and Mele (1979) 18-21 think Hesiod is an 
impoverished aristocrat, and Starr (1977) 126-127 makes him an aspiring non-aristocrat; cf. Starr (1982) 438 
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    It is of interest that handbooks on Greek literature often describe Hesiod and his poems by 
contrasting them with Homer, especially with regard to their socio-political orientation; vice 
versa, however, this is hardly ever the case.29 It is remarkable, furthermore, that such 
comparisons not only emphasize Hesiod’s peasant status, but are also very explicit about 
Homer’s aristocratic quality. This is a timeless trend visible, for instance, in Croiset (1910),30 
Lesky (1957),31 and Easterling-Knox (1985), who can serve as a good example. In the chapter 
on Homer, Easterling and Knox avoid the question of the poet’s socio-political stand, but in 
the chapter on Hesiod state on WD 174-201: ‘Hesiod’s preoccupation with ethics and with the 
justice of Zeus is a whole world away from the old aristocratic view of the divine right of 
kings, which is unquestioned in the Iliad an still largely prevails in the Odyssey (…). In 
particular, it is noteworthy that in Hesiod’s view injustice leads ultimately to war as the worst 
of evils. War, of course, is the sport of princes, and in this passage above all Hesiod turns his 
back on Homer and the heroic tradition.’32 In comparisons of this kind, the apparent certainty 
with regard to Hesiod’s social status allows for a more explicit view of Homer. We will now 
look at this mutually reinforcing process taking place in antiquity. 
 
2 - Fighting and Farming 
This section will focus on the ideological opposition of fighting and farming, which is roughly 
the same as that between war and peace - these concepts, at least, were opposed to each other 
by Panedes preferring ‘peace and agriculture’ (gewrgivan kai; eijrhvnhn) to ‘war and slaughter’ 
(polevmou~ kai; sfagav~).33 It should be noted beforehand that this thematic contrast between 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘Hesiod, who cannot be termed an aristocrat, illustrates aspects of ethical and social attitudes which were later 
part and parcel of aristocratic thought’. According to Desmond (2006) 33 Hesiod was ‘relatively rich’ - that is 
why Will (1965) 549 disqualifies him as a revolutionary. 
29 In this respect the modern approach does not differ much from that of the Suda: in the relatively short entry on 
Hesiod (half a page in Adler) Homer is mentioned three times, while the entry on Homer counts no less than six 
pages and does not even mention Hesiod once. 
30 Croiset (1910) in his many chapters on Homer does not focus so much on the political orientation of Iliad and 
Odyssey, but says of Hesiod that he is ‘loin d’avoir dans l’esprit un type humain comparable en noblesse à celui 
du héros homérique’ (505). Where the heroes of old are concerned, Hesiod does not display ‘la moindre 
sympathie pour leurs grandes passions ni le moindre enthousiasme pour leurs exploits’ (ibid.). 
31 Lesky says little on Homer’s social milieu in the Homer-chapter, but begins the Hesiod-chapter by stating 
there is a huge gap separating Hesiod from Homer, a gap ‘das Hesiod sozial und geistig in eine andersgeartete 
Welt verweist’ (113). 
32 Easterling-Knox (1985) 98-99. Cf. e.g. Burn (1936) 47 on the large social differences between the contexts of 
Hesiodic and Homeric poetry, Detienne (1963b) 18 speaking of a ‘distance profonde’ between Hesiodic and 
Homeric society, Nussbaum (1960) 214 saying the WD ‘brings within our cognizance the class of the small but 
independent farmer of whom we learn practically nothing from Homer’, and Jaeger (1945) 71 stating that ‘it is 
obvious that Hesiod deliberately sets up against the aristocratic training of Homer’s heroes a working-class ideal 
of education, based on the areté of the ordinary man.’ 
33 Cert. 208-209. It should be noted beforehand that fighting and farming were not thought of as mutually 
exclusive ‘professions’: in antiquity, soldiers were often farmers and vice versa (cf. X. Oec. stressing time and 
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the two poets in all probability goes back as far as Hesiod himself, who at the very beginning 
of the Works and Days sets his poem off against the Homeric tradition by saying there are two 
kinds of Eris, and not one.  
    It has always been - and it still is - one of the basic tenets of Hesiodic scholarship that his 
mention of the dual Eris right after the proem should be interpreted as a ‘correction’ of the 
account of Eris’ nature given in the Theogony.34 This passage in fact constitutes the prime 
evidence for the ubiquitous notion that the Theogony was composed before the Works and 
Days.35 I find this a very insensitive reading of Eris’ dual nature, which at the least sits rather 
uneasily with the most rudimentary findings of oral theory. Self-correction of this kind 
belongs to scholars in the modern age of the book, not to the bards of Dark Age Greece, 
whose poems are in perpetual flux and depend on the particulars of each performance. Of 
course poems can refer to other poems, critically or not, but this cannot be taken as an 
indication of chronology.36 The dual Eris, I think, should be interpreted rather as a signal of 
departure from heroic epic.37 In heroic poetry, Eris is often the ultimate cause of war and 
slaughter - one can think, for instance, of the apple of Eris setting in motion events that lead to 
the Trojan War, or the eris that sets Agamemnon and Achilles against each other at the outset 
of the Iliad. Hesiod, however, is looking for another beginning: he splits Eris in two, 
                                                                                                                                                   
again that the ideal kalo;~ kajgaqov~ (‘gentleman’) is both an agricultural expert and a master strategian). But the 
activities were opposed conceptually, of course, although it is probably an overstatement to say with Marsilio 
(2000) 59 that there were ‘two rival traditions’, one that takes war as its subject, and the other ‘that exalts the 
spirit of ‘work’.’  
34 WD 11-26, supposedly referring to Th. 225-232. The argument, exemplified by West (1978) 142-143, is that 
since Eris in the Th. is portrayed as a purely negative force (the mother of notions like Hunger, Battles and 
Lawlessness), and Hesiod needed an Eris with a positive side as well (‘Emulation’), he decided to split them in 
two, creating a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ Eris in the WD. His words in WD 11 (oujk a[ra moùnon e[hn   jErivdwn gevno~) 
should thus be read as a ‘correction’ (so e.g. Verdenius 1985 14) that is the result of this new ‘discovery’ (West 
1978 142): ‘there is not after all only one Eris’ (ibid.), cf. the translation by Most (2005): ‘So there was not just 
one birth of Strifes after all’.  
35 Just a few of the veritable host of scholars placing the Th. before the WD on account of the ‘Eris-palinode’ are 
Wade-Gery (1949) 84 n.6, Walcot (1961) 2-3, Most (1991) 77-83 arguing that the correction increased the 
credibility of the WD, Rousseau (1996) 118, and Steiner (2005) 353. The argument is usually reinforced by 
pointing to other places where the WD allegedly ‘presupposes’ the Th. (cf. Walcot 1966 81-82), notably the 
Prometheus-story (cf. Most 1991 84-91); Krafft (1963) 99 argues that the Th. was the earlier work because 
Hesiod expresses his views on the dual nature of women more clearly in the WD, obviously as a result of further 
reflection (and experience, perhaps). The relative chronology gave rise to speculation concerning Hesiod’s 
artistic development, cf. Wade-Gery (1949) 91 n.8 calling Hesiod ‘an imaginative boy’ while composing the Th., 
a ‘Song of Innocence’ followed by the WD’s ‘Song of Experience’. There were some who claimed the WD’s 
priority (see e.g. Cadoux 1929 263, offering no arguments, and esp. Latimer 1930 78, with some references), but 
these voices are now silent. 
36 See e.g. von Fritz (1962) 11 explaining the difference in terms of genre (according to him, a double Eris is 
pedantic in theogony, but does fit a poem on an Ermahnung des Bruders); and Clay (2003) 6-7, in terms of 
perspective (there is only one Eris in the divine world, who has a double appearance in the world of mankind); 
and Gagarin (1990) 174-177, in terms of postmodernism (the ambiguous nature of Eris in the WD points to the 
instability of language).   
37 Cf. Steiner (2007) 187-188, referring to Rousseau (1993).  
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acknowledging the evil one that leads to war and then dedicating the rest of his poem to the 
good one that promotes hard work and competition which leads to wealth and success.38 
Hesiod thus presents himself as a anti-heroic poet of peace, and it is this particular image, 
together with the obviously agricultural theme of the Works and Days, that turns him into the 
perfect opposite of Homer. 
    It goes without saying that Homer was throughout antiquity regarded as the war-poet par 
excellence. Plato’s Ion, for instance, claims to be the ‘best general in Greece’ because he 
knows his Homer best, and Niceratus in Xenophon’s Symposium similarly says that anyone 
wanting to become strathgikov~ should study Homer.39 Homer is generally praised both for 
his thorough knowledge of warfare and his grand descriptions of battle.40 And even though 
Euripides often chooses to use the Homeric legacy to depict the atrocities of war, and presents 
some of Homer’s heroes as cowards or bullies, another poet can still claim in admiration that 
Homer sang so beautifully of the fires of Troy that unravaged cities have become jealous.41 
But both fans and critics (such as Euripides and Panedes) agree on Homer’s focus on war and 
slaughter.42 
    The stark contrast between Homer’s theme and Hesiod’s supposedly favourite subject was 
noted very early.43 The oldest explicit mention of the division (that can be dated with 
certainty) can be found in Aristophanes’ Frogs, a comedy that presents two other poets, 
Euripides and Aeschylus, engaged in an ajgw;n lovgwn. Somewhere halfway, Aeschylus tells us 
how useful the great poets from ancient times were, Orpheus teaching on the subject of mystic 
rites, Musaeus on oracles, … 
 
        …  JHsivodo~ de; 
 gh~̀ ejrgasiva~, karpẁn w{ra~, ajrovtou~: oJ de; qeìo~   {Omhro~ 
  
                                               
38 I am much intrigued by the fact that ancient cosmogonies often posit a pair of opposites at the earliest 
beginning (cf. Long 1963 101); perhaps Hesiod’s dual Eris was influenced by such cosmogonic thinking. Pucci 
(1996) 204-207 suggests the bad Eris in the WD is the Homeric or rather ‘iliadique’ one (associated with Perses 
in the WD), while the good Eris ‘aide aussi Hésiode à mener sa belle compétition avec Homère’ (204); cf. Most 
(1997) 118 arguing that the bad heroes in Hesiod’s myth of the races followed the bad Eris. 
39 Pl. Ion 541a-b; X. Smp. 4.6. 
40 See for other explicit descriptions of Homer as the ultimate poet of war also e.g. Hermog. Id. (Walz 3.375), 
Lib. Sent. 1 (VIII p. 106 F.) ‘those skilled in war must admire Homer for his tactics’ (oJ me;n polemiko;~   {Omhron 
qaumazevtw tẁn taktikẁn), Maximus of Tyre calling Homer ‘bellicose’ (filopovlemon, 23.2; cf. Homer cited 
as praising war in 29.2); see also the link between Homer and the martial poet Tyrtaeus (on which see Quint. 
Inst. 10.1.56 and Them. Or. 15.198c). 
41 AG 16.304 (anon.): ‘By telling the burnt city’s story, Homer, you have allowed unsacked cities to envy her 
fate’ (Diexiwvn,   {Omhre, th;n kekaumevnhn / fqoneìn ejfh̀ka~ ta;~ ajporqhvtou~ povlei~, transl. slightly altered). 
42 According to Dionysius, Homer’s very composition is ‘manly’ (ajndreìw~, Comp. 6.12.12). 
43 See e.g. Steiner (2005), finding the (implicit) opposition as early as Ibycus.   
SWORDS AND PLOUGHSHARES 
 241
ajpo; toù timh;n kai; klevo~ e[scen plh;n toùd’, o{ti crhvst’ ejdivdaxen, 
 tavxei~, ajretav~, oJplivsei~ ajndrwǹ; 
 
‘… and Hesiod on agriculture, the seasons for crops, and ploughing. And where did 
the godlike Homer get respect and renown if not by giving good instruction in the 
tactics, virtues, and weaponry of men?’44 
 
One could argue that this is not, strictly speaking, a case of opposition, since there are four 
poets instead of two, and the list of poets looks more like a climax (with the qeiò~ Homer at 
the end) than a balanced dichotomy.45 The opposition is very obvious, however, in a Laconian 
utterance ascribed to king Cleomenes, ruler of Sparta around 500 BC:  
 
Kleomevnh~ oJ  jAnaxandrivdew to;n me;n   {Omhron Lakedaimonivwn ei\nai poihth;n 
e[fh, to;n de;   JHsivodon twǹ eiJlwvtwn: to;n me;n ga;r wJ~ crh; polemeìn, to;n de; wJ~ crh; 
gewrgeiǹ parhggelkevnai. 
 
‘Cleomenes, the son of Anaxandridas, said that Homer was the poet of the Spartans 
and Hesiod that of the helots: for the one gave orders about how to wage war, the other 
about how to do farming.’46 
 
This characterization deals with Homer and Hesiod alone, and the poets - by their typical 
subjects of ‘fighting’ and ‘farming’ (polemeiǹ and gewrgeiǹ) - are opposed in most powerful 
terms, for the opposition is framed according to the distinction between Spartans and helots; a 
starker contrast is hardly imaginable. Spoken by the king, the opposition also contains a very 
negative evaluation of Hesiod, whose poetry is of secondary importance since the helots and 
their activities are utterly subservient to the Spartans. Obviously, this distinction has strongly 
political overtones as well. If indeed Cleomenes was its author, the saying would be the 
earliest explicit contrast between Hesiod and Homer on the basis of the ideological opposition 
between peace and war. 
    It is my belief that the contrast with Homer further radicalized Hesiod’s image as a farmer 
or shepherd. Hesiod, it should be noted, is not a farmer-poet per se: there is plenty of conflict 
                                               
44 Ar. Ran. 1033-1036.  
45 Still, the list could also be taken to consist of two pairs, the first two poets teaching two things (Orpheus ‘rites 
and to refrain from killing’, and Musaeus the ‘cures of illness and oracles’), whereas the second pair teaches 
three subjects each.  
46 Plu. Mor. 223A. 
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and battle in the Hesiodic poems.47 But Hesiod could never be remembered as a poet of war 
as long as he was compared to Homer. And so, energy was rather spent on developing his 
image of the countryman, which could take rather extreme forms. In Lucian’s Saturnalia, for 
instance, Cronus calls Hesiod ‘that shepherd’ (to;n poimevna ejkeìnon), and Lucian elsewhere 
describes him as a ‘shepherd, a hard-bitten, hairy man displaying rich tan on his body.’48 
Another good example comes from Dio’s Second Oration on Kingship, where Alexander the 
Great characterizes Hesiod contemptuously as the poet ‘for shepherds, carpenters, and 
farmers; since he says that shepherds are beloved by the Muses, and to carpenters he gives 
very shrewd advice as to how large they could cut an axle, and to farmers, when to broach a 
cask.’49 He proceeds to say - much like Cleomenes - that this sort of poetry is only useful for 
people who ‘lived a slave’s life’ (ejdouvleuon), ‘herding and farming’ (nevmonte~ kai; 
gewrgoùnte~) for their masters.50 Hesiod’s original occupation as a shepherd was of course 
well-known from the Theogony, but Lucian transforms him into the typically rough and 
rugged flea-bag so familiar from many other texts. Similarly, in Dio’s obviously negative 
description of Hesiod, we find some other oft-heard stereotypes of countrymen: their limited 
mind is exclusively focused on the trivia of day-to-day survival, they learn slowly and only 
through practical experience, and their life of toil and hard work does not befit the free 
citizen. 
    Throughout antiquity, this stereotypical picture of Hesiod as ‘Farmer George’ was often 
referred to and further elaborated. In this process, his typically ‘rural’ qualities could be 
evaluated either in a positive or a negative mode. Hence, Hesiod can appear as traditional or 
boorish, wise through experience or dim-witted, and modest or poor. Plutarch, for instance, 
lauds Hesiod’s preference for the simple life and quotes him to lend weight to his claim that 
useless things like perfume and jewelry should be expelled from the state, whereas Pausanias 
explicitly tells us that one of the reasons that Hesiod did not perform at royal courts was his 
                                               
47 In the Th., I counted 337 lines out of a total of 1022 that deal with war and violence, coming to exactly 33 
procent (still leaving out the gruesome descriptions of violent monsters). Furthermore, the Shield contains a grim 
scene of battle, and the fragments that we have contain much violence as well. To describe Hesiod as a Boeotian 
farmer ‘for whom all war-struggles are quite strange’ (Kaczynska 1998 45) is a misrepresentation based on a 
construct of Hesiod that goes back to the ancient times themselves. 
48 Lucian Sat. 6; Ind. 3: poimevni (...) sklhrẁ/ ajndri; kai; daseì kai; polu;n to;n h{lion ejpi; tẁ/ swvmati 
ejmfaivnonti. Cf. Rh.Pr. 9, where the guide on the ‘steep road’ to good speaking is a ‘vigorous man with hard 
muscles and a manly stride, who shows heavy tan on his body’ (karterov~ ti~ ajnhvr, uJpovsklhro~, ajndrwvdh~ 
to; bavdisma, polu;n to;n h{lion ejpi; tẁ/ swvmati deiknuvwn); see also the description of the Hesiod-like goatherd 
Lycidas (Theoc. Id. 7.13-19). 
49 D.Chrys. 2.8-9: toì~ poimevsin kai; toì~ tevktosi kai; toì~ gewrgoì~. tou;~ me;n ga;r poimevna~ fhsi; 
fileìsqai uJpo; tẁn Mousẁn, toì~ de; tevktosi mavla ejmpeivrw~ paraineì phlivkon crh; to;n a[xona temeìn, 
kai; toì~ gewrgoì~, oJphnivka a[rxasqai pivqou; cf. below, p. 249. 
50 D.Chrys. 2.8-9; references are made to Th. 22-35, WD 423-425 and WD 368-369. 
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‘boorishness’ (ajgroikiva).51 Similarly, Plutarch can claim (much like Dio’s Alexander but this 
time without the sarcasm) that ‘there is no lack of attention or experience shown in what 
[Hesiod] has to say about the daily course of life’ (dh̀lov~ ejstin oujk ajmelẁ~ oujd’ ajpeivrw~ 
peri; diaivth~ ... dialegovmeno~), suggesting there is a sort of timeless validity and wisdom to 
Hesiod’s sayings.52 At the same time, however, Plutarch very clearly shows us that Hesiod 
was attacked for the obviousness of (some of) his advice when he defends one of his 
apparently less insightful sayings, ‘invite your friend to the feast, but let your enemy be’: as 
history has shown that it can be dangerous and even deadly to accept dinner-invitations from 
so-called friends, ‘the advice of Hesiod is therefore not absurd or silly, as some assert, but 
wise.’53 Dio Chrysostom is one of those sceptics: in his oration on envy (a subject on which 
Hesiod naturally counted as an expert), he is highly ironical in presenting Hesiod as an 
abstract thinker speaking to intelligent persons.54  
    Hesiod’s position as an advocate of modesty and moderation has been amply discussed in 
chapter 5. It is not hard to find passages illustrating Hesiod’s connection to both hard work 
and poverty. Apart from the discussions of Works and Days 311 that turn him into an expert 
on e[rgon (‘decent work’),55 Hesiod is often associated with a no-nonsense work ethic; see, for 
instance, Dio praising Hesiod’s attack on idleness, and the Stoics quoting from the Works and 
Days to promote work or to reject procrastination.56 Theognis referred twice to Hesiod’s 
saying on ‘accursed poverty’,57 and it seems that Aristotle too saw Hesiod as an author 
familiar with dire circumstances - when he in the Politics discusses the household, mankind’s 
most basic community, he says that ‘Hesiod was right when he wrote ‘First and foremost a 
house and a wife and an ox for the ploughing’ – for the ox serves instead of a servant for the 
poor.’58 
                                               
51 Plu. Mor. 527B-C, Paus. 1.2.3; see also Galen 6.652.4-9 connecting Hesiod with ajgroikiva. 
52 Plu. Mor. 158A-B; see also Thes. 3.2, where Plutarch suggests that the most ancient wisdom of Greece ‘had 
some such form and force as that for which Hesiod was famous’ (toiauvth ti~, wJ~ e[oiken, ijdeva kai; duvnami~, 
oi{a/ crhsavmeno~   JHsivodo~ eujdokivmei), pointing again to his traditional character. 
53 Plu. Mor. 530D: ouj geloìon ou\n, w{~ fasiv tine~, oude; ajbevlteron, ajlla; sofo;n to; toù  JHsiovdou; see for a 
similar defense by Plutarch S WD 797-799 (against the charge of talking ‘ridiculously’, geloivw~) and 423-427 
(against the charge of ‘talking about details’, smikrologiva). 
54 D.Chrys. 77.5. 
55 See ch. 6, pp. 196. 
56 D.Chrys. 7.116, SVF 3.648, SVF 3.138 (Chrysippus). 
57 Thgn. 1.155-156 and 1.1062 (WD 717), see ch. 5, pp. 158. 
58 Arist. Pol. 1252b9-12: ojrqẁ~   JHsivodo~ ei\pe poihvsa~ ‘oi\kon me;n prwvtista gunaìkav te boùn t’ ajroth̀ra: 
(WD 405)’ oJ ga;r boù~ ajnt’ oijkevtou toì~ pevnhsivn ejstin. See also Strabo 9.2.24 who refers to Hesiod’s 
‘rough’ path in his description of Ascra as a high and ‘rough’ place (uJyhloù kai; tracevo~ tovpou), emphasizing 
its poverty.  
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    Considering such elaborate stereotyping (especially of Hesiod) taking place throughout 
antiquity, and considering that the explicit opposition between Hesiod and Homer in terms of 
peace and war can be traced at least to the fifth century (and presumably all the way to Hesiod 
himself),59 it is only to be expected that the Greeks also found more subtle ways of contrasting 
the two poets in this respect.60 I will demonstrate just how subtly such oppositions could be 
framed by entering into a brief discussion of an intriguing papyrus containing, as the title 
suggests, the words that Hesiod spoke at the very moment he was inspired by the Muses. This 
discussion will also round off the present section. 
    Papyrus Oxyrhynchus 3537, dated to the third century AD, is a small poem of unknown 
date by an unknown author imagining what Hesiod might have said at the very moment of 
inspiration. ‘Hesiod’ first asks himself which of the gods has ‘shaken’ him (1-4), and then 
asks the Muse to tell him of gods, giants, heroes, women and the universe (5-7). Most 
interesting is his elaborate rejection of insignificant Ascra and the small bucolic poem, which 
‘rustics sing’ (8-21); the poem ends with the poet’s intention to reveal what he has learned 
from the Muses: ‘now I begin to sing’ (22-24). The papyrus is severely damaged, and 
discussion so far has mostly focussed on restauration.61 Of great interest is Agosti’s discovery 
that the poem is an acrostic, spelling out the epic (but only Homeric, and not Hesiodic) 
formula to;n d’ ajpameibovmeno~ prosevfh (‘and answering him he said’). Most, however, has 
been the first to ask the really interesting questions.62 In his article, he convincingly shows 
that the poem entails a devaluation of the Works and Days in favour of the more serious 
poetry to which the Theogony and Catalogue belong, the moment of inspiration marking the 
caesura in this developmental scheme; the papyrus thus offers a rather unique testimony on 
the priority of the Works and Days in Hesiod’s oeuvre.63 The Homeric reference caught in the 
                                               
59 See for an explicit contrast in Latin literature Man. Astr. 2.1-24, who characterizes Homer’s work as 
concerned with certamina and bellum, while Hesiod’s Astronomy is called a pacis opus. 
60 We have already seen (ch. 4, p. 125), how the Homeric war-poet Tyrtaeus gave a particularly martial twist to 
the work-ethic advocated by the image of the rough road to excellence (WD 291). In the 24th oration of 
Maximus of Tyre, for instance, a dispute between a soldier and a farmer is fought out with the aid of references 
to Homer and Hesiod. 
61 Esp. West (1984) reacting to the papyrus’ publication by Parsons (1983). 
62 Most (2008), offering an excellent analysis, even though he only does so ‘in the hope of attracting the attention 
of other scholars to it’ (65). 
63 See Most (2008) 68. This observation needs some qualification, however, since there are but few explicit 
ancient statements on the priority of the Th. over the WD as well. Moreover, I wonder whether the first two lines 
of Hesiod’s epitaph (‘Ascra with many cornfields was my home, but my dead bones / the horse-striking 
Minyans’ country holds’,   [Askrh me;n patri;~ polulhvi>o~, ajlla; qanovnto~ / ojsteva plhxivppwn gh̀ Minuẁn 
katevcei, see ch. 5, p. 141) point to a similar development from didactic-agricultural to heroic-martial poetry, the 
first epithet (‘with many cornfields’ having obviously agricultural overtones, while the second one (‘horse-
goading’) is mainly Homeric, though Hesiod uses it twice (but not in the WD; horses of course being typically 
attributes of heroes and not used on the farm). Such a concern with Hesiod’s theme may also be present in the 
second part of the epitaph, which ascribes great ‘glory’ (kùdo~) to Hesiod’s wisdom. The term kùdo~ is normally 
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acrostic, Most argues, is meant to ‘render Hesiod more serious by associating him with 
Homer.’64 
    My only problem with Most’s analysis is that he does not go far enough. It is only the 
acrostic that makes him remark on Hesiod’s wish to attain Homeric grandeur, but in my view 
this is the main theme of the poem as a whole. Throughout the poem, Hesiod denounces those 
qualities that normally characterize him when opposed to Homer, most obviously his 
agricultural theme: the cattle-stables are ‘thrice-wretched’ (8), a bucolic poem is ‘small’ (18), 
and Hesiod hates the ‘rustic sound’ of the ‘goatherd’s pipe’ (20-21); moreover, he is leaving 
behind the mountains and their sheep (2) in order to go to the cities65 and the ‘circle of 
contests’ (9). But there are other ways in which this Hesiod seeks to become Homeric: he 
wants to sing of things ‘[which I have never] seen with my eyes’ (7), steering his subject 
away from self-observed everyday life to mystical truths (much like blind Homer); he wants 
to drink ‘much’ from the Aganippe, rejecting the typically Hesiodic sips and instead taking a 
big swallow;66 and he takes much time to say goodbye to his roots (both Ascra and his 
father’s hometown Cyme, 11-12), and, I think, to his family as well (15-16) - not only 
because they are mentioned in the (now to be rejected) Works and Days, but also because they 
are essential to the Hesiodic persona.67 Only if Hesiod gets rid of all his defining 
characteristics can he become like Homer, and now we can better understand the meaning of 
the acrostic. The poet did not choose to;n d’ ajpameibovmeno~ prosevfh at random, as just any 
typically Homeric formula. ‘Hesiod’ himself is speaking in this poem, and the tovn whom 
Hesiod is trying to ‘answer’ with his career move is Homer.  
    In this remarkable poem too, then, we see just how fundamental the fighting-farming 
contrast is - without his agricultural theme, Hesiod ceases to be Hesiod. 
 
3 - The King and the People  
This section will deal with the question of the poet’s socio-political stand, a significant 
‘watershed’ in the tradition of the contest. It will be argued that both Hesiod and Homer can 
                                                                                                                                                   
used for martial exploits, and its appearance here may suggest that Hesiod’s sofiva is as important as physical 
excellence (cf. Xenophanes DK 11 B 2, discussed in ch. 7, p. 221 n.67). 
64 Most (2008) 70; Most argues that the poem presents the Th. and Cat. as mystical poems, far exceeding the 
juvenilia contained in the WD. 
65 ptol- in line 9 must surely be restored as ptoliveqron (or -a), not as (a form of) ptovlemo~, cf. Most (2008) 
66-67. Pausanias says Hesiod did not perform at courts because of his ‘boorishness and reluctance to travel’ 
(ajgroikiva kai; o[kno~ plavnh~, 1.2.3). 
66 See ch. 9, pp. 288-295 for the water-metaphor distinguishing two types of poetry, little drops representing 
Hesiodic poetry (or at least the hellenistic reconstruction of it), and big amounts symbolizing the Homeric type. 
67 See ch. 4, pp. 112-114 for Hesiod’s human nature and ‘knownness’ distinguishing him from Homer. 
CHAPTER 8 
246 
be associated with either high (the rulers / the few) or low (the ruled / the many), even though 
certain preferences can easily be discerned: Hesiod is generally associated with the people, 
and Homer with kings and aristocrats. When the poets are opposed to each other, however, 
such preferences radicalize into more extreme polarization. 
    Before we start our discussion proper it is perhaps worth our while to ask whether this 
thematic contrast, like that between fighting and farming, can also be traced back to the age of 
the poets themselves. To be sure, Hesiod is well-known for his criticism of kings in the Works 
and Days:68 he calls them ‘gift-eating’ (WD 39, 221, 264), tells them a fable teaching that 
might is not right (202-212), and warns them several times against (the evil deriving from) 
‘crooked judgements’.69 There seem to be no obvious signs, however, that Hesiod in such 
passages is referring in some way to Homeric epic. Homer, on the other hand, may have been 
provoked by the anti-aristocratic tone of the Works and Days. There is one (and only one) 
character in the Iliad who voices such sentiments, ‘ugly beyond all men who came to Troy’, 
who is immediately beaten back into submission with Agamemnon’s sceptre: Thersites. I 
would suggest that Homer’s Thersites-episode is fashioned (in part) as a response to Hesiod’s 
epic of peasants. 
    The Thersites-episode in the Iliad (2.211-277) is as famous as it is ambiguous. Even if it 
should be regarded as an example of class struggle in Dark Age Greece,70 scholars disagree 
widely on its meaning and the right approach to retrieve it.71 Instead of offering a new 
‘solution’, I would like to add to the complexity of the episode by pointing to the thematic 
connection between Thersites’ speech and the Works and Days. Thersites is introduced by the 
narrator as one engaged in ‘seeking eris with kings’ (ejrizevmenai basileùsin, 214), and 
these very same words are used again by Odysseus to describe him (247). Obviously, this is 
the man’s main occupation,72 but more importantly, he is the only one in Homeric epic to 
regularly do so.73 His speech contains Hesiodic reminiscences, notably a warning against 
greed and the abuse of power; Thersites’ suggestion to leave Agamemnon on the shores of 
Troy to ‘digest his prizes’ (237) resembles Hesiod’s oft-heard description of kings as ‘gift-
                                               
68 The Th. takes a far more positive stand on kings, calling them ‘Zeus-nourished’ (82; cf. Th. 96, to which refers 
Call. Jov. 78) and ‘wise’ (88), and describing their justice and respect (81-92). 
69 Esp. in WD 238-273, that deals with the city suffering for the sins of one person, the works of the maiden 
Justice, and the thrice ten thousand guardians of Zeus. 
70 The majority view; see the lucid overview by Marks (2005) 1-6, who himself takes the opposite view. 
71 See Rose (1988) on the historical, literary and ideological approach; in his article, he stresses the inadequacy 
of all of those, and assumes a ‘plurality of meanings’ (15); see also the careful analysis by Thalmann (1988), and 
recently Steiner (2007) 193 and 199 on Thersites as representing a certain genre of poetry.  
72 Cf. Il. 2.220, where it is said that Thersites ‘was in the habit of reviling’ (neikeiveske) Achilles and Odysseus. 
73 Achilles (who is often regarded as Thersites’ ‘double’, see e.g. Thalmann 1988 19, Rose 1988 19) is the only 
other seeking eris with a king (Il. 1.277), but that is an isolated incident. 
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eating’. Thersites is an odd one out in the Iliad: the only commoner to speak in the assembly, 
the only one to seek eris with kings, the only one described as ugly - is he meant to be 
(understood by the audience as) alien to heroic epic, because he is imported from some place 
else? In other words: could Thersites be (in part) a caricature of Hesiod? If he is, the Homeric 
narrator takes a strong stand against the political orientation of the Works and Days. It is 
impossible to know for sure, but it is an interesting possibility.  
 
Let us return to the socio-political image of the poets. Hesiod, to begin with, is most often 
associated with the common people. According to some versions of the contest, for instance, 
Hesiod won because he was judged by the crowd instead of by the nobility. We have seen 
above that Hesiod could be described as poor, and chapter 5 paid ample attention to his 
embrace of the victim’s perspective, and his warnings - addressed to the kings - against greed 
and abuse of power. His sayings are ‘popular’ in the sense that they are used by the people, 
and Aristotle is often keen to point out that Hesiod’s reputed ‘philosophy’ does not transcend 
the ordinary notions of hoi polloi.74 Generally speaking, then, Hesiod is usually pictured as 
belonging to the Unterschicht of society.75 
    Homer, by contrast, is often associated with kings and the ruling faction in general. His 
aristocratic image is obviously connected to the almost universal belief in his knowledge of 
warfare and tactics - we have seen that Socrates can summarize Homer’s poetry as dealing 
with ‘wars and generalships and the government of cities and the education of mankind’.76 
But there are many more indications. One of these is provided by Ford, who has argued 
persuasively that Homer was in classical times so closely associated with the aristocracy that 
Athenians had to be careful about quoting Homer in the courtroom.77 Aristotle, who speaks of 
kingship on numerous occasions, very often cites Homer to prove his point - it is obvious that 
he associated him with kingly rule.78 Philodemus wrote a book called On the good king 
                                               
74 See e.g. EN 1155a32-b7, where Hesiod’s saying on friendship (WD 25) is first called a mere proverb, after 
which Aristotle proceeds to the opinions of ‘those who try to find a more profound and scientific explanation’ 
(ajnwvteron ejpizhtoùsi kai; fusikwvteron), like those of Empedocles and Heraclitus; cf. Metaph. 989a10-12 
and Oec. 1343a18-21. Hesiodic lines are regularly reported as being proverbial; see e.g. Plu. Thes. 3.3.2 saying 
Hesiod was famous for his gnwmologivai, and Athen. 3.101f describing Hesiod’s speech as gnwmikov~.  
75 It is occasionally seen, however, that Hesiod can be positive about the social elite as well, which in these cases 
almost immediately brings up the explicit comparison with Homer. See S Il. 1.175c (T), 2.360b (bT), 17.251a 
(A), Plu. Mor. 801E, D.Chrys. 2.23-24. 
76 Pl. R. 599c: polevmwn te pevri kai; strathgiẁn kai; dioikhvsewn povlewn, kai; paideiva~ pevri ajnqrwvpou.  
77 Ford (1999a) 232-241; see also Perlman (1965) 55-58 arguing that the Athenian jury preferred quotations from 
tragedy, a (more) democratic art form. See for (democratic) anger about the aristocratic abuse of Homer also X. 
Mem. 1.2.56 (discussed in ch. 2, pp. 77-78) and Iambl. VP 259.  
78 In EN 1113a7-8 it is said that Homer ‘represented’ (ejmimeìto) ‘ancient constitutions’, by which Aristotle 
means kingship. Homer illustrates the ‘kingly’ relationship between father and son in EN 1160b24-27 and Pol. 
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according to Homer, in which the philosopher ‘derives the character of the ideal king from 
the Homeric poems’,79 and Dio Chrysostom explicitly characterizes Homer as being 
preoccupied with kings and kingship, displaying a marked aversion for hoi polloi.80 
    On the other hand, Homer can in certain contexts also be constructed as the people’s poet, 
as has been shown by Graziosi in her book on the ancient reception of Homer. It is in fact one 
of the great merits of her study that she has seriously attacked the widespread modern belief 
that in antiquity Homer was regarded as an aristocrat by showing that alleged ancient view to 
be a projection of the notions of the modern scholars themselves.81 She makes a good case, 
although it appears to me that she sometimes downplays important evidence;82 furthermore, 
‘democratic’ views of Homer often seem to be conscious reactions, i.e. attempts to 
appropriate Homer for the people and wrest him away from the aristocracy. For us it will 
suffice to say that Homer, although he is mostly associated with the rulers and nobility, could 
occasionally be presented as a poet of the people.83 
    Even though both Hesiod and Homer cannot be univocally aligned with either the people or 
the king, it is clear that when the poets are opposed on the socio-political axis, they are firmly 
placed in their ‘corner’ of preference. This can, of course, already be seen in the Certamen. It 
is incorrect to assume that Homer’s rejection by a king (Panedes) is in any sense typical, since 
it is clearly part of the surprise of Hesiod’s victory that he was chosen by a king; moreover, 
when after the contest proper Homer starts touring through Greece, he is hired by king Midas’ 
sons on Crete, is the guest of king Medon in Athens, recites for the proesthkovte~ 
(‘governors’) in Argos, and is honoured with costly gifts like a silver cup and a bronze statue. 
                                                                                                                                                   
1259b10-14, and between pater familias and the household in Pol. 1252b20-23; the kindness of the king towards 
his subjects in EN 1161a10-15; and kingship as life-long generalship in Pol. 1285a10-15. See Pol. 1292a13-15 
for Homer’s criticism of democracy. 
79 DeLacy (1948) 264. 
80 In Or. 61.1, for instance, Dio says that Homer’s usual topic consists of ‘kings and generals’ (ta; tẁn basilevwn 
kai; strathgẁn); in 53.11-12 he singles out the king as a special person on whose ajrethv Homer has much to 
say. Or. 32.22 presents Homer as ‘constantly singing of the mob as being cruel and unruly and prone to 
violence’, and it is implied in 7.107 that Homer would only call cities without poor people ‘well-inhabited’.  
81 Graziosi 2002, esp. ch. 4 on Homer’s ‘blindness, poverty and closeness to the gods’; her reconstruction of 
Homer’s image in antiquity agrees very much with that of Schmid-Stählin (1929) 88: ‘… er ist der Typus eines 
armen, blinden, nach Rhapsodenart fahrenden Dichters, der für die überall gern angenommenen Gaben seiner 
Muse schnöden Undank erntet, betrogen und ausgenützt wird’. 
82 Even though she may be right that ‘in antiquity Homer was consistently represented as poor’ (134), it goes too 
far to adduce Heraclitus’ story on Homer and the lice as proof for his low social status (‘Homer’s poverty is 
implicit: no aristocrat would be said to entertain himself with children on a louse hunt’, 162), while it is simply 
untrue that ‘Homer is never said to be an esteemed singer at the court of rulers’ (137), on which see more below.   
83 See Graziosi (2002) 157 for some of the most important early texts; an interesting late example is Paus. 1.2.3, 
who says that Homer, traveling around the world, ‘depreciated the help afforded by despots in the acquisition of 
wealth in comparison with his reputation among ordinary men’ (th;n wjfevleian th;n ej~ crhvmata para; tẁn 
dunatẁn uJstevran qevmeno~ th̀~ para; toì~ polloì~ dovxh~). 
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Hesiod, on the other hand, after the contest stays ‘among the people of Oenoe’ (ejn toi~̀ 
Oijnoeùsin), where he is murdered. The division is very clear-cut. 
    Instances of such polarized oppositions occur elsewhere. One example is Cleomenes’ 
description (cited above) of Homer as a poet for Spartans and Hesiod for helots - obviously, 
this division operates not only in respect to the activities of two separate classes (fighting 
versus farming), but also regarding their political status: Homer belongs to the rulers, Hesiod 
to the powerless subjects. The opposition can also be witnessed in Dio’s Second Oration on 
Kingship: while Hesiod’s verses are fit for craftsmen, farmers, and in short, those ‘who lead a 
slave’s life’ (an aristocratic exaggeration of their actual low status), the poetry of Homer is 
‘alone truly noble and lofty and suited to a king, worthy of the attention of a real man, 
particularly if he expects to rule over all the peoples of the earth’.84 It is extremely interesting 
to see that later in the same treatise the harsh characterization of Hesiod is somewhat 
mitigated when Alexander admits that Hesiod’s poetry contains at least something useful for 
kings, too.85 He then concludes that the ‘noble ruler of princely soul’ (gennaiò~ kai; 
basiliko;~ th;n yuchvn) should read ‘not all poetry, but only the most beautiful and majestic, 
such as we known Homer’s alone to be, and of Hesiod’s the portions akin to Homer’s…’.86 
Hesiod, therefore, is only kingly when he is not too Hesiodic. 
    It is in this context of political polarization that we should understand a remarkable saying 
attributed to Simonides: 
 
Simwnivdh~ to;n   JHsivodon khpouro;n e[lege, to;n de;   {Omhron stefanhplovkon, to;n 
me;n wJ~ futeuvsanta ta;~ peri; qeẁn kai; hJrwvwn muqologiva~, to;n de; wJ~ ejx aujtwǹ 
sumplevxanta to;n   jIliavdo~ kai;   jOdusseiva~ stevfanon. 
 
‘Simonides said that Hesiod was a gardener and Homer a weaver of garlands, since the 
former planted the mythological stories about gods and heroes, while the latter wove 
together the garland of the Iliad and Odyssey out of them.’87 
                                               
84 D.Chrys. 2.6: … movnhn tẁ/ o[nti gennaivan kai; megalopreph̀ kai; basilikhvn, h|/ prevpei to;n noùn 
prosevcein a[ndra mavlista me;n a[rxein mevllonta tẁn o{poi pote; ajnqrwvpwn. See for similar judgements of 
Homer e.g. 2.44 ‘Homer seems a competent instructor for an education that is truthfully heroic and kingly’ 
(e[oike ... iJkano;~ ei\nai paideuvein   {Omhro~ hJrwikhvn tina kai; basilikh;n tẁ/ o[nti paivdeusin,), and 2.54 ‘he 
who tries to give heed to him [= Homer] will be a highly successful and exemplary king’ (oJ touvtw/ peirwvmeno~ 
to;n noùn prosevcein eujtucevstatov~ te kai; a[risto~ basileuv~). 
85 He is thinking of Th. 80-82 (Calliope attending on kings from their earliest childhood), which he interprets as a 
statement on the necessity of kings studying rhetoric and philosophy (D.Chrys. 2.23-24). 
86 D.Chrys. 2.27: oujc aJpavsh/, th̀/ de; kallivsth/ kai; megaloprepestavth/ (...), oi{an movnhn i[smen th;n   JOmhvrou 
kai; tẁn   JHsiovdou ta; toiaùta. 
87 Gnom. Vat. Graec. 1144 (= Most T16). 
CHAPTER 8 
250 
This saying is far more than a mere statement on chronology, indicating Hesiod’s priority;88 it 
is rather a description of their poetry that typifies the relationship between the poets89 in terms 
now strongly familiar to us. On the one hand, there is the farmer-like Hesiod, on his knees 
with his hands in the dirt, providing the raw and unworked material of myth: an interesting 
blend of the Works and Days (the poem of ‘planting’, so to speak)90 and the Theogony. 
Homer, on the other hand, has the genius and sophistication to transform these materials into 
pleasurable end-products, which are finished and thus named, Iliad and Odyssey. The (nearly) 
perfect parallelism between the two descriptions stresses the process of shapeless matter (ta;~ 
peri; qeẁn kai; hJrwvwn muqologiva~, note the vague periv and the plural) being turned into the 
perfect ‘garland’ (singular) consisting of two poems. It is difficult not to interpret the 
‘gardener’ Hesiod as having a low status when compared to Homer, whom he apparently 
‘serves’. Such a reading is strengthened by the kind of product Homer is preparing, for a 
stevfano~ can also be interpreted as a ‘crown’, which implies that the Iliad and Odyssey are 
made for kings, and that Homer is significantly higher on the social ladder.91 On the other 
hand, the saying of Simonides is much less condemning than that of the Spartan king 
Cleomenes, and also suggests a picture of complementarity.92 
    The above-mentioned cases of polarization are some of the most outspoken and clear 
examples of a phenomenon that is fairly widespread: the process that makes the ‘typical’ 
qualities of Hesiod and Homer come out more strongly when they are opposed.93 The 
compatibility of the Hesiod-Homer opposition with some well-known oppositions in the 
ethico-political sphere suggests that the contrast between the two poets was constructed with 
the aid of these other oppositions, and perhaps also vice versa. As a result, all such polar 
concepts as fighting - farming, king - people, and Homer-Hesiod are ‘aligned’, so to speak, to 
form one great grid of typical values that gain their meaning from the conceptual opposition 
to others. Sometimes, however, we find texts where such neat binary structures are 
consciously upset, i.e. cases of ‘boundary crossing’ in which Hesiod or Homer are explicitly 
                                               
88 Most (2006) 170-171 grouped the saying under the testimonia headed ‘Hesiod older than Homer’. Svenbro 
(1972) 188 treats the passage as proof that Homer was regarded as a ‘stitching’ rhapsode (stringing flowers 
together into a garland) - but how about Hesiod? 
89 This was already recognized by Harriott (1969) 138, who unfortunately does not proceed beyond the 
observation that Simonides’ description is ‘metaphorical’. 
90 The same verb, futeuvw, is actually used in WD 22 and 812.  
91 With this in mind, it is a double paradox that in the Certamen it is Hesiod who receives the crown, making 
Homer ‘bow’ for him. 
92 Simonides is credited with yet another revealing insight concerning the difference between Hesiod and Homer; 
see ch. 9, pp. 274-275.  
93 See also Athenaeus 5.186F, who says Hesiod has shown a ‘Boeotian insensibility’ (Boiwtikhv ajnaisqhsiva) in 
advising us to invite our neighbours to dinner instead of the ‘best men and those who are held in esteem’ (tou;~ 
ajrivstou~ te kai; ejntivmou~) as Homer does. 
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placed at the a-typical end of the axis. It is this sort of image-construction that we will now 
briefly look at. 
 
4 - Hesiod’s Crossing and Homer’s Expansion 
Obviously, the neat binary scheme with the balanced system of opposites does not always 
hold. There are always cases that do not fit. In Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, for instance, the  
kalov~ te kajgaqov~ (‘perfect gentleman’), much like the kings in Homer, is an expert on both 
warfare and agriculture, and occupies himself with both.94 In Aristophanes’ Peace, it is the 
typically peace-loving farmers who turn out to be the best fighters because of their hardy way 
of life, and in similar vein the shepherd-god Pan is often engaged in war.95 These cases, 
however, do not at all invalidate the conceptual oppositions, which are there to provide the 
typical picture, which does not have to account for all cases. Moreover, even when boundaries 
are crossed or blurred the scheme in some way still holds because such cases are presented as 
extraordinary. Xenophon’s picture of the ideal gentleman, for instance, presupposes the 
opposition of the activities he manages to combine. 
    Hesiod and Homer can also ‘cross’, and can thus sometimes be credited with ‘a-typical’ 
qualities. In the case of the poets, there are basically two possibilities: Hesiod ‘crosses’ to 
Homer’s side and receives Homeric qualities; and Homer ‘crosses’ over to Hesiod’s side 
(sometimes these things happen at the same time). These two scenarios, however, work in a 
wholly different way, and thus each deserves some special attention. 
 
Hesiod is sometimes seen to cross over to Homer’s side, i.e. take a place in the socio-political 
field that is typically Homer’s. As we have seen, Hesiod’s remarks on the divine descent of 
kings, and their Muse-given ability to settle disputes (both qualities described in the 
Theogony, not in the Works and Days) made him Homeric to some extent. There is also some 
crossing of the thematic watershed of fighting versus farming, as is for instance demonstrated 
by Manilius, who describes Hesiod’s agricultural poem as dealing with ‘man’s warfare with 
the soil’, militiam soli.96 This is an obviously playful remark, describing Hesiod’s most 
                                               
94 See e.g. X. Oec. 4.12: ‘I think that being engaged in agriculture is nothing less than being engaged in warfare’ 
(oujde;n e[moige dokeì h|tton twǹ gewrgikẁn e[rgwn ejpimeleìsqai h] tẁn polemikẁn), and also e.g. 4.24 and 
5.1. See on the historical reality of the Homeric heroes tending sheep and driving ploughs e.g. Starr (1982) 439, 
and on the conceptual connection between the heroic and the agricultural Murnaghan (2006). 
95 [Longus] Daphnis and Chloe 2.23. 
96 Man. Astr. 2.21. There is another instance of thematic crossing in line 23, where Hesiod’s advice on 
agricultural matters is described as knowledge of ‘the grafting of errant fruits on trees as though in illicit union’ 
(arbusta vagis essent (…) adultera pomis), the themes of wandering and adultery being of course the stuff that 
heroic epic is made of. 
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unheroic poem in martial terms,97 but may also prepare the way for the beginning of the third 
book of the Astronomica, where Manilius opposes his difficult task of writing a didactic poem 
on a less attractive (because peaceful) subject to the relatively easy job of composing war 
poetry to enchant the audience: 
 
non ego in excidium caeli nascentia bella, 
 fulminis et flammis partus in matre sepultos, 
 non coniuratos reges Troiaque cadente 
 Hectora venalem cineri Priamumque ferentem… 
 
‘I shall not tell of war conceived for heaven’s destruction and offspring buried by the 
flames of the thunderbolt in its mother’s womb; or of the oath-bound kings and how, 
in Troy’s last hour, Hector’s body was ransomed for his obsequies and fetched by 
Priam…’98 
 
The first two lines refer to the Theogony,99 the others to the Iliad - Hesiod and Homer are now 
both described as war poets.100 The rhetorical aim of this warped picture of his direct 
predecessor Hesiod (who Manilius believed to have written an Astronomica as well)101 is to 
stress the uniqueness and difficulty of Manilius’ own enterprise.102 In order to present his 
Astronomica as something new, Manilius had to group Hesiod with Homer. 
    Generally speaking, the instances of Hesiod ‘crossing’ are relatively implicit and 
infrequent; they seem to be mostly motivated by the author’s wish to play with the well-
known Hesiodic stereotype, not to actually question or modify it. The stereotype is thus 
reinforced, and Hesiod, like his mirror-image of the conservative countryman, essentially 
remains who he is.  
 
                                               
97 Modern scholars are sometimes tempted to do the same. See e.g. Jaeger (1945) 57 saying on Hesiod’s subject 
that heroism can be witnessed not only in the fighting heroes of Homer but also ‘in the quiet incessant battle of 
the worker against the elements and the hard earth’.   
98 Man. Astr. 3.5-8. 
99 Perhaps to the Titanomachy (wrongly called ‘the war of the Giants’ by translator Goold, who was perhaps 
inspired by Van Wageningen (1921) ad loc. suggesting that Gigantomachiam respuit poeta), or, more likely, to 
the Typhoeus-episode. 
100 The two poets are the first in a list of many writers dealing with warfare, such as those who wrote of the 
Persian Wars or Rome’s road to power (Astr. 3.9-26).  
101 See Man. Astr. 2.15 and 24.  
102 The theme is somewhat of a topos for didactic poets; compare Lucretius’ claims of originality (DRN 4.1-9 
and 5.336-337) and the difficulty of describing science in verse (esp. 1.136-145). 
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The crossing of Homer is quite different. There are many and very explicit cases that present  
Homer as associated with values typically belonging to Hesiod, or present him as an expert on 
matters that are traditionally Hesiodic. In chapter 7, we have already seen how Homer moves 
on Hesiodic terrain when answering some of the questions in the Certamen. These cases are 
unlike those discussed above because it appears that Homeric ‘crossing’ is more serious and 
more permanent. It is therefore perhaps better to speak of ‘expansion’ - Homer more or less 
‘annexes’ territory that was not his own and expands his own reach and scope. I will give one 
example of this process, the presentation of Homer as a farmer - perhaps the most obvious 
case of crossing as Hesiod (in contexts of opposition) is first and foremost seen as a farmer-
poet.  
    In antiquity, Homer was sometimes credited with knowledge of farming, though not so 
much when alone103 - it is especially when compared to Hesiod that Homer steps to the fore as 
an expert on agriculture. We have already seen how Dio’s Alexander turns Homer into an 
expert on ta; gewrgikav through the ploughing-metaphor in Iliad 11.67-71.104 This rather 
brilliant manoeuvre ascribes to Homer the positive values of both warfare and agriculture: 
Homer’s poetry is described as both kingly and fit for real men, whereas Hesiod is left with 
the negative values of both polar opposites: he is associated with ‘slavish’ poetry, and is 
accused of writing for filhvdonoi kai; malakoiv (‘hedonists and softies’).105 
    But there are other cases, less subtle and more explicit. For instance: Cicero, who in his 
Cato claims there is much peace and pleasure in the actual work on a farm, says on the subject 
of manuring that ‘this is matter about which the learned Hesiod, though he wrote on 
agriculture, has not one word to say. But Homer, who, I believe, lived many generations 
earlier, represents Laertes as soothing his sorrow at the absence of his son in cultivating his 
                                               
103 There are only a few explicit references. See S Il. 18.550-560 (bT): ‘… with divine power he has depicted 
every type of agriculture on the shield [of Achilles], about the plough, about reaping. And he also represented the 
place for planting vines’ (… daimonivw~ pàsan ijdevan gewrgiva~ katevgraye th̀/ ajspivdi, peri; ajrovtrou, peri; 
qerismoù. ei\ta kai; ajmpelovfuton cwrivon dietuvpwsen), and 18.541b: ‘After the divinities and the cities he 
takes up something agricultural. With divine power he has shown by the use of epithets, on what kind of land 
one should put labour, [namely] on soft and fertile land’ (meta; ga;r ta; qeìa kai; ta;~ povlei~ gewvrgiovn ti 
paralambavnei. daimonivw~ de; dia; tẁn ejpiqevtwn uJpevdeixen, eij~ oJpoivan pote; gh̀n deì povnon katativqesqai, 
eij~ malakh;n kai; eu[bwlon); see also S Il. 8.93a1 (AT) and 93a2 (b). It is very remarkable that [Plutarch]’s De 
Vita et Poesi Homeri, which is very elaborate in crediting Homer with expertise on absolutely everything, 
mentions Homer’s concern with ‘farming life’ only very briefly, see Vit. 176: ‘nor does he overlook (…) the 
farming life, but describes this as well’ (ouj pareìde d’ oujde; (...) to;n gewrgikovn [sc. bivon]: ajlla; kai; toùton 
e[deixe, transl. Keaney/Lamberton 1996) - perhaps, as Keaney and Lamberton comment on [Plutarch]’s brief 
description of Homer’s astronomy, ‘the tacit implication may be that, among the early hexameter poets, the 
precedents … were to be sought in (…) Hesiod, rather than in Homer’ (173). 
104 See ch. 7, pp. 226-228. 
105 D.Chrys. 2.8-12. See also Alexander’s claim in 2.13 that Hesiod himself ‘was not unaware of how much 
inferior his powers were to Homer’s’ (oujde; aujto;~ ajgnoeìn th;n eJautoù duvnamin o{son ejleivpeto  JOmhvrou) and 
thus composed a Catalogue of Women (see on this passage also ch. 7, pp. 228-229). 
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farm and in manuring it, too.’106 Philostratus, in a context that speaks of Homer’s superiority 
over Hesiod, claims that the war-poet Homer ‘also included all matters pertaining to peace… 
he touched on agricultural tasks and the appropriate seasons for performing them.’107 These 
are both cases in which Hesiod, failing in his own area, is eclipsed by Homer, who in 
Philostratus’ formulation even seems to have written on works and days as well.  
    This crossing is of a different kind than Hesiod’s described above. Homer’s ‘expansion’ on 
a thematic level is symptomatic of a larger process, accelerated during the Second Sophistic 
but set in much earlier, whereby Homer’s authority and reach completely outgrow the 
traditional opposition to Hesiod; it is better to see Homer as more and more including Hesiod 
than opposing him:108 in the end, it seems the sceptre that the Muses gave to Hesiod has 
passed to Homer.109 Hesiod becomes less the other poet than simply another poet, one 
example of a great number of artists who must all bow for king Homer.  
 
5 - Conclusion 
In this chapter we have considered the ancient socio-political opposition of Hesiod and 
Homer. As we have seen, there is much evidence besides the Certamen that shows that the 
two poets were in certain contexts imagined as binary opposites in this respect. In fact, the 
contrasting values attributed to Hesiod and Homer coincide neatly with those of certain well-
known social and political conceptual dichotomies, i.e. that of war versus peace, and king 
versus people. Obviously, such oppositions are closely related and overlap to a considerable 
degree, as can be seen, for instance, in king Cleomenes’ description of Hesiod and Homer as 
poets of helots and Spartans, respectively. Since they align and blend together, the compatible 
oppositions form a very powerful ‘scheme’ of typical values. It seems fair to conclude that 
Hesiod and Homer played a role in this typification, a process that at the same time turned 
them into types as well: describing Hesiod as a helot typifies both the helot and Hesiod. 
    The characterizations of Hesiod and Homer at one side of the two oppositions discussed 
varies in frequency and explicitness. Hesiod is first and foremost a farmer-poet, often 
associated with the people, and sometimes with peace. Homer is the heroic poet par 
excellence, often connected to aristocratic sentiments, and sometimes an advocate of war. But 
                                               
106 Cic. Cat. 15.54: … de qua doctus Hesiodus ne verbum quidem fecit, cum de cultura agri scriberet. At 
Homerus, qui multis ut mihi videtur, ante saeculis fuit, Laerten lenientem desiderium, quod capiebat e filio, 
colentem agrum et eum stercorantem facit. 
107 Philostr. Her. 25.3: oJpovsa kat’ eijrhvnhn eijsi; ... e[rga w|n gewrgiva a{ptetai, kai; w{ra~, ai} shmaivnousin 
oJpovsa crh; ej~ th;n gh̀n pravttein, transl. Maclean/Aitken (2001). 
108 See on the same process in matters of style and language ch. 9, esp. pp. 314-317. 
109 Cf. AP 7.409 where Homer ‘holds the sceptre of song’ (u{mnwn skàptron e[cei). 
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however this may be for the poets when they are alone, their positions are often radicalized 
when explicitly compared: then Hesiod becomes a helot, a gardener, and a slave, with Homer 
as a Spartan, a weaver of garlands and a king. This type of radicalization can, although to a 
lesser degree, also be witnessed in modern scholarship, where especially Hesiod is 
characterized as typically un- or anti-Homeric. For both poets (but Hesiod in particular), the 
other is necessary to identify the one. 
    In the fourth section we have briefly examined a trend that undermines the traditionally 
dichotomous view of the two poets, i.e. that of Homer’s expansion. Homer is often seen to be 
so universal that he ‘invades’ areas that are usually associated with Hesiod. This trend is to 
some degree timeless, but grows considerably stronger at the end of the classical period. 
Aristophanes, for instance, though certainly expressing Homer’s superiority, could still voice 
the supposedly common view presenting Hesiod and Homer as thematically different or 
separate. Homer’s omnipresence was strongly felt, however, and in the Hellenistic Age the 
only way to oppose it was by reviving the traditional image of Hesiod as a counter-force to 
Homer. During the Second Sophistic Homer became more and more the sole icon of Greek art 
and identity as he irreversibly incorporated Hesiodic themes. Interestingly enough, this 
‘imperialism’ also fits the nucleus of values Homer is traditionally associated with: kingship, 
power, and dominance. The process was given shape by stories of having Homer ‘defeat’ 
Hesiod on his own terrain; this also explains the sophists’ unprecedented interest in the story 
of the contest, which presents a surprisingly different picture. With the expansion of Homer, 
Hesiod ceases to be the other poet. 
    It must be said that this developmental scheme is still somewhat sketchy; what is needed, is 
an examination of the other watershed essential to the story of the Certamen: the poetics of 
Hesiod and Homer (‘the effect on the audience: reason versus emotion’). This is the subject of 





Chapter 9  
 
The Other Poetics 
 
 
0 - Introduction 
This is the final chapter of the book, which forms the climax of my study because it is deals 
with the reception of Hesiod as a poet in a strict sense: its main concern is the ancient 
construction and evaluation of Hesiod’s ‘poetics’, i.e. the more or less coherent theory of 
poetry that the Greeks ascribed to him. This particular focus is so central to the Hesiodic 
figure and his Homeric foil that it proved impossible to treat the subject in the same 
(convenient) way as the other two forms of poetic sofiva (ethico-political orientation and 
philosophy), i.e. subdivided into chapters on Hesiod together with Homer, Hesiod alone, and 
Hesiod against Homer. This chapter is thus special in that it discusses all three manifestations 
of Hesiod bound together by the single theme of poetics.  
    We will focus the investigation on several aspects of Hesiod’s poetry: the relation of his 
poems to the truth, Hesiod’s place in the debate on ars and ingenium, the intended effect of 
his poetry on the audience, and the appreciation of his style. This chapter is also the most 
difficult one, since the four aspects mentioned above are a) so inextricably linked that their 
separate treatment below may seem arbitrary at times, and b) subject to change over time, so 
that the thematically organized sections below will have to accommodate the diachronic 
perspective as well.  
    The main thread of this chapter, like that of the previous one, is provided by the opposition 
of Hesiod and Homer in the Certamen. As we have seen in chapter 7, Homer’s performance 
in the contest is praised in several instances. The narrator himself tells us twice that Homer 
responded kalw~̀ (‘well’) to Hesiod’s challenges, but the real interest lies with the response of 
the audience: in two cases, they experience a sense of intense ‘wonder’ or ‘admiration’ 
(qaùma), and after the recitation ‘the Greeks praised Homer, because the verses transcended 
the fitting’ (to;n   {Omhron oiJ   {Ellhne~ ejph/vnoun, wJ~ para; to; proshk̀on gegonovtwn twǹ 
ejpẁn).1 The explanatory clause is emblematic for the difference between Hesiod and Homer 
explored in this chapter: Hesiod remains with the prosh̀kon (‘fitting’) while Homer goes 
beyond (and qaùma is the result).  
                                               
1 Allen V 205-206. 
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    Throughout this chapter we will see that Hesiod is regularly characterized as writing and 
composing ‘within bounds’ in several respects - keeping his eye on truth, neatly applying the 
rules of his art, and generally speaking in a ‘fitting’ voice on a subject that is ‘fitting’. In all 
these respects, Homer goes further. The oppositions examined in this chapter can be 
schematized as follows: 
 
Hesiod  Homer 
   
e[tuma (truth) veracity yeuvdea (fiction) 
tevcnh (craft) ‘method’ maniva (madness) 
paraivnesi~ (advice) intent yucagwgiva (transport) 
kaqarovth~ (purity) style poikiliva (variety) 
 
These oppositions will occupy sections 1-4 of the present chapter. In the first section, on 
poetic veracity, Hesiod’s devotion to truth will be contrasted with Homer’s love for fiction. 
First, we will briefly consider the possibility that Hesiod himself may have been the first to 
articulate this contrast; furthermore, a precarious attempt is made to connect early 
philosophical interpretations of Homer with his reputation as a ‘liar’. After these 
preliminaries, we will see how the opposition was framed in antiquity.  
    Section 2 is mainly concerned with inspiration, and examines how Hesiod and Homer were 
believed to have composed their poems; more strictly speaking, this section deals with the 
age-old opposition of ars (tevcnh) and ingenium (fuvsi~). Even though Hesiod was closely 
associated with divine inspiration (the main reason being his own description of the 
Dichterweihe), it was in the end Homer who became the inspired poet par excellence, while 
Hesiodic poetry was turned into an exemplum of limae labor. As we will see, this interesting 
shift is closely connected to changing conceptions of the term ‘inspiration’ itself. 
    Section 3 opposes the intent (or function) ascribed to the Hesiodic and Homeric poems in 
antiquity. In this respect as well, Hesiod is generally presented as ‘fitting’, his poetry meant to 
advise mankind on how to honour the gods, seek a livelihood and in general live their life. 
Homer, on the other hand, is framed not as a didactic poet but instead as one engaged in 
yucagwgiva, the transport of his listener’s souls. Of course, the qualities attributed to both 
Hesiod and Homer can be evaluated very differently. 
    Section 4 deals with matters of style. It is no surprise that the types of language and diction 
belonging to poets who were thought to differ in so many respects was constructed as 
antithetical as well. Homer becomes the foremost representative of the grand style, while 
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Hesiod is slowly turned into a ‘slender poet’. The polarization is mainly due to Hellenistic 
poets, who to some degree resisted the universally acclaimed Homeric model and championed 
Hesiod for their cause, but its traces go back much further.  
    Obviously, neat binary oppositional schemes are reductionist and do not do full justice to 
reality. Sometimes boundaries disintegrate: Hesiod can appear alongside with Homer as 
divinely inspired, while Homer can also be framed as truthful. Such examples of boundary-
crossing are discussed in section 5. As we have concluded in chapter 8, the crossing by 
Hesiod is often an exception confirming the rule, while Homeric crossing is a sign of his ever-
increasing influence and stature. In matters of poetics as well, we will conclude, Hesiod 
changes from the other poet into another poet. 
 
1 - Truth and Fiction 
In this section an attempt is made to frame the opposition between Hesiod and Homer in 
terms of the dichotomy between truth and fiction. Such an equation may seem obvious 
enough to anyone familiar with ancient literary criticism (especially from Alexandrian times 
onwards) and modern scholarship, which both tend to attribute to Hesiod and Homer the 
didactic and panegyric function of poetry, respectively. This is not to say, of course, that I 
wish to deny the didactic quality of the Homeric poems, which is (rightly) ascribed to them by 
ancient Greeks and modern scholars alike; but my focus is on the opposition of Hesiod and 
Homer, which is usually framed in terms of the truth-fiction dichotomy.  
    This section, however, offers a fresh perspective on this widely-held communis opinio in 
that it argues, first of all, that this dichotomy was recognized by the Greeks in full at an 
extremely early age, and, secondly, that it was firmly entrenched in early philosophical 
thought. These two factors, which in my view guaranteed the recurrence of the truth-fiction 
watershed from earliest antiquity to modern times, are the subject of subsections 1.2 and 1.3. 
First, however, we will examine the evidence for the claim that Hesiod himself was the first to 
voice the opposition.  
 
1.1 - Lying Muses 
In the proem to the Theogony, ‘certainly the most influential and the most imitated passage in 
the Hesiodic corpus’,2 Hesiod tells us how he ‘once’ found himself in the unexpected  
company of the Muses. They speak to him very briefly: 
 
                                               
2 Lamberton (1988) 55. 
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 ‘poimevne~ a[grauloi, kavk’ ejlevgcea, gastevre~ oi\on, 
 i[dmen yeuvdea polla; levgein ejtuvmoisin oJmoià, 
 i[dmen d’ eu\t’ ejqevlwmen ajlhqeva ghruvsasqai.’ 
 
 ‘Field-dwelling shepherds, ignoble disgraces, mere bellies: 
 we know how to say many false things similar to genuine ones, 
 but we know, when we wish, how to proclaim true things.’3 
 
After this short speech the Muses give Hesiod a staff of laurel and breathe a divine voice into 
him, making him sing of the eternal gods. And so Hesiod became a poet. 
    Needless to say, this curious address by the Muses has generated an almost literally 
immeasurable amount of interpretive efforts by modern scholars. It would be a difficult task 
indeed to find another set of lines in the Hesiodic poems that has been the subject of such 
intense and diverse speculation. It appears, in fact, that there is only one point of (almost) 
universal agreement: that the Muses in lines 27-28 mention some kind of opposition 
(suggested by the repeated i[dmen), dealing with ejtuvmoisin oJmoià on the one hand and 
ajlhqeva on the other. But this still leaves much room for various interpretations of the ‘true 
things’ set against the ‘false things similar to genuine ones’. The following overview of 
different readings does in no way pretend to be exhaustive, but does present a fair impression 
of the great variety of scholarly interpretations. 
    The first type of reading places the opposition inside Hesiod’s own work, claiming in some 
way or another that both line 27 and 28 refer to himself and his own poetry. One of the most 
common-sense approaches, i.e. to view the lines as a ‘simple and honest admission that poetry 
combines truth with invention’,4 is not usually taken, since most readers feel that such a view 
underrates the contrast that is so powerfully expressed. Some scholars, who include line 26 in 
their analysis, believed that this contrast should be understood in terms of social class (such as 
Wilamowitz),5 or in terms of a spiritual renewal.6 Burn believed the ejtuvmoisin oJmoià were 
nothing more than the insignificant details ‘which the bards made up as they went along’, 
presumably in general sticking to the truth; according to Wade-Gery, Hesiod warns us that 
                                               
3 Th. 26-28; the passage is quoted more fully in ch. 6, p. 173. 
4 Bowra (1964) 27; cf. Bowie (1993) 9 et passim arguing that hexameter poets were well aware of the fact that 
their poetry was largely fictitious.   
5 Wilamowitz (1916) 477: it is to be supposed that since Hesiod had apparently left the ‘Bauernstand’, he also 
switched to another kind of poetry. 
6 Schmid-Stählin (1929) 249-250, Jaeger (1945) 75-76. Cf. Epimenides, a Cretan theogonist who also pictures 
the Muses yelling at him ‘Cretans always liars, ignoble disgraces, idle bellies’ (DK 3 B 1). 
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some of the (philosophical) hypotheses in the Theogony might on further inspection prove 
false.7 Many scholars interpret the lines as an indication of Hesiod’s dependence on the 
Muses: they can make the poet say the truth or utter lies, and he is but their faithful servant; 
were he to offend, ‘he would be misled into recording a lying vision’8 - curiously enough, 
Walcot suggests that the lines may instead be a way ‘to disown all responsibility if a god felt 
himself unfairly portrayed’; for that would then be the Muses’ fault.9 Other notable 
interpretations are that of Blaise and Rousseau, who argue that Hesiod is actually performing 
both at the same time, i.e. recycling fiction in order to show the truth, and especially that of 
Ferrari, who interprets the speech in terms of the theme of good and bad exchange that is so 
central to the Works and Days.10  
    There is a specific branch of such ‘intra-poetic’ interpretation that calls for particular 
attention, and that is the rather popular approach I will loosely call ‘postmodern’. This type of 
reading, initiated by Pietro Pucci, credits Hesiod with the postmodern view that language 
cannot but represent reality with a certain distortion and uncertainty.11 Theogony 27-28 are 
thus interpreted as a reflection on the problematic relationship between language and reality.12 
Followers of Pucci thus argue that Hesiod points to ‘the indeterminacy of the signifying 
relation, the recognition that language itself (...) is a form of fiction’,13 that Hesiod indicates 
that ‘categories of language are fluid’,14 or that due to the gap lying between himself and the 
Muses Hesiod ‘cannot guarantee the absolute truth of his song’.15 It is my belief that such 
deeply anachronistic readings are of relatively little value; as Morgan says, interpreting 
Theogony 27-28 as claiming that all poetic representation may be a lie is probably too 
advanced for Hesiod.16 In my view, postmodernist readers pay too little attention to the 
cultural and intellectual context in which these lines arose, and over-interpret particular 
formulations, especially the phrase eu\t’ ejqevlwmen (‘if we wish’) which does not - I would 
                                               
7 Burn (1936) 34, Wade-Gery (1949) 86. See also Stroh (1976) who thinks the lines define Hesiod’s poem as a 
rhetorical exercise with some fictitious parts. See Verdenius (1972) 235 n.1 for some other scholars who believe 
Th. 27-28 ‘sanctions the element of fiction in his own work’.  
8 Harriott (1969) 112-113; see further Barmeyer (1968) 106 on disturbing the Inspirationsakt, Griffith (1983) 49 
saying Hesiod reminds us that ‘we should not trust the poet who tries to sing without the Muses’ blessing’, and 
Nagler (1992) 81-82 discerning two levels of authoritative speech: that of the human and that of the divine. 
9 Walcot (1960) 37. 
10 Blaise and Rousseau (1996) 224-225; Ferrari (1988), esp. 47-57. See also Stoddard (2004) 79-85, who 
interprets the ajlhqeva as immortal truth and the e[tuma as mortal reality. 
11 Pucci (1977), esp. 8-21. 
12 Cf. Gagarin (1990) 180. 
13 Arthur (1983) 106, cf. Tsagalis (2006) 85 ‘… the speech of the Muses indicates that the language of the 
Theogony will indeed be a jigsaw puzzle deliberately hard to solve.’ 
14 Too (1998) 34. 
15 Clay (2003) 63, who is however quick to state that this does not mean that all language is incapable of 
conveying truth (‘Hesiod is not a Derridean avant la lettre’, 64). 
16 Morgan (2000) 21. 
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say - indicate the Muses’ fickleness, but their absolute power.17 For the present study, 
however, the postmodern interpretation is of great interest since it clashes violently with 
ancient notions, as we will see below. 
    Apart from readings that seek their explanation primarily in Hesiod’s own poetry, there are 
many ‘inter-poetic’ interpretations which understand Theogony 27-28 as a response to other 
poets. Obviously, such readings usually take these lines as contrasting truth and fiction: 
Hesiod claims truth for himself, and ascribes yeuvdea to others.18 According to Paley and 
those taking his lead, these ‘others’ are older poets, whom Hesiod has set out to improve.19 
Most scholars, however, think that Hesiod is primarily thinking about contemporary poets, 
perhaps other theogonists, as Nagy has claimed on several occasions,20 who preserved all 
kinds of local and incompatible traditions which were to be replaced by one poem that was 
acceptable to all. Most of these readings, however, understand heroic poetry as Hesiod’s 
prime target, contrasting Hesiod’s truth to the ‘basically realistic but stylistically ornamented 
and extensively fictionalized narrative of heroic epic.’21 Naturally, it is only a small step from 
here to assume that Hesiod - more specifically - has Homer in mind. 
    It seems to be the majority view that the Muses’ brief speech articulates an opposition 
between Hesiod’s truthfulness and Homeric fiction, although it must be said that this view is 
                                               
17 See e.g. Neitzel (1980) 393-394 who argues that Th. 27-28 cannot be taken as a distinction between truth and 
fiction since the phrase eu\t’ ejqevlwmen is a clear indication of the Muses’ fickleness and unreliability: the 
Muses, he argues, do not wish to tell the truth all the time, and they are not going to tell it to Hesiod, either. So 
also Thalmann (1984) 148 who concludes ‘there is no way of knowing whether the song with which the Muses 
inspire him is authentic truth or falsehood that simulates it.’ These scholars, however, import certain notions into 
the text which are not there at all. The expression ‘if we wish’ does not mean that the Muses are capricious, but 
that they are in full control: compare the hawk’s words to the nightingale in WD 209: ‘I shall make you my 
dinner if I wish, or I shall let you go (deip̀non d’ ai[ k’ ejqevlw poihvsomai hje; meqhvsw) - this does not mean that 
the hawk is going to eat the nightingale at one time and not eat him at another time, or that there will be 
uncertainty on the part of the nightingale about which choice the hawk will make. See for other such expressions 
Il. 24.343-344 (Hermes putting the eyes ‘of those he wishes’ (w|n ejqevlei) to sleep while waking others) and Od. 
10.22 (Aeolus making the winds blow or stopping them, ‘whichever he wishes’ (o{n k’ ejqevlh/si)); these also 
indicate an absolute (divine) power (cf. West 1978 on WD 209) and deal with polar oppositions. The point is that 
the Muses will turn Hesiod into a good singer or a bad one: it is up to them. There is no indication that they will 
tell him the truth on one occasion, and tell him lies on another, or that he will not be able to tell the difference. 
18 In the views of some scholars, the intra- and interpoetic interpretations curiously overlap, as in Marsilio 
(2000), who argues that even though all logos is paradoxical in nature Hesiod ‘nevertheless asserts complete 
access to ‘truth’ and ascribes to other poets the dangerous logos of ‘lies similar/identical to true things’’ (13). 
Even Pucci (1977) 31 believes that Hesiod in Th. 26 addresses his fellow-poets, ‘both his predecessors and 
contemporary singers.’ 
19 Paley (1883) xiii-xiv. See also Jaeger (1947) 11, who states that Hesiod is consciously moving beyond the 
older poets in claiming the truth ‘about the very beings that it is hardest to know anything about: the gods 
themselves’, and Bowra (1952) 40-41, who also believes Hesiod is emphasizing the truth of his message since he 
is bringing something new. 
20 See Nagy (1990) 45-47, (1992b) 125 Hesiod promoting his theogony against ‘a multiplicity of pseudo-
Hesiods’, and (1996) 41 speaking of ‘un manifeste panhellénique unique en son genre’.  
21 Cole (1983) 22; cf. e.g. Østerud (1976) 28, Verdenius (1972) 234. 
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often only assumed22 or rather loosely argued.23 It appears that most scholars either take the 
contrast as self-evident or shrink from the task of proving something for which there is in fact 
very little evidence.24 On the other hand, we have already seen that it is at least possible that 
Hesiod does sometimes refer to Homer,25 and some scholars have rightly pointed out that line 
27 shows a remarkable similarity to Homer’s description of Odysseus lying to his wife on the 
occasion of their first meeting after his return: ‘Thus he made the many falsehoods of his tale 
seem like the truth’ (i[ske yeuvdea polla; levgwn ejtuvmoisin oJmoià), suggesting, perhaps, that 
the Muses inspired the poet of the Odyssey with the capacity of telling yeuvdea.26 
Furthermore, one might argue that Hesiod’s explicit mention of himself invites a polemical 
reading equally concrete.27 I think, therefore, that the truth-fiction watershed between Hesiod 
and Homer in all likelihood goes back to Hesiod himself, who presents himself as a faithful 
servant of the Muses, while picturing Homer as skilled in the creation of fiction. 
    There is much to suggest that the Greeks themselves also understood Theogony 27-28 this 
way. It is to the ancient evidence, therefore, that we will soon turn. First, however, we will 
enter into a brief digression on Homer as a philosopher of language, which will put the truth-
fiction dichotomy in a broader context. 
 
1.2 - Homer as a Philosopher of Language 
It is important to note at this point that Hesiod’s classification of Homeric poetry as yeuvdea is 
polemical in nature and in no way agrees with the heroic poet’s view of himself; heroic poetry 
in general claims to tell the truth, and Homer is no different.28 We may even say, with Nagy, 
that on closer examination Hesiod and Homer do not present essentially different attitudes 
                                               
22 See e.g. Diller (1946) 141-142, Mehmel (1954) 19, Kraus (1955) 72-73, Maehler (1963) 40-42, Kambylis 
(1965) 63, Murray (1981) 91. Häussler (1973) 139 (with bibliography in n.84) curiously defines Th. 27-28 as a 
‘feine Spitze’ (but not serious polemic) against Homer. 
23 See e.g. Sikes (1931) 6, claiming the rivalry was ‘no doubt’ partly due to social class (Homer being a court 
poet, but Hesiod ‘a poet of the people’, Snell (1955) 74-75, arguing that Hesiod opposes the grim reality of 
everyday life to the beautiful phantasies by Homer, and Clay (2003) 181 stating that Hesiod believes himself to 
be better than Homer because is poetry is ‘far more universal and complete’. Svenbro (1976) 50-59 presents a 
particularly interesting case connecting Hesiod’s truthfulness to his socio-economic independence: no longer a 
parasitic ‘belly’ like (Svenbro believes) Homer (to be), he is no longer forced to adjust his poetry to his audience. 
According to Havelock (1963) 105, Th. 27-28 not only contrasts Hesiod and Homer, but also sheds a light on a 
contrast in Homer, who is both a story-teller and a tribal encyclopaedist.   
24 Cf. Rudhardt (1996) 29-30 warning us not to be quick to assume that Hesiod is talking about Homer; he thinks 
that Hesiod may well be engaged in polemic, but that the lack of material forbids us to say with certainty against 
whom. Lamberton (1988) 59 rather strangely believes Th. 27-28 are probably not aimed at Homer because ‘their 
rivalry is worked out at a far deeper level’. 
25 Cf. ch. 7, p. 212-213. 
26 See e.g. Neitzel (1980) 389, Goldhill (1991) 45, Arrighetti (1996) 53-54.  
27 Cf. Ford (1985) 86 stating that a poet can only mention other poets once he has given his own name.  
28 On the truth-claim of heroic poetry in general see Bowra (1952) 40-41, and of Homer e.g. Walsh (1984) 3-21. 
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about truth at all.29 But this book is not about their poetry per se, but about its reception; and 
there are certain clues that Homeric language was in fact regarded from early times onwards 
as fictional instead of truthful, and creative instead of realistic. This tradition of Homeric 
reception goes back to the early fifth century at least, and seems to have occupied early 
philosophers in particular. It is my belief that ancient thinkers about language and truth 
deliberately articulated such a picture of Homer to contrast with the philosophical image 
attributed to Hesiod. As we have seen in chapter 6, Hesiod was - in some circles at least - 
reconstructed as an ‘atomistic’ thinker who believes in a world neatly made up of all its 
constituent parts, and in a language that can accurately reflect this ‘taxonomic’ view of reality 
and hence be truthful. By contrast, early philosophers seem to associate Homer especially 
with a more Protagorean or Gorgian view of language as a tool - they trace notions like the 
conventionality of language, its manipulative power and the preponderance of form over truth 
to Homer himself. 
    Obviously, it is far beyond the scope of this book to fully investigate the early 
philosophers’ view of Homer’s relation to the qualities of language just mentioned. It is 
equally obvious, however, that we are in dire need of an exhaustive and systematic treatment 
of this subject. For the time being, I offer five (closely related) indications for an ancient 
tradition of a ‘proto-Protagorean’ Homer which is constructed as a foil to Hesiod’s atomism 
and linguistic puritanism (discussed in chapter 6). The following list, then, is necessarily 
incomplete, but does contain - I hope - much suggestive and provocative material that might 
support my thesis of the poets’ complementarity. 
1) Homer is especially associated with the theory that ‘sensory perception = knowledge’, 
which is at ease with a poetics that favours form over content. Heraclitus, who chastized 
Hesiod’s polymathy, ridicules Homer for being concerned with the ‘knowledge of visible 
things’ (gnws̀in tẁn fanerwǹ),30 and it is the main point of his riddle of the lice to indicate 
Homer’s utter failure to understand there is more than meets the eye.31 Aristotle claims that 
Democritus referred to Homer in order to prove his theory that thought equals perception; that 
is why Democritus commends Homer for saying ‘Hector lay there thinking other thoughts.’32 
                                               
29 Nagy (1992b) 125-126. 
30 DK 22 B 56. 
31 Homer is thus baffled by the boys killing lice saying ‘What we have seen and picked up, that we leave behind, 
but what we have not seen and not picked up, that we carry with us’. How can you ‘carry’ what you have not 
seen? See on Homeric ‘truth’ deriving from autopsy and ‘Erscheinung’ Schmitter (1991) 63-64. 
32 Arist. de An. 404 a29-30: kalẁ~ poih̀sai to;n   {Omhron wJ~ ‘  {Ektwr keit̀’ ajllofronevwn’. The reference is 
to Il. 23.698, where it is, however, Euryalus and not Hector who is ‘thinking other thoughts’ due to a violent 
blow. The mistake is perhaps Aristotle’s; see Delatte (1934) 34. It is beside the point to note that Aristotle is 
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But Aristotle not only reports this particular view of Homer,33 but also credits Homer with 
this theory of his own accord,34 and he has been followed in this respect.35 
2) Homer seems to be connected somehow to the theory of flux, which asserts that everything 
is in continual motion and thus denies any fixity to things; hence, it posits that an absolute 
truth does not exist. Some sort of Heraclitean flux-theory is ascribed to Homer in Plato’s 
Theaetetus,36 where its main purport is the relativity of truth; this is why in the same dialogue, 
Protagoras’ homo mensura-statement is similarly traced to Homer. It is immediately obvious 
that this second indication is closely related to the first (on the equation of perception and 
knowledge): as Socrates says, ‘So you were perfectly right in saying that knowledge is 
nothing but perception. And it has turned out that these three doctrines coincide – the doctrine 
of Homer and Heraclitus and all their tribe that all things move like flowing streams, the 
doctrine of Protagoras, wisest of men, that man is the measure of all things, and Theaetetus’ 
conclusion that, on these grounds, it results that perception is knowledge.’37 Homer (perhaps 
partly due to his reputed descent from a river) is usually associated with streams and rivers 
(on which see further below); by contrast, there is no such explicit ancient connection 
between Hesiod and flux.38 
3) Homeric language is often described in terms of use and convention. Protagoras’ well-
known criticism of Homer, for instance, deals with language that is formally right though 
‘untrue’ on the level of meaning;39 and Homer’s name is mentioned in the title of a work of 
Democritus dealing with the conventional nature of words.40 Moreover, many ancients 
regarded Homer as an onomatothetes, a word-maker whose very activity belies the notion that 
                                                                                                                                                   
mistaken in assuming that this means that Democritus embraced a Protagorean concept of truth; obviously, this 
way of interpreting Homer made sense to him. 
33 Cf. Metaph. 1009b25-31, where Aristotle says people think Homer (the reference is again to Il. 23.698) 
‘clearly’ agreed with Anaxagoras who said to his disciples that ‘things would be for them as they judged them to 
be’.  
34 Cf. esp. de An. 427a25-26, where Homer on account of Od. 18.136 (‘such is the nature of man’s mind’) is 
ranked among the ‘ancient philosophers’ (like Empedocles) who all ‘look upon thinking as a bodily process like 
perceiving’ (to; noeìn swmatiko;n w{sper to; aijsqavnesqai uJpolambavnousin, 427a26-27).  
35 See S.E. Pyrrh. 1.86, Adv. Eth. 1.44; M.Ant. 4.33. Cf. D.L. 9.73 reporting the Sceptics’ appropration of Homer 
on account of Il. 20.248-250, where the poet is supposedly speaking of the equal value of contradictory sayings. 
36 See Pl. Tht. 152e-153a, 160d, and 179e. See on Homer and flux also Clay (1992) 137. 
37 Pl. Tht. 160d: Pagkavlw~ a[ra soi ei[rhtai o{ti ejpisthvmh oujk a[llo tiv ejstin h] ai[sqhsi~, kai; eij~ taujtovn 
sumpevptwken, kata; me;n   {Omhron kai;   JHravkleiton kai; pàn to; toioùton fùlon oi|on rJeuvmata kineis̀qai 
ta; pavnta, kata; de; Prwtagovran to;n sofwvtaton pavntwn crhmavtwn a[nqrwpon mevtron ei\nai, kata; de; 
Qeaivthton touvtwn ou{tw~ ejcovntwn ai[sqhsin ejpisthvmhn givgnesqai. 
38 In Pl. Cra. 402a-b Hesiod is mentioned together with Homer in connection with flux-theory, but only as a poet 
who transmitted the names of gods that might indicate the validity of the flux-theory. Aristotle (Cael. 298b25-
33) explicitly separates ‘Hesiod and his school’ (oiJ peri;  JHsivodon) from those who think that ‘in general 
everything is in a state of becoming and flux’. 
39 See DK 80 A 28, where Protagoras objects to Homer’s mh̀ni~ being feminine since ‘anger’ is such a masculine 
quality, while A 29 criticizes Homer’s use of an imperative (a[eide) when asking the Muse for her favour. 
40 D.L. 9.48 (= DK 68 B 26). 
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language arose naturally but furthers the view that language is the product of convention or 
imagination.41 By contrast, Hesiod seems to have been far less known as a creator of words; 
perhaps his obvious concern for etymology and especially the double nature of words (like 
e[ri~ and aijdwv~) disqualified him as an onomatothetes; if he would have been one of the 
original name-makers, he would not have to separate them. 
4) Homeric language is often evaluated in terms of its emotional or spiritual effect. Plato, who 
thinks of inspiration as an emotionally heightened state (maniva) passed on from the god to the 
audience via the poet,42 believed that Homer was the inspired poet par excellence (a belief he 
probably borrowed from Democritus, on whom more below). Gorgias, a teacher of rhetoric 
and persuasion, was also the most Homeric of the sophists,43 and it is obvious that Homer was 
Gorgias’ first and foremost role model with regard to style and its concomitant yucagwgiva.44 
Plato most interestingly compares Gorgias to the Homeric Gorgo because of the petrifying 
effect both prodigies exert upon their audience;45 and O’Sullivan has convincingly 
demonstrated that this effect of e[kplhxi~ indeed connects Homer to Aeschylus and 
                                               
41 Momigliano (1929) seems to credit Democritus with the view of Homer as an onomatothetes, but his evidence 
is lacking (cf. Cole 1967 67-69 on Democritus’ view of language as growing by ‘piecemeal, conventional 
accretions’, 69). Homer is explicitly called a creator of words by Demetrius (On Style 94), Dio Chrysostom 
(12.68), and Pindarion (ap. S.E. Adv. Gr. 202, see Fehling 1965 221); see also Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 10-
29 on Homer as a creator (instead of a transmitter) in general and [Plu.] Vit. Po. 54B on his status as an 
onomatothetes in particular. 
42 Cf. the well-known metaphor of the magnet, see Pl. Ion 533d-e. 
43 Gorgias focused on Homer in a way unparalleled by his fellow-sophists. He was interested in Homer’s life 
(DK 82 B 25), and his most famous speeches, the Encomium of Helen and the Defence of Palamedes, were 
largely based on Homeric characters and events from the Trojan Cycle. He echoed at least one verse from the 
Iliad (DK 82 B 27) and introduced himself with a Homeric phrase in the Gorgias (449a). Incidentally, this 
introduction in the Gorgias is an interesting case. When Socrates asks him if he is a rhetorician, Gorgias answers 
‘Yes, and a good one, Socrates, if you really want to call me what, in Homer’s expression, I boast myself to be 
(eu[comai ei[nai)’. This is most likely a reference to Il. 6.211 (Labarbe 1949 310), the last sentence of Glaucus’ 
account of his lineage. In this well-known passage from the Iliad the Greek Diomedes and the Trojan Glaucus 
prepare to do battle but soon find out there exists an old tie of friendship between their families. So instead of a 
fight there is an exchange of armour, whereby Glaucus gives golden for bronze, ‘the worth of one hundred oxen 
for the worth of nine’ (6.236). For people familiar with Homer, Gorgias thus sends out a clear message: ‘I am not 
the alien enemy I may at first look like but in fact an old friend, and although my fee may seem high your 
investment will pay you back tenfold’. The phrase is very well-suited to Gorgias’ purposes. 
44 ‘If the word yucagwgiva has not survived in our scanty fragments of Gorgias, he can plausibly be deduced to 
have used it’, O’Sullivan (1992) 114. It is not certain (though likely) that he connected the term to poetry, as 
Kennedy (1963) 63 supposes; it is not in the fragments, and Plato for instance uses the term in its metaphorical 
sense only for rhetoric (Phdr. 261a and 271c).  
45 Pl. Smp. 198c. 
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Gorgias.46 The rhetor Antiphon uses a Homeric word to express his influence on the audience; 
and Aristotle also comments on the emotional impact of Homer’s language.47 
5) Homer seems to be associated with the notion that the whole is more than sum of its parts,  
which is natural for a poet whose main concern it supposedly is to sweep his audience away. I 
have not been able to find much early evidence for this connection,48 but I am much intrigued 
by Maximus of Tyre’s observation that ‘[Homer] decided against composing a separate kind 
of poetry for each group, in the way in which Hesiod detailed the genealogies of the heroes 
separately, (…) while giving his account of the gods in a separate poem, and his helpful 
recommendations for human life, the works to be done and the days for doing them, in yet 
another. This is not how Homer’s poetry works; it neither separates everything out (oujde; 
ajpokevkritai e{kasta cwriv~) nor yet mixes it all indiscriminately together. The external 
form of this discourse is dictated by the myths he tells, the story of Troy and the experiences 
of Odysseus, but combined with them is a lucid theology, an account of political forms, and 
an account of human virtues and vices and experiences and disasters and successes…’.49 
Masterfully, Hesiod’s atomistic method is here extrapolated to include his very works (which 
are naturally described as list-like), while he is obviously contrasted to Homer, who does not 
‘separate everything out’ but manages to treat various philosophical themes in the course of a 
mythical narrative.  
 
Obviously, the five indications for a Protagorean Homer described above are sketchy and 
based on relatively little evidence. Nonetheless, there appear to be certain leads suggesting 
that some people considered Homer’s poetry and language as fictional and creative, mainly 
concerned with form and with the effect on the audience. These qualities, however, are not 
simply deduced from his poetry, but seem to be connected from early times onwards to a 
coherent philosophy attributed to the poet in certain circles. This philosophy comprises the 
(related) theories that perception is knowledge, that everything is in flux, that language is 
conventional, that language conveys and/or manipulates emotion, and that the whole is more 
                                               
46 O’Sullivan (1992) 20, 74-75; Walsh (1984) 89 similarly argues that Homer and Aeschylus enchant their 
audience, thus turning them into passive consumers (while Euripides, representing the opposite type of poetry, 
forces them to actively participate in the play’s dilemma’s). 
47 DK 87 A 6, Arist. Rh. 1417b2-4. Naturally, rhetoricians regard either Homer or his protagonists as the first 
rhetoricians ever; see Brown (1914) for a useful overview of relevant passages, and Sluiter (2005) for a recent 
discussion of the rhetorician’s use of Homer.  
48 One lead is Arist. Rh. 1365a10-15 quoting Homer on the rhetorical effect of enumeration, on the principle that 
‘the same whole when divided into parts appears greater’ (diairouvmena de; eij~ ta; mevrh ta; aujta; meivzw 
faivnetai). 
49 Max.Tyr. Or. 24.6 (= Most T46). 
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than its constituent parts. This particular reconstruction of Homer-the-philosopher-of-
language presents a nearly perfect mirror image of that of Hesiod; as we have seen in chapter 
6, Hesiod was regarded as an atomistic thinker believing in the truthfulness of language, who 
separated and categorized until the taxonomy of language matched that of reality. 
 
1.3 - Believing the Poet 
It is time now to return to the ancient testimony on the truth-fiction watershed that we have 
first traced back to Hesiod himself (1.1), and then placed in a broader, philosophical context 
(1.2). In the present subsection, we will investigate how the opposition between Hesiod and 
Homer was imagined in antiquity, giving many examples from different periods of time but  
focusing on one of the earliest poets to do so explicitly: Pindar. 
    In the archaic, pre-Platonic period, notions of poetic truth and knowledge were closely 
connected to the concept of inspiration, and it was especially Hesiod who was then associated 
with such inspiration.50 As we have seen in chapter 6, the poet-philosophers Parmenides and 
Empedocles made use of Hesiodic revelation to indicate the truth of their own teaching, while 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus attacked Hesiodic thought by attacking inspiration as a way of 
acquiring knowledge. Perhaps Solon was mainly thinking of Hesiod when he wrote that 
‘poets tell many lies’,51 for this well-known statement gains considerable force when we take 
it to refer to Theogony 27 - Hesiod would then be just as guilty of yeuvdea as the poets he 
himself reproaches.  
    The connection between inspiration and truth is particularly visible in the work of Pindar, 
who explicitly claims his words to be true and presents a close, harmonious and Hesiod-like 
relationship with the Muse as proof of this. We will now briefly explore Pindar’s connection 
to Hesiod,52 focusing on four aspects in particular: Pindar’s self-assumed persona of the 
prophet, his status as ‘chosen one’, his belief that inspiration guarantees truth, and his view of 
hard work as necessary for great achievements. We will then discuss some interesting 
Pindaric passages that associate fiction with Homer; this subsection will end with a number of 
other testimonies concerning the fictionality of Homer and its opposition to the truthfulness of 
Hesiod. 
    Pindar pictures the poet as the Muses’ protégé and presents himself as highly dependent on 
the goddesses. His self-presentation as a prophet is very reminiscent of Hesiod. Hesiod’s 
                                               
50 See on Hesiodic inspiration and the reception of his Dichterweihe further section 2 below. 
51 Fr. 202 Martina (= S [Pl.] De iust. 374a Greene): polla; yeuvdontai ajoidoiv. 
52 The link was noted in antiquity: AP 2.382 calls Pindar the ‘Heliconian swan of Thebes’. See for discussions of 
the connection of Pindar to Hesiod e.g. Sperduti (1950) 233-237, Bowra (1964) 33-34 and further below.   
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closeness to the divine provided him with superhuman, mantic powers,53 and these prophetic 
capabilities return in Pindar, who in fact calls himself ‘the famous prophet of the Pierians’ 
(ajoivdimon Pierivdwn profavtan)54 and elsewhere says ‘give me an oracle, Muse, and I shall 
be your prophet’ (manteuveo, Moìsa, profateuvsw d’ ejgwv).55 He is not always this explicit, 
but the notion of extreme intimacy between the poet and his Muse can be found throughout 
the Pindaric poems;56 for instance, Pindar is the ‘helper’ (ejpivkouro~) of the Muses, he wants 
to be their ‘friend’ (fivlo~), and even addresses the the Muse as ‘our mother’ (mavter 
aJmetevra).57 Sometimes Pindar seems to be so close to the Muse that he and the goddess can 
hardly be distinguished from each other: in Nemean 4.3, songs are called the daughters of the 
Muses, and in Olympian 9.81 Pindar can be seen to drive the chariot of the Muses, which is 
elsewhere the task of the goddesses themselves.58 In instances like these, Pindar presents 
himself as almost interchangeable with the Muse; here, as in the picture of the poet as 
profhvth~, the Hesiodic notion of the mouthpiece of the Muses returns. 
    Second, Pindar has combined his prophetic status with the Hesiodic notion that he was 
specifically chosen by the Muses to proclaim a divine message.59 Sometimes, Pindar suggests 
that he had no say in his transformation into a poet,60 and was picked to convey a message 
that is not his own: ‘I pray that with the Graces’ aid I may celebrate that achievement and 
surpass many in honoring victory in words, casting my javelin nearest the target of the 
Muses’61 - here, it is apparently the Muses who have told the poet what to sing.62 The 
                                               
53 See further ch. 9.2 below, esp. pp. 279-280. 
54 Pi. Paean 6.6.  
55 Pi. fr. 150 Maehler (= Eustath. Il. 9.45). There is reason to assume that in Plato’s times the terms ‘seer’ 
(mavnti~) and ‘prophet’ (profhvth~) were distinguished, the former speaking from an altered state of mind, 
giving the actual content of the oracle, while the latter controlled the form, the dactylic hexameter (see Nagy 
1989 24-29); the mantis would thus function as the ‘middle man’ (the term is Nagy’s) between the god and the 
prophet. In Pindar’s picture, however, there is no middle man (see also Nem. 1.61-2, where Tiresias can also do 
without a mantis) and asks the Muse to become the mantis herself; he will then be her prophet, thus directly 
declaring the voice of the Muse. Tigerstedt (1970) 173-175 oddly denies that Pindar is posing as a mantis 
because she is unwilling to allow for furor poeticus before Plato (on which see further 9.2.2 below, pp. 281-284) 
- but Pindar’s seership is not concerned with ecstasy, but with truth. 
56 I cannot find any justification for the view of Walsh (1984) 59 that ‘Pindar does not enjoy Hesiod’s intimacy 
with the Muses’. 
57 Pi. Ol. 13.96-97, fr. 155.2, Nem. 3.1 (the Hesiodic character of which was recognized as early as Falter 1934 
21). 
58 Pi. Isthm. 8.61. See also Pyth. 11.41-42, where the poet says: ‘Muse, it is your duty, since you have contracted 
to hire your voice for silver, to keep it moving this way and that…’ (Moìsa, to; de; tevon, eij misqoìo sunevqeu 
parevcein fwna;n uJparguron, a[llot’ a[lla/ tarassevmen…). 
59 Sperduti (1950) 233 ‘Like Hesiod, Pindar was strongly conscious of his priestly role and his mission as a 
teacher’. See also Maehler (1963) 42 speaking of Hesiod’s ‘Sendungsbewußtsein’. 
60 See Pyth. 5.65 and Dith. 2.23. 
61 Pi. Nem. 9.54-55: eu[comai tauvtan ajreta;n keladh̀sai su;n Carivtessin, uJpe;r pollẁn te timalfeìn 
lovgoi~ / nivkan, ajkontivzwn skopoì’ a[gcista Moisàn. 
62 Cf. the opening lines of Pyth. 4, were Pindar asserts he cannot begin his song until the Muses have arrived. 
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‘chosenness’ of Pindar elevated him above ordinary people,63 just as the breath of the god 
separated Hesiod from his former company. Furthermore, poets are believed to be of divine 
stock: the Muse is ‘our mother’, just as Hesiod had explained that ‘it is through the Muses and 
far-shooting Apollo that there are singers and harpers upon the earth’ (Theogony 94-95). 
    The third and most important link between Pindar and Hesiod, however, is that both regard 
inspiration and a close relationship with the Muses as the strongest guarantee of truthfulness 
of song.64 To Pindar this is essential, since his poetry revolves around the truthful 
communication of worthy deeds and klevo~.65 He mentions the Muse together with the 
personified  jAlavqeia (‘Truth’) in Olympian 10.3-4, and in Olympian 6 he addresses his 
corodidavskalo~, who is asked to oversee the truth of Pindar’s words, as the ‘message stick 
of the fair-haired Muses’, a metaphor that emphasizes the exactness and precision by which 
truth can be measured.66 Moreover, Hesiod is mentioned by name in the context of honest, if 
not truthful speech in Isthmian 6.66-72: this passage deals with the honesty of Lampon, 
whose ‘tongue does not stray from his thoughts’ (glws̀sa d’ oujk e[xw frenwǹ), which is 
presented as a quality deriving from his life motto, the Hesiodic line that ‘industry advances 
work’.67 
    Interestingly, it is implied here that telling the truth is a hard-won achievement, and that 
even naturally gifted poets like Pindar have to work hard to attain it. This Hesiodic notion of 
the necessity of hard work is reflected in the numerous farming-metaphors that Pindar uses to 
describe his own practice as a poet.68 Just as for the victors in the games Pindar sings about, 
success for the poet can come only through a combination of natural talent and training.69 
Pindar is thus in this respect comparable to the protagonists of his epinicians. 
    The combination of these elements presents a poetic self-image that is reminiscent of 
Hesiod’s portrayal of himself as a servant subjugated to a divine message, a true Mousavwn 
                                               
63 Cf. Bowra (1964) 2-11, 41.  
64 Obviously, this goes for Homer as well (cf. n.28 above), at least to a considerable degree (see 2.1 below, pp. 
277-278); but it seems that Pindar himself focused on Hesiod as the Muse-inspired truth-teller par excellence. 
65 Cf. Griffin (1999) 190 ‘Of all Archaic poets, the three who have gained the strongest reputations for devotion 
to truth are Hesiod, Xenophanes and Pindar’. 
66 Pi. Ol. 6.89-91: hjukovmwn skutavla Moisàn. Race (LCL) ad loc. explains the curious expression: ‘The 
skutavla was a Spartan message stick around which writing material was wound, inscribed, and cut into a strip. 
Only with a duplicate stick could the strip be correctly wound to reveal the message’. 
67 Pi. Isthm. 6.66-67 (melevtan / e[rgoi~ ojpavzwn) is from antiquity onwards (S Isthm. 6.97) thought to refer to 
WD 412 (‘industry fosters work’, melevth dev toi e[rgon ojfevllei). 
68 In Ol. 9.27 he claims to be cultivating the garden of the Graces, in Pyth. 6.1-3 he is ‘plowing once again the 
field of bright-eyed Aphrodite or of the Graces’. Athletic champions ‘can supply the Pierian plowmen much to 
sing about’ (Nem. 6.32-33) or ‘give the Muses work for their plow’ (Nem. 10.26). See Murnaghan (2007) on the 
connection between farming and truth-telling (although she does not discuss Pindar). 
69 There seems to be little truth, therefore, in the oft-stated belief that Pindar favors ingenium to the virtual 
suppression of ars (see e.g. Verdenius 1983 22 ‘Pindar is the first author who doubts the value of learning’). 
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qeravpwn70 - and this is obviously the persona chosen by Pindar as most beneficial to his own 
poetry. Through many (mostly) implicit references, Pindar characterizes Hesiodic speech 
thus: it is divine, toilsome, and truthful. It is of great interest to us to compare this to the rather 
explicit evaluation of Homeric language in Nemean 7. In this hymn, Pindar explains how 
poets like himself with the aid of Mnemosyne can repay athletes for their labors (movcqwn), 
and then continues (7.20-27): 
 
... ejgw; de; plevon’ e[lpomai 
lovgon   jOdussevo~ h] pavqan 
          dia; to;n aJdueph̀ genevsq’   {Omhron: 
 
ejpei; yeuvdesiv oiJ potana/̀ te macana/̀ 
semno;n e[pestiv ti: sofiva 
         de; klevptei paravgoisa muvqoi~. tuflo;n d’ e[cei 
 h\tor o{milo~ ajndrwǹ oJ pleis̀to~. eij ga;r h\n 
 e} ta;n ajlavqeian ijdevmen, ou[ ken o{plwn colwqeiv~ 
 oJ kartero;~ Ai[a~ e[paxe dia; frenẁn 
 leuro;n xivfo~: 
  
  ‘... I believe that Odysseus’ story  
has become greater than his actual suffering  
         because of Homer’s sweet verse,  
 
for upon his fictions and soaring craft  
rests his great majesty, and his skill  
         deceives with misleading tales. The great majority 
 of men have a blind heart, for if they could have seen 
 the truth, mighty Aias, in anger over the arms,  
 would not have planted in his chest 
 the smooth sword.’ 
 
The ‘sweet-versed Homer’ (aJduephv~   {Omhro~) appears here as very different from Hesiod or 
Pindar. Homer produces yeuvdea (contrasted to ajlavqeia three lines later), and does so 
                                               
70 Th. 100. See Barmeyer (1968) 80-81 on the singer as a servant of the deities that inspire him, and Falter (1934) 
74-75 for an overview of the expression in Greek literature. 
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through his ability to make a story ‘greater’ (plevona) than it actually is;71 he is magnificent in 
the full sense, and that is why Homer is so semnov~, ‘majestic’. His skill is paravgoisa, 
literally ‘past-leading’, because his story of Odysseus is bigger than the actual event, so that 
the listener is led past it instead of straight at it - a remarkable contrast to the accuracy of the 
Muses’ measure-stick. Furthermore, Pindar also connects Odysseus to the suicide of Aias: the 
latter hero ‘planted the smooth sword’ in his own chest because he lost the dispute over the 
arms of Achilles to Odysseus, who was apparently able to persuade the ‘blind’ majority of 
fellow-Greeks of his own yeuvdea, i.e. that the arms should be rightfully his. Odysseus, I 
suggest, had to make himself ‘bigger’ in order to overshadow the rightful heir to Achilles, 
‘mighty’ (karterov~) Aias. The lovgo~  jOdussevo~ (‘story of Odysseus’), therefore, is 
ambiguous: it is not only Homer’s tale of Odysseus, but also Odysseus’ own tale about 
himself that is fiction.72 Homer, just like Pindar, resembles his protagonist;73 but whereas 
Homer’s likeness to Odysseus consists in their method of deception, Pindar, just like the 
athletes he describes, tries to ‘hit the mark’. 
    It seems that Pindar in these passages distinguishes two kinds of poetry; one is the sweet 
and majestic but thoroughly deceptive kind of Homer, while the other is connected to toil, 
truth, the Muses and Hesiod.74 This distinction between poets is never made wholly explicit, 
but there is one fragment which does seem to oppose them. This is Paean 7b.11-20: 
 
 JOmhvrou [de; mh; tri]pto;n kat’ ajmaxitovn 
 ijovnte~, aj[ll’ ajl]lotrivai~ ajn’ i{ppoi~, 
 ejpei; au[          p]tano;n a{rma 
 Moisa[             ]men. 
 ej]peuvco[mai] d’ Oujranoù t’ eujpevplw/ qugatri; 
    Mnam[o]suv[n]a/ kovraisiv t’ euj- 
    macanivan didovmen. 
 t]ufla[i; ga;]r ajndrwǹ frevne~, 
                                               
71 Cf. Thucydides (1.10.3) arguing that the Trojan War was a relatively small affair which Homer, ‘as a poet’ 
(poihth;n o[nta) literally ‘adorned for the greater’ (ejpi; to; meìzon ... kosmh̀sai). 
72 This was already noted by Most (1985) 150, who offers a thorough discussion of the passage (148-156). He 
also rightly stresses that the pavqa in 7.21 refers to Odysseus’ sufferings in the Odyssey and not to events during 
the Trojan War. 
73 It is wrong to equate Homer with the ‘majority of men’ (as does Bury 1965a), despite the suggestive tuflov~ 
(‘blind’): Homer is like Odysseus the deceiver, not like the masses who are deceived (as is suggested by Most 
1985 150, who strangely enough does not use the ambiguity of tuflov~ to strenghten this argument). 
74 Cf. Walsh (1984) 52-59, who believes Pindar distinguishes two types of poetry, the first consisting of either 
slander or flattery, corrupting both the encomiast and the audience, and the second a product of ‘noble eros’, a 
desire to laud and thus immortalize those worthy of praise, a type engendering excellence.  
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 o{]sti~ a[neuq’  JElikwniavdwn 
 baqeìan e..[..]..wn ejreuna/̀ sofiva~ oJdovn. 
 
‘…and not going on the trodden highway of Homer, 
but on another’s horses, 
since ... winged chariot 
Muse(s) ... I (ride?). 
And I pray to Ouranos’ well-robed daughter, 
   Mnemosyne, and to her children 
   to provide facility, 
for blind are the minds of men, 
if anyone without the Helikonians 
seeks the deep path of skill.’75 
 
In this passage two types of poetry are contrasted with the aid of the Hesiodic road-image 
from Works and Days 287-292. On the one hand, there is the ‘trodden highway’ of Homer, 
which resembles Hesiod’s short and easy road to badness; on the other, there is the ‘deep path 
of skill’ preferred by Pindar, reminiscent of Hesiod’s long and steep road.76 The main 
difference between the two appears to be the presence of the Muses. Homer’s highway, it is 
suggested, is travelled without them, while Pindar emphatically asks the Muses to accompany 
him on his own path. This path, we must infer, leads to truth; for apart from the Muses, there 
is the presence of their mother Mnemosyne (mentioned as fostering poetry that is contrasted 
to the tale of Odysseus in Nem. 7.15-16) and the recurrence of the blindness-motif (as stated 
in Nem. 7.23-25, it is the truth that the blind cannot see). Although Pindar is not explicit, it is 
fairly certain that the ‘other’ poet contrasted to Homer is Hesiod. The winged chariot 
(associated with Hesiodic inspiration by Parmenides and Empedocles) and the name 
‘Heliconians’ (referring to the place of Hesiod’s inspiration) are sure hints in this direction,77 
and there is of course the Hesiodic setting of the two roads, which also adds the suggestion 
that the Homeric road is an easy one, while the deep path is difficult. 
 
                                               
75 Paean 7b.11-20, transl. slightly altered. 
76 Perhaps this ‘deep path’ should be contrasted to Homer’s ‘soaring craft’ in Nem. 7.22, and linked to the truly 
wise and ‘deep-thinking’ (baquvfrone~) Fates in Nem. 7.1. Incidentally, Pindar’s road image is an interesting 
subtext for Callimachus’ well-known one (Call. Aet. I 25-28).   
77 Cf. Bowra (1964) 33-34. 
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In the middle of the fifth century, then, Hesiod and Homer could be employed to illustrate two 
opposing poetics, Homer exemplifying the sweet and magnificent distortion of reality, and 
Hesiod representing the toilsome path to truth with the aid of Mnemosyne and the Muses. 
Although Pindar provides us with this period’s fullest and clearest picture of the opposition, 
there are indications that some of his contemporaries shared the notion of Hesiod being 
truthful and Homer deceptive. Bacchylides for instance, who described the poet as the ‘divine 
prophet of the Muses’,78 called Hesiod a ‘minister of the Muses’ in the fifth epinician.79 After 
thus mentioning him by name, he continues by citing Hesiod’s saying ‘He whom the 
immortals honour is attended also by the good report of men’80 as the reason for thrusting 
envy aside and praise, ‘for the sake of truth’ (ajlaqeiva~ cavrin), any mortal who is succesful. 
There is a Pindar-like connection here between Hesiod, the Muses and truth. The historian 
Herodotus, another contemporary of Pindar’s, seems to be particularly aware of Homer’s 
capacity for expressing supposed facts that are belied by careful iJstorivh (the ‘research’ of 
the historian himself). When Herodotus discusses the archaic notion of an earth-encircling 
Ocean, he says ‘the man who spoke of the Ocean referred the story to the realm of uncertainty 
and has no disproof; for I know of no river of Ocean; and I suppose that Homer or some older 
poet invented this name and brought it into his poetry.’81 Herodotus’ main point is of course 
not that Homer is wrong, but that Homer is no historian: he invents instead of investigates, 
and tells stories that are not falsifiable (and do not need to be): it is poetry, not history. What 
is of interest to me, is that it is Homer who is singled out as the example of someone writing 
untruths.82 
    There are some other early sources, then, for the truthfulness of Hesiod and the fictionality 
of Homer, although there is no such explicit opposition between the poets comparable to that 
in Pindar - unless we count a maxim attributed to Simonides.83 According to this testimony, 
Simonides, ‘on being asked who was the better, Homer or Hesiod, said, ‘The Muses bore 
                                               
78 B. Epin. 9.2: Mousàn ... qeìo~ profavta~.  
79 B. Epin. 5.191-192: provpolo~ Mousàn. 
80 Fr. 344 MW: o}n <a]n> ajqavnatoi ti[mẁsi, touvtwi / kai; brotẁn fhvman e{p[esqai. 
81 Hdt. Hist. 2.23: oJ de; peri; toù   jWkeanoù levxa~ ej~ ajfane;~ to;n mùqon ajneneivka~ oujk e[cei e[legcon: ouj gavr 
tina e[gwge oi\da potamo;n   jWkeano;n ejovnta,   {Omhron de; h[ tina tẁn provterwn genomevnwn poihtevwn dokevw 
tou[noma euJrovnta ej~ poivhsin ejseneivkasqai. 
82 In Hist. 2.116 Herodotus shows a similar awareness of the different demands of different genres: Homer is 
here said to have rejected the story of Helen visiting Egypt, although he knew it, ‘as it suited not so well with 
epic poetry as the tale of which he made use’ (ouj ga;r oJmoivw~ ej~ th;n ejpopoiivhn eujpreph;~ h\n tẁ/ eJtevrw/, tẁ/ 
per ejcrhvsato). 
83 Gnom. Vat. 514 Sternbach. The fragment’s authenticity is uncertain; PMG does not print it, Campbell’s LCL 
edition (1991) does (T 47(j)). More recently Sider (1996) 274-275 took a middle position since he believes it to 
be a forgery, though ‘hiding behind [it] may be a passage in Simonides’ poetry where his two predecessors were 
more artfully set alongside one another’.  
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Hesiod, the Graces Homer.’’84 Obviously, both the question and the answer are of interest to 
us. The question (if genuine) indicates a fifth-century debate on which poet was the better 
(confirming our hypothesis of an early contest-story), and also shows that this was a serious 
matter, considering the gravity of some of the other questions presented to Simonides.85 
Furthermore, the form of the question implies that Simonides was expected to choose between 
them, as if the anonymous questioner (representing the Greeks in general) believed that the 
two poets cannot be liked equally much.86 The answer of Simonides is also revealing: the 
poets cannot, in his view, be measured along the same axis - there are different criteria for 
determining which is kreivsswn (‘better’ or ‘stronger’). The Muses and the Graces, I suggest, 
indicate truthfulness and beauty, respectively, so that Hesiod’s poetry is through his pedigree 
characterized as truthful, while Homer’s ancestry connotates the ‘majesty’ of his ‘sweet verse’ 
(in Pindar’s words). The question of who is better is thus said to depend on the criteria used -
the same lesson that was taught by the Certamen.87 
    Needless to say, later references to the truthfulness of Hesiodic speech and the deceptive 
qualities of Homeric language abound. We have already amply discussed Hesiod’s connection 
to truth in Part Two; and for the tradition of Homer as an author of fiction it must suffice here 
to refer to Dio’s Trojan Oration, an epideictic tour de force in which Homer’s account of the 
Trojan War is systematically undermined and the poet himself is exposed as ‘surpassing all 
men in bravery when it comes to fiction’.88 Expressions of the opposition may become more 
bold and elaborate; but they are already fully articulate in the early fifth century, and perhaps 
in part go back to the poets themselves. 
                                               
84 ejrwthqei;~ povtero~ kreivsswn,   {Omhro~ h]   JHsivodo~, ei\pen:   JHsivodon me;n aiJ Moùsai,   {Omhron de; aiJ 
Cavrite~ ejtevknwsan. I am following Sternbach’s emendation; in the codex, the names of Hesiod and Homer are 
switched (!). 
85 What or how god is (Campbell T 47(c) = Cic. N.D. 1.22.60), whether it is better to be wealthy or wise (T 47(d) 
= Arist. Rh. 1391a), if everything gets old (T 47(f) = P. Hibeh 17), and who the noble are (T 47(g) = Arist. fr. 92 
(Rose)).  
86 Cf. the way other popular cultural icons are opposed: you either like the Beatles or the Stones better (70’s), 
Sean Connery or Roger Moore (80’s), Nintendo or Sega (90’s). 
87 Incidentally, the Muses and Graces have the same father (Zeus). Whether it is intended or not, the statement of 
Simonides makes Hesiod and Homer relatives (cf. ch. 1, pp. 36-37) and may point to an ultimately common 
origin of their poetry. 
88 D.Chrys. 11.23: ajndreiovtato~ ajnqrwvpwn h\n pro;~ to; yeùdo~   {Omhro~. See for just a few other examples 
Eratosthenes ap. Str. 1.2.7 (declaring ‘that not only the commentators on Homer but also Homer himself are 
dealers in nonsense’); D.H. 2.18.4; Lucianus JTr. 39 and Philops. 2; Pliny the Younger saying (Epist. 3.9.28)  it 
is typically Homeric to abandon chronology, one of the Homeric tricks attacked by Dio as well (11.24-25). The 
very verb   JOmhrivddein means ‘to use fiction’ (yeuvdesqai, Hsch. 2.202.20 Schmidt). The archaic conception of 
Hesiod whom the Muses gave knowledge and truth resurfaces, for instance, in Dio Chrysostom, who in the 77th 
oration (ironically) refers to Hesiod as a man ‘who composed and chanted his poems, not by human art, but 
because he held converse with the Muses and had become a pupil of those very beings’ (oujk ajnqrwpivnh/ tevcnh/ 
ta; poihvmata poiẁn te kai; a[/dwn, ajlla; taì~ Mouvsai~ ejntucw;n kai; maqhth;~ aujtwǹ ejkeivnwn genovmeno~) - 
and this turned him into a sophos, who ‘expressed himself very truthfully as well as with experience of human 
nature’ (ajpefhvnato mavl’ ajlhqẁ~ te kai; ejmpeivrw~ th̀~ ajnqrwpivnh~ fuvsew~); cf. Lucian Ind. 3. 
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2 - The Poet’s Craft: Inspiration and Perspiration  
This section is concerned with the notion of inspiration in antiquity and its key role in the 
opposition between Hesiod and Homer. In the previous section, brief mention was already 
made of inspiration because of its function as a guarantee of truth, especially relevant in the 
archaic period. In this section, however, we will focus on the classical and hellenistic age, in 
which the concept of inspiration is less connected to content (‘truth’, as opposed to falsehood) 
but more to the creative ‘method’. This type of inspiration, more congenial to our modern 
one, is understood as an irrational and relatively brief burst of creativity leading instantly to a 
satisfactory end-product; uninspired art, by contrast, is seen as the never-quite-finished result 
of painstaking, technical (almost mechanical) labor. The main point of this section is that 
Hesiod was first associated with inspiration type 1, but later with the opposite of inspiration 
type 2: the truth-teller became a labourer. By contrast, Homer changed vice versa: the 
introduction of the new notion of inspiration turned him from a liar into a truly ‘possessed’ 
poet. Much attention will be paid to Plato, who seems to have played an essential role in this 
reversal (2.2), and the hellenistic re-appraisal of Hesiod’s image as a ‘technical’ author (2.3). 
In the first subsection, however, we will briefly examine modern scholarship on Hesiod’s and 
Homer’s inspiration. 
 
2.1 - Modern Scholarship 
Throughout antiquity, inspiration appears as remarkably consistent in its formal aspects; poets 
of all periods claim a special relationship with their Muse (inspiration personified),89 whom 
they call upon to present their poem as partaking of superhuman authority and quality. It is 
rather more difficult, however, to generalize about the nature and meaning of inspiration. 
What is it exactly that the Muses are thought to contribute to the creative process? This 
question has often been posed, but it is clear that there is no univocal answer; different poets, 
as scholars have shown, ask the Muses for different things90 - even in one and the same poem, 
the relationship between Muse and poet can be characterized in different and sometimes even 
apparently contradictory ways.91 Obviously, even though the subject of inspiration has been 
thoroughly studied, its understanding remains an ongoing process. The brief overview in this 
                                               
89 See Falter (1934) for a systematic and full overview of all invocations of gods and goddesses in Greek and 
Roman literature. Commager (1967) 2-16 provides a still apt discussion of the Muses as a literary convention. 
90 See e.g. the studies of Maehler (1963), Harriott (1969), and Walsh (1984). The ambitious study of Barmeyer 
(1968) is somewhat strained by the main hypothesis that there is unity in all (ancient and modern) poets’ views 
of the Muses.  
91 The Odyssey is the prime example. The singers Phemius and Demodocus seem to need the god, but can also 
sing on their own (Od. 8.44-45, 8.287-289). Phemius even claims to be self-taught (Od. 22.347-348). See further 
below. 
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subsection, therefore, could never aim to be exhaustive or complete. Its main focus is the way 
a poet imagines the relationship with the Muse, which in part defines his own poetics. Three 
aspects seem to be especially relevant in this respect: 1) the poet’s share in the creative 
process, 2) the veracity of his poetry, and 3) its overall aim or function.  
    Most scholarship has focused on the Homeric poems and the rather equivocal picture of 
inspiration emerging from them. As to the first question, the contribution of the Muses, it has 
often been suggested that Homer primarily regards the Muses as all-knowing creatures who 
can provide him with factual information, since he invokes the Muses only when he has a 
specific question he needs an answer to.92 Others have stressed the fact that these questions 
are quite rare, which implies that in most cases the poet can rely on his own knowledge. This 
latter view is strenghtened by the fact that the aoidoi featuring in Homer’s poems, Phemius 
and Demodocus, usually regarded as Homer’s idealized image of himself,93 do not have such 
questions for the Muse but rather seem to have acquired a permanent gift which guarantees 
the quality of their songs. There are also many hints in the poems that the poet conceived of 
his own art as a tevcnh comparable to other crafts.94 It is especially Phemius’ famous paradox 
on the origin of his craft95 that reminds us of our ultimate inability - as demonstrated by the 
many attempts to explain the apparent inconsistency96 - to understand exactly what part the 
Muses play.97  
    Similar ambiguity surrounds the second question, that of the truthfulness of Homeric 
poetry. As has been noted above, epic poetry obviously claims the truth for itself, and 
                                               
92 See e.g. Minton (1960) 292-293. 
93 See e.g. Kraus (1955) 66, De Jong (2002) 391-392. Lamberton (1986) 3 points out that this view was already 
held in antiquity. 
94 See e.g. Od. 17.384 (and for a similar passage WD 25-26). This, however, does not necessarily eliminate or 
even diminish the share of the god, as is advocated by e.g. Murray (1981) 96-97 and Havelock (1963) 155, who 
regards the Muse not as a symbol of dependence on divine guidance, but of ‘the bard’s command of professional 
secrets’. I would say that it is rather proof that any trade or craft is presided over by one god or another. Patron 
gods were also invoked during ordinary handiwork like the baking of pots.   
95 Od. 22.347-348: ‘I am self-taught, and the god has planted in my heart lays of all sorts’ (aujtodivdakto~ d’ 
eijmiv, qeov~ dev moi ejn fresi;n oi[ma~ / pantoiva~ ejnevfusen). 
96 According to Maehler (1963) 23, Phemius means he can create new songs; Tigerstedt (1970) 168 solves the 
paradox by claiming that autodidaktos entails theodidaktos; Verdenius (1983) 38-39 comments on the common 
reading that separates between content and technique; Walsh (1984) 13 thinks Phemius cannot conceive himself 
as independent of the god because he is unable to see he is part of a long tradition; Ritoók (1989) 342 believes 
Phemius means that human faculties are supplemented by the divine ‘faculty to arouse, increase and satisfy 
desire’; Bowie (1993) 17 interestingly interprets the statement in terms of dual motivation; but there are many 
more interpretations. 
97 In my view, the problem can be largely evaded if one assumes that Homer sees himself (and the bard 
portrayed by him) as comparable to the heroes he describes; they too can be ‘inspired’ with a divine power that 
makes them ‘more truly themselves’ (Bowra 1952 89); cf. Latte (1946b) 158 comparing Hesiod’s inspiration to 
the way Homer pictures the gods as inspiring the heroes with ‘Spannkraft’, and Snell (1955) 40 saying that 
Homer speaks of divine intervention ‘wo immer ein Mensch mehr leistet oder mehr sagt, als man nach seinem 
bisherigen Verhalten erwarten könnte.’ 
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Demodocus, (perhaps) an alter ego of Homer himself, is lauded for singing ‘in order’ about 
the fall of Troy98 - an expression presumably meaning that his words match reality.99 On the 
other hand, it has of course often been noted that the greatest storyteller in the Odyssey is a 
crafty liar, whose speech is nonetheless comparable to that of poets. According to some, 
Odysseus’ so-called Cretan lies in Ithaca cast a shadow of doubt over his adventures in books 
9-12.100 It could also be, however, that the truth-fiction dichotomy was relatively unimportant 
to Homer, who seems to have been less concerned with the contrast between truth and 
falsehood than that between knowledge and ignorance.101 
    Third and finally, it is of interest to see what it is that the poet asks the Muses for. What 
exactly do the Muses help the poet to attain? Needless to say, there is much debate about the 
aim and function of Homeric poetry. On the one hand, several studies have demonstrated that 
the Homeric bard serves as the memory of a community since he repeats before the audience 
their own values and truths.102 On the other hand, the poet himself takes pride in his ability to 
take away cares and to enliven the party during banquets - this is why some scholars believed 
Homer claims ‘the hedonistic function’ for his poetry.103 Naturally, there are all kinds of 
middle positions.104 In section 3 we will take a closer look at the poets’ place in the opposition 
between hedonism and didacticism. 
    On the question of inspiration in its broadest sense, then, Homer’s work is decidedly 
polyvalent; hence, his poetics can be interpreted in many different and even contradictory 
ways. It is especially with regard to such thorough-going ambiguity that the modern reading 
of Hesiod’s inspiration can be clearly contrasted. Although it is true that Hesiod too mentions 
the hedonistic function of poetry, and may hint that the Muses’ gift makes one persuasive 
rather than knowledgeable,105 modern discussions of Hesiod’s poetics usually focus on the 
inspiration scene with its truth-telling Muses from the beginning of the Theogony; a much 
more univocal picture of Hesiod’s inspiration thus emerges. 
                                               
98 Od. 8.489: kata; kovsmon. 
99 See e.g. Walsh (1984) 8-14. 
100 See e.g. Goldhill (1991) 36-56. 
101 Murray (1981) 91. 
102 E.g. Havelock (1963), Svenbro (1976). 
103 Sperduti (1950) 227; see also Ritoók (1989). Latte (1946b) claims that the goal of Homeric song is to convey 
‘Schmuck des Daseins’, not any ‘nutbares Wissen’ or ‘Deutung der Welt’ (159). Kraus (1955) also emphatically 
denies any didactic intent to Homer; Verdenius (1970) 27 states slightly more carefully that ‘‘to delight his 
audience’ is Homer’s main object.’  
104 Walsh (1984), for instance, argued that all audiences in the Odyssey ‘assume that song should provide 
pleasure’ (5), but also points out that part of that pleasure in fact derives from receiving knowledge. 
105 See Th. 80-93 and 94-103. Walsh (1984) deduced from the former passage that the question of truth was not 
very important to Hesiod as ‘the king need apparently be nothing but eloquent’ (25). This is somewhat of an 
exaggeration, however, as the Muse-nourished king is said to judge ‘with straight judgements’ (ijqeivh/si 
divkh/sin, Th. 86) and ends quarrels ‘with knowledge’ (ejpistamevnw~, Th. 87). 
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    The scholarly pre-occupation with Hesiod’s Dichterweihe is understandable, since it is one 
of the most elaborate and emphatic statements of poetic inspiration in Greek (and perhaps 
even Western) literature. The Muses, as we have seen in the previous section, obviously talk 
of truth and fiction, so that discussions of Hesiod’s poetics are usually couched in similar 
terms: thus, the inspiration scene is generally interpreted as a claim to truth, and the 
contribution of the Muses as valuable information otherwise unavailable to mortals. 
Symptomatic of this particular approach to Hesiod is the lively debate on the question of 
whether Hesiod’s experience with the Muses was ‘true’ or not, and the tendency of scholars to 
answer this question with a ‘yes’ (qualified or not).106 In my view, the difference from 
Homeric scholarship could hardly be expressed more clearly than the belief that Hesiod’s 
vision is utterly free from ‘poetische Einkleidung’ but should be regarded as ‘echt und 
möglich.’107 
    As a consequence of this view of Hesiod, his relationship to the Muses is generally viewed 
in terms of a prophet following his calling.108 It is often pointed out that whereas Homer 
composes his own narrative and chooses to be steered by the Muses when he is uncertain 
about his facts, Hesiod’s Muses seem to have a far tighter grip on him. The subject of his song 
is part of his transformation into a poet: ‘… [they] breathed into me a divine voice to celebrate 
things that shall be and things that were aforetime; and they bade me sing of the race of the 
blessed gods that are eternally’109 - hence the age-old and ever-repeated notion that Hesiod 
                                               
106 Most scholars agree that the encounter with the Muses was ‘real’ for Hesiod, and that the inspiration scene in 
the Th. in some way or another reflects a ‘real’ experience. See e.g. Latte (1946b) 157 speaking of Hesiod’s 
inspiration as a ‘sehr reales Erlebnis’, Bowra (1952) 427-428 offering some good parallels for shepherds 
becoming poets, and Harriott (1969) 35 ‘Hesiod is describing what he believes actually happened to him’ (cf. 
Commager 1967 9). Kambylis (1965) 59 argued that the relatively short sentences and somewhat shaky style of 
the passage indicate a genuinely felt admiration and awe. Some scholars, who apparently do not believe in the 
physical reality of the Muses, state that the encounter was an inner or dreamlike experience: see e.g. Wade-Gery 
(1949) 87 speaking of a ‘vision’, Walcot (1966) 48-50, Neitzel (1980) 394-395 (thus continuing an ancient 
debate on whether Hesiod was awake or dreaming while meeting the Muses). Most (1991) esp. 73-77 represents 
the minority view of scholars prepared to see the Dichterweihe as part of a carefully wrought persona (cf. Pinsent 
1985 122 who suggests that the staff the Muses gave to Hesiod was in fact a graduation gift from a ‘professional 
sacred school of singers’). 
107 So Falter (1934) 14, saying it is too early to think of poetische Einkleidung; see for a similarly teleological 
view the statement of Kambylis (1965) 53 claiming that Hesiod’s age ‘verbietet’ us to think of fiction. Walcot 
(1960) 36 also explicitly rejects the possibility of literary convention, cf. Athanassakis (1983) 1: ‘there is no 
reason to assume that either Hesiod’s shepherding or his vision are fiction or pure literary convention.’ 
108 See e.g. Rand (1911) 146 ascribing to Hesiod ‘the moral sublimity of a Hebrew prophet’, Maehler (1963) 41 
‘Hesiod fühlt sich als Priester und Prophet’, Lamberton (1988) 120 speaking of the ‘humanism of [Hesiod’s] 
prophecy’, Kirby (1992) 37 describing Hesiod as a ‘uates’. Hesiod’s was already recognized in antiquity as a 
seer, perhaps because some believed he had written a poem called Seercraft (Paus. 9.31.5); the statue of Hesiod 
in the gymnasium of Zeuxippus stood between those of seers (AP 2.36-44).  
109 Th. 31-33: ejnevpneusan dev moi aujdh;n / qevspin, i{na kleivoimi tav t’ ejssovmena prov t’ ejovnta, / kaiv m’ 
ejkevlonq’ uJmneìn makavrwn gevno~ aije;n ejovntwn... 
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presents himself as an instrument of the Muses.110 Furthermore, whereas Homer invokes the 
Muses, the goddesses come to Hesiod of their own accord. They interrupt his normal life, 
condemn his current occupation and change him into a poet. Both their intervention and their 
specific task mark Hesiod as a ‘chosen one’, a man with a vocation. Sikes aptly said that ‘in 
Hesiod (…) the singer first becomes an inspired teacher, with a divine message to deliver.’111 
And there are more indications in the Dichterweihe that characterize Hesiod as a seer or 
prophet.112 Through his elaborate description of his own transformation, then, Hesiod has 
apparently left us with a far more univocal image of himself than Homer: chosen, truthful, 
didactic.113  
    This necessarily brief and sketchy overview shows that modern readers of the poems of 
Hesiod and Homer understand differences in terms of inspiration in a broad sense. We will 
now see that their sensitivity to the epic poems is matched by that of ancient readers, who also 
differentiate between Hesiod and Homer in this respect, and sometimes along similar lines. 
There is one thing, however, that further increases the complexity of the ancient interpretation 
of inspiration, and that is that the very concept of inspiration itself radically changes over 
time. Early ages mainly regarded inspired people as vehicles of truth, since the goddess 
herself supposedly spoke through them. In the fifth century, however, this claim to truth and 
knowledge became more complex as the inspired poet became ‘mad’. We will now see how 




                                               
110 A ‘Sprachrohr der Musen’, in the words of Fakas (2001) 63; cf. Pucci (1996) 198 on Hesiod as a ‘porte-
parole’ or even ‘substitut’ of the Muse. Of course the poem of Hesiod is also often interpreted as a joint venture 
(cf. e.g. Clay 2003 51-52 speaking of a ‘collaborative production’). 
111 Sikes (1931) 4. Many scholars have deduced from Th. 32 that the Muses’ gift consists of both poetic and 
prophetic powers; the main proponents of this theory are listed by Tigerstedt (1970) 171 n.41. The idea is of 
course not unusual, since there is a ‘close connexion between poetry and prophecy which is widespread in early 
literature’ (West 1966 166). The few attempts to downplay Hesiod’s prophetic image are very unconvincing. 
Tigerstedt (1970) 171-172 seems to believe Hesiod’s account is too sober for a mystic experience; but there are 
no rules that say all such experiences should be described in trance-like fashion. Andrews (1943), who compared 
Hesiod to the Hebrew prophet Amos, found many similarities, yet still claims the former wrote ‘without 
prophetic commission’, and was not ‘under divine compulsion’; strangely enough, she excludes the 
Dichterweihe from her discussion and focuses on the WD instead. 
112 The association of the Muses with water (Th. 1-6), which is connected to manticism (Kambylis 1965 23-30), 
and especially the branch of laurel (an attribute from Aly (1913) onwards interpreted as a link to Apollo, lord of 
seers). Less convincing are the suggestion of Barmeyer (1968) 107-108 that the oak and rock in Th. 35 refer to 
prophecy and the claim of Beye (1972) 28 that Hesiod’s language is similar to that of the Delphic oracle.   
113 See on the last qualification e.g. Combellack (1974) 124 recognizing two types of literature in the time of 
Hesiod (poetry and prose oratory), and then claiming that ‘it is thoroughly characteristic of Hesiod that neither 
kind of ‘literature’ is thought to be for entertainment.’ 
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2.2 The Impact of Plato: the Manic Poet 
As we have seen in section 1, inspiration was in archaic times conceived as a form of divine 
empowerment: the all-knowing Muses grant the poet superhuman power, so that he can pass 
on the ‘Glanz eines Wissens’.114 In this notion of inspiration, the main concern is ultimately 
with the product, i.e. knowledge of things that are and will be: prophets exist for the message. 
At the end of the fifth century, however, a new concept of inspiration arises under the 
influence of Plato. The basic sequence Muse - poet - product is still maintained, but the focus 
shifts from product to poet. Plato investigates the condition of the poet qua inspired being, 
and calls this status maniva (‘madness’): the poet is in the Muses’ power and has no control 
over his own song (which is thus not really his own).115 This new characterization of the poet 
has important consequences for the art itself; since the poet does not contribute anything, 
poetry itself cannot be a craft or tevcnh. This means that the poem can in theory still bring us 
the truth, but it surely cannot bring us knowledge, for the poet cannot rationally account for 
the things he says.116 Moreover, his inspired art seems to suspend the faculty of reason in his 
audience too, since those listening to poetry turn into ‘enthusiasts’. Even though Plato himself 
claims that the notion of inspiration as maniva is very old, it has often been noted that it is in 
fact almost completely new, tailor-made for his specific purpose of disqualifying the poets as 
authorities on knowledge and education.117 
    It is of great interest to the present study that Plato singles out Homer as the inspired or 
‘manic’ poet par excellence. For instance: when the Athenian in the Laws says that ‘poets as a 
class are divinely gifted and inspired when they sing, so that with the help of Graces and 
Muses they frequently hit on how things really happen’,118 it is because he has just quoted a 
‘very wise and truthful’ (kata; qeovn kai; kata; fuvsin) saying from Homer. When Socrates 
concludes, at the end of the Phaedrus, that all books and writing are inferior to thoughts and 
discussion, Homer is mentioned as the prime example of those poets who cannot defend their 
statements and cannot claim any knowledge of the truth.119 Most interesting is the short 
                                               
114 Otto (1971) 39. 
115 Murray (1996) 8-9 overemphasizes Plato’s part in the invention of the poet as a ‘mouthpiece for the god’s 
message’ (9); it is important to realize that the ‘mouthpiece-theory’ is ancient (in fact going back to Hesiod 
himself), but it was only in Plato’s time that this was thought to disqualify the poet’s own thinking.  
116 The poets’ proud claims of seer- or prophet-like capabilities are thus turned against them, cf. e.g. Pl. Ap. 22c. 
117 Cf. e.g. Commager (1967) 21 n.36 pointing to Plato as the inventor of manic ecstacy, Harriott (1969) 83 
saying that Plato’s concept of inspiration is ‘almost entirely new and that it is made acceptable by being dressed 
in language and imagery familiar from tradition’, Murray (1981) 85, Kahn (2001) 64 says generally that ‘Plato 
had set the fasion of presenting his newest theories as age-old wisdom’.  
118 Pl. Leg. 682a: qeìon ga;r ou\n dh; kai; to; poihtiko;n ejnqeastiko;n o]n gevno~ uJmnw/doùn, pollẁn tẁn kat’ 
ajlhvqeian gignomevnwn suvn tisin Cavrisin kai; Mouvsai~ ejfavptetai eJkavstote. 
119 Pl. Phdr. 278c. 
CHAPTER 9 
  282 
dialogue Ion, where Socrates elaborates on the theme of inspiration as divine possession and 
takes the Homeric rhapsode Ion as an example: Ion can recite and comment on Homer only 
because of a divine gift, and not because of any knowledge he possesses; and of course the 
same goes for Homer himself, who is the true target of Plato’s critique.120 
    It is highly remarkable that Hesiod, the prototype of the inspired poet for Pindar and 
Bacchylides, and the ultimate spokesman of the Muses for Parmenides and Empedocles, loses 
his prophetic status completely in the works of Plato. Hesiod can be called gennaiò~ 
(‘worthy’), frovnimo~ (‘sensible’), or sofov~ (‘wise’), but never qeiò~ (‘divine’) or ‘inspired’ 
or the like; he is certainly never associated with ‘manic’ inspiration in a way that Homer 
clearly is.121 How could such a shift have come about? Obviously, Plato made Homer his 
prime target since he had the greatest reputation as a poet and educator. Furthermore, as the 
passages from Laws and Phaedrus show, the ‘manic’ Homer is often characterized as the 
foremost example of poets, implying that they all (Hesiod included) fall prey to maniva when 
composing. And finally, Plato’s focus on Homer was not all new in that he probably owed 
much to the inspiration theory of Democritus.122 Still, that the traditionally inspired Hesiod is 
never mentioned explicitly as such by Plato remains remarkable. I will argue, however, that 
this shift can be understood when we recognize that it is that very tradition that has been 
instrumental in Plato’s choice for Homer. Two considerations are especially relevant here. 
    The first is Plato’s concern about the effects of poetry on the audience. Poetry, defined as 
manic and non-rational, appealed to the non-rational parts of the audience, and thus revealed 
itself the enemy of philosophy. The poet’s maniva was proven contagious since it was passed 
on to his listeners, as the famous comparion between inspiration and magnetism in the Ion 
                                               
120 Pl. Ion 533d-536d. 
121 Hesiod is associated with the Muses in R. 546e, and perhaps Plato thinks of Hesiod when he speaks of 
children of the gods in Ti. 40e; but there is no mention of maniva here. I cannot agree with Havelock (1963) 8 
who claims that Plato does not distinguish between Homer and Hesiod. 
122 Plato’s somewhat older contemporary Democritus was one of the first to develop a physical theory of 
inspiration. The details of this theory are obscure and controversial, but it is fairly certain that he believed the 
souls of poets to be particularly light and fiery, a quality which rendered them capable of communicating with 
light and fiery beings like spirits and gods (Delatte (1934) still offers the most thorough and authoritative 
discussion of the particulars). Hence Democritus could say that ‘what a poet writes with inspiration and the 
breath of the gods is very fine’ (poihth;~ de; a{ssa me;n a[n gravfh/ met’ ejnqousiasmoù kai; iJeroù pneuvmato~, 
kala; kavrta ejstin, DK 68 B 18). It is likely that Democritus was mainly thinking about Homer here, since he is 
also reported to have said that ‘Homer, by getting a share in the divine nature, accomplished the ordering of all 
kinds of verses’ (  {Omhro~ fuvsew~ lacw;n qeazouvsh~ ejpevwn kovsmon ejtekthvnato pantoivwn, DK 68 B 21). 
O’Sullivan (1992) 68-71 plausibly argued on the basis of this fragment and other evidence that Homer was the 
prototype of the inspired poet for Democritus. 
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makes clear.123 Entire groups of people could thus be cut off from their noù~, their faculty of 
reason. This dangerous effect of irrational poetry is also caused by its mimetic quality: when 
‘Homer or some other of the makers of tragedy’ imitates one of the heroes who is in grief, 
Socrates says in the Republic (605c-d), we feel pleasure and leave our very selves to 
‘accompany the representation with sympathy’ (eJpovmeqa sumpavsconte~); and this is what 
we feel poets need to do: create pathetic scenes to which we can respond emotionally.124 
    Homer was the obvious choice to represent this kind of poetry since he appealed to the 
people’s appetite for beauty, pleasure and rapture. We have already seen that Pindar described 
Homeric poetry as magnificent and capable of misleading the masses, and we find similar 
descriptions in the Platonic corpus.125 The ultimate reason behind Homer’s banishment from 
Plato’s state is precisely the fact that he is such a powerful and beautiful poet, and can keep 
the audience completely in trance. This is obvious from the final words with which Socrates 
still somewhat reluctantly lets Homer go: ‘If the poetry that aims at pleasure and imitation has 
any argument to bring forward that proves it ought to have a place in a well-governed city, we 
at least would be glad to admit it, for we are well aware of the charm it exercises. But, be that 
as it may, to betray what one believes to be the truth is impious. What about you, Glaucon, 
don’t you feel the charm of the pleasure-giving Muse, especially when you study her through 
the eyes of Homer?’126 Plato’s description of Homer’s effect on the audience was in fact 
widely felt; O’Sullivan plausibly argued that Homer in the days of Plato and later was felt to 
represent the genus grande, the main characteristic of which was its power to sweep the 
audience away.127 
    Secondly, Homer was in Plato’s times already predetermined as untruthful. As we have 
seen in section 1.2, he was associated with philosophical notions that presented truth as 
relative and apparent, and knowledge as fluid, impossible or even nonexistent. It was the main 
aim of Plato’s criticism of Homer to disqualify him as a source of knowledge, especially 
                                               
123 Pl. Ion 535e-536d; the magnet-stone (the god) extended its powers to an iron ring (the poet), who transfers the 
same powers to a second ring (the rhapsode) and ultimately to a third (the audience). Cf. Else (1986) 196 
defining Plato’s concept of poetry as ‘communication from one soul to another’. 
124 Cf. Pl. R. 605d: ‘We praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way’ 
(ejpainoùmen wJ~ ajgaqo;n poihth;n o}~ a}n hJmà~ o{ti mavlista ou{tw diaqh̀/). See for some discussions of this 
criticism of Homeric poetry as pathetic and irrational Murdoch (1977), Moravcsik (1982) 29-46, Woodruff 
(1982) 137-150, Too (1998) 51-81. See also Hunter (2004) 239 describing Homer’s language as ‘the ‘natural’ 
language of suffering and strong emotion’.  
125 Esp. Pl. Smp. 195d; R. 387b, 595b, and 606e-607a. 
126 Pl. R. 607c-d: ei[ tina e[coi lovgon eijpeìn hJ pro;~ hJdonh;n poihtikh; kai; hJ mivmhsi~, wJ~ crh; aujth;n ei\nai ejn 
povlei eujnomoumevnh/, a{smenoi a]n katadecoivmeqa, wJ~ suvnismevn ge hJmìn aujtoì~ khloumevnoi~ uJp’ aujth̀~: 
ajlla; ga;r to; dokoùn ajlhqe;~ oujc o{sion prodidovnai. h\ gar, w\ fivle, ouj khlh̀/ uJp’ aujth̀~ kai; suv, kai; mavlista 
o{tan di’   JOmhvrou qewrh̀/~ aujthvn; 
127 O’Sullivan (1992) 106-129. 
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knowledge of ethical truth,128 since it was exactly the content of his ethical teaching that he 
wished to destroy.129 By focusing on Homer, Plato’s attack on the poets’ status as a teacher 
and on their reputation for truth and knowledge thus rested on previous views of the poet and 
built further on them.   
    We can see how the first and second consideration combine to make Homer the most 
eligible candidate for Plato’s new type of inspiration. It is also immediately clear why Hesiod 
was so unsuitable. As we have seen in chapter 6, the Hesiodic type of inspiration was in the 
fifth century conceived as a revelatory experience which consisted of a transfer of knowledge 
instead of an appeal to the emotions. Moreover, the language of Hesiod was traditionally 
regarded as truthful speech, advocating the one-on-one relationship between words and 
things. These pre-existing interpretations are obviously incompatible with the Platonic 
stereotype of the inspired poet. Homer, by contrast, in part because of his own reception, 
could rather easily be molded into a poet that Plato felt himself capable of attacking. And so 
Homer could become the inspired poet par excellence.  
 
It is unclear, however, whether this denial of manic inspiration to Hesiod also directly landed 
him in the category of poets who compose through tevcnh. There is ample evidence for 
Hesiod as a ‘technical’ writer in the hellenistic age and later (see the next subsection), but 
earlier evidence is rather circumstantial.130 It will be of interest, however, to discuss in some 
detail a passage from Isocrates’ To Nicocles. This does not, strictly speaking, deal with 
inspiration, but does address the obviously related questions of poetry’s impact on the 
audience and lack of truth. In this passage, Hesiod and Homer are explicitly contrasted to each 
other. 
    Isocrates’ To Nicocles, written around 376 BC, is an essay investigating the best conduct of 
a ruler towards his subjects. Somewhere in the middle, Isocrates mentions the many wise 
lessons already written down by the ancients: 
 
[42] ... ta; sumbouleuvonta kai; twǹ poihmavtwn kai; twǹ suggrammavtwn 
crhsimwvtata me;n a{pante~ nomivzousin, ouj mh;n h{distav g’ aujtwǹ ajkouvousin, ajlla; 
                                               
128 Cf. Gill (1993) 44 ‘The claim that representative poetry is ‘three degrees removed from the truth’ and 
‘deceptive’ (in Republic 10) consists in the claim that poetry deceives people into thinking that it can convey 
knowledge of ethical truth’. 
129 Cf. Else (1986) 197 saying it was Homer’s ‘worst sin’, according to Plato, ‘to present human happiness as 
tragically incommensurate with goodness.’ 
130 One could think, for instance, of the toil involved in composing Hesiodic poetry according to Pindar, and 
Hesiod’s image as a collector (see chapter 6). 
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pepovnqasin o{per pro;~ tou;~ nouqetoùnta~: kai; ga;r ejkeivnou~ ejpainoùsi me;n, 
plhsiavzein de; bouvlontai toì~ sunexamartavnousin, ajll’ ouj toi~̀ ajpotrevpousin. 
[43] Shmeìon d’ a[n ti~ poihvsaito th;n   JHsiovdou kai; Qeovgnido~ kai; Fwkulivdou 
poivhsin: kai; ga;r touvtou~ fasi; me;n ajrivstou~ gegenhs̀qai sumbouvlou~ tw/̀ bivw/ tw/̀ 
tẁn ajnqrwvpwn, taùta de; levgonte~ aiJroùntai sundiatrivbein taì~ ajllhvlwn 
ajnoivai~ màllon h] tai~̀ ejkeivnwn uJpoqhvkai~. [44]  [Eti d’ ei[ ti~ ejklevxeie twǹ 
proecovntwn poihtẁn ta;~ kaloumevna~ gnwvma~, ejf’ ai|~ ejkeìnoi mavlist’ 
ejspouvdasan, oJmoivw~ a]n kai; pro;~ tauvta~ diateqeìen: h{dion ga;r a]n kwmw/diva~ th̀~ 
faulotavth~ h] tẁn ou{tw tecnikẁ~ pepoihmevnwn ajkouvsaien. 
 
‘[42] … while all men think that those compositions, whether in prose or in verse, are 
the most useful which give us advice, yet it is certainly not to them that they listen 
with greatest pleasure; on the contrary, they feel about these just as they feel about the 
people who admonish them; for while they praise the latter, they choose for associates 
those who share in, and not those who would dissuade them from, their faults. [43] As 
a case in point, one might cite the poetry of Hesiod and Theognis and Phocylides; for 
these, they say, have proved the best counsellors for human life; but in spite of what 
they say, people prefer to occupy themselves with each other’s follies rather than with 
their admonitions. [44] And, again, if one were to make a selection from the leading 
poets of their maxims, as we call them, into which they have put their best effort, men 
would show a similar attitude towards them also; for they would rather listen to the 
cheapest comedy than to poems composed with so much skill.’131 
 
This passage on Hesiodic poetry should be compared to the characterization of its opposite. In 
paragraph 48-49, Isocrates continues the theme of man’s aversion to good advice and of his 
inclination towards pleasure: 
 
jEkeìno d’ ou\n fanero;n, o{ti dei ̀ tou;~ boulomevnou~ h] poieìn h] gravfein ti 
kecarismevnon toi~̀ polloi~̀ mh; tou;~ wjfelimwtavtou~ twǹ lovgwn zhteìn, ajlla; 
tou;~ muqwdestavtou~: (...) Dio; kai; th;n  JOmhvrou poivhsin kai; tou;~ prwvtou~ 
euJrovnta~ tragw/divan a[xion qaumavzein, o{ti katidovnte~ th;n fuvsin th;n twǹ 
ajnqrwvpwn ajmfotevrai~ taì~ ijdevai~ tauvtai~ katecrhvsanto pro;~ th;n poivhsin. 
[49]  JO me;n ga;r tou;~ ajgwǹa~ kai; tou;~ polevmou~ tou;~ tẁn hJmiqevwn ejmuqo-
                                               
131 I have slightly adapted the translation of Norlin.  
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lovghsen, oiJ de; tou;~ muvqou~ eij~ ajgwǹa~ kai; pravxei~ katevsthsan, w{ste mh; movnon 
ajkoustou;~ hJmiǹ ajlla; kai; qeatou;~ genevsqai. Toiouvtwn ou\n paradeigmavtwn 
uJparcovntwn devdeiktai toì~ ejpiqumoùsin tou;~ ajkrowmevnou~ yucagwgeiǹ o{ti tou ̀
me;n nouqeteiǹ kai; sumbouleuvein ajfektevon, ta; de; toiaùta lektevon, oi|~ oJrws̀i 
tou;~ o[clou~ mavlista caivronta~. 
 
‘This much is clear, that those who aim to write anything in verse or prose which will 
make a popular appeal should seek out, not the most profitable discourses, but those 
which most abound in myths; (…) That is why we may well admire the poet Homer 
and the first inventors of tragedy, seeing that they, with true insight in human nature, 
have embodied both kinds of pleasure [i.e. of ear and eye] in their poetry; [49] for 
Homer has dressed the contests and battles of the demigods in myths, while the tragic 
poets have rendered the myths in the form of contests and action, so that they are 
presented not to our ears alone, but to our eyes as well. With such models, then, before 
us, it is evident that those who desire to entertain their hearers must abstain from 
admonition and advice, and must say the things which they see are most pleasing to 
the crowd.’132 
 
In these two passages the dividing lines are sharply drawn. In the one corner, we find Hesiod 
(with Theognis and Phocylides),133 and in the other Homer (with his usual associates, the 
tragedians). The poetry typified by Hesiod is (1) ‘most useful’, (2) tries to ‘advise’ the 
audience, (3) appears to appeal to reason (his ‘admonitions’ are contrasted with ajnoivai~ or 
‘follies’ in 43) and (4) is not pleasant. Homeric poetry on the other hand is described as (1) 
‘not the most profitable (…) but the richest in myth’; (2) trying to ‘entertain’ (yucagwgeiǹ), 
(3) appealing to the senses and (4) bringing pleasure to the audience. Hesiodic poetry is not 
appreciated by the many, whereas they love Homer and the tragedians, because these poets 
stoop to their level and give them exactly what they want.134 
                                               
132 Idem. 
133 The presence of the gnomic poets is a sure indication that Isocrates is thinking about the WD. 
134 Apart from the obvious oppositions, there are also more subtle ways in which Isocrates contrasts the two 
types of poetry. See for instance the highly ironic line ‘That is why we may well admire (qaumavzein) the poet 
Homer and the first inventors of tragedy, seeing that they, with true insight in human nature, have embodied both 
kinds of pleasure in their poetry’. That we should ‘admire’ Homer is a commonplace, usually connected to the 
idea that Homer’s poetry itself is full of qaùma (see for wonder in the Certamen ch. 7, pp. 219 and 231, and 
further below). Here, however, Isocrates ironically suggests we should admire Homer for seeing through ‘the 
nature of man’ (th;n fuvsin th;n tẁn ajnqrwvpwn) and thus being able to manipulate him so well; cf. Too (1995) 
31-32, Bons (1996) 42-43. His relationship to mankind is thus totally different from Hesiod’s, who wishes to 
improve ‘the life of man’ (tẁ/ bivw/ tẁ/ tẁn ajnqrwvpwn). 
THE OTHER POETICS 
 287
    It is perhaps possible to add to this list of oppositions the one between fuvsi~ and tevcnh, or 
ars and ingenium.135 It is true that in the second passage Isocrates does not speak of 
inspiration or maniva, but Plato’s influence is obvious in the description of Homer’s poetry as 
aimed at the senses, hedonistic, and generally setting a bad example. In the first passage, 
however, we do find hints suggesting non-inspired or technical composition. First of all, the 
poetry of Hesiod (and Theognis and Phocylides) is described as tecnikẁ~ pepoihmevna, 
‘things composed technically’. In Isocrates, a text described as tecnikov~ is a text that is 
intelligent, important and instructive, and can only be written by someone who has had a 
decent training136 - obviously, someone like Isocrates himself, whose very speech To Nicocles 
resembles the Works and Days in other ways as well.137 The attribution of tevcnh to Hesiod 
and his fellows is reinforced by the use of the verb ejspouvdasan, which denotes effort and 
hard work.138 All this reflects on Homer and the tragedians too, who are thus accused of 
taking the easy road by pleasing the audience. 
    The passage from Isocrates’ To Nicocles is treated so elaborately in this section because it 
is the first testimony explicitly linking Hesiod to technical writing, i.e. writing through 
tevcnh.139 We can clearly see how, once again, Hesiod is constructed with the aid of his 
                                               
135 See on Isocrates’ notion of tevcnh Too (1995) 164-171. 
136 See e.g. In Soph. 12 and 15, Ant. 205 and 206 and especially Panath. 271, where Isocrates describes his own 
speech as belonging to that category of speeches that are ‘more weighty and more worthy of serious study, 
discourses which are instructive and technical (…), which aim at the truth (…) and which rebuke our faults and 
admonish us’ (spoudaiotevrou~ kai; filosofwtevrou~ ... touv~ te didaskalikou;~ kai; tecnikou;~ (...), tou;~ 
th̀~ ajlhqeiva~ stocazomevnou~ (...) kai; tou;~ ejpiplhvttonta~ toì~ aJmartanomevnoi~ kai; nouqetoùnta~). This 
category is here too contrasted (and preferred) to speeches ‘written for display or for the law-courts (…), spoken 
for our pleasure and gratification’ (tẁn pro;~ ta;~ ejpideivxei~ kai; tou;~ ajgwǹa~ gegrammevnwn (...), pro;~ 
hJdonh;n kai; cavrin legomevnwn). Apart from the obvious similarities to the dichotomy described in To Nicocles, it 
is remarkable that the type of speech denounced here is connected to ajgwǹe~, just like the poetry of Homer and 
the tragedians. These remarkable similarities between the views of poetry in both speeches make it difficult to 
argue that the sharp contrast between the two types of poetry in To Nicocles is specific to this speech, as is 
argued by Poulakos (1997) 37, even though he is right to pay attention to the persona Isocrates wishes to create 
for himself in this oration (i.e. ‘the type of adviser to the king who, committed to giving the best advice, speaks 
without regard to what the interlocuter wishes to hear’, ibid.).  
137 Cf. Mirhady and Too (2000) 157, who note that ‘the presentation of the material in the form of a catalogue of 
maxims shows the influence of Hesiod’. Interestingly, they also point to the democratic orientation of the treatise 
(despite its character as a ‘mirror for a prince’) and Isocrates’ care to avoid being seen as a sophist (158). 
138 Cf. Dio Chrysostom’s 36th oration, where he distinguishes Phocylides from Homer poet in the following 
way: ‘[Phocylides] is not one of those who string together a long and continuous poem, as your Homer does, 
who uses more than five thousand verses of continuous narration in describing a single battle; on the contrary, 
the poems of Phocylides have both beginning and end in two or three verses. And so he adds his name to each 
sentiment, because it is a serious matter and of great importance (a{te spoudaìon kai; polloù a[xion 
hJgouvmeno~), unlike Homer who nowhere named himself in his poetry’ (36.12, transl. slightly altered). So here, 
too, Phocylides is described as regarding poetry as a serious affair (compare Isocrates’ ejspouvdasan and 
Phocylides’ spoudaìon) and in this being opposed to Homer (who is again characterized as writing on the 
subject of war). 
139 There are more references to Hesiod as exemplary of the ‘technical’ way of writing: his maxim to ‘add little 
to little’ (Plu. Mor. 9E; Doxopater 6.93 Walz; John of Sicily Walz 6.93) and insistence on hard work (Doxopater 
6.96 Walz) were convenient hooks on which to hang this connection. The idea of Hesiod as a writer through 
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opposite Homer; at roughly the same time that Plato constructs his manic poet Homer, the 
idea of Hesiod as an uninspired labourer arises. This constitutes a definite downgrade of the 
traditional prophet of the Muses, and in my view, the de-inspiration (exhalation?) of Hesiod 
marks a turning-point in the history of Hesiod as a poetic symbol slowly losing its importance 
to Homer. For some time, however, it was precisely Hesiod’s newly gained status as a 
technical writer that caused a veritable revival of poetic interest - but for this, as we will now 
see, a ‘Callimachean revolution’ was necessary.  
 
2.3 - The Hellenistic Hesiod: on Wine and Water 
As is well-known, the hellenistic age witnessed the birth of a new kind of poetry, which 
modern scholars (as well as the poets themselves) generally regard as breaking radically with 
the old. The ‘revolution’ has often been described: instead of traditional epic, characterized by 
grand themes, a grand style, considerable length and the presence of old-fashioned heroic 
values, the Alexandrian scholar-poets preferred another type of poem, which deals with 
humbler themes, seeks a more sophisticated and ‘thin’ (leptov~) style, is considerably shorter 
in length (or strings together several shorter poems) and focuses on less heroic and more 
human values.140 Moreover, the self-proclaimed shift from quantity to quality was 
accompanied by a renewed interest in tevcnh: the carefully crafted and thoroughly learned 
poems were endlessly polished and reworked. In this subsection, we will briefly discuss the 
hellenistic re-discovery of Hesiod and the concomitant revival of Hesiodic inspiration. 
Obviously, an exhaustive discussion of Hesiod’s role in hellenistic poetics is far beyond the 
                                                                                                                                                   
tevcnh and training is a persistent one. The most interesting example, perhaps, comes from Lucian’s Professor of 
Public Speaking, a satirical treatise in which a rJhtovrwn didavskalo~ promotes the new vogue in rhetorical 
education: no long training but a crash course in easy tricks. The tough road is presented as the ‘narrow, thorny 
and rough path’ (ajtrapo;~ stenh; kai; ajkanqwvdh~ kai; traceìa, Rh.Pr. 7; note the ‘thorns’, which will return in 
AP 11.20.2 below), which ‘Hesiod described so well’ ( JHsivodo~ eu\ mavla uJpodeivxa~ aujth;n, ibid.). In a later 
passage, where the tough road is elaborately described in terms of extreme length and hardship (it was followed 
by Demosthenes, the example par excellence of the writer not naturally gifted but successful through hard work, 
who was, incidentally, a notorious water-drinker as well, cf. Athen. 2.44E, D. 6.30 and 29.46; see on water-
drinking further below), Hesiod even appears as the ‘guide of the rough road’ (th̀~ traceiva~ ojdoù ejkeivnh~ 
hJgemwvn, Rh.Pr. 9); he is not explicitly named, but his description says enough (in Rh.Pr. 9, he is described in 
terms that remind one of the cynic, ‘a vigorous man with hard muscles and a manly stride, who shows heavy tan 
on his body’ (karterov~ ti~ ajnhvr, uJpovsklhro~, ajndrwvdh~ to; bavdisma, polu;n to;n h{lion ejpi; tẁ/ swvmati 
deiknuvwn); this already points to Hesiod, but the identification is made certain through comparison with Ind. 3, 
where Hesiod is called ‘a hard-bitten, hairy man displaying rich tan on his body’ (see for this passage also ch. 8, 
p. 249). Cf. also Rh.Pr. 10, where the ‘guide of the rough road’ is called an ‘impostor’ (ajlazwvn), the same word 
used for Hesiod in Sat. 5, in a similarly ironic context (see further below, pp. 310-311). (The last part of Rh.Pr. 
10, where the professor advises his listener to ‘bid a long good-bye to that hairy, unduly masculine fellow, 
leaving him to climb us himself, all blown and dripping with sweat’, also obviously points to Hesiod.).  
140 See for a good discussion of the ‘revolution’ Bing (1988) 50-90.  
THE OTHER POETICS 
 289
scope of the present book; and there are some very thorough monographs available.141 I will 
focus, therefore, on a motif associated with inspiration by some of the hellenistic poets, i.e. 
the motif of water. This focus on the much-employed poetical symbol will sufficiently bring 
to the fore the difference perceived between Hesiodic and Homeric poetry in this period. 
    That Hesiod played a considerable role in Alexandrian poetics is doubted by no-one; 
according to one scholar, ‘Hesiodic poetry was all the rage’.142 Callimachus himself presented 
Hesiod as the prototypical exponent of the new poetry: he gave Hesiod a prominent place in 
the prologue to his own masterpiece, the Aetia,143 and commended the poem of his fellow-
poet Aratus with the following words: 
 
  JHsiovdou tov t’ a[eisma kai; oJ trovpo~: ouj to;n ajoido;n 
   e[scaton, ajll’ ojknevw mh; to; melicrovtaton 
  tẁn ejpevwn oJ Soleu;~ ajpemavxato: caivrete leptai; 
   rJhvsie~,   jArhvtou suvntono~ ajgrupnivh. 
 
‘Hesiod’s is the theme and Hesiod’s the manner. I misdoubt 
that not to the utter end but only the most honeysweet 
of his verses has the poet of Soli copied. Hail subtle  
discourses, the earnest vigil of Aratus.’144 
 
Although the poem contains much that is uncertain, all scholars agree that it contains in a 
nutshell the new ideals of the hellenistic poets:145 there are the ‘subtle discourses’ (leptai; 
rJhvsie~),146 the search for low-key, ‘honeysweet’ verses,147 and the poet’s hard work that 
                                               
141 See, e.g. Reinsch-Werner (1976) on Hesiod and Callimachus, and Fakas (2001) on Hesiod and Aratus. 
142 Cameron (1995) 377. 
143 Fr. 2.1-5 Pf. Callimachus may have mentioned Hesiod again in the epilogue (depending on whether or not fr. 
112 should be placed at the end of the Aetia); cf. Lamberton (1988) 151 ‘[the Aitia] opened and closed with 
Kallimakhos in the role of Hesiod on Mount Helikon’. 
144 Ep. 29 Pf. (= AP 9.507 = 56 Gow/Page); the epigram is ‘vieldiskutiert’ (Hose 1994 196) and variant readings 
have been proposed, esp. with regard to the words ajoido;n e[scaton (see on suvntono~ ajgrupnivh, the other 
subject of much conjecture, e.g. Cameron 1972 and Hose 1994). Several scholars prefer the reading ajoidẁn at 
the end of the first line, suggested by Scaliger and adopted by Pfeiffer, because it opens up the possibility of 
Hesiod being contrasted to Homer: ‘not the best of the poets [= presumably Homer] did he copy, but only the 
most honeysweet of his [= Hesiod’s] verses’ (see e.g. Wilamowitz 1924 I 206, Reinsch-Werner 1976 9-13, 
Schwinge 1986 13, Riedweg 1994 129, D’Alessio 1996 ad loc.). But this seems to strain the meaning of 
e[scato~, and makes it very difficult to understand the ejpevwn as belonging to Hesiod again (see further the most 
fervent defender of ajoido;n, Cameron 1995 374-379, for no less than 7 objections to ajoidẁn). The reading as 
transmitted must remain as it is.  
145 Cf. Possanza (2004) 88. 
146 The curious expression rJhvsie~ is explained by Cameron (1995) 322, who detected a pun on Aratus’ name, 
deliberately misspelled (rJhvsie~   jArhvtou = ‘utterances of the inutterable’).  
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keeps him up all night - a reflection of the Alexandrian belief that ‘dichterische Inspiration 
allein nicht genügt, sondern unendlichter Fleiß und entsagungsvolle Arbeit bis tief in die 
Nacht hinein Voraussetzung für das Gelingen eines poetischen Kunstwerkes sind’.148 These 
qualities are all connected to Hesiod, who has delivered the ‘theme’ and the ‘manner’,149 and 
whose presence at the very beginning overshadows the entire poem.150 
    How are we to understand this prominence of Hesiod? Two observations seem to be 
especially relevant here. First of all, we should not overly emphasize the relative importance 
of Hesiod. In the past, it has often been suggested or even explicitly stated that the hellenistic 
embrace of Hesiod entailed a firm rejection of Homer; the obvious praise for Hesiod by 
Callimachus was taken as a justification for elaborate comparisons between Hesiod and the 
new poets, which at the same time tended to characterize Homer as an a priori less likely 
model.151 This is obviously wrong: even though Hesiod is hailed as the new champion of 
poetry, Homer himself is not abandoned at all; the work of the hellenistic poets, including that 
of Callimachus, abounds with references to the Iliad and Odyssey.152 Homer was still felt to 
be the greatest of poets, even so much so that he could not be rivalled153 - and Hesiod is used 
to make that point. Callimachus so emphatically picked Hesiod as the new poetical example 
                                                                                                                                                   
147 Aratus called the Muses ‘honey-sweet’ (meilivciai) in the proem to his Phaenomena (17); see Fakas (2001) 
120 on Aratus’ subtle way of claiming Hesiod as a predecessor. 
148 Riedweg (1994) 132; see also Commager (1967) 24 on the ‘toiling’ poets Philetas, Callimachus, and Erinna. 
There is double entendre here: Aratus also had to stay awake for his studies of the heavenly phenomena. Some 
scholars believe Callimachus is ironic and hints that it was not so much the stars themselves, but the 
astronomical work of Eudoxus that Aratus was studying (see e.g. Bing 1988 36, Hose 1994, Nisetich 2001 312). 
149 Whatever this may mean exactly. Cameron (1995) 378 voices the obvious reading (a[eisma is subject matter, 
trovpo~ stands for style and metrical technique), and rightfully rejects the interpretation of Reinsch-Werner 1976 
(‘Here is pure Hesiod’). Riedweg (1994) 127 assumes it is a hendyadyoin (‘Hesiodeisch ist die Art dieses 
Gesangs’). I do not believe Stewart (2008) claiming the epigram says that Aratus’ poem is Hesiodic in its 
‘essential character’ (by which she means its didacticism) but Homeric in its style.   
150 There is a remarkable echo of this epigram in an epigram preceding the text of the WD in two manuscripts 
(see S WD Prol. D Pertusi), not so far (to my knowledge) included in the interpretation of Ep. 27. The epigram 
misses its first line and continues: ‘… / of rams to call it delighted but of mortals. / Hail, Helicon, who nurtured 
such a man, hail, subtle / discourses from the Muse-inspired mouth of Hesiod’ (... / ajrneiẁn kalevein eu[aden 
ajlla; brotẁn: / caìr’  JElikw;n o}~ toìon ejqrevyao, caivrete leptai; / rJhvsie~  JHsiovdou mousopnovwn 
stomavtwn). The unmistakable references to Hesiod’s meeting with the Muses (as described in Th. 22-34) make 
it likely that the first distich must have been something like: ‘It delighted the Muses of Helicon (or, possibly, 
something like ‘posterity’) to call Hesiod not a shepherd of sheep and of rams but of mortals’. 
151 Reinsch-Werner (1976) passim; Schwinge (1986) 14 speaking of Hesiod as the ‘Patron, ja in kallimacheischer 
Perspektive gewissermaßen Archeget der neuen Dichtung’ or as the ‘die neue Dichtung legitimierende 
Gegenautorität gegen die von Kallimachos’ Gegnern reklamierte Autorität Homer’ (ibid.); cf. also Fakas (2001) 
46 ‘die Nachahmung Hesiods wird nicht als Selbstzweck betrieben, sondern als Mittel, um Homer zu 
überwinden’. See also the wholly unfounded remark of Myres (1958) 27 that Homer was ‘much out of his 
element (…) in the dull, gaudy, modern, cosmopolitan Alexandria’ or Too’s easy claim that ‘Hesiod is the 
evident subtext’ for ‘the association between the divine, the political, and the library’ (1998 118). 
152 Cf. Cameron (1995) 375. We should also note that Callimachus’ praise for Hesiod is qualified. Both the Aetia 
and the Phaenomena are didactic poems, which are to some degree naturally modelled on Hesiod. On the other 
hand, it is somewhat over-clever to point out that epigram 27, speaking of copying ‘only the most honeysweet of 
his verses’, suggests that ‘there was a substantial residue left behind that was not sweet’ (Cameron 1995 378). 
153 Cf. Asper (1997) 122 (and n.66) speaking of Homer as an ‘Überdichter’. 
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because he wanted to emphatically reject the neo-Homeric poetry of his own time. Hesiod, so 
it seems, was not primarily selected for his own poetic qualities, but for his reputation for  
being the non-Homer. The promotion of Hesiod over Homer is more of a metaphor than a 
reality, especially useful as a slogan for change. This is not to deny, of course, that there were 
numerous qualities of Hesiodic poetry that the new poets could relate to.154 
    The second observation is most relevant to this section: in order to promote Hesiod, the 
story of his inspiration is reinvigorated. As his poethood is reinstated, the connection to the 
divine is reopened and will never be shut off again. The new poets are both toiling and 
inspired at the same time, and Hesiod is their most obvious role model; inspiration is linked to 
learning and knowledge again, since the hellenistic poets are self-proclaimed polymaths like 
Hesiod himself.155 There are some explicit references to Hesiod’s inspiration in the hellenistic 
age, notably by Callimachus, whose two descriptions of the event are very similar: in both 
cases the Muses meet Hesiod ‘close to the foot-print of the fiery horse’,156 ‘while tending his 
sheep’.157 Both circumstances are probably metapoetically significant: the latter calls attention 
to the modest nature of Hesiodic poetry and is perhaps meant to refer to the genre of bucolic 
poetry; the former is a reference to the well struck by Pegasus, the Hippocrene, mentioned as 
a favorite dwelling-place of the Muses in Theogony 6 - this is an example of the pure and 
exquisite water that Callimachus often uses to characterize his own poetry and inspiration.158 
    Remarkably enough, water also plays an important part in the other hellenistic descriptions 
of Hesiod’s inspiration, i.e. those of Asclepiades and Alcaeus of Messene. In the epigram by 
Asclepiades (AP 9.64), the Muses meet Hesiod again while he is ‘feeding his sheep’ 
(poimaivnonta mhl̀a), and give him a laurel and ‘inspiring water of the Heliconian spring, that 
the hoof of the winged horse once struck’ (kravna~   JElikwnivdo~ e[nqeon u{dwr, / to; ptanou ̀
pwvlou provsqen e[koyen o[nux); ‘after he had his fill’ he wrote the Theogony, Works and 
                                               
154 See Reinsch-Werner (1976) 16-19 for the formal qualities imitated by Callimachus; her claim that he did not 
follow’s Hesiod qua content is somewhat marred by her anachronistic judgement of Hesiod’s supposedly 
‘uneinheitliche, unlogische Gedachtenführung’. Lamberton (1988) 150 is more on the mark in stating that ‘the 
Alexandrians found in Hesiod pre-echoes of their own aestheticism, their own delight in the play of illusion and 
convention.’  
155 See for the positive evaluation of polumaqiva (traditionally associated with Hesiod, see ch. 6) Call. fr. 460 Pf.,  
which praises Aratus as ‘a very learned and excellent poet’, polumaqh̀ kai; a[riston poihthvn). For the 
continuity of Hesiod’s inspiration as the transfer of knowledge see e.g. Lucian Dem.Enc. 12.6 (ironically 
picturing Hesiod’s inspiration as the quick and easy equivalent of years of training and education (cf. Rh.Pr. 4.4 
and Ind. 3, on which see n.175 below).  
156 Call. fr. 2.1 and 112.6: par’ i[cnion ojxevo~ i{ppou. 
157 Call. fr. 2.1: mh̀la nevmonti, and fr. 112.5: polla; nevmonti botav. 
158 See Kambylis (1965) 98-102, and Commager (1967) 28 commenting dryly that ‘some Alexandrian writers 
boldly declared that the waters of the holy spring were now available as a bottled commodity’. According to 
Knox (1985) 117, water is not a literary symbol for Callimachus, but it is its source that matters to him: he seeks 
pure and unfamiliar springs. But the origin is only one aspect of the water-metaphor; see further below.  
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Days and Catalogue. In AP 7.55, Alcaeus tells us how nymphs wash the body of the deceased 
Hesiod with water, and goat-herds (poimevne~) pour libations of milk and honey; the poet is 
then described as the ‘old man who had tasted the pure fountains of the nine Muses’ (ejnneva 
Mousevwn oJ prevsbu~ kaqarẁn geusavmeno~ libavdwn). We can thus see a recurrence of 
motifs clearly to be understood as metapoetical: the herding, the honey, and the pure water.159 
Through them, Hesiod is made into a poet both inspired and refined.160 
    Using the concept of ‘water’ as a metaphor for a type of speech is not new.161 In the fifth 
century, water was employed as the opposite of wine, which was closely associated with 
inspiration even earlier.162 Wine, moreover, was probably thought to lead to a particular kind 
of poetry, i.e. the magnificent, bombastic and overwhelming kind, that is often said to release 
one of all cares.163 In classical times we find numerous references to the wine-water 
controversy, especially in Aristophanes; in the Knights, for instance, wine is said to inspire 
great ideas, which is later opposed to speaking on a stomach full of water.164 Aristophanes’ 
contemporary Phrynichus testifies to water-drinking as a well-known art-metaphor when he 
calls the musician Lamprus ‘a water-drinking mortal, a mincing charlatan surpassing them all, 
dry bone of the Muses, nightmare to nightingales, a hymn of Hell.’165 The rise of wine as an 
artist’s favourite drink was undoubtedly connected to the rise of the new concept of 
inspiration, i.e. that of divine frenzy.166 It thus appears that wine and water were common 
symbols for different types of speech as early as the fifth century.167 
                                               
159 Cf. Nic. Ther. 10-12 situating Hesiod’s song ‘on the steeps of secluded Melisseeis by the waters of 
Permessus.’ Melisseeis (‘Bee-place’) is an unknown or imaginary location on Helicon, named after the hard-
working bees with which the honeysweet hellenistic poets compared themselves (see the bibliography in Asper 
1997 115 n.21).  
160 See for the connection between ‘pure’ (kaqarov~) and the hellenistic ideal of ‘refined’ (leptov~) Schwinge 
(1986) 15. 
161 See on the wine-water debate e.g. Kambylis (1965) 118-122, Crowther (1979), Knox (1985), and the brief but 
rather thorough discussion of Asper (1997) 128-134. 
162 According to Alcaeus, song and wine belong together (fr. 43 Diehl); Simonides said that wine and music have 
the same origin (PMG 647), and turned wine into a metaphor for poetry (fr. 75 Bergk); the epic poet Panyassis 
claimed that ‘every song, every dance, every passionate love, goes with wine’ (fr. 14 Kinkel). Of course such 
beliefs were easily conceived during symposia, where ‘poetry circulated amongst the guests like the wine which 
they drank’ (Murray 1996 17).  
163 Alcaeus fr. 34, 50, 68 (Bergk); Archilochus 77D; Epicharmus fr. 131 K-A.  
164 Ar. Eq. 85-96 and 347-350. See also Cratinus fr. 203 K-A, Eubulus 2.211 Kock, Amphis 5 in FCG iii p. 318. 
Aristophanes is supposed to have asked the audience once to forgive his weak jokes since he had been taken ill 
earlier and was forced to drink water (fr. 346 K-A). 
165 Phrynichus fr. 74 K-A (= Athenaeus II.44D): a[nqrwpo~ w]n uJdatopovth~, minuro;~ uJpersofisthv~, Mousẁn 
skeletov~, ajhdovnwn hjpivalo~, u{mno~   {Aidou.  
166 See Ar. Ran. 356-357 and O’Sullivan (1992) 118-119; Euripides says that a lot of Dionysus inside one’s body 
will cause prophecy (Bacch. 298-301) and Plato compares poets to bacchants, stressing the ecstatic condition of 
both (Ion 534a-b). 
167 Asper’s (1997 128-134) discussion of ‘Wasser und Wein’ is of great use for its bibliographical value and its 
overview of the most important issues, but his analysis is flawed by his strict (and anachronistic) distinction 
between the ‘Lebensweisen und Arbeitsauffassungen’ of poets and their style, which leads him to believe that 
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    What does seem new, however, in the hellenistic use of the concept of water, is the 
inclusion of Hesiod and Homer into the debate: Hesiod is turned into a water-drinker, and 
opposed to the consumption of wine. Antipater of Thessaloniki (who perhaps coined the term 
‘water-drinker’) began an epigram addressed to Helicon by referring to Hesiod’s drinking 
from the Hippocrene, and then asks a boy to pour him ‘an Ausonian wine from a source even 
more carefree. And I would rather drink one single cup of that than a thousand from your 
Pegasus’ source.’168 Another of his epigrams (AP 11.20) also illustrates the opposition:  
 
 Feuvgeq’ o{soi lovkka~ h] lofnivda~ h] kamash̀na~  
  a[/dete, poihtẁn fùlon ajkanqolovgwn, 
 oi{ t’ ejpevwn kovsmon lelugismevnon ajskhvsante~, 
  krhvnh~ ejx iJerh̀~ pivnete lito;n u{dwr. 
 shvmeron   jArcilovcoio kai; a[rseno~ h\mar   JOmhvrou 
  spevndomen: oJ krhth;r ouj devceq’ uJdropovta~. 
 
 ‘Away with you who sing of loccae, lophnides or camasenes,169 
  race of thorn-gathering poets; 
 and you who practising effeminately decorative verse 
  drink only simple water from the holy fount. 
 Today we pour the wine in honour of the birthday of Archilochus 
  and virile Homer. Our bowl receives no water-drinkers.’ 
 
In this epigram the water-drinkers and their bleak, over-sophisticated poetry are set against 
the verses of ‘virile’ Homer. When we combine Antipater’s two epigrams, we find Hesiod 
(implicitly) and Homer (explicitly) connected to the two opposite drinking-camps. It should 
be noted, however, that the poets are brought into a debate that is much older: the arguments 
used by Antipater to counter Callimachus’ poetics are essentially the same as those used 
centuries earlier. Euripides, for instance, was ridiculed by Aristophanes for his learned words 
and effeminacy, whereas the (Homeric) Aeschylus was portrayed as a manly poet.170 The term 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘die vorhellenistische Tradition dieses Gegensatzes ist nicht poetologisch’ (128). It is beside the point to describe 
a claim that wine brings inspiration as ‘Apologie übermäßigen Weingenusses’ (128), and simply misleading to 
quote only one-fifth of Phrynichus’ attack on Lamprus and conclude that this fragment deals with ‘eine 
Kennzeichnung seines Charakters (‘ein trockener Typ’), nicht seiner Musik’ (130 n.102).    
168 AP 11.24: Au[sona Bavkcon / oijnocoeì krhvnh~ ejx ajmerimnotevrh~. / bouloivmhn d’ a]n e[gwge pieìn para; 
toùde kuvpellon / e}n movnon h] para; seù civlia Phgasivdo~. 
169 Obscure and obsolete words denoting ‘cloaks’, ‘torches’ and ‘fish’. 
170 Cf. O’Sullivan (1992) 146-150. 
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ajkanqolovgoi, with its associations with dryness (curiously paradoxical for a water-drinker), 
reminds us of Phrynichus’ Mouswǹ skeletov~ (‘dry bone of the Muses’) just as the kovsmon 
lelugismevnon (‘effeminate decoration’) is foreshadowed by his uJpersofisthv~, because the 
term can refer not only to effeminacy but also to the twistings of a sophist.171 
    Apart from the epigrams, there is other evidence for overlap between the wine-water 
dichotomy and the opposition between Homer and Hesiod, although it is considerably later.172 
Dio Chrysostom, for instance, in the Trojan Oration compares Homeric poetry as a ‘pleasure-
drug’ (favrmakon th~̀ hJdonh~̀) to wine.173 According to Demetrius, people writing in what he 
calls the ‘compacted’ (katestrammevnh) style, an elaborate but artificial way of composition 
(contrasted with the simple, untutored ‘disjointed’ or dih/rhmevnh style), resemble tipsy men 
(oijnwvmenoi); examples are Isocrates, Gorgias, Alcidamas, and of course Homer.174 Lucian, on 
the other hand, attacks an empty-headed but pretentious book-buyer by contrasting him with 
Hesiod, pictured again as drinking water from the Hippocrene.175 In one passage from 
                                               
171 The Suda offers lelugismevno~ as a gloss for aJbrov~, but lugismoiv are also bendings of dancers, wrestlers, 
and, metaphorically, sophists; it is in fact Euripides who is said to excel in them (Ar. Ran. 775). 
172 There are two more epigrams that deserve attention. First, in AP 11.61, there is a sick man who is prescribed 
water by a doctor accused of quackery, because he apparently ‘never learnt that Homer calls wine the strength of 
men’ (oujd’ ejdidavcqh, o{tti mevno~ merovpwn oi\non   {Omhro~ e[fh - the reference is probably to Il. 9.706). As in 
Aristophanes, water is associated with sickly persons, while wine is credited with the special capacity of 
imparting power to whomever drinks it. Of greater interest, however, is AP 15.22, where a certain Simias sings 
praise of the Phocian Epeius, who fought in the Trojan War and ‘dashed down from their seats the gilded kings, 
[Epeius,] a man who was not reckoned among the chieftains of the Achaeans, but one of low degree (dusklhv~) 
who carried water from the pure fountains (ajpo; kranàn ijqaràn nàma kovmize). But now he has entered the path 
of Homer (nùn d’ ej~  JOmhvreion e[ba kevleuqon), thanks to thee, holy Pallas of many counsels. Thrice blessed he 
whom with a gracious mind thou watchest over. This blessedness ever lives and breathes (o{d’ o[lbo~ ajei; pneì)’. 
This Epeius was a proverbial coward but is nonetheless mentioned as one of the men who helped to build the 
wooden horse, and as belonging to the select group of volunteers actually entering it; the epigram seems to 
congratulate him on his career-change from zero to hero. His former status, remarkably enough, is defined by 
portraying him as drawing water from pure fountains. This changes thanks to Pallas, called ‘the manly goddess’ 
in the first line, who gave him the idea of the horse and thus made him ‘walk the Homeric path’, which evidently 
means that she turned him into a warrior, a profession not to be associated with water. Although wine is not 
mentioned, we know it is the warrior’s drink, breathing into man the power necessary for combat, and as such 
associated with Homer. It is interesting that Epeius’ blessing, caused by a life-changing moment of inspiration, is 
said to ‘breathe’ forever, since Epeius’ newly-acquired ‘Homerness’ is thus expressed on three levels: the 
originally water-carrying (Hesiodic?) coward, keeping far from battle, through a Homeric type of inspiration (1) 
turns his efforts to a Homeric occupation (2) and is thus celebrated forever in Homeric fashion (3). 
173 D.Chrys. Or. 11.42-43; cf. Plu. Mor. 15E-F speaking of the intoxicating wine of the myths which needs be 
tempered by the water of philosophy.  
174 Demetr. On Style 12-15. 
175 Lucian Ind. 3: ‘Come now, do you [= the book-buyer] maintain that without instruction you know as much as 
we? How can you, unless, like the shepherd of old, you once received a branch of laurel from the Muses? [...] 
Instead of giving you laurel they would have scourged you with myrtle or sprays of mallow and would have 
made you keep your distance from those regions, so as not to pollute either Olmeios or the Hippocrene, whose 
waters only thirsty flocks or the clean lips of shepherds may drink (a{per h] poimnivoi~ diyẁsin h] poimevnwn 
stovmasin kaqaroì~ povtima).’ 
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Plutarch Hesiod is accused of ignorance in the field of vinology,176 and in another said to have 
held the belief – just like Pindar – that water is best, since Chaos, the primal principle of the 
universe, is actually Hesiod’s name for water ‘because it flows’ (para; th;n cuvsin).177 
    In the hellenistic re-appraisal of Hesiod, we see ancient and traditional notions of Hesiodic 
poetry and inspiration recycled and adjusted for new purposes; old water in new bottles, one 
might say. This blend of tradition and innovation produced a Hesiod that was a fitting symbol 
for a new age, but nonetheless could not stop the growth of Homer’s all-importance. In the 
end, the shepherd sipping from the Hippocrene was no match for the poet supposedly born 
from a river. 
 
3 - The Hesiodic Genre: the Rise of a Didactic Poet 
In this section, I will (briefly) deal with a third watershed supposedly separating the poetry of 
Hesiod and Homer, i.e. that of aim or function: as was noted before, when comparing the two 
poets most scholars nowadays either implicitly or explicitly assume that whereas Homer 
composed heroic epic to entertain, Hesiod wrote didactic poetry to instruct.178 Such simplified 
typifications exist even though boundaries are admittedly blurry; it is obvious, for instance, 
that Homeric poetry has a didactic quality that is often commented upon by scholars focusing 
on his poetry alone.179 We will now investigate whether or not the ancients believed Hesiod to 
be didactic, and to what degree they thought didacticism belonged to the Hesiodic ‘genre’. 
    Obviously, ‘genre’ is a difficult concept to deal with generally,180 and this seems to be even 
more so when applied to the study of ancient literature;181 therefore, I will not concern myself 
                                               
176 Plu. Mor. 701 D-E; cf. Pliny the Elder referring to Hesiod for the medicinal effects of wine but to Homer for 
its intoxication (NH 23.43). 
177 Plu. Mor. 955D; cf. Mor. 725D, where Hesiod according to Plutarch aptly praises water of ‘an ever-flowing 
and a running spring, and one untroubled’; for that is healthy which is uncorrupted...’ (quoting WD 595). 
178 See section 2.1 above, pp. 276-280. Nonetheless, such agreement does not definitely settle matters. It is still 
unclear, for instance, whether didactic poetry can be called epic or not, or how we should classify Hesiod’s 
Catalogue and Shield. 
179 See e.g. Jaeger (1945) 39-40 ascribing didactic intent to Homer himself; Verdenius (1970) 21-26 believes 
Homer is generally not didactic, but he can nonetheless pinpoint the passages where ‘Homer himself is lecturing’ 
(21). Clay (2003) 69 argues that Hesiod pictures both kings and singers as offering ‘not truth, but distraction’; 
Heath (1985) somewhat overzealously distinguishes between two types of didacticism and argues that Hesiod’s 
poems are not ‘finally’ didactic (i.e. ‘intended to instruct’) but ‘formally’ didactic (i.e. ‘purporting to be intended 
to instruct’). 
180 See e.g. Gutzwiller (1991) 9-13 for a brief introduction to genre theory.  
181 Even though notions of genre existed in antiquity (the Greeks spoke of different ei[dh or ‘kinds’ of literature), 
there seem to be two fundamental problems in understanding them. First of all, existing notions were 
considerably less explicit than today, especially in pre-Aristotelian times, which has sometimes caused modern 
preconceptions to creep in and blur the picture. Secondly, in times that do show an obvious explicit and implicit 
interest in genre and tradition, boundaries between ancient genres (insofar as we can understand and reconstruct 
them) were often considered rather fluid, and were in fact constantly crossed and redefined by the authors 
themselves - this holds especially true for the hellenistic period (see e.g. Harder e.a. 1998, Hinds 1998). 
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here with a discussion of the implications of this term. What I do wish to point out, however, 
is that our investigation of Hesiod and Homeric poetry so far showed us that distinctions, 
oppositions and general qualifications are sometimes so pronounced, especially in the post-
classical age, that it seems that Hesiod was definitely associated with a certain ‘kind’ of 
poetry. Apparently, Callimachus could qualify the a[eisma and trovpo~ of the Phaenomena, a 
didactic poem written in a subtle style, as ‘Hesiodic’ - and this certainly seems like a 
‘genre’.182 It will be worth our while, therefore, to examine how later recipients dealt with the 
Callimachean description. 
    Searching for the Hesiodic genre is a nearly impossible enterprise for the archaic and 
classical period. There are many reasons for this, the most important one being that up to the 
third century there was no broad consensus on the way form, style, or subject matter should 
be defined in the case of Hesiod. Even the most basic definition of Hesiod, i.e. as a poet, is 
not unanimously accepted: Hippias and Protagoras, for instance, seem to place him into this 
category, and so do the oft-heard expressions ‘Homer and Hesiod and the other poets’,183 but 
Aristotle, the great systematizer of poetry, does not acknowledge Hesiod as a poet and regards 
him rather as a primitive thinker. Searching for further specifications, such as Hesiod the 
didactic poet or Hesiod the gnomic poet, thus becomes rather fruitless; of course such 
specifications can be found in certain cases, but they are on the whole limited to a certain 
context.184 
    This is not to say, of course, that there were no discernible tendencies considering Hesiod’s 
form, style, or subject matter; we have discussed them above. But it is especially in the 
hellenistic age that they could be unified so as to turn Hesiod into a poetic symbol of a distinct 
kind. In many respects, the Alexandrian circle with its literary awareness and metapoetical 
interest seems the obvious place for such a development. The transformation of Hesiod into 
the quiet writer of subtle themes is also clearly in part due to the Alexandrians’ need to come 
up with a literary champion that could compete with the Homer that everybody else was 
following. They needed a non-Homer to whom they could attribute their own, coherent 
system of poetics (that corresponded to a large degree to typifications of Hesiod already 
                                               
182 Cf. Fakas (2001) 40 on Aratus honoring Hesiod as the ‘prẁto~ euJrethv~ und Archeget der didaktischen 
Dichtung’.  
183 See ch. 3.2.1 above, pp. 97-98. 
184 We should also consider that both Hesiod and Homer, as the only really ajrcaiòi poets of Greece and the 
fontes of all education and learning, because of this special status to some degree resist classification. It is only 
after the poems of Hesiod and Homer were created, it was believed, that literature diversified and different 
genres crystallized, so that the earliest poets more or less pervade them all (and this goes especially for Homer, 
see section 5 below).  
THE OTHER POETICS 
 297
current). We should further note that the emergence of Hesiod as a poet of a distinct kind (as 
opposed to a thinker or moralist) occurs in the context of a group of poets sharing certain 
ideas about literature and looking for some way of grounding their own, new and different 
poetical identity - and they did this by reinvigorating a cultural emblem from the past.185 It is 
only when there is a group of intellectuals and artists who share a certain view of literature 
that the concept of genre can exist. This is why it can be argued that the concept of genre 
(however framed exactly) fully developed among the hellenistic poets. And Hesiod, their 
poetic champion, formed part of their tools to describe it. 
    The investigation into the Hesiodic ‘genre’ in this section is very limited. First, we will see 
how Callimachus’ passed on the name of Hesiod as an important metapoetical signpost to his 
Roman successors, who maintained a fairly rigid system of genre and seem to have had a 
clear idea about how to categorize Hesiod. We will then see how the didacticism attributed to 
Hesiod typified him in later Greek rhetorical handbooks, where his name is connected to  
(morally) instructive subgenres like the maxim or the fable. 
 
3.1 - The interpretatio latina 
In this brief subsection, I will focus on some passages from Ovid, Virgil, and Propertius, 
because they show the most explicit references to Hesiod as a poetic symbol. In the works of 
the golden poets, Hesiod’s status as a farmer or shepherd is conspicuously stressed. Virgil 
characterizes his Georgics as an ‘Ascraean song’ (Ascraeum carmen),186 and Propertius refers 
to this work of Virgil as ‘the precepts of the old bard of Ascra, in what soil flourishes the 
corn, on what hill the grape.’187 The grape and the grain return in Ovid’s description of 
Hesiodic poetry, which he contrasts to that of Homer: 
 
 vivet Maeonides, Tenedos dum stabit et Ide, 
      dum rapidas Simois in mare volvet aquas; 
 vivet et Ascraeus, dum mustis uva tumebit, 
      dum cadet incurva falce resecta Ceres. 
 
                                               
185 This is different from the mnemonic mechanism discussed in chapter 2.1, i.e. that every recipient of Hesiod 
defines his relationship to the earlier poet to a large degree in his own individual way, and models the poet after 
his own image.  
186 Georg. 2.176. Ascraeus refers not only to Hesiod but to Callimachus c.s. as well, cf. Thomas (1988) ad loc. 
and Clausen (1994) 203. See for an analysis of the relationship between the Georgics and the WD Nelson (1998). 
187 Prop. 2.34.77-78: Ascraei veteris praecepta poetae, / quo seges in campo, quo viret uva iugo. 
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‘Maeonia’s son [= Homer] will live as long as Tenedos will stand, and Ida, as long as 
Simois shall roll his waters rushing to the sea; the poet of Ascra, too, will live as long 
as the grape shall swell for the vintage, as long as Ceres shall fall beneath the stroke of 
the curving sickle.’188 
 
Obviously, the agricultural quality of Hesiodic poetry is set against the heroic themes of 
Homer here - the island Tenedos, Mt. Ida and the river Simois are all connected to the Trojan 
Cycle. In the Culex, a work falsely attributed to Virgil, there is a mention of shepherds who 
live a carefree life in the Tempe-valley, ‘vying each for himself with the bard of Ascra’,189 
and Ovid, who described Hesiod as ‘keeping flocks’ (servans pecudes) in the Ars Amatoria 
(1.28), combined the two professions of farmer and shepherd in the Fasti where he says he 
was inspired by a special goddess, ‘not those whom the teacher of ploughing beheld when he 
followed his Ascraean sheep.’190 
    These citations show that the Latin poets concentrated on the Works and Days as the 
Hesiodic work par excellence. They also show that they considered this a didactic work (see 
Propertius’ praecepta and Ovid’s praeceptor). But the Hesiod of the Theogony was not 
forgotten; it was in fact the authorship of this serious and grand poem that made him useful 
for the Latin writers as a means of legitimizing their own kind of poetry, which they took 
seriously as well. This much is clear from a much-discussed passage from Virgil’s Eclogues, 
in which the poet Gallus, ‘wandering by the streams of Permessus’ (errantem Permessi ad 
flumina, 6.64), is met by the legendary Linus, ‘a shepherd of immortal song’ (divino carmine 
pastor, 6.67), who addresses him thus (6.69-71): 
 
  Hos tibi dant calamos, en accipe, Musae, 
Ascraeo quos ante seni, quibus ille solebat 
cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos. 
his tibi Grynei nemoris dicatur origo… 
 
‘These reeds – see, take them – the Muses give you – even those they once gave the 
old Ascraean, wherewith, as he sang, he would draw the unyielding ash trees down the 
mountain sides. With these do you tell of the birth of the Grynean wood...’ 
 
                                               
188 Ovid Amores 1.15.9-12. 
189 [Virg.] Culex 96: aemulus Ascraeo pastor sibi quisque poetae. 
190 Ovid Fasti 6.13-14: non quas praeceptor arandi / viderat, Ascraeas cum sequeretur oves. 
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This scene is generally taken to refer to Gallus’ switch from love poetry to the ‘higher’ genre 
of pastoral.191 The poet receives the reed-pipe, a symbol of pastoral or bucolic poetry, and is 
thus transferred to the ‘loftier company’ of Hesiod,192 to whom the Muses once presented a 
similar gift. That Gallus is ordered to speak of the origo of the Grynean wood is another 
indication that he is placed in the tradition of Hesiod and Callimachus, both singers of 
origines. Propertius too speaks of the difference in status between love poetry and Hesiodic 
poetry.193 
    It is not just the ‘theme’, however, that defines Hesiodic poetry for the Romans; it is 
obvious that they had to some degree inherited the stylistic characteristics attributed to Hesiod 
by the hellenistic poets. Homer’s Ida and the rushing waters of the Simois (from Ovid’s 
Amores quoted above) form not only a thematic, but also a stylistic opposition with Hesiod’s 
grape and grain. Mountains and rivers are usual metaphors for epic in the Homeric, 
magnificent and overwhelming style;194 by contrast, the symbols used for Hesiodic poetry are 
small, useful, and connected to intense labour. Hesiod’s Ceres is resecta, not only ‘cut off’ but 
also ‘restrained’,195 and the only things ‘swelling’ in his work are grapes (tumidus, ‘swollen’, 
is a technical term used to describe a bombastic and pompous style). Similarly, Virgil’s 
description of Hesiod as one who solebat cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos not only 
indicates, on a superficial level, the immense charm of his verse,196 but also on a metapoetical 
level congratulates him on having treated a difficult epic subject in such a fine and delicate 
way: the rigidas ornos likely refer to the Theogony (orni are common symbols for epic 
subject matter, and rigidus points to the ‘tough’ subject of the birth of the cosmos), and 
deducere is a technical term for the fine, subtle or leptov~ style.197 
                                               
191 The Permessus is in Propertius 2.10.25-26 the stream that inspires love-elegy, and errare is a verb typically 
used of unhappy lovers and love-poets (Putnam 1970 212); cf. Hunter (2006) 27. 
192 Putnam (1970) 213. 
193 Prop. 2.10.25-26: nondum etiam Ascraeos norunt mea carmina fontes, / sed modo Permessi flumine lavit 
Amor (‘not as yet are my verses acquainted with the springs of Ascra; Love has dipped them only in Permessus’ 
stream’). A similar opposition between love poetry and Hesiodic poetry may be behind AP 9.161, also composed 
during the reign of Augustus. 
194 Homer himself is often associated with rivers, cf. AP 9.184, 9.522; we should not forget the tradition making 
him the son of the river Meles (cf. e.g. AP 2.407-408, Cert. 9-10 Allen, [Plu.] Hom. Vit. 2.1, Hsch. s.v. Suda 
3.524.27, Anon. Vita Romana 3).   
195 Reseco is - to my knowledge - not a very marked metapoetical word, but it can be used metaphorically for 
‘checking’ or ‘curtailing’ language (cf. Plin. Ep. 2.5.4). 
196 Being able to move inanimate objects through song was a sign of tremendous poetical power; Orpheus is the 
poet most often associated with this capability (and, according to some sources, the father of Hesiod). This is the 
only passage in antiquity crediting Hesiod with such powers. This ‘superficial’ reading is the only one allowed 
by the modern commentators Coleman, Clausen, and Putnam. 
197 It is interesting to compare this passage to Prop. 2.13.3-9, where the poet says that Love ‘suffered me not to 
scorn these delicate muses (me tam graciles vetuit contemnere Musas), but commanded me to dwell, as I do, in 
Ascra’s grove’ (iussit et Ascraeum sic habitare nemus); not that Pierian oaks should follow my words (…), but 
rather that Cynthia be held spellbound by my verse: then would my skill bring me greater fame than Linus of 
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    With respect to both theme and style, then, the Augustan poets seem to have a very 
consistent and almost rigid conception of Hesiodic poetry: Hesiod wrote didactic epic in a 
subtle style, differing in theme and style from Homer. 
 
3.2 - Hesiod in the Handbooks 
Proof for the didacticism of Hesiod can also be found in the rhetorical handbooks of later 
times. Hesiod does not feature prominently in these writings, but when he does, he is usually 
associated with two text types typical of wisdom poetry: the chreia or ‘maxim’,198 and 
especially the ainos or ‘fable’,199 which will be briefly discussed here. 
    There are some indications that the ainos had always been seen as something connected to 
Hesiod,200 but the first explicit link is made by Quintilian, in an age that was for the first time 
quite concerned with the definition and delimitation of text types. When Quintilian called 
Hesiod the fabella’s primus auctor (5.11.19), he was probably reporting a common belief. 
What is more interesting, is that he immediately seems to try to connect this to what is further 
known of Hesiod since he remarks that ‘they [fables] often attract the mind, particularly that 
of uneducated rustics, who listen to fiction in a simpler spirit and, in their delight, readily 
assent to things that they enjoy hearing’201 - it is hard not to understand the image of the 
audience of uneducated rustics as summoned by the farmer-poet himself. Hermogenes in a 
somewhat similar vein mentions ainoi as very fit for children since ainoi can shape their still 
malleable souls; Hesiod is here the example as well.202  
    Plutarch, unwilling - as usual - to depreciate Hesiod in any sense, first stresses Hesiod’s 
knowledge concerning everyday life and then suggests Aesop was a pupil of Hesiod, ‘for the 
words of the hawk to the nightingale first suggested to Aesop the idea of this beautiful and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Argos’. Because Hesiod’s name is here obviously connected to love poetry, it has been suggested that the 
Ascraeum nemus simply represents poetic excellence in general (so Camps 1967 ad loc., cf. Kambylis 1965 179 
describing the nemus as an Oberbegriff), but this is unlikely: it is obviously Hesiod’s sweet and seductive style 
which Propertius is anxious to adopt, but he clearly says his theme will be different: his poem will not be about 
oaks (indicating an epic subject), but about love. 
198 See Quint. Inst. 10.1.52; Plu. Thes. 3.3.2; Hermog. Prog. 2.7 Spengel (= 1.23 Walz); Doxopater in Aphth. 
Progymn. 2.251 Walz. 
199 The ainos in Hesiod’s (and Homer’s) time denotes a kind of enigmatic discourse invested with a persuasive 
agenda (see Mordine 2006 364-365); in later times, the term is more specifically used for the ‘(animal) fable’. I 
have nevertheless chosen to use the conventional translation ‘fable’ above because I will discuss rather late 
sources anyway.    
200 See Irwin (1998) 181-182, esp. n.36. 
201 Quint. Inst. 5.11.19: ducere animos solent praecipue rusticorum et imperitorum, qui et simplicius quae ficta 
sunt audiunt, et capit voluptate facile iis quibus delectantur consentiunt. 
202 Hermog. Prog. 2.3 Spengel.  
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ingenious wisdom uttered by many different tongues.’203 Other sources connecting the ainos 
to Hesiod also leave out the lack of intellectual maturation in the audience, and emphasize its 
didactic function.204 Of special interest is the explanation of ainos in the Suda (2.173): 
 
Ai\no~: lovgo~ paroimiwvdh~. (...) ai\nov~ tiv~ ejstin: wJ~ ajnhvr te kai; oujk ajnhvr, o[rniqa 
koujk o[rniqa, o[rniqa d’ o{mw~, ejpi; xuvlou me kouj xuvlou kaqhmevnhn, livqw/ te kouj 
livqw/ me balw;n diwvlesen. eujnoùco~, nukteriv~, navrqhx, kivsshri~. ai\no~ diafevrei 
muvqou tw/̀ to;n ai\non mh; pro;~ paid̀a~, ajlla; pro;~ a[ndra~ pepoih̀sqai kai; mh; pro;~ 
yucagwgivan movnon, ajlla; kai; paraivnesin e[cein tinav. bouvletai ga;r 
ejpikruptovmeno~ paraineìn ti kai; didavskein: o{per kai;  JHsivodo~ faivnetai 
pepoihkwv~. 
 
‘Ainos: a type of speech with proverbial power. (…) Here is an example of an ainos: a 
man and not a man, killed me, a bird and not a bird, but a bird nonetheless, sitting on 
wood and not wood, hitting me with a stone and not a stone. The answer is a eunuch 
who kills a bat sitting on a fennel stalk with a pumice-stone. An ainos differs from a 
mythos in that an ainos is not written for children, but for adults, and does not only aim 
at entertainment, but also at advice. For it, being hidden, wants to give advice and 
teach; this is also what Hesiod appears to have written.’ 
 
This description of ainos focuses on the wisdom hidden in the story; what an ainos really 
wants to do, is give advice and teach - that is also the reason why they are not for children but 
for adults: because they are not (only) for entertainment but (also) for advice.205  
    It is most interesting to compare this Suda entry with two passages of Doxopater’s 
commentary on Aphthonius. In both passages Doxopater discusses mùqo~ (‘fiction’), a 
                                               
203 Plu. Mor. 158B: touvtẁ/ ga;r ajrch;n th̀~ kalh̀~ tauvth~ kai; poikivlh~ kai; poluglwvssou sofiva~ oJ pro;~ 
th;n ajhdovna lovgo~ toù iJevrako~. 
204 This definition is more in keeping with the original meaning of the ainos than Quintilian’s description, since 
the ainos in Hesiod and Homer presumes a sophisticated audience who need to employ their interpretative 
abilities in order to understand it; cf. Mordine (2006) 364-366. 
205 That this advice is ‘hidden’ perhaps makes the ainos suitable for adults instead of children. This, and the 
example of the eunuch, suggest that the writer of this entry was thinking of the text type of the ainigma (‘riddling 
story’), etymologically linked to the ainos and also connected to Hesiod; see Tryphon, Spengel 3.194.10 (= Walz 
8.735) and Gregory of Corinth, Spengel 3.225.1 (= Walz 8.776). See also Jul. Or. 7.207a-b: ‘Then when the 
myth was gaining ground and coming into favour in Greece, poets developed from it the fable (ainos) with a 
moral, which differs from the myth in that the latter is addressed to children and the former to men, and is 
designed not merely to entertain them but conveys moral exhortation besides. For the man who employs fable 
aims at moral exhortation and instruction (paraineìn te kai; didavskein), though he conceals his aim and takes 
care not to speak openly, for fear of alienating his hearers. Hesiod, for instance, seems to have written with this 
in view…’. 
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difficult concept variously defined and used. ‘Some’, he says, ‘also call it [mùqo~] ainos, 
because of the advice that is in it; an example is Hesiod who says in his book on the works 
and days ‘now I will tell an ainos to kings who will understand’.’206 And later he says of 
Aphthonius that ‘he demonstrated that even though muq̀o~ is common to both poets and 
rhetoricians, the poets and rhetoricians nevertheless do not use it for the same reason; for the 
rhetoricians employ it for advice, but the poets mostly just for entertainment. I said ‘mostly’, 
because it sometimes happens that poets too use it for advice, for instance the one about the 
nightingale by Hesiod.’207 What these passages make clear is that the ainos is a Hesiodic text 
type, and that it is so because of its paraivnesi~ or ‘advice’, which is also characteristic of 
Hesiod. 
    Obviously, this classification of Hesiod as an ‘adviser’ and ‘non-entertainer’ rests on age-
old conceptions.208 Generally speaking, the typification of Hesiod as such becomes more and 
more explicit over time - see, for instance, the scholia on the Works and Days: ‘The purpose 
of the book, then, is educational; the meter has been cast over this purpose of explanation as a 
kind of dressing, which enchants the souls and fills them with love for the book. That209 also 
explains why its poetical style is old-fashioned; for the book is mostly free of embellishments, 
adjectival ornaments and metaphors; for the unadorned and unartifical obviously suit moral 
discourse.’210 It is clear from this passage that the didactic intent attributed to Hesiod is 
connected to concepts of style as well. It is to this last of the three major poetic watersheds 




                                               
206 Doxopater in Aphth. Prog. 2.143 Walz: Tine;~ de; kai; ai\non aujto;n wjnovmasan ajpo; th̀~ ejn aujtẁ/ 
parainevsew~, wJ~   JHsivodo~ ejn tẁ/ peri; tẁn e[rgwn kai; hJmerẁn biblivw/ levgwn: Nùn d’ ai\non basileùs’ ejrevw 
fronevousi kai; aujtoì~. 
207 Ibid. 2.149: e[deixe ga;r o{ti eij kai; koinov~ ejsti tẁn te poihtẁn kai; rJhtovrwn oJ mùqo~, o{mw~ ouj dia; th;n 
aujth;n aijtivan aujtẁ/ crwǹtai oi{ te poihtai; kai; oiJ rJhvtore~: oiJ me;n ga;r rJhvtore~ dia; paraivnesin, oiJ de; 
poihtai; wJ~ ejpi; to; pleìston dia; to; movnhn yucagwgivan ejmpoieìn.   JW~ ejpi; to; pleis̀ton de; ei\pon, diovti 
e[sq’ o{te kai; oiJ poihtai; pro;~ paraivnesin aujtẁ/  crẁntai, wJ~ oJ th̀~ ajhdovno~ e[cei para; tẁ/   JHsiovdw/. 
208 There is in fact a striking resemblance between the comments of Doxopater and the passage from Isocrates’ 
To Nicocles (see above, pp. 284-288) - only the word for ‘giving advice’ (sumbouleuvw in Isocrates) changed for 
reasons of etymology (presumably to aid the process of learning these rhetorical precepts by heart). See also the 
Helicon-stèlè presenting Hesiod as a writer of uJpoqhvkai (cf. Hurst 1996 60, 63-64). 
209 I.e. the fact that the book has a didactic purpose. 
210 S WD prol. Ab:   JO me;n ou\n skopo;~ toù biblivou paideutikov~: to; de; mevtron w{sper h{dusmav ti tẁ/ skopẁ/ 
th̀~ eJrmhneiva~ ejpibevblhtai qevlgon ta;~ yuca;~ kai; katevcon eij~ th;n pro;~ aujto; filivan. dio; kai; 
ajrcaiovtropov~ ejstin hJ ejn aujtẁ/ th̀~ poihtikh̀~ ijdeva: twǹ ga;r kallwpismẁn kai; twǹ ejpiqevtwn kovsmwn kai; 
metaforẁn wJ~ ta; polla; kaqareuvei: to; ga;r aJploùn kai; to; aujtofue;~ prevpei toì~ hjqikoi~̀ lovgoi~: kai; 
toùto me;n dh̀lon; cf. S WD prol. Ac and esp. Fa. 
THE OTHER POETICS 
 303
4 - Beauty and Style  
In the discussion of Hesiod’s inspiration and genre mention has been made of his style as 
well, especially as it was described by the hellenistic and Roman poets. In this section, we 
will focus more specifically on the style and the esthetic quality of poetry, and investigate the 
notions of Hesiodic style in periods both earlier and later than the hellenistic age. We will see 
that despite some differences and inconsistencies through time there is a remarkable 
continuity in the conception of Hesiodic style.211   
    O’Sullivan, who in his book on the beginnings of literary criticism set out to show that 
‘ancient rhetoric is a single, great, traditional theory’, convincingly demonstrated that a notion 
of stylistic typification, such as we see more rigidly expressed in the theories on genera 
dicendi, already existed in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. His investigation of stylistic 
evaluation in especially Isocrates, Alcidamas and Aristophanes reveals the early existence of a 
rather developed and remarkably consistent way of describing two opposite styles. On the one 
hand, there is the so-called genus grande (which O’Sullivan aligns with what Aristotle calls 
the levxi~ ajgwnistikhv, which Demetrius calls the megaloprephv~ or deino;~ carakthvr, and 
which was also associated with the ‘spoken’ style), which is ‘majestic’ (semnov~), grand, and 
bombastic, uses archaisms, metaphors and unclear words, and is often compared to impressive 
natural phenomena like mountains and thunderstorms. Opposed to this is the genus tenue 
(also known as the levxi~ grafikhv, the ijscno;~ carakthvr or the ‘written style’), a style that 
depends on tevcnh and is ‘fine’ (leptov~), ‘pure’ (kaqarov~), ‘polished’ (ejxergazovmeno~), 
‘well-rounded’ (strogguvlo~) and ‘precise’ (ajkribhv~).212   
    O’Sullivan of course noticed the similarities between this stylistic opposition and the one 
propagated by the hellenistic poets, who connected it to the opposition between Homer and 
Hesiod, and he subsequently argued that ‘there are a number of reasons why we should 
suspect that some sort of polarization of the two was extant before the literary activities of the 
scholar-poets’ (68); his main reasons are Democritus’ (and Plato’s) classification of Homer as 
a grand-style poet who composes through enthousiasmos, the connection of Gorgias (and his 
pupil Alcidamas) to Homer, and Hesiod’s link to the ‘precise’ master of ojrqovth~ ojnomavtwn 
Prodicus.213 Although all his evidence is circumstantial and Hesiod and Homer are never 
                                               
211 Cf. O’Sullivan (1992) 4 rightly pointing out that the rather inconsistent use of terms in ancient literary 
criticism (‘connotation rather than denotation is the mode of ancient critical language’) should not hide its 
general continuity. Segal (1992) 4 rightly remarks that the Greeks were used to regard poetry as performance and 
as ‘the living voice of song’, so that criticism focused on vocal qualities (e.g. sweetness, flow, abundance, 
strength). 
212 O’Sullivan (1992) 8-14 et passim. 
213 O’Sullivan (1992) 68-79. 
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explicitly involved in any stylistic evaluation, his argument is very cogent. There are, 
however, two important points to further improve his argument.214 
    The first one has to do with focus. It is true that Hesiod and Homer are not involved in the 
stylistic dichotomy of the fifth and fourth century in any explicit way, but the poets clearly 
are contrasted with regard to the effects of the two kinds of poetry. The genus grande and 
genus tenue have, according to traditional rhetorical theory, an opposite function, i.e. to move 
and to teach, respectively - and this is a typification very easily applied to Homer and Hesiod 
in early times: we have seen how Pindar contrasts Hesiod as a truthful mouthpiece of the 
Muses with the ‘majestic’ (semnov~) Homer who makes stories bigger.215 ‘Simonides’ 
similarly claimed that Hesiod was a son of the Muses, and Homer of the Graces; and, in 
another fragment, that Hesiod was a gardener and Homer a garland-maker - apart from the 
oppositions in this fragment already discussed,216 this contrast may also indicate Hesiod’s 
hard work as a poet and Homer’s aim for pleasure and connection to feasts.217 Even when the 
poets are not explicitly opposed, there are nonetheless hints of a comparable contrast.218  
    The second point is that Hesiod and Homer are virtually never mentioned together, i.e. as 
equals, in contexts containing a stylistic evaluation of some sort. They can be mentioned as 
comparable with regard to other things, but hardly in the aesthetic sphere. Searching through 
ancient sources I have been able to find only one passage, and a very late one at that 
(Plutarch’s De Pythiae oraculis), in which Homer and Hesiod are equated on stylistic grounds 
and both credited with ‘elegance of diction’ (logiovthto~ to; kalovn), ‘sweetness of sound’ 
(eujfwniva~) and excellence of versification (eujepeiva/); presented as comparable in regard to 
‘force, grace, and diction’ (dunavmei de; kai; cavriti kai; kataskeuh̀/ peri; levxin); and implied 
to be the ‘best and fairest’ (a[rista kai; kavllista) of poetic compositions.219 This passage is 
                                               
214 It is clear that the opposition of Hesiod and Homer was not the main aim of O’Sullivan’s book. This perhaps 
also explains the very curious oversight in his treatment of Isocrates 2; while he notices Homer is here associated 
with yucagwgiva (p. 72), he does not mention the contrast to the earlier-mentioned poetry of Hesiod, connected 
to advice and tevcnh. Instead, he is a bit careless in saying that Isocrates attributes the power of yucagwgiva to 
‘the poets’ (114). 
215 See section 1.3 above, pp. 271-272. 
216 See section 1.3 above and ch. 8, pp. 249-250. 
217 Plutarch sees such great oppositions recurring even in the smallest details, cf. his comments on WD 580-581 
(‘Dawn, which when it shows itself sets many men on their way and puts the yoke on many oxen’): ‘Plutarch 
says that Homer has adorned dawn with epithets that strive for pleasure by calling her ‘saffron-robed’ and ‘rosy-
fingered’; Hesiod, on the other hand, (describes dawn) rather from the works to which she sets mankind when 
she advances, and changes mankind from their feebleness into an active life’ (to;n me;n ou\n   {Omhrovn fhsin oj 
Plouvtarco~ ejpiqevtoi~ eij~ tevryin eujdodimoùsi kosmh̀sai th;n hjw ̀ ‘krokovpeplon’ aujth;n levgonta kaiv 
‘rJododavktulon’: to;n d’  JHsivodon meizovnw~ ajpo; twǹ e[rgwn, ejf’ a} dh; proi>oùsa kineì tou;~ ajnqrwvpou~ kai; 
ajpo; th̀~ ejkluvsew~ eij~ th;n ejnergo;n meqivsthsi zwhvn, S WD 578-581). 
218 See for such hints sections 1, 2 and 3 above. 
219 Plu. Mor. 396F. 
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a highly exceptional case in which stylistic characteristics often attributed to Homer are said 
to be shared by both epic poets. The anomaly, to the best of my knowledge not noted before, 
is difficult to explain.220 But it does serve to illustrate my point, since it seems the exception 
to the general rule that Hesiod and Homer cannot both be said to be beautiful,221 and are on 
the whole perceived to be stylistically incomparable.  
    As we have seen, this incomparatibility can be traced back to a stylistic dichotomy between 
Hesiod and Homer in classical times, and the opposition was overtly propagated in the 
hellenistic age. Another indication of the poets’ polarization, not mentioned before, is the 
appropriation of archaic poets through family ties. The poet Stesichorus, for instance, was 
said to be a descendant (or even the son) of Hesiod, but countervoices claimed him for 
Homer.222 Such a tug-of-war is in fact an evaluation of Stesichorus’ poetry, with Hesiod and 
Homer as opposing criteria. Simonides is similarly linked to both Hesiod and Homer,223 and 
                                               
220 In this passage from the dialogue, some friends are discussing the deplorable quality of the hexameter lines 
pronounced by the oracle. It could be that Hesiod is added to Homer because one of the friends is a poet 
(perhaps) affiliated with Hesiod since he wrote poems ‘in a philosophic and restrained style’ (filosovfw~ kai; 
aujsthrẁ~). Perhaps the oddity is due to Plutarch’s fondness for Hesiod (cf. e.g. pp. 37, 160, 171, 225-226, 300).  
221 Plato called Hesiod and Homer ‘pleasant’ and ‘beautiful’ but his comments are not purely stylistic since he 
does not separate the poetic-aesthetic from the educational-ethic. There is a good example in Lg. 658a-659d, 
where the Athenian investigates the hypothesis that the best kind of art is that most capable at pleasing the 
audience; he ends up, however, concluding that beauty and pleasure are not dependent on the whole audience but 
only those who are the best educated and thus most suited to vote. Through this move, the criterium of hJdonhv 
transforms into a criterium of ajrethv. (See also Bravo 2003 106: ‘… exprimé dans ces termes ce critère [of 
judging art] devient purement éthique’, and Schöpsdau (1994) ad loc. who similarly notes that the poet is turned 
into an Erzieher again.) 
    We find a similar case at the beginning of the Timaeus. One of Socrates’ interlocutors, Critias, talks of a 
conversation his grandfather and namesake Critias once had. Since the father of Critias senior was a good friend 
of Solon’s, someone praised Solon as ‘not only the wisest of men, but also the noblest of poets’ (sofwvtaton 
gegonevnai Sovlwna kai; kata; th;n poivhsin au\ tẁn poihtẁn pavntwn ejleuqeriwvtaton, Ti. 21c). To this the old 
man replied that if Solon would have become a poet instead of a statesman, ‘in my opinion he would have been 
as famous as Homer or Hesiod, or any poet’ (kata; ge ejmh;n dovxan ou[te   JHsivodo~ ou[te   {Omhro~ ou[te a[llo~ 
oujdei;~ poihth;~ eujdokimwvtero~ ejgevneto a[n pote aujtoù, Ti. 21d). There are basically two ways this passage 
has been interpreted. The first is to take the text at face value, and believe that the comparison with Hesiod and 
Homer is meant to reflect on Critias junior’s character; it shows that Critias is someone ‘indoctrinated with the 
importance and seriousness of poetry’ (Welliver (1977) 13). The second is to point to the fact that poetry is 
rejected since Solon did not choose to become a full-time poet because there were more important things to do – 
and this of course reflects well on Critias senior expressing his contempt for poetry (Johansen 2004 34; this 
interpretation was already put forward by Proclus, see Taylor 1928 ad loc.). The advocates of both 
interpretations refer to R. 599, where it is said that Homer is not by any city credited as a good legislator, 
whereas Solon is; and both interpretations agree on the negative evaluation of Hesiod and Homer. I would like to 
suggest, however, that the most relevant parallel to this passage is not R. 599, but Smp. 209d. In this passage, 
Hesiod and Homer are compared to Solon and Lycurgus: the point there is that all four of them live on forever 
because of the immortal children they have created. Fame is the main point of comparison, and that seems to be 
the case here as well. The parallel from the Symposium shows us what is wrong about the interpretations offered 
so far: they draw a too sharp distinction between the poet and the legislator. Wisdom and a free-born spirit are 
characteristics attributed to both poets and legislators, exactly because they were not easily separated in the days 
of Plato.   
222 For Stesichorus as a (grand)son of Hesiod see Cic. De Rep. 2.20, Procl. S WD 291, Tzetz. Vit. Hes. 18, Suda 
4.433; for the affiliation with Homer AP 7.75, 9.184, [Long.] De Subl. 13.3, Quint. Inst. 10.1.62, D.Chrys. 55.6. 
223 The same goes for Terpander, ‘he who brings pleasure to men’ (cf. Suda 4.527). 
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perhaps the diplomatic statements ascribed to him (see above) reflect an attempt to mediate 
between the two poets. Generally speaking, then, the poets are regarded as stylistic opposites.  
 
However this may be, from the imperial period onwards another view arises that soon 
becomes the dominant one: the view that Homer is the best in any kind of style, and that his 
superior genius is shown by the brilliant way he can change his diction, style, and tone.224 
This development may be connected to the emergence of a third genus dicendi, an invention 
usually attributed to Theophrastus but at least firmly attested in the first century BC.225 The 
concept of a third and best style, perhaps originally described as a blend of the earlier two,226 
destroys the age-old notion of a stylistic dichotomy. With Homer as the prime example of 
stylistic excellence, Hesiod slowly disappears as a foil in this respect. Once again, Homer 
becomes all-comprehensive and comes to ‘include’ Hesiod. That is why Homer can be said to 
have qualities that were in an earlier time typically ascribed to Hesiod, but not the other way 
around. 
    It should be noted, however, that traces of the old characterization of Hesiod still remain. 
Quintilian praises ‘the smoothness of his vocabulary and composition’ (levitas verborum et 
compositionis, 10.1.52), and Plutarch too mentions Hesiod’s ‘ornament and smoothness’ 
(kovsmou kai; leiovthto~, Mor. 747E). Dionysius ranks Hesiod among the poets employing 
the levxi~ glafurav, which uses the smoothest (leiovtata) and blandest (malakwvtata) 
words, and aims to be decorative rather than dignified (Dem. 40.11). When Dionysius has 
discussed the glafura; suvnqesi~ or ‘polished composition’,227 a composition that ‘requires 
not only that its words shall be properly fitted and smoothed together, but also that the clauses 
should be effectively interwoven with one another’, he names Hesiod as ‘the one who seems 
to me to have developed the type most successfully.’228 It is especially Hesiod’s simplicity, 
sweetness and purity, the qualities best stressed in the hellenistic period, that still remain 
                                               
224 On Homer’s capability at switching from one style to another esp. D.H. Dem. 41.2, Quint. Inst. 10.1.46-47, 
Hermog. Id. 297 (Rabe). See on Homer’s polymorphism further below, pp. 314-317. 
225 Cf. Kennedy (1994) 86; see on the invention of the third style and the role of Theophrastus Innes (1985) 260-
263 and the bibliography in Kennedy (1963) 278 n.25. 
226 Cf. Innes (1985) 260; it should be noted that the concept of the three styles as it was widely known in the 
times of Cicero and later (grand-middle-plain) differs considerably from this (largely postulated) theory of 
Theophrastus, who (presumably) regarded the middle style as a mean between extremes.  
227 It seems that levxi~ (‘style’) and suvnqesi~ (‘composition’) are slightly different concepts (see De Jonge 2008 
204 n.145), though we do not need to go into the particulars here.  
228 D.H. Comp. 23.9: ejpopoiẁn me;n ou\n e[moige kavllista toutoni; dokeì to;n carakth̀ra ejxergavsasqai. 
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known as ‘Hesiodic’,229 although Hermogenes demonstrates the predominance of Homer 
when he writes that ‘it should be clear to everyone what kind of diction is typical of poetry, 
and that the most beautiful of poetic dictions is that of Homer. His diction is probably the only 
one that is pure, so far as poetry allows, with the possible exception of Hesiod.’230 Here we 
see the omnipresent Homer scoring higher points than Hesiod even where purity is 
concerned.231 
    That Homer can be Hesiodic but Hesiod cannot be Homeric is demonstrated by Quintilian, 
who first elaborately praises Homer for his many qualities and then says that ‘Hesiod rarely 
rises to heights’ (raro adsurgit, 10.1.52); Hesiod cannot reach the Homeric altitude of the 
grand style; he is awarded the ‘palm in the middle style’ instead.232 The clearest indication of 
Hesiod’s disqualification for grandness is his near-absence from the treatise On the Sublime. 
This may not surprise us, since the author believes that one of the most important sources of 
the sublime (apart from the subject, figures, diction and composition) is the ‘inspiration of 
vehement emotion’ (sfodro;n kai; ejnqousiastiko;n pavqo~, 8.1).233 It takes a natural genius 
to produce sublimity, which means ‘not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them 
out of themselves (e[kstasin). Invariably what inspires wonder, with its power of amazing us 
(su;n ejkplhvxei), always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing (toù piqanou ̀
kai; toù pro;~ cavrin). For our persuasions are usually under our own control, while such 
passages exercise an irresistable power of mastery, and get the better of every listener’ (1.4). 
It is, of course, above all Homer whom ‘Longinus’ selects to illustrate the sublime in 
poetry.234 
                                               
229 See S WD prol. Ab (purity), Velleius Paterculus 1.7.1 (sweetness), Theon 2.74 Spengel (= Walz 1.175-176, 
simplicity), Hermog. Id. 2.363.1 Spengel (= Walz 3.320, sweetness and simplicity), Men.Rh. 3.340 Spengel (= 
Walz 9.150, purity), John of Sicily 6.397 Walz (sweetness), Vacca Most T26 (sweetness).  
230 Hermog. Id. 393 Rabe (= Spengel 2.408): levxi~ ge mh;n fanera; pàsin, h{ti~ ejsti;n hJ poihtikhv, kai; wJ~ tẁn 
kata; poivhsin kallivsth levxewn hJ   JOmhvrou. kaqaro;~ ga;r ejn poihvsei kinduneuvei movno~ h] suvn ge   JHsiovdw/ 
kat’ aujth;n ei\nai. 
231 We can clearly see that Homer’s dominance and exemplarity in every style is a topos. In the chapter devoted 
to the quality of purity (Rabe 227-234 = Spengel 2.275-281), Hermogenes quotes Homer only once, and in this 
case to demonstrate that Homer’s unusual word ‘track’ is the opposite of words that belong to the ‘pure’ type of 
style.  
232 Quint. Inst. 10.1.52: palma in illo medio genere dicendi.  
233 Even though the sublime can be achieved without emotion (Subl. 8.2, cf. Innes 2002), Hesiod’s lack of maniva 
puts him a priori at a disadvantage; furthermore, the vehement experience of e[kplhxi~ must always be present 
in the audience.  
234 Perhaps the passage most clearly doing so is to be found in 9.11. Homer has just been cited to show ‘his habit 
of entering into the sublimity of his heroic theme’, after which the author comments: ‘Here indeed Homer is 
swept away by the whirlwind of the battle ( {Omhro~ me;n ejnqavde ou[rio~ sunempneì toì~ ajgws̀in) and so 
affected by it that he too ‘Stormily raves (maivnetai), as the War-god, the spearman, or Fire, the destroyer, / 
Stormily raves on the hills in the deep-lying thickets of woodland; / Fringed are his lips with the foam-froth’.’ 
Here the genius Homer has even transported himself, ‘breathing together with the battles’ and behaving like one 
of his characters, in casu Hector (Il. 15.605-607).  
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    According to the treatise, the sublime is not concerned with details and accuracy. What is 
beautiful is always at the same time great and extraordinary too.235 ‘So it is by some natural 
instinct that we admire, not the small streams, clear and useful as they are (eij kai; diaugh ̀kai; 
crhvsima), but the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, and above all the Ocean’ (35.4). And again, in 
35.5: ‘... that what is useful or necessary is easily obtained by man; it is always the unusual 
which wins our wonder’. That is why even though Homer, Demosthenes and Plato (the three 
are mentioned together often) have made countless mistakes, this does not in the least tarnish 
‘the true successes to be found everywhere in the work of these heroes’ (36.2). Implicitly, the 
ocean that is Homer236 is compared to the hellenistic icon of small streams, the composer of 
clear and useful poetry Hesiod. One passage explicitly compares the two and disqualifies 
Hesiod for magnificence. In 9.4, Longinus mentions Homer’s description of Strife, which 
causes him to think of Hesiod:237   
 
w|/ ajnovmoiovn ge to;   JHsiovdeion ejpi; th;~   jAcluvo~, ei[ge   JHsiovdou kai; th;n   jAspivda 
qetevon,  
  th̀~ ejk me;n rJinwǹ muvxai rJevon: 
ouj ga;r deino;n ejpoivhse to; ei[dwlon, ajlla; mishtovn. oJ de; pẁ~ megequvnei ta; 
daimovnia:  
  o{sson d’ hjeroeide;~ ajnh;r i[den ojfqalmois̀in, 
  h{meno~ ejn skopih̀/, leuvsswn ejpi; oi[nopa povnton: 
  tovsson ejpiqrwvskousi qeẁn uJyhceve~ i{ppoi. 
th;n oJrmh;n aujtwǹ kosmikẁ/ diasthvmati katametrei.̀ tiv~ ou\n oujk a]n eijkovtw~ dia; 
th;n uJperbolh;n toù megevqou~ ejpifqevgxaito, o{ti a]n di;~ eJxh~̀ ejformhvswsin oiJ twǹ 
qeẁn i{ppoi, oujkevq’ euJrhvsousin ejn kovsmw/ tovpon. uJperfuà kai; ta; ejpi; th̀~ 
qeomaciva~ fantavsmata... 
     
                                               
235 Subl. 35.3: ‘Look at life from all sides and see how in all things the extraordinary, the great, the beautiful (to; 
peritto;n ... kai; mevga kai; kalovn) stand supreme...’. 
236 This is a very common image for Homer (cf. Quint. Inst. 10.1.46, [Long.] Subl.13.3, D.H. Comp. 24).  
237 It is unclear why. Longinus had just quoted Homer’s larger-than-life description of Eris, and it is unlikely that 
this makes him think of the Hesiodic Gloom (  jAcluv~) because she was also ‘preternaturally large herself’ (so 
Usher 2007 294); there is nothing in the Shield-passage that indicates her supernatural size. It is more likely that 
the battle-scene in Homer, where the personifications Terror, Rout, and Strife are present, reminds Longinus of 
the battle depicted on Hesiod’s shield, also attended by several personifications. But there may be another 
explanation. As Usher (2007) has brilliantly shown, all quotations from Homer (and the one from Genesis, in 
which Usher is most interested) in Subl. 9 are connected by thematic associations, mostly concerned with light 
and darkness. It is possible that it was this string of associations that made Longinus think of Hesiod’s Gloom, 
especially since ‘gloom’ (ajcluv~) returns later (Subl. 9.10) in a passage referring to Ajax begging Zeus to rescue 
the Greeks from darkness.  
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‘Quite unlike this is Hesiod’s description of Gloom, if indeed we are right in adding 
the Shield to the list of Hesiod’s works:  
  ‘Rheum from her nostrils was running.’ 
He has not made the image terrible, but offensive. But see how Homer magnifies the 
powers of heaven: 
  ‘Far as a man can see with his eyes in the shadowy distance, 
  Keeping his watch on a hill-top, agaze o’er the wine-dark ocean, 
  So far leap at a bound the high-neighing horses of heaven.’ 
He makes their stride as far as the East is from the West. So supreme is the grandeur 
of this, one might well say that if the horses of heaven take two consecutive strides 
there will then be no place found for them in the world. Again he shows the 
imagination of genius in his Battle of the Gods...’238 
 
The passage from Hesiod is obviously selected to show us how it is not supposed to be done; 
Longinus selected personifications by both Homer and Hesiod to enhance Hesiod’s function 
as the foil for Homer, illustrating all the more clearly the latter’s poetic excellence.239 What 
makes Homeric poetry apparently so great is the fact that he can ‘magnify’ (megequvnei), 
employ supreme greatness (th;n uJperbolh;n toù megevqou~), use imagery beyond what is 
natural (uJperfua ̀fantavsmata) - and it is to these powers that Hesiod is contrasted. At the 
same time, Longinus in picking this passage from the Hesiodic corpus is brilliantly ridiculing 
the stream Hesiod is so often associated with - compared with Homer, who oversees ‘the 
wine-dark ocean’, the ‘clear and useful stream’ is just a trail of mucus.240 
 
                                               
238 [Long.] Subl. 9.4-5; the citations are Sc. 267 and Il. 5.770-772. 
239 This is especially obvious because the Hesiodic passage on Eris is preceded by Homer´s description of Eris in 
Il. 4.442-443, which endows her with cosmic proportions. Since Hesiod was particularly associated with the 
figure of Eris as mentioned in the WD (see also next note), Longinus’ criticism may include an implicit denial of 
his truly ‘epic’ qualities. Such denial is perhaps continued elsewhere in the treatise, where Longinus comments 
on the sublime nature of theomachies (evoking traditional elements well-known from Hesiod’s Titanomachy and 
Typhoeus-episode, cf. Usher 2007 299), but quotes Homeric passages only. 
240 There is one other passage where On the Sublime mentions Hesiod. In chapter 13, Longinus speaks of the 
debt of other authors to Homer, naming Plato above all. He continues: ‘So many of these qualities would never 
have flourished among Plato’s philosophical tenets, nor would he have entered so often into the subjects and 
language of poetry, had he not striven, with heart and soul, to contest the prize with Homer, like a young 
antagonist with one who had already won his spurs (…). For, as Hesiod says, ‘Good is this strife (e[ri~) for 
mankind’. Fair indeed is the crown, and the fight for fame well worth the winning, where even to be worsted by 
our forerunners is not without glory’ (13.4). That this Hesiodic description on Eris, coming from the WD, is 
approved by Longinus is interesting in itself (see previous note), but the passage gains considerable force if we 
see it in the light of the well-known story of the contest of Hesiod and Homer. There is a contest of stylistic 
excellence going on, crown and all, but this time Homer wins, and it is not Hesiod who is the competitor – it is 
the ‘young antagonist’ Plato. In this competition, the only one that matters according to Longinus, Hesiod can 
only watch from the sideline and give comments.  
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5 - Boundary Crossing 
It has been the main concern of this chapter to reconstruct the conceptual opposition of 
Hesiod and Homer as poets, and gather evidence on four major watersheds: truth versus 
fiction, ars versus ingenium, didactic versus hedonistic, and plain versus grand. It is my belief 
that the evidence constitutes abundant proof that the poetic opposition of Hesiod and Homer 
was a real one, and that it shows a remarkable consistency and continuity through time. 
However, no watershed is absolute, and the boundaries drawn so far allow for some 
transgression. Such boundary crossing is the subject of this final section. 
    The final section consists of two parts. First, we will take a look at some of the most 
interesting examples of boundary crossing, i.e. passages in which Hesiod is temporarily 
credited with Homeric qualities, or vice versa. The focus here will be not so much on the mere 
fact of such crossing, but on the question why it is there. The second part will be concerned 
with a special type of ‘crossing’ we have already encountered in the previous chapter: that of 
Homer’s ‘expansion’. The main focus of this part will be on Aristotle’s Poetics, but there are 
many more interesting examples.   
 
5.1 - Crossing 
Generally speaking, Hesiod can temporarily acquire several Homeric qualities, although it 
must be said that judging from the evidence some boundaries are apparently harder to cross 
than others. Of the four oppositions indicated above, the stylistic one is the most rigid by far: 
whereas Homer demonstrates his genius by easily switching between styles and excelling in 
each of them, Hesiod’s poetry is practically never said to be grand or magnificent. Even 
Plutarch’s elaborate praise in De Pythiae Oraculis241 does not include terms traditionally 
associated with Homer. 
    The watershed between truth and fiction is slightly less rigid, as an example from Lucian’s 
Saturnalia will make clear. In this passage, Cronus is asked by a priest whether the story, told 
by Hesiod and Homer, of him eating his children is really true. The agitated god then replies: 
‘Do you imagine that that shepherd, that impostor, has any sound knowledge of me?’.242 His 
angry defence is extended to Homer, who was probably too ‘blind’ to see the truth. The 
passage reminds us of the traditional critique of the representation of the gods by Hesiod and 
                                               
241 See above, pp. 304-305. The only possible exception I have been able to find is AP 7.52, a funerary epigram 
(composed by a further wholly unknown Demiurgus) calling Hesiod the ‘crown of spacious Hellas’ (  JEllavdo~ 
eujrucovrou stevfanon) and the ‘ornament of poetry’ (kovsmon ajoidh̀~). 
242 Lucian Sat. 6: Oi[ei ga;r to;n poimevna ejkeìnon, to;n ajlazovna, uJgiev~ ti peri; ejmoù eijdevnai; (Transl. slightly 
adapted.) 
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Homer, but Lucian has taken a novel approach by suggesting Hesiod was a lying fool: his 
description of Hesiod as a shepherd anticipates the Dichterweihe, but instead Cronus leaves 
him in his unenlightened state. Hesiod was a shepherd, and a fraud: he made things up, just 
like Homer.243 Why he did so is not made clear; it is presumably to seem important.244 That is 
the reason, at least, that Aelius Aristides in one of his speeches presented Hesiod as a ‘fraud’. 
Aristides does so in order to defend himself against charges of boastfulness by his fellows. 
‘Compare my remark in passing with Hesiod’s Dichterweihe’, he says, and you will see that 
Hesiod ‘was such a wretched and brazen fellow’ (scevtlio~ h\n kai; u{bristh~) that he 
counted his inspiration among the achievements of the Muses. And that was not all: ‘he was 
such a fraud and so ambitious (ajlazw;n kai; filovtimo~), that he said that he also received a 
scepter from them (…) And he did not even stop here in his wantonness (u{brew~). As if he 
were purposefully making you burst with laughter he added: ‘and they inspired me with 
song’.’245 Like Lucian, Aristides focuses on the inspiration scene, Hesiod’s guarantee of truth, 
to mark the poet as a liar. We should note, however, that both passages are highly ironic, and 
thus in fact strengthen the traditional view of Hesiod as a faithful truthteller.  
    Occasionally, Hesiod features alongside Homer as a poet aiming to enchant instead of to 
edify. We have already seen that Agatharchides, singling out Hesiod and Homer in particular, 
concluded that ‘every poet strives more to give pleasure than to tell the truth.’246 Other critics 
are less polemical and state that both Hesiod and Homer actually do both at the same time. 
Maximus of Tyre presents the poetry of Hesiod and Homer (together with that of Orpheus) as 
having ‘the power to enchant and guide the souls of the young, gently mingling sound 
argument with their habitual pleasure.’247 In a similar vein, Clemens points out that the poets, 
though educated in theogony by the prophets, often ‘teach their wisdom through allegory’, 
and use their ‘poetical enchantment’ (poihtikh; yucagwgiva) as a ‘curtain for the masses’ 
(parapevtasma pro;~ tou;~ pollou;~).248 The scholiast shows a similar awareness.249 In such 
                                               
243 We should note the parallel treatment of Homer, whose blindness (a biographical datum like Hesiod’s 
profession) is here not an indication of a great inner vision, but of a lack of perception. 
244 Cf. Theophr. Char. 23 on ‘fraudulence’ or ajlazoneiva. 
245 Aristid. 28.19-23, containing references to Th. 11, 18, 22, 30, and 31.  
246 See ch. 3, p. 101. 
247 Max.Tyr. Or. 17.3: katepav/dein iJkanh; ta;~ tẁn nevwn yucav~, kai; dhmagwgeìn, kai; hJdonh̀/ sunhvqei 
ajnakirnavnai pravw~ ajlhqeì~ lovgou~ (transl. Trapp). 
248 Clem.Al. Strom. 5.4.24.1; he names Orpheus, Linus, Musaeus, Homer and Hesiod. 
249 S WD Prol. Aa: Hesiod is ‘not simply aiming at the pleasure of his readers, but putting that rather in second 
place, while he makes the advantage to one’s disposition the principal aim’ (oujc aJplẁ~ eij~ hJdonh;n ajpoblevpwn 
tẁn ejnteuxomevnwn, ajlla; tauvthn me;n pavrergon qevmeno~, th;n de; wjfevleian th;n eij~ to; h\qo~ prohgouvmenon 
skopo;n poihsavmeno~). 
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examples, Hesiod through affiliation with Homer becomes an enchanter and crowd-pleaser 
like him. It is only in generalizing contexts that such claims can be made. 
    Finally, Hesiod’s status as a mouthpiece of the Muses (inspiration type a) obviously 
facilitated his occasional appearance as a ‘manic’ poet of the Homeric type. Ovid, for 
instance, in the opening of his didactic work on the art of love, says he was not inspired by 
any god; he can vouch for the truth of his work since he has found it all out by himself.250 He 
contrasts this ‘rational’ way of composition with the case of Hesiod: ‘… neither did Clio and 
Clio’s sisters appear to me while I kept flocks in thy vale, O Ascra.’251 Furthermore, it is 
likely that many did not perceive (or acknowledge) the difference between the two types of 
inspiration, as is witnessed by Maximus of Tyre arguing against the view that Hesiod when he 
received the laurel ‘was immediately transformed from a shepherd into a poet and began to 
sing, just as they say the Corybants become possessed and ecstatic whenever they hear a 
pipe’.252 In some cases, ancient boundaries can be seen to simply dissolve, as in a passage 
from the Borysthenitic oration by Dio Chrysostom, where Hesiod as a possessed poet is even 
put on a par with Homer. In this treatise, Dio gives his audience a Stoic lecture about the best 
way gods and men should live together. Earthly monarchies are shown to be a reflection of 
the organization of the universe as a whole, with Zeus as the supreme leader of it all. That is 
why the divine poets are right when they, instructed by the Muses (maqovnte~ ejk Mouswǹ), 
call him ‘the father of gods and men’. He then continues: 
 
‘For the chances are, indeed, that poets as a class (to; poihtiko;n gevno~) are not utterly 
bad marksmen when they speak of sacred things and that they are not missing the 
mark when they use such expressions as that repeatedly; on the other hand, it is not 
likely that they have received a real initiation according to the rites and regulations of 
true initiates, or that with reference to the universe they, if I may say so, have any clear 
knowledge of the truth (peri; th̀~ ajlhqeiva~ safev~). But we may think of them as 
merely like the attendants at the rites, who stand outside the doors, decking portals and 
the altars which are in full view and attending to the other preparations of that kind but 
never passing within. Indeed that is the very reason why the poets call themselves 
‘attendants of the Muses’ (qeravponta~ Mouswǹ), not initiates or any other august 
                                               
250 Ovid Ars Amat. 1.29-30: Usus opus movet hoc: vati parete perito; / vera canam… (‘Experience (usus) 
inspires this work: give ear to an experienced bard; true will be my song…’). 
251 Ovid Ars Amat. 1.27-28: Nec mihi sunt visae Clio Cliusque sorores / Servanti pecudes vallibus, Ascra, tuis.  
252 Max.Tyr. Or. 38.2: eujqu;~ a[/dein, genovmenon poihth;n ejk poimevno~, w{sper fasi;n tou;~ korubantiẁnta~ 
ejpeida;n ajkouvwsin aujloù ejnqousiàn, tẁn protevrwn logismẁn ejxistamevnou~. Instead, Maximus argues, 
Hesiod is telling us through his Dichterweihe that he was not trained by a professional. 
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name. So, as I was saying, it is reasonable to suppose that not only do those who busy 
themselves near some ritual, hard by the entrance to the sanctuary, gain some inkling 
of what is going on within, when either a lone mystic phrase rings out loudly, or fire 
appears above the enclosure, but also that there comes sometimes to the poets – I mean 
the very ancient poets (levgw de; toi~̀ pavnu ajrcaivoi~) – some utterance from the 
Muses, however brief, some inspiration of divine nature and of divine truth, like a 
flash of fire from the invisible (fwnhv ti~ ejk Mousẁn ajfivketo braceìa kaiv pouv ti~ 
ejpivpnoia qeiva~ fuvsewv~ te kai; ajlhqeiva~, kaqavper aujgh; puro;~ ejx ajfanoù~ 
lavmyanto~). This is what happened to Homer and Hesiod when they were possessed 
by the Muses (a} e[pascon ejk Mouswǹ kai; kateivconto   {Omhrov~ te kai;   JHsivodo~). 
But the poets who came after them in later days, bringing to stage and theatre naught 
but their own wisdom, uninitiate addressing uninitiate, have ofttimes disclosed 
imperfect patterns of holy rites; but, being applauded by the multitude, they tried in 
their own right to initiate the mob, actually, as we might say, building open booths for 
Bacchic rites at tragic crossroads…’.253  
 
Dio’s debt to the Platonic theory of divinely sent ‘madness’ is obvious: we see here again how 
the poets, without knowing this themselves, may hit upon the truth when they are inspired by 
the Muses.254 There is, however, one considerable difference. In Plato, Homer is associated 
with the tragedians as those composing through madness, but here it is Hesiod who figures as 
Homer’s partner, and both of them are contrasted to the tragedians who play the crowd and 
tell them lies. Obviously, older boundaries dissolve, and inspiration becomes a looser term 
that can be employed as the context demands.255 
                                               
253 D.Chrys. 36.33-35 (transl. slightly altered). 
254 Cf. Jul. Or. 4.136a-137c. It goes too far, however, to call this passage from Dio a ‘ornata rielaborazione’ of 
Pl. Phdr. 245c, as Luzzatto (1983) does (74 n.84). On the other hand, the differences between Plato’s and Dio’s 
presentation of divine inspiration as noted by Nesselrath (2003) 134-135 are not altogether impressive.  
255 The passage in question is a very good example of the decisive influence of context. It is obvious that the 
distinction between the inspired epic poets and the uninspired tragedians is based on a chronological difference, 
and I believe Luzzatto (1983) 73 is right to perceive here a theory of an ‘evoluzione della letterature greca in due 
tappe’. But we should remember that Dio’s lecture on the organization of the universe is a largely Stoic one, and 
it may be that in his treatment of Hesiod and Homer he is influenced by the Stoic theory on the truth of poetry. 
This theory held, in a nutshell, that poetry can be a source of wisdom since it sometimes goes back to the sayings 
of the original namegivers and wise men, but that it has become distorted over time. The most ancient poets are 
the best preserved links, since they are closest to the wise men who lived at the beginning of time. This is why 
Hesiod and Homer have no ‘clear knowledge of the truth’, but are likened to the attendants of the holy rites who 
sometimes catch a mystic phrase from olden times. That is also, I believe, why Dio can say (36.40) that the myth 
of the chariot of Zeus, told by the Persian Magi, is even truer than the sayings of Hesiod and Homer: for the 
Magi hold a knowledge that is far older than that of the Greek poets (as is suggested in 36.49, where the Magi 
accuse the Greeks of ‘youthful ignorance and faulty memory’, neovthto~ te kai; mnhvmh~ ajsqenoù~). Whereas in 
narrating myths Hesiod and Homer ‘present each detail with much plausibility’ (e{kasta fravzousi meta; 
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5.2 - Homeric expansion 
The relationship between Hesiod and Homer changes over time. Whereas the two poets could 
be regarded as more or less equal in archaic and classical times, Homer soon becomes the 
dominant partner: his sphere of interest and expertise expands into areas previously (almost) 
uniquely associated with Hesiod. Eventually, Homeric poetry is seen to be so ‘total’ as to 
wholly include Hesiod. The expansion of Homer begins rather early but becomes more visible 
over time. It is apparent in all three aspects of the poets’ sofiva - ethical orientation, 
knowledge, poetical quality - but can be witnessed most clearly in the last of these, i.e. that 
aspect that deals with poetry in a stricter sense: style, intent, and skill.  
    Homer’s expansion was significantly helped on its way by Plato, who conceived of a divine 
poet who - during moments of inspiration - could be both truthful and pleasing; obviously, he 
saw Homer as the prime example of this new type of poet. That this means an invasion of 
Hesiodic territory can be gleaned from a supposedly casual remark describing Homer’s poetry 
as composed ‘with the help of Graces and Muses’ (xuvn tisi Cavrisi kai; Mouvsai~).256 
However innocent this remark may seem, it indicates a breach with a strong tradition seeing 
Hesiod as truthful and Homer as beautiful, exemplified by Simonides’ maxim that ‘the Muses 
bore Hesiod, the Graces Homer.’257 
    Due to the efforts of Plato, who wanted to disqualify poetry as a form of knowledge based 
on tevcnh, Homer became ‘manic’ and thus (occasionally) truthful. Aristotle, however, the 
next great literary critic, rejected the notion of the manic poet and conceived all poetry as a 
human tevcnh or craft; remarkably enough, Homer remains for him the poet par excellence. 
This is presumably so for at least two reasons. The first is that the aim of poetry, according to 
Aristotle, is to create a powerful emotional response in the audience; as we have seen, this is 
traditionally what Homer is good at. Second, poetry is on the whole not to be judged 
according to its faithful depiction of the particulars of everyday reality, but to its concern with 
                                                                                                                                                   
pollh̀~ peiqoù~, 42) and sing ‘pleasing songs’ (cariventa a[/smata, 43), the Magi insist on the truthfulness of 
their myths and sing a barbarian song. They are, it is suggested here, the true initiates, whereas Hesiod and 
Homer are mere ‘prophets’ of the Muses (profh̀tai tẁn Mousẁn), a term used not for the inspired oracle but 
the priest who translates the divine utterance. It appears, then, that the ‘evolution’ of poetry consists not of two 
but of three stages, in which Hesiod and Homer represent the second: in the Greek epic poems, insistence upon 
the truth has already made way for mere plausibility, and the ‘barbarian’ sound has already been made 
‘graceful’; the trend will end in poetry that only aims at pleasure and has no more tie with the divine. (I believe, 
with Nesselrath (2003) 135-136, that Dio takes the message of Zarathustra and the Magi seriously; and of course 
the teachings of the Magi turn out to be so adapted that they are in perfect accord with the Stoic philosophical 
view of the world.) In this particular view of poetry, Hesiod and Homer occupy a special place, a sort of twilight 
zone between the perfectly true poetry of most ancient times and the utterly untrue poetry of modern times. They 
are somewhere in between, not initiated but not uninitiated either. They see the truth, but it is not clear. 
256 Pl. Lg. 682a; cf. AP 7.1 (Alcaeus of Messene) describing Homer as the ‘star of the Muses and Graces’ 
(Mousavwn ajstevra kai; Carivtwn). 
257 See above, pp. 274-275. 
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universality in its highest degree. Therefore, ‘realism’ or truth may occasionally be sacrificed 
for a higher goal, and petty untruths should not be in the way of the general effect of a certain 
scene.258 Homer, ‘who has above all taught the others the proper way of creating fiction’,259 is 
the best at thus manipulating the audience: ‘even in the Odyssey the inexplicable elements in 
the story of his landing would obviously have been intolerable, had they been written by an 
inferior poet. As it is, Homer conceals the absurdity by the charm of all his other merits.’260 
Here the sweet verse of Homer re-appears, but this time his manipulative powers are 
positively evaluated, for it is a general rule of literature that ‘what is convincing though 
impossible should always be preferred to what is possible and unconvincing.’261 Thus in 
Aristotle it is not the concept of the ‘lying’ Homer that has changed; it is just that ‘lying’ has 
become an integral part of poetry. 
    Whereas Homer is lavishly praised in the Poetics for doing virtually everything right, 
Hesiod is not even mentioned in the treatise.262 The two places where Aristotle does attribute 
poetical qualities to Hesiod, he only seems to do so in order to disqualify him as a natural 
philosopher. In Metaphysics 1000, Hesiod is ranked among the qeolovgoi (‘speakers on gods’) 
and muqikẁ~ sofizomevnoi (‘mythological thinkers’), and the main objection against these 
supposed cosmologists is that they ‘considered only what was significant to themselves’:263 
since their archaic model of explaining the world uses terms of mythology instead of science, 
‘where the actual application of these causes is concerned, their statements are beyond our 
comprehension.’264 A ‘mythological thinker’, Aristotle argues, should not be taken seriously 
as a philosopher. The only other passage ascribing poetical qualities to Hesiod is 
Meteorologica 353, where the poet is not named though most likely referred to. When 
speaking of the sea, Aristotle begins by discussing the earliest conceptions of it: 
                                               
258 Cf. Arist. Po. 1460b22-26: ‘… if an impossibility has been portrayed, an error has been made [as in the case 
of a portrait of a horse advancing both its right legs]. But it is justifiable if the poet thus achieves the object of 
poetry (…) and makes that part or some other part of the poem more striking. The pursuit of Hector is an 
example of this’ (… a]n ta; pro;~ aujth;n th;n tevcnhn ajduvnata pepoivhtai, hJmavrthtai. ajll’ ojrqẁ~ e[cei, eij 
tugcavnei toù tevlou~ toù auJth̀~ (...), eij ou{tw~ ejkplhktikwvteron h] aujto; h] a[llo poieì mevro~. paravdeigma 
hJ toù   {Ektoro~ divwxi~). It is clear that Aristotle is here arguing against the nitpicking of Homer, points of 
critique he labels ‘accidental’ (kata; sumbebhkov~, 1460b16). 
259 Arist. Po. 1460: dedivdacen de; mavlista   {Omhro~ kai; tou;~ a[llou~ yeudh̀ levgein wJ~ deì. 
260 Arist. Po. 1460a35-b2: kai; ta; ejn   jOdusseiva/ a[loga ta; peri; th;n e[kqesin, wJ~ oujk a]n h\n ajnektav, dh̀lon a]n 
gevnoito, eij aujta; faùlo~ poihth;~ poihvseien: nùn de; toì~ a[lloi~ ajgaqoì~ oJ poihth;~ ajfanivzei hJduvnwn to; 
a[topon. 
261 Arist. Po. 1460a26-27: proaireìsqaiv te deì ajduvnata eijkovta màllon h] dunata; ajpivqana. 
262 This is in part due to Hesiod’s lack of mimesis, see ch. 3, p. 99. Cf. Else (1986) 76 saying that according to 
Aristotle, ‘poetry and mimesis are practically identical.’ 
263 Arist. Metaph. 1000a10: movnon ejfrovntisan toù piqanoù toù pro;~ auJtouv~. 
264 Arist. Metaph. 1000a14-15: peri; aujth̀~ th̀~ prosforà~ twǹ aijtivwn touvtwn uJpe;r hJmà~ eijrhvkasin. One is 
reminded of Herodotus disqualifying Homer as a historian: what Homer says ‘has no disproof’ (oujk e[cei 
e[legcon, Hist. 2.25). 
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oiJ me;n ou\n ajrcaiòi kai; diatrivbonte~ peri; ta;~ qeologiva~ poioùsin aujth~̀ phgav~, 
i{n’ aujtoi~̀ w\sin ajrcai; kai; rJivzai gh~̀ kai; qalavtth~: tragikwvteron ga;r ou{tw kai; 
semnovteron uJpevlabon i[sw~ ei\nai to; legovmenon, wJ~ mevga ti toù panto;~ toùto 
movrion o[n: 
 
‘The ancients who concerned themselves with theology make it [= the sea] have 
sources, their purpose being to provide both land and sea with origins and roots. They 
perhaps supposed that this would give a more dramatic and grander air to their 
theories, according to which the earth was an important part of the universe…’265  
 
This is the only passage in Aristotle (or in fact, the whole of classical literature) where 
Hesiod, whom I believe Aristotle is thinking of here,266 is described with the (Homeric) 
qualities semnov~ and tragikov~, qualities that allow one to magnify beyond reality. But the 
passages from Metaphysics and Meteorologica do not turn Hesiod into a fully-fledged poet, of 
course, or indicate any ‘expansion’ on Hesiod’s side; the attribution of poethood only serves 
to disqualify him as a philosopher. Not a philosopher and not a poet, Hesiod’s status in 
Aristotle is rather unclear: he is most of all ajrcai`o~, almost as primal and undifferentiated as 
the a[rcai of the earliest fusiologhvsante~. A good start for a discussion, which should then 
quickly take a more sophisticated turn.  
    The use of Homer by Plato and Aristotle demonstrates his polyvalence as a symbol of 
poetry: in the same time at the same place, two great intellectuals could construe wholly 
antithetical views of one and the same poet. Needless to say, both the notion of Homer the 
inspired genius and Homer the perfect artisan were widely followed, allowing for countless 
other subdivisions and specifications. In fact, it is often the polyvalence of Homer that seems 
his primary quality: throughout antiquity we hear that Homer tells all the stories, speaks all 
languages, masters all styles, knows all the tricks;267 similarly, his scope is all-inclusive.268 
                                               
265 Arist. Mete. 353a34-b3.  
266 Hesiod is called an ajrcaìo~ elsewhere (Metaph. 989a10-12, perhaps Metaph. 983b33-984a3), has concerned 
himself with qeologiva (Metaph. 1000a9-11, perhaps Metaph. 983b27-30), and in fact did write that the sea has 
sources (Th. 282). 
267 Cf. e.g. AP 15.36 (Cometas) calling Homer the ‘teller of many tales’ (poluvmuqe); D.Chrys. 10.24 calling 
Homer ‘bilingual’ because he also understands the language of the gods (cf. 11.22), and in 12.66 claiming that 
Homer ‘mingled together every Hellenic dialect which before his time were separate’ (pàsan th;n   JEllhnikh;n 
glwt̀tan dih/rhmevnhn tevw~ ajnevmixe), cf. 53.5 ‘Homer is capably of everything and reproduces literally every 
sound (iJkano;n panto;~ crhvmato~ kai; pavsa~ ajtecnẁ~ ajfievnta fwnav~); Dionysius tells us in Comp. 9.2.2 that 
Hesiod excels in one style only whereas Homer is good at all of them, cf. Demetrius citing Homer as the 
example in his discussion of all styles, and Cicero Orat. 31.109 naming Homer as the prime example of an artist 
THE OTHER POETICS 
 317
Incidentally, this quality is widely recognized by modern scholars as well.269 By contrast, 
Hesiod remains more or less the same. 
 
6 - Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed the reception of Hesiod as a poet; we investigated certain 
tendencies regarding the way his poems were viewed, the way he was believed to have 
composed them, and the evaluation of his style. Throughout all five sections we have 
encountered two factors of decisive importance in the development of the poetic appreciation 
of Hesiod. These are here summarily presented. 
    The first factor is the continuous appreciation of Hesiod’s poetry as truthful, useful, and 
didactic. Hesiod’s inspiration was initially conceived as a succesful transfer of data which 
corresponded neatly to the facts of life. He is invariably associated with a style fit for teaching 
(fine, pure, polished and precise), and grouped with poets that are famous for their good 
advice and ethical exhortations. When in the hellenistic age poetry became not only didactic 
but learned as well, Hesiod remained the example with regard to both theme and style. With 
the solidification of rhetorical categories in Roman and later times, Hesiod became 
permanently connected to the smooth and simple style and to the genre of didactic epic and 
other text types aiming to teach. Like the synthesis ascribed to Hesiod by Dionysius - ‘… it 
requires that the words shall keep on the move, swept forward and riding along on top of one 
another, all sustained in their movement by mutual support, like the current of a stream that 
never rests. (…) This result is achieved by the exact fitting together of the words, so that no 
perceptible interval between them is allowed. (...) It requires not only that its words shall be 
properly fitted and smoothed together, but also that the clauses should be effectively 
interwoven with one another and achieve their final form together as a period’270 - this factor 
                                                                                                                                                   
shifting styles; examples of Homer’s literary omnipotence abound in [Plutarch]’s De Vita et Poesi Homeri (even 
though such claims may be ‘polemical bluster’, Struck 2004 156). Too (1998) 22 retraces the appreciation for 
‘multiple voices and the ability to produce all kinds of voices’ to early Greek poetry; to the examples he 
mentions should be added Helen speaking with the voices of the wives of the heroes inside the Trojan Horse 
(Od. 4.266-289).  
268 Cf. e.g. AP 7.6, 7.7, 9.24, 16.303. In such epigrams, Homer is often compared to the sun, emphasizing his all-
inclusive scope and his use for all mankind. 
269 On the ‘practically super-generic’ influence of Homer see e.g. Dowden (2004) 188-205 and Hunter (2004); 
according to Foley (2004) 181-182, epic enjoys the status of ‘master-genre’ all over the world. 
270 D.H. Comp. 6.112.3-113.2 Usener/Radermacher: kekinh̀sqai bouvletai th;n ojnomasivan kai; fevresqai 
qavtera kata; twǹ eJtevrwn ojnomavtwn kai; ojceìsqai th;n ajllhloucivan lambavnonta bavsin w{sper ta; rJevonta 
kai; mhdevpote ajtremoùnta: (...) toùto de; poioùsin aiJ twǹ aJrmoniẁn ajkrivbeiai crovnon aijsqhto;n oujdevna 
to;n metaxu; tẁn ojnomavtwn perilambavnousai: (...) ouj movnon de; ta; ojnovmata toì~ ojnovmasin ejpithdeivw~ 
sunhrmovsqai bouvletai kai; sunexevsqai, ajlla; kai; ta; kwl̀a toì~ kwvloi~ eu\ sunufavnqai kai; pavnta eij~ 
perivodon teleutàn. 
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shows tradition smoothing over and fitting together several strands of Hesiod’s reception, 
ultimately presenting a Hesiod as remarkably the same throughout the centuries. 
    But the reception of Hesiod is not only determined by this constant factor, given shape by 
tradition. It is also the influence of Homer, here more than in any of the other chapters, that is 
of great importance. This is clear at once from the highly significant fact that from the sixth 
century BC to the third century AD Hesiod and Homer are virtually never put on a par with 
regard to style, beauty and impact. As we have seen, Hesiod and Homer continuously take 
opposite sides: when Pindar compares himself to the truthful and toiling Hesiod, Homer is 
described as making stories bigger, seducing his audience away from ajlavqeia with his sweet 
verse. When Plato turns him into a manic poet composing in frenzy, there is no comparable 
treatment of Hesiod. Homer is the ultimate dramatist, playing at the emotions of the audience, 
and thus the great example for verbal magicians like Gorgias - Hesiod, by contrast, is 
ultimately un-dramatic and a symbol of linguistic correctness. These are just a few examples. 
I do not wish to claim, of course, that Homer in the early and classical period is never credited 
with poetical qualities that have above been described as Hesiodic (e.g. truthfulness, purity, 
and precision); he regularly is. What I do claim, however, is that there is a clear tendency to 
describe Homeric poetry as un-Hesiodic, and that every time Hesiod is compared to Homer, 
Homer takes shape as his antagonist. 
    This antithetical view of Hesiod and Homer in antiquity is complemented by another one 
that presents a Hesiod who is slowly paling in comparison with Homer, the greatest poet of all 
times. As Homer grew in importance, he began to include qualities that were traditionally 
associated with Hesiod. Significant contributions to this development were Plato’s depiction 
of Homer as truthful without knowledge, and Aristotle’s view of Homer as the master 
craftsman; perhaps the modification of an originally dichotomous theory of style also played a 
part. In the end, it seems that the most important difference between Hesiod and Homer is that 
the first is stable and one-sided, while the other is polyvalent and dynamic. Against such a 








The reception of Hesiod in antiquity amounts to more than the sum total of all references by 
later Greeks to the enshrined poetic corpus of a cultural icon. In fact, Hesiod’s image is far 
from a static and univocal given. Every time the poet is named, quoted, mentioned or 
otherwise referred to, he is more than just being integrally ‘received’: in each case, he is 
refashioned and redefined to fit the demands and aims of the recipient, and takes on a new 
shape in every new context. One and the same poet can thus appear as a blasphemous teller of 
monstrous tales, a keeper of arcane knowledge, a slow-witted farmer, a philosopher with a 
cosmic outlook, a teacher of justice and reciprocity, and a truth-telling seer. The panhellenic 
symbol Hesiod can be employed in many different ways and places, and each recipient 
contributes to its diversity. 
     This is not to say, however, that Hesiod can mean almost anything: there are limits to the 
symbol’s semantic range, put there by traditions that determine Hesiod’s employability. There 
seem to be two main factors which thus define how Hesiod can be used, and what themes and 
subjects are Hesiodic or not. The most important of these factors is undoubtedly the poet’s 
own text, especially the Theogony and Works and Days. Obviously, Hesiod’s own words 
determine to a considerable degree the boundaries of his reception, however interpretive and 
far-fetched. The second factor, I have argued, is Homer. It is the main argument of this book 
that the ancient image of Homer is crucial to the understanding of Hesiod’s reception. Homer 
defines Hesiod (and, to a smaller degree, vice versa), and this happens in three different ways: 
by association, by absence, and by opposition. The picture of Hesiod changes fundamentally 
when he is presented together with Homer, when he is alone (which still often means that 
Homer is present in the background), or when he is framed as Homer’s opposite. There is not 
one Hesiod, nor are there infinitely many; I would say there are three. In this conclusion, I call 
them the sacred Hesiod (when combined with Homer), the modern Hesiod (when alone), and 
the typical Hesiod (when opposed to Homer). 
    The tripartite view of Hesiod is expressed in the structure of the book, which is organized 
into three Parts, each dealing with one particular Hesiod. Each Part is further subdivided 
according to the three more or less separate qualities of sofiva attributed to poets in antiquity: 
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‘moral and educational integrity’, ‘knowledge and factual accuracy’, and ‘technical skill and 
aesthetic/emotional impact’. (The last of these qualities, however, is treated integrally in 
chapter 9, since it has proven too strained to discuss the strictly ‘poetical’ evaluation of 
Hesiod in three separate Parts.) In this last chapter, I will summarize the findings of the three 
Parts and offer my final conclusions. As was stated in the introduction to this book, the rather 
large scope of my study has often led to abstraction and generalization; this naturally holds 
true for the conclusion as well.  
 
Part One: the sacred Hesiod 
The first Part of the book was concerned with the image of Hesiod when equated or 
associated with Homer. In its introductory chapter (1), which was mainly concerned with 
ancient notions about Hesiod’s place in time and society, we have seen that the Greeks - much 
like modern scholars - were used to assimilating (or ‘lumping’ together) Hesiod and Homer. 
The poets were generally regarded as roughly contemporary, sometimes even related - a sure 
indication of a widespread belief that their poetry is alike. Such a view is confirmed by 
teachers and scholiasts using Hesiod to explain Homer (and vice versa), and the way they are 
commonly set apart from the younger poets as ‘ancients’ (ajrcaiòi). Furthermore, Hesiod’s 
place in society appears to have been comparable to that of Homer: his poetry was studied in 
schools, sung during symposia and performed at religious festivals. The fact that most of the 
references to the study or performance of Hesiod also mention Homer suggests that the 
Greeks were usually confronted with Hesiodic poetry in a wider context, which was largely 
determined by Homer. It must have been natural and normal for them to understand Hesiod 
and Homer as a combination.  
    Chapter 2 set out to examine more precisely that combination and offers a discussion of the 
ethico-religious import of Hesiod when together with Homer. It turns out that the combination 
of the two poets in the field of ethics and education was extremely strong. An analysis of the 
material suggested that at the outset of their reception, Hesiod and Homer were regarded as 
(almost) equally important teachers and moral authorities. From the earliest times onwards, 
their poems’ morals and maxims were credited with a great prescriptive value, often 
amounting to a law-like pertinence - one example is Herodotus’ comment on the poets’ 
decisive influence on the development of Greek religion. It is significant that the earliest (and 
heaviest) attacks on poetry are generally aimed at Hesiod and Homer together; one can think, 
for instance, of Xenophanes’ dismissive portrayal of epic poetry, and Plato complaining in 
Republic 3 about the pernicious effects that the poets’ lies have on society. Ancient criticism 
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in general often focuses on the immoral behaviour of the gods and the fantastic descriptions of 
the underworld, and is usually aimed at the Homeric poems in combination with the 
Theogony. Not surprisingly, Hesiod and Homer were also the primary objects of the earliest 
and most elaborate defences of poetry. Among the several strategies of defence discussed 
(selection, altering the surface, allegorical reading, poetic licence, and harmonization), it is 
especially the process of harmonization that demonstrates the central position of Hesiod and 
Homer as moral guides and teachers; apparently, their poetry was thought important enough 
to merit the trouble of harmonizing it with the accounts of the two other ethical authorities in 
the Greek world, i.e. the lawgivers and philosophers.  
    The connection between Hesiod and Homer as sources of ‘encyclopaedic’ knowledge was 
rather strong among the Greeks: as we have seen in chapter 3, the poets together are credited 
with a vast scope and could offer their students detailed, sometimes even technical 
information on virtually every topic. Together, Hesiod and Homer can be set against other 
poetic or prose sources to form a separate and exclusive category of their own. Most often, 
their knowledge is regarded as more respectable and trustworthy than that of the tragedians 
and historians. It is interesting that Hesiod and Homer, revered storekeepers of ancient 
knowledge, are  never pictured as philosophers together; even though they were both regarded 
as great philosophers individually, they are never presented as propagating similar doctrines. 
Apparently, in this particular field the Greeks chose to differentiate instead of assimilate (as 
was further argued in chapters 6 and 9). 
    The Hesiod of the first Part, we may conclude, can be characterized as ‘sacred’ in several 
ways. His poems were performed in religious contexts, and they were typically thought to 
deal with religious subjects, more specifically the behaviour of the gods and the particulars of 
the underworld. Moreover, his poetry itself is hallowed or ‘enshrined’ - it is pictured as 
ancient, at the cradle of Greek culture, religion, and civilization. His poems are 
‘identitätsfundierend’ for the Greeks, in a way that also holds for the Torah, the Epic of 
Gilgamesh and the Book of the Dead for their respective cultures. This formative character of 
his works finds expression in the great ethical and more generally prescriptive value attributed 
to them. Countervoices, attacking the very foundations of Hesiod’s authority and thus denying 
him the status of an educator, are mostly smothered by an elaborate educational system of 
exegetes at all levels, who are continually teaching, interpreting and explaining Hesiod, which 
had the effect, if not the intention, of keeping him at the heart of Greek culture and identity. 
This first Hesiod, the sacred Hesiod, is thoroughly affected by association with Homer, whose 
status as an ancient and enshrined educator reinforces these qualities in Hesiod. 
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Part Two: the modern Hesiod 
As we have seen, Hesiod’s image is essentially different when he is alone (i.e. when he is 
referred to in passages that do not mention Homer anywhere in the immediate context). One 
could argue that this Hesiod - since he is least affected by Homer - is the ‘real’ one, but such a 
qualification should be between quotation marks for at least two reasons: first and foremost, 
because it has been shown that Hesiod, even in contexts without Homer, is to some degree 
implicitly determined by the other poet; and secondly, because the other Hesiods (those either 
explicitly associated with or opposed to Homer) are no less real - Homer is a crucial part of 
Hesiod’s image and reception. Still, we must conclude that Hesiod alone is strikingly different 
from the others. This Hesiod is the subject of Part Two.  
    Chapter 4 investigated the fundamentals underlying the Greek (re)construction of Hesiod. It 
started out with an examination of the biographical tradition, which appears to be largely 
based on the constructive elements suggested by the (famously self-reflective) works of 
Hesiod themselves: Hesiod is regarded as an inspired shepherd and a prize-winning poet 
because he says so himself. Another part of the vita, it was argued, is the result of a more 
creative use of the source text by posterity. I believe that the stories of Hesiod’s violent death, 
his double burial and his posthumous power are caused by an imaginative reworking of his 
own well-known statements on demons and their benign influence on mankind. Hesiod is thus 
deliberately heroized, even if it is unclear whether he had a cult or not. Hesiod’s heroic status 
contrasts with that of Homer, who is often pictured as a god - this is one good example of how 
Homer defines Hesiod even when he is not mentioned anywhere. 
    The second section of chapter 4 is concerned with so-called ‘mechanisms of memory’, the 
six (in my view) most important mnemonic processes that determine why some parts of 
Hesiod are forgotten, while others are remembered as essentially Hesiodic. They are the 
practice of assimilation, by which Hesiod is consciously or unconsciously made to resemble 
the recipient (which makes that, for instance, Heraclitus can criticize Hesiod as if he were a 
philosopher); the catchword-factor, explaining the afterlife of certain verses or passages 
through their sheer catchiness (the best example being Hesiod’s verses on the road to virtue, 
which - often altered or misquoted - found their way into many different contexts); the 
principle of snowballing, when recipient B refers to recipients A’s reference to Hesiod (as is 
the case with some Muse-inspired philosophers, who refer to each other’s use of the Hesiodic 
source); the principle of clustering, according to which a recipient consciously or 
unconsciously creates a consistent Hesiod by clustering similar references (so that Aristotle 
can create a consistent picture of Hesiod as an ‘originator’); the Homeric factor (the most 
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obvious proof that Homer is still somehow present even though Hesiod is ‘alone’), which 
dictates that Hesiod will not be associated with themes that are distinctly Homeric (the theme 
of war being the most important one); and the persona’s paradox, which explains why Hesiod 
is practically never explicitly associated with either works or days (themes whose Hesiodic 
quality it is too obvious to mention). The six mechanisms are usually combined and are only 
separated in this study for the sake of convenience. Together, they explain a great part of the 
dynamics underlying the collective memory of Hesiod. 
    Chapter 5 dealt with the ethico-political orientation of Hesiod when he is alone. Four 
ethical themes seem to be most regularly associated with this Hesiod in antiquity: 
demonology, justice in the polis, human interaction, and moderation. The themes share the 
concept of balance or proportionate compensation and their main focus on human behaviour 
in the context of the city-state. The chapter illustrates how crucial the absence or presence of 
Homer is to the image of Hesiod: with Homer, he is often blamed for inspiring particularly 
antisocial behaviour, but without Homer, Hesiod becomes the paragon of polis-minded 
thinking: he continually promotes cooperative values and warns against greed and violence. 
Perhaps it is this part of Hesiod’s image, almost completely based on the Works and Days 
alone, which explains why Hesiod is generally regarded as ‘wise’ (sofov~). Furthermore, the 
chapter demonstrates how easily the past is adjusted to fit the present. The original context of 
Hesiod’s advice (aimed at farmers in a small village) is wholly erased as his admonitions are 
brought up to date and seen to be equally valid in (or perhaps even meant for) the new context 
of the nascent polis. Here, too, some aspects of Hesiod are forgotten while others are 
reinforced through repetition and adaptation. 
    The philosophical Hesiod is the subject of chapter 6. As we have seen, Hesiod (when alone) 
was in antiquity credited with a distinct and remarkably coherent philosophy. Three topics are 
associated with him most frequently: 1) physics and cosmology, 2) epistemology and the 
acquiring of knowledge, and 3) the truthfulness of language. In all three areas of interest, 
Hesiod is rather consistently pictured as displaying three related qualities. First, there is the 
immense scope of his investigations: the entire cosmos is his object of study, and he is said to 
know everything. The breadth of his enterprise results in both heavy criticism (such as that of 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus) and serious imitation (from the natural philosophers and 
Empedocles, for instance). Second, there is his ‘atomist’ (as opposed to holistic) approach to 
acquiring knowledge, i.e. the careful collecting and categorizing of all constituent parts that 
together account for the whole. This ‘method’ was originally attributed to Hesiod because of 
his cosmological speculations, but the image soon spilled over into other areas of interest; this 
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is most clearly visible in Plato, who presents Hesiod as someone who knows a wagon because 
he can list all its parts. And third, Hesiod is often thought to assume or teach that there is a 
transparent, one-to-one relationship between words and things, which turns him into a 
predecessor of linguistic purists like Prodicus. As was already stated, these three qualities are 
closely related and mutually reinforcing. A polymath will naturally be a collector and an 
organizer, who will naturally have an all-encompassing scope and aim at completeness. Such 
a spirit (constructed or not) will naturally seek meaning in the apparent structure instead of 
postulating deeper layers of unity: in other words, the items in the list represent the bigger 
picture, as words directly represent reality. We must conclude that Hesiod the philosopher is a 
univocal and powerful figure, taken seriously by the earliest philosophers and often recurring 
in later thought. 
    The second Hesiod, then, is unlike the first because he is not so much enshrined as he is 
modernized. Association with Homer evidently makes Hesiod ancient and sacred, but Hesiod 
alone is regarded as a topical thinker reflecting on and contributing to modern issues. He is 
employed in contemporary discussions on key themes such as moderation, justice in the city, 
the way to achieve knowledge, and the truthfulness of language. In such cases, the original 
setting of Hesiod’s wisdom and admonitions is forgotten as he is being turned into a modern 
thinker through the process of assimilation: Hesiod can thus become like Solon or Prodicus. 
Furthermore, Hesiod’s image as an ‘atomist’ philosopher is a strikingly consistent one, just 
like his reconstruction as a teacher of reciprocity. Common to both the ‘ethical’ and the 
‘philosophical’ Hesiod of chapters 5 and 6 is the emphasis on balance and measurement: in 
Hesiod’s view, language, social and political behaviour, and the universe as a whole all 
consist of elemental units that can be categorized, classified, and balanced. The just and the 
wise know how to categorize and classify, and they see this balance. Hesiod the wise is their 
guide, and though he may have died long ago, as a hero his presence continues into later 
times.   
 
Part Three: the typical Hesiod 
The last Part of this study dealt with the third Hesiod, i.e. the poet who is defined through 
opposition with Homer. This Hesiod is found most explicitly in the many contest stories that 
present Hesiod as Homer’s opponent in a wisdom contest, the subject of chapter 7. An 
analysis of its most interesting versions, which focuses on the Certamen, has suggested that 
the traditional tale was not meant to offer a final verdict on the difficult question who the 
greatest poet is. Hesiod’s victory - the only consistent element in all the versions and thus the 
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only part of the story that the audience knew beforehand - is not there to conclusively crown 
either Hesiod or (as is held by those who believe in Panedes’ Fehlurteil) Homer, but rather 
provides a stimulating point of departure for a tale concerned with the question of how to 
judge the sofiva of poets. Hesiod and Homer feature in this tale not only because they are the 
most famous of Greek poets (and because their meeting was thought historically possible), but 
also because their poetry can be constructed as antithetical. The criteria of the judge(s) gain 
force because the duelling poets are so unlike as to be regarded as opposites. As we have seen, 
the main watersheds between them are the content of their poetry (farming versus fighting), 
its ethico-political orientation (people versus king), and its effect on the audience (reason 
versus emotion). The qualifications of Hesiod and Homer in the Certamen are not peculiar to 
this story, nor specifically invented for it; they are the reflection of centuries of literary 
criticism employing Hesiod and Homer as metapoetic symbols. The process witnessed in the 
stories of the contest can in fact be seen throughout antiquity: when the poets are opposed, 
their typical qualities come out most clearly, and this is especially true for Hesiod. 
    Chapter 8 further investigated two of the main watersheds mentioned above, and has shown 
that the contrasting values attached to Hesiod and Homer correspond rather neatly to broader 
cultural dichotomies such as farming versus fighting, people versus king, and peace versus 
war. Since these compatible sets of oppositions align and overlap, they form a powerful ‘grid’ 
of typical values with which Hesiod and Homer are associated. A good example of such 
overlap is Simonides comparing Hesiod to a gardener and Homer to a weaver of garlands, 
thus tapping into a complex system of cultural values in order to define the poets as poets. I 
believe it is indicative of the poets’ cultural significance that they are so firmly embedded in 
this complex scheme. In the case of Hesiod in particular, it is clearly visible that certain of his 
qualities are focused on and blown up when he is implicitly or explicitly contrasted with 
Homer. Interestingly enough, it is mostly through opposition that he becomes a farmer-poet, a 
spokesman of the people, or an advocate of peace. These are the qualities that we (the modern 
audience) usually think of as most typically Hesiodic, but we must now conclude that they are 
to a considerable degree caused by his opposition to Homer; we have not encountered the 
farmer or the pacifist so clearly in Parts One and Two. Hesiod’s image, then, radicalizes into a 
type by means of the contrast with Homer. Hesiod, in this Part, features as the anti-Homer. 
    A similar process can be witnessed in chapter 9, which was concerned with the opposition 
of Hesiod and Homer as poets in the strictest sense (and thus dealt with the ‘technical skill 
and aesthetic/emotional impact’ of poetic sofiva). We have seen that Hesiod - in contexts that 
set the two poets against each other - is rather consistently depicted as having qualities that 
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are opposite to those of Homer: he is truthful and didactic, composes through tevcnh instead 
of maniva, and employs a pure and low-key style. Obviously, I do not wish to claim that these 
qualities are exclusively Hesiodic: the Greeks also attributed all these qualities to Homer, but 
not when he is opposed to Hesiod. In such contexts, didacticism, tevcnh, and pure or simple 
speech they are typically characteristic of Hesiod alone.   
    Some of these qualifications are clearly at least in part derived from his own poetry, 
especially the truthfulness and didacticism. Others, however, may seem rather odd to someone 
engaging with Hesiod’s poetry for the first time: despite his oft-celebrated encounter with the 
Muses, Hesiod is not manic or ecstatic but rational and technical; despite his obvious share in 
the language of epic, his style is characterized as pure and simple. We can only understand 
this once we see that all such qualifications of Hesiod as a poet are either established or 
reinforced through opposition with Homer. In these cases, Hesiod is truthful because Homer 
is fictional, Hesiod is didactic because Homer is entertaining, Hesiod is a technical writer 
because Homer is a manic poet, and Hesiod’s language is low-key because Homer’s is 
magnificent. That Hesiod and Homer can be used as symbols of opposing poetics is borne out 
by the telling fact that in Greek (and Roman) literature, Hesiod and Homer are almost never 
equated with regard to style, beauty, and emotional impact. It is thus as poets in the strictest 
sense that Hesiod and Homer are most clearly ‘split’; the greatest watershed is found in the 
field of poetics. 
    As we have seen, much of the evidence discussed in chapters 8 and 9 called for a 
modification of a strictly antithetical view of the two poets. In both chapters, Homer was seen 
to ‘invade’ areas that were typically associated with Hesiod, and to include qualities formerly 
attributed to the other poet. Through the influence of Plato’s concept of inspiration, Aristotle’s 
views on Homeric craftsmanship, and the rise of rhetorical theory (among other things), 
Homer became the ultimate icon of poetic excellence tout court because of his polyvalence or 
perhaps even omnivalence: he became the poet who knew everything, taught and exemplified 
every virtue, and availed himself of all poetic styles and registers. Topics that were regarded 
as truly Hesiodic in classical times (such as the distinction between words), are at least also 
Homeric in later periods, and in some cases even almost exclusively connected to Homer. By 
consequence, Hesiod slowly disappeared into the background.  
 
Generally speaking, the story of Hesiod’s relative significance can be viewed as one of 
continuous decline, with one remarkable revival in the hellenistic age. For the sake of clarity, 
I discern five phases in this development. The first phase (ca. 1200-700) is the time of oral 
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composition and performance, in which the poems were not fixed yet but spread through 
Greece by way of singers, among whom I count Hesiod and Homer as well (even though the 
genesis of the Hesiodic poems may not be wholly parallel to those of Homer). The only 
evidence we have for this phase comes from the poems themselves, which seem to picture 
their two traditions as complementary but distinct; they are clearly interdependent but can 
refer to each other in a critical way. There are no clear indications (as indeed all proof of such 
interaction is rather circumstantial) that one poetic tradition was thought more important than 
the other. 
    The second phase roughly coincides with the archaic age (ca. 700-450) and is concerned 
with the poets’ earliest reception. Even though Homer’s lyric and tragic qualities have by this 
time already made him a more popular poet, there are some indications that Hesiod is hardly 
inferior with regard to cultural significance. His Theogony was an important source for the 
Milesian philosophers, and for Parmenides and Empedocles; the Works and Days were 
intensely studied by Solon and Theognis. Equally interesting, however, are the cases of 
criticism instead of imitation. The earliest explicit attacks on poetry by Xenophanes, 
Heraclitus and (pseudo-)Pythagoras are levelled against Hesiod and Homer together, which 
shows that Hesiod’s status as an educator was almost equal to Homer’s. 
    This situation changes notably in the third phase (ca. 450-300), in which Hesiod’s gradual 
disappearance has definitely begun (some indication of this is the ratio of references to Hesiod 
and Homer in the works of Plato and Aristotle, which comes to about 1:3). The main cause 
behind this development is that Hesiod lost his monopoly on certain qualities formerly almost 
uniquely associated with him: the allegorists turned Homer into a natural philosopher as well, 
Plato propagated the extremely succesful notion of Homer as the inspired poet par excellence 
(not even mentioning Hesiod in this respect), and Aristotle focused solely on Homer’s poetic 
tevcnh, presenting Hesiod as a failed physiologist. Obviously, some themes and qualities 
remained Hesiodic (farming, atomism, truthful speech), and he is often presented on a par 
with Homer, but his importance is waning. 
    In the fourth phase, that of the Hellenistic period, interest in Hesiod resurges as he is turned 
into the champion of a new poetics. Some of his traditional characteristics - an obsession with 
hard work, a concern with small things, and simple and pure speech - align with his more 
recent qualification as an ‘unspired’ poet to make him the symbol of the learned and labouring 
poets of the new, un-Homeric kind. Interestingly, this revival is accompanied by a renewed 
interest in Hesiod’s more ‘heroic’ epic, the Theogony, whose interest in beginnings and 
cataloguing character was congenial to the Alexandrians. Nonetheless, as was stated in 
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chapter 9, the hellenistic embrace of Hesiod did not entail a rejection of Homer; in fact, he 
was regarded as forming an unsurpassable class of his own. 
    After this recovery, however, Hesiod’s gradual disappearance continues during the fifth and 
final phase, the Second Sophistic. Even though most Hesiodic references from antiquity come 
from this period (see also table 1 in the Introduction), the ratio between references to Hesiod 
and Homer drops to about 1:5 (as calculated in the works of Lucian and Dio Chrysostom, 
which seem to be representative; the rate is lowest at 1:9 in the Palatine Anthology). Much of 
this can be explained by Homer’s continuing invasion of fields formerly thought of as 
Hesiodic. Incidentally, this could help to explain the popularity of the contest-story in the 
Second Sophistic, where Hesiod’s victory was far more sensational than in earlier times. As 
has been concluded before, there is too little of the original Hesiod left for him to remain a 
poet ‘besides’ Homer: Hesiod has stopped being the other poet, and has become another poet. 
 
The diachronic sketch above brings together the many observations on the development of 
Hesiod’s relative significance, which are somewhat scattered throughout this study; the 
historical perspective, however, forms the necessary counterpart to the essentially thematic 
approach that has organized the chapters. Both emphasize the main hypothesis of this book, 
i.e. that Hesiod’s reception can only be understood when the ancient image of Homer is taken 
into account. The three Hesiods we have encountered are all fundamentally different; 
moreover, they are remarkably consistent. The reception of Hesiod, then, is characterized by 
these three different traditions, which - as we have seen above - are all grounded in the 
Hesiodic poems themselves, mostly take shape in the fifth and fourth century BC, and leave 
their traces throughout antiquity. Interestingly, these traditions appear to largely neglect or 
override the distinction between the Theogony and the Works and Days, which is so essential 
to modern studies of Hesiod. Generally speaking, Hesiod’s image in antiquity is mostly 
determined by ad hoc (clustering) references from both works (the Works and Days being 
about twice as popular), without taking much account of the character of the poems as a 
whole. Aristotle’s consistent picture of Hesiod as an ‘originator’, for instance, is made up of 
references to both the Theogony and Works and Days (the Theogony in this case presumably 
providing the most obvious leads for such a representation). 
    For the sake of convenience, the most important differences between the three Hesiods are 













    
Ethics / Politics    
Description Educator Teacher of Justice/Balance Pacifist and People’s Poet 
Themes - Behaviour of the gods and 
the Underworld (Th.) 
- Proper religious behaviour 
(WD) 
- Demonology (WD) 
- Proper (= reciprocal) 
behaviour in the polis (WD) 
- Moderation (WD) 
- Peace and Farming (WD) 
- Abuse of Power (WD) 
    
Philosophy    
Description - (Old Knower) Categorizing Polymath Atomist & Linguistic Purist 
Themes Empty category (focus on 
historical and geographical 
knowledge instead) 
- Chaos, Love and the 
elements (Th.)  
- Truth and Falsehood (Th.) 
- The elements (Th.) 
- Word-distinctions (WD) 
    
Poetry     
Description - (Ancient poet) Sweet and Pure Composer Low-key Technical Writer 
Style Empty category (Hesiod 
and Homer do not share any 
stylistic features) 
Smooth, sweet, pure - Simple, didactic 
- Technical, uninspired  
    
 
The overview is very schematic and unavoidably obscures much of the details and nuances 
discussed in the book; nonetheless, it does present the three Hesiods and their 
interdependence in a clear fashion. The first one is the Hesiod created by association with 
Homer: he is a culture hero grounding in his poetry the right way to live for ‘all the Greeks’. 
As a hallowed teacher and moral authority, he is the object of continuous study and imitation. 
It is obvious that this Hesiod only exists side by side with Homer in the field of ethics and 
education; in the areas of philosophy and poetry, they are presented as having nothing in 
common. It is all the more striking that this Hesiod is so frequent: as we have seen in the 
introduction, in about a third of all ancient references to Hesiod, he is combined with Homer.  
    The third one is the Hesiod best known to us: it is the farmer-poet straining his poetical 
powers to write down his lists of gods and chores. The typical Hesiod was constructed by the 
Greeks through opposition with Homer, and as the anti- or non-Homer he occupies a central 
place in an extensive system of social, cultural and poetic values. Although Hesiod is 
explicitly contrasted to Homer in only 9% of all cases, the characteristics resulting from them 
are sometimes visible in the modern Hesiod as well. In matters of style, for instance, the 
typical and the modern Hesiod are quite compatible. Even so, the relatively low percentage 
does reflect on our own present-day conception of Hesiod: we usually think of Hesiod as 
different from Homer, creating either an oppositional or a complementary picture by focusing 
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on certain passages and leaving out others. In this, we are like the Greeks - but in our day, this 
point of view has perhaps become disproportionally dominant, obscuring the second Hesiod. 
    The second Hesiod, with whom 60% of all references is concerned, is caught in the middle: 
he is tied to the other two, but nonetheless shows a distinct and highly intriguing profile. He 
was presumably considered a hero, whose careful admonitions on justice and reciprocity 
made him a valuable teacher on how to live in the polis. Furthermore, he was regarded as an 
important philosopher, explaining total structures (like the cosmos or language) from an 
atomist perspective, and believing in the one-to-one relationship between words and things. 
His poetry was seen as pure and sweet. It is this modern Hesiod that we often fail to see, 
because we tend to look at Hesiod through Homer, and thus conceive of him as the other poet. 
But Hesiod was originally a poet sui generis, and there were contexts in which he would make 
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‘De andere dichter’ uit de titel van dit boek verwijst naar Hesiodus, een Griekse zanger uit de 
zevende eeuw voor Christus, die vooral bekend is geworden door een tweetal middellange 
gedichten. Eén daarvan is de Theogonie, een kort epos over de geboorte van de kosmos en 
van de goden, die elkaar vervolgens drie generaties lang bevechten om de heerschappij; het 
andere is de Werken en Dagen, een leerdicht over de condition humaine en de regels die 
aangeven hoe een mens moet leven en werken in een wereld die door goden is ingericht. 
Hesiodus behoort tot een zeer exclusieve groep van half-mythische dichters die vanwege hun 
wijsheid en anciënniteit bij de oude Grieken hoog in aanzien stonden. De belangrijkste dichter 
uit deze groep is Homerus, auteur van de Ilias en de Odyssee. Het is de relatie tussen deze 
twee culturele iconen die in dit proefschrift een belangrijke rol speelt. 
    Dit boek gaat niet zozeer over Hesiodus, maar veeleer over ‘Hesiodus’, dat wil zeggen het 
beeld dat in de Griekse wereld van Hesiodus bestond: het benadert de dichter als een praktisch 
voorbeeld en theoretisch concept in literair-kritische teksten uit de oudheid, als een locus die 
wordt ingevuld met bepaalde sociale en politieke waarden en normen, als een vehikel voor 
natuurkundige en filosofische denkbeelden, en meer in het algemeen als een cultureel icoon 
dat de Grieken door de eeuwen heen op allerlei manieren inzetten in hun eigen discours.  
‘Hesiodus’ moet daardoor beschouwd worden als een panhelleens en veelzijdig symbool dat 
met iedere verwijzing weer verder wordt vormgegeven. Zo kan Hesiodus in latere teksten 
onder andere verschijnen als een geïnspireerde ziener, een kleingeestige boer, een filosoof 
met een kosmische blik of een goddeloze verteller van monsterlijke verhalen. Het is het doel 
van deze studie om zowel het resultaat van dit receptie-proces als het proces zelf te 
analyseren: het gaat niet alleen om het antieke beeld van Hesiodus, maar ook om de manier 
waarop dat beeld tot stand is gekomen. Voor dit onderzoek wordt vooral gebruik gemaakt van 
de methoden en bevindingen van de zogenaamde memory studies. 
     Studies naar het collectieve of culturele geheugen doen onderzoek naar de manier waarop 
een  groep mensen (zoals een volk, een vereniging of een familie) samen herinneringen vormt 
en ophaalt aangaande gebeurtenissen, plaatsen en figuren uit het verleden. Dit soort 
onderzoek is gebaseerd op Halbwachs’ theorie dat herinnering in de eerste plaats een sociale 
daad is en wordt gekenmerkt door twee essentiële uitgangspunten. Het eerste is dat het 
herinnerde verleden een construct is van de mensen in het heden, die bewust en onbewust het 
verleden een vorm en inhoud geven die het best past bij hun eigen (hedendaagse) behoeften; 
vandaar dat men zich sommige zaken herinnert maar andere vergeet. Het tweede uitgangspunt 
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stelt dat een gezamenlijk herinnerd verleden onmisbaar is voor het creëren en onderhouden 
van een groepsidentiteit, die wordt gedeeld door alle leden. Hierdoor krijgen  mensen het 
gevoel dat ze ergens bij horen.  
    Dit boek behelst een onderzoek naar de Griekse collectieve herinnering aan Hesiodus en 
past dus binnen de discipline van de memory studies; als zodanig is het ook gebaseerd op 
dezelfde uitgangspunten. Daarom wordt Hesiodus benaderd als een construct dat gevormd 
wordt naar de behoeften van de recipiërende auteurs, in casu de latere Grieken; zij hebben 
met een verwijzing naar Hesiodus altijd een bepaald doel voor ogen, en creëren dus telkens de 
Hesiodus die hun het beste uitkomt. Daarnaast wordt de belangrijke rol van de dichter in de 
maatschappij vooral afgelezen aan de mate waarin hij aan de Grieken in het algemeen en 
kleinere groepen in het bijzonder een identiteit verleent. Hesiodus’ werken werden al vroeg in 
de geschiedenis gecanoniseerd en daarmee voor de hele oudheid heilig verklaard; zijn werken 
waren van groot belang voor de vorming en het behoud van een heel corpus aan waarden, 
normen en wijsheid die samen als oer-Grieks golden.   
    Niet alleen maakt het onderzoek naar de herinnering aan Hesiodus gebruik van de 
methoden en bevindingen van de memory studies, het probeert ook een bijdrage te leveren aan 
deze (relatief jonge) wetenschappelijke discipline. Vandaar dat in dit boek veel aandacht 
uitgaat naar het proces achter het vormen en weer ophalen van herinneringen. Zo wordt er 
onder andere ingegaan tegen het zogenaamde ‘presentisme’, de notie dat iedere historische 
periode weer een volledig nieuw beeld schetst van het verleden. Die notie is onjuist omdat er 
ook een grote mate van continuïteit in de traditie valt aan te wijzen. In dat kader past de 
aandacht in deze studie voor andere factoren die voor de herinnering aan Hesiodus van groot 
belang zijn, te weten zijn eigen teksten en vooral de verschillende interpretatieve tradities van 
de Grieken die, zo blijkt, voor een grote mate van continuïteit in de Hesiodus-receptie zorgen. 
Ook wordt er gewerkt met recente theorieën aangaande psychologische en vooral sociale 
processen die bepalen hoe herinneringen worden gevormd. De commemogrammen - 
diagrammen die de verwijzingen naar Hesiodus’ werken in kaart brengen - zijn daar een 
concrete uitwerking van; het belangrijkst voor dit onderzoek echter is zonder twijfel het feit 
dat de receptie van Hesiodus niet op zichzelf wordt bestudeerd, maar in samenhang met die 
van Homerus. Deze wijdere blik is ingegeven door recente theorievorming over 
‘periodiseren’, het mentale proces waarbij het verleden wordt ingedeeld in handige en 
overzichtelijke blokken: sommige gebeurtenissen en figuren uit het verleden worden in de 
collectieve herinnering aan elkaar gekoppeld door overeenkomsten naar voren te halen en 




juist de verschillen benadrukt worden en de overeenkomsten bewust of onbewust terzijde 
worden geschoven (‘differentiatie’).  
    Dit proces, zo blijkt, geldt niet alleen voor historische perioden, maar ook voor de literaire 
en culturele iconen Hesiodus en Homerus. De figuur van Homerus is essentieel voor het 
onderzoek naar het beeld van Hesiodus in de oudheid, omdat de twee vaak als gelijken of juist 
als tegenpolen voorgesteld werden. Op die manier is de beeldvorming van Hesiodus sterk 
afhankelijk van die van Homerus; zelfs in teksten waar van Homerus niet expliciet sprake is, 
is zijn invloed op Hesiodus merkbaar. Het belang van de onderlinge relatie voor de 
beeldvorming vindt zijn weerslag in de organisatie van het boek. De drie Delen daarvan 
behandelen elk één type van relatie: zo is er één Deel over Hesiodus samen met Homerus, één 
Deel over Hesiodus alleen en één Deel over Hesiodus als tegenpool van Homerus. Deze drie 
typen van relatie vinden hun weerslag in drie fundamenteel verschillende tradities van 
beeldvorming die samen de receptie van Hesiodus uitmaken. De aandacht voor de 
wederzijdse beïnvloeding van deze twee culturele iconen in de Griekse verbeelding laat 
tevens het proces zien waardoor de recipiënten hun herinneringen aan hen vormgaven.  
    Naast deze fundamentele indeling in drieën, gebaseerd op de drie verschillende tradities 
van herinnering aan Hesiodus, wordt voor de organisatie en presentatie van het materiaal nog 
een driedeling gebruikt, die teruggaat op een antiek onderscheid tussen de kwaliteiten van de 
dichter qua dichter. De Grieken zagen zelf in dat de ‘geestelijke voortreffelijkheid’ (sofiva) 
van hun dichters zich manifesteerde op drie min of meer verschillende terreinen: 1) morele en 
pedagogische authoriteit, 2) kennis van de wereld en feitelijke juistheid, en 3) technische 
vaardigheid en de kunst het publiek te raken. In dit boek worden deze drie kwaliteiten 
vertaald als 1) de ethische en politieke oriëntatie van de dichters, 2) hun status als 
‘wetenschappers’ en filosofen in de niet-ethische zin, en 3) hun stijl en de impact op het 
publiek. Deze categorieën worden zo goed als mogelijk afzonderlijk behandeld in de drie 
Delen; de onderstaande samenvatting maakt echter duidelijk dat het materiaal zelf een al te 
systematische aanpak niet altijd toelaat. 
    Dit onderzoek heeft een tamelijk wijde blik: het brengt ongeveer duizend jaar van 
verwijzingen naar Hesiodus in beeld, van circa 700 v. Chr. tot circa 300 n. Chr. Dat wijde net 
heeft gevolgen gehad voor de vangst: over het algemeen geldt dat alleen expliciete of 
anderszins duidelijke verwijzingen een plek hebben gekregen. Het boek is dus zeker niet 
volledig, maar geeft wel de kaders aan waarbinnen de antieke receptie van Hesiodus begrepen 
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Het eerste Deel van het boek concentreert zich op Hesiodus als gelijke van Homerus en 
onderzoekt teksten waarin de dichters op verschillende vlakken worden geassimileerd. Het 
inleidende hoofdstuk (1) laat zien dat het een normale praktijk was voor de Grieken - net als 
voor veel moderne geleerden - om Hesiodus en Homerus aan elkaar gelijk te stellen. Zo 
werden de dichters in het algemeen beschouwd als ruwweg contemporain, en in sommige 
gevallen zelfs als verwant, hetgeen zeker geïnterpreteerd moet worden als een aanwijzing 
voor een wijdverbreid geloof in de verwantschap tussen hun poëzie. Bovendien lijkt 
Hesiodus’ poëzie een plek in de Griekse maatschappij te hebben gehad die vergelijkbaar is 
met die van Homerus: zijn gedichten werden bestudeerd op school, voorgedragen tijdens 
symposia en opgevoerd in het kader van religieuze festivals. Omdat de meeste verwijzingen 
naar de studie of opvoering van Hesiodus’ poëzie ook melding maken van Homerus (maar dat 
vice versa minder opgaat), mogen we ervan uitgaan dat de Grieken meestal met Hesiodus te 
maken kregen in een wijdere context, die voor een groot deel bepaald was door Homerus.  
    In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de combinatie van Hesiodus en Homerus op het ethisch-religieuze 
vlak benaderd. Het is duidelijk dat de twee dichters vooral op het gebied van ethiek en 
opvoeding als een sterke eenheid worden gezien. Vanaf het eerste waarneembare moment van 
hun receptie worden Hesiodus en Homerus beschouwd als (bijna) even belangrijke leraren en 
morele authoriteiten. Aan de min of meer verstopte morele boodschappen in hun gedichten 
werd een grote prescriptieve waarde toegekend, die soms een wetachtige status had. Het is in 
dit kader significant dat de vroegste (en dikwijls ook hevigste) aanvallen op de morele lading 
van poëzie gericht worden op Hesiodus en Homerus samen: dikwijls gaat het hierbij dan om 
het verwerpelijke gedrag van de goden in hun gedichten. Tegelijkertijd speelden de twee 
dichters eveneens de belangrijkste rol in een uitgebreid (voor een groot deel in de context van 
opvoeding en opleiding ontwikkeld) systeem om dichters te verdedigen tegen dergelijke 
aanklachten. Eén manier om dit te bereiken is het zogenaamde ‘harmoniseren’: laten zien dat 
de dichters - mits juist geïnterpreteerd - precies hetzelfde bedoelen als de twee andere grote 
morele authoriteiten in de Griekse wereld, te weten de oude wetgevers en de gevestigde 
filosofen. 
    Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over de kennis en de wetenschappelijke status van de dichters. Aan de 
ene kant is duidelijk dat Hesiodus en Homerus worden gezien als een gezaghebbende bron 
voor kennis over de meest uiteenlopende onderwerpen; ze vormen in dit opzicht samen een 
exclusieve categorie van ‘weters’ die als meer respectabel en betrouwbaar gelden dan de 
tragici en de historici. Aan de andere kant is het opvallend dat Hesiodus en Homerus samen 




denkers, maar ze worden nooit samen gepresenteerd als de aanhangers of bedenkers van 
soortgelijke doctrines. In dit specifieke veld lijkt er eerder sprake te zijn van differentiatie dan 
van assimiliatie (zoals verder wordt aangetoond in hoofdstukken 6 en 9).  
    Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat de eerste Hesiodus, de Hesiodus van Deel 1, in 
meerdere opzichten als ‘heilig’ kan worden omschreven. Zijn gedichten werden voorgedragen 
in een religieuze context en concentreerden zich volgens de Grieken vooral op religieuze 
onderwerpen (te weten het gedrag van de goden en de situatie in de onderwereld). Bovendien 
hebben de gedichten zelf een zweem van heiligheid: ze zijn oeroud, onaantastbaar en in hoge 
mate identiteitsfunderend. Het formatieve karakter van zijn werken wordt weerspiegeld in de 
grote prescriptieve waarde die eraan wordt toegekend. Deze eerste Hesiodus, de heilige 
Hesiodus, is zeer beïnvloed door de assimilatie met Homerus, wiens status als oer-opvoeder 
van de Grieken deze kwaliteit in Hesiodus aanzienlijk versterkt.  
 
Het tweede Deel gaat over Hesiodus ‘alleen’, dat wil zeggen over het gebruik van Hesiodus in 
die teksten waarin van Homerus in de directe context geen sprake is. In het inleidende 
hoofdstuk (4) wordt er gezocht naar de belangrijkste factoren die tezamen de Griekse 
(re)constructie van Hesiodus bepalen. Naast de tekst van de uitzonderlijk autobiografische 
gedichten zelf en de doelen van de recipiërende auteur wordt extra nadruk gelegd op de 
traditie van Hesiodus’ receptie, een factor die dikwijls buiten beschouwing wordt gelaten 
maar wezenlijk is voor de herinnering aan ieder cultureel icoon. Dit blijkt onder andere uit 
een korte analyse van de biografische traditie (die nauwer aansluit bij het werk van Hesiodus 
dan tot nu toe werd geloofd): door de bewuste heroïsering van Hesiodus krijgen de dichter en 
zijn werken een heel eigen plaats in de Griekse verbeelding.  
    Om deze drie voornaamste factoren (tekst, traditie, recipiënt) concreter te maken, worden in 
het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 4 zes mechanismen geïsoleerd die in hoge mate bepalend zijn 
voor de herinnering aan Hesiodus: 1) assimilatie (de recipiënt maakt Hesiodus in bepaalde 
opzichten aan zichzelf gelijk), 2) het slogan-principe (bepaalde verzen hebben door hun 
memorabele karakter een hoge overlevingskans), 3) het sneeuwbal-principe (recipiënt B 
verwijst naar de verwijzing naar Hesiodus door recipiënt A), 4) clusteren (de recipiënt creëert 
bewust of onbewust een consistente Hesiodus door verschillende verzen onder één 
overkoepelend thema te groeperen), 5) de blokkerende invloed van Homerus (waardoor 
bepaalde thema’s nooit Hesiodeïsch kunnen worden omdat ze al Homerisch zijn), en 6) de 
persona’s paradox (die bepaalt dat de meest typisch Hesiodeïsche verzen juist daardoor 
nauwelijks aangehaald worden). Uiteraard komen deze mechanismen in de praktijk bijna 
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altijd gecombineerd voor, afhankelijk van de context en de invalshoek: zo zal recipiënt-
georiënteerde beeldvorming vooral gebruik maken van het sneeuwbal-principe en clusteren. 
    Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de ethisch-politieke lading van het beeld van Hesiodus wanneer hij 
alleen is. Het blijkt dat er vier thema’s zijn die bovenal met deze Hesiodus geassocieerd 
worden: demonologie, rechtvaardigheid in de polis, menselijke omgang en matiging - allen 
vooral ontleend aan de Werken en Dagen. Bij alle thema’s staat het concept van balans of 
reciprociteit centraal, en ligt de nadruk op de sociale context van de stadstaat. Dit hoofdstuk 
laat bovenal zien hoe belangrijk de af- of aanwezigheid van Homerus is voor het concept 
Hesiodus: met Homerus kan hij door tegenstanders afgeschilderd worden als een gevaar voor 
de samenleving, zonder Homerus geldt hij unaniem als de grote inspirator van waarden die 
voor het samenleven in de polis van groot belang zijn. Het lijkt er ook op dat Hesiodus zijn 
‘standaard’ epitheton van ‘wijze’ (sofov~) vooral aan deze (aan hem toegeschreven) expertise 
te danken heeft. Daarnaast toont dit hoofdstuk hoe gemakkelijk het verleden aangepast kan 
worden aan de behoeften van het heden. De oorspronkelijke context van Hesiodus’ adviezen, 
gericht aan een zeer kleine gemeenschap van boeren, is geheel vergeten wanneer zijn 
aanwijzingen worden begrepen in de nieuwe context van de polis in wording. 
    De filosofische Hesiodus is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 6, waarin blijkt dat de Grieken 
aan Hesiodus een geheel eigen en opvallend coherente filosofie toeschreven. De dichter werd 
vooral geassocieerd met drie disciplines: natuurfilosofie, epistemologie en taalwetenschap. 
Hesiodus wordt in al deze gebieden tamelijk consistent voorgesteld met drie duidelijk aan 
elkaar verwante eigenschappen. Allereerst is daar de enorme reikwijdte van zijn speculaties: 
het gaat Hesiodus om het totale systeem, bijvoorbeeld het gehele universum, waar hij zo goed 
als alles van weet - deze reputatie levert hem zowel kritiek als navolging op. Daarnaast is er 
de ‘atomistische’ benadering tot het vergaren van kennis: Hesiodus is iemand die nauwgezet 
data verzamelt en alle gegevens netjes categoriseert, waardoor hij uiteindelijk het geheel kan 
begrijpen. Deze methode werd oorspronkelijk aan Hesiodus toegeschreven vanwege zijn 
kosmologische onderzoekingen, maar liep daarna al snel over in andere gebieden, zoals de 
taalwetenschap. Ten derde wordt Hesiodus vaak voorgesteld als iemand die gelooft in de 
strikte één-op-één relatie tussen woord en ding, waardoor hij een boegbeeld wordt voor 
taalpuristen als Prodicus. Omdat deze drie eigenschappen bij elkaar passen en elkaar zelfs 
versterken, moeten we concluderen dat Hesiodus de filosoof een opmerkelijk eenduidig figuur 
is, die door latere tijden uiterst serieus werd genomen.  
    Samenvattend kunnen we zeggen dat de tweede Hesiodus - Hesiodus alleen - een heel 




gemoderniseerd en up to date gebracht. Deze Hesiodus wordt aangehaald in discussies over 
relevante en actuele onderwerpen in de moderne stadstaat, zoals matiging, rechtvaardigheid, 
correct gedrag in de polis en het waarheidsgehalte van taal. De Hesiodi uit hoofdstuk 5 en 6, 
die elk zo consistent zijn, hebben bovendien veel gemeen met elkaar: Hesiodus de morele gids 
en Hesiodus de filosoof concentreren zich allebei op maat en balans. Of het nu om taal, 
gedrag of de kosmos als geheel gaat: alle systemen bestaan volgens de dichter en denker uit 
elementaire deeltjes die gecategoriseerd en gemeten kunnen worden. Hesiodus de ‘wijze’ ziet 
het grote systeem en kent de balans. 
 
Het derde Deel gaat over de Hesiodus die wordt gedefinieerd door de tegenstelling met 
Homerus. Deze Hesiodus komt het meest expliciet naar voren in de vele verhalen over een 
legendarische dicht- en wijsheidswedstrijd tussen de twee zangers. Hoofdstuk 7 analyseert de 
meest uitgebreide versie, het zogenaamde Certamen, en stelt dat het traditionele verhaal niet 
bedoeld was om een definitief oordeel te vellen inzake de lastige vraag wie van de twee 
dichters nu de beste was. De overwinning van Hesiodus - het enige onveranderlijke element in 
alle verhalen - geldt eerder als een interessant startpunt voor discussie over hoe men de sofiva 
van dichters moet beoordelen. Hesiodus en Homerus zijn de tegenstanders in dit verhaal 
omdat hun poëzie zo tegengesteld is. De belangrijkste verschillen zijn gelegen in de inhoud 
van hun poëzie (het boerenbedrijf tegenover de oorlog), hun ethisch-politieke oriëntatie (het 
volk tegenover de vorst), en het effect van hun poëzie op het publiek (een rationele tegenover 
een emotionele respons). De eigenschappen van Hesiodus en Homerus in het Certamen zijn 
niet specifiek voor dit verhaal, maar zijn de weerslag van eeuwenlange literaire kritiek die 
Hesiodus en Homerus gebruikt als metapoëtische symbolen. Wat we zien in het Certamen, 
zien we in de hele oudheid: als de dichters tegenover elkaar worden geplaatst, komen hun 
meest typische eigenschappen het sterkst naar voren, en dat geldt in het bijzonder voor 
Hesiodus. 
     In hoofdstuk 8 wordt onderzoek gedaan naar twee van de hierboven genoemde 
tegenstellingen. Hier blijkt dat de tegengestelde waarden die aan Hesiodus of Homerus 
vastzitten tamelijk netjes overeenkomen met bredere culturele tweedelingen, zoals die tussen 
vrede en oorlog, stad en platteland, en die tussen het volk en de machthebbers. Aangezien 
deze tegenstellingen elkaar overlappen, vormen de tegenstellingen een sterk ‘systeem’ van 
typische waarden waarin ook de concepten Hesiodus en Homerus een vaste plaats hebben. 
Omdat de dichters van een groot cultureel belang zijn, nemen ze een zo duidelijke plaats in 
binnen dit schema van waarden. Met name in het geval van Hesiodus is duidelijk zichtbaar 
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dat bepaalde eigenschappen worden uitvergroot wanneer hij impliciet of expliciet 
gecontrasteerd wordt met Homerus. Het is vooral interessant dat Hesiodus juist door oppositie 
de eigenschappen krijgt die wij als de meest kenmerkende zien: dan wordt hij de 
boerendichter, de spreekbuis van het volk, en de voorvechter van vrede. Dat beeld hadden we 
eerder nog niet zo duidelijk gezien. De derde Hesiodus, zo kunnen we concluderen, is de 
typische Hesiodus. 
     Diezelfde radicalisering komen we ook tegen in hoofdstuk 9, dat zich bezighoudt met de 
strikt ‘poëtische’ eigenschappen van Hesiodus, te weten zijn dichterlijke capaciteiten en de 
impact op het publiek. In contexten waarin de twee dichters tegenover elkaar worden 
geplaatst, wordt Hesiodus steevast voorgesteld met eigenschappen die tegenover die van 
Homerus staan: Hesiodus is waarheidsgetrouw en didactisch, hij dicht door vaardigheid 
(tevcnh) in plaats van inspiratie en zijn poëzie wordt gekenmerkt door een pure en simpele 
stijl. Natuurlijk zijn deze eigenschappen niet strikt Hesiodeïsch; ze worden ook aan Homerus 
toegeschreven, maar niet als hij tegenover Hesiodus wordt geplaatst. Hesiodus is didactisch 
omdat Homerus vermaakt, Hesiodus is een technische schrijver omdat Homerus een 
geïnspireerde dichter is, en Hesiodus’ taal is bescheiden omdat die van Homerus groots is. 
Het is buitengewoon opvallend dat Hesiodus en Homerus nergens in de Griekse literatuur 
geassimileerd worden op het gebied van stijl, schoonheid en emotionele impact. Het is dus als 
dichters in de meest strikte zin dat ze het meest verschillend zijn.  
    In de loop der tijden echter raakt Hesiodus, zoals in zowel hoofdstuk 8 als 9 wordt 
aangegeven, zijn positie als dichter naast en tegenover Homerus langzaam maar zeker kwijt. 
Homerus wordt de expert op gebieden waarmee voorheen uitsluitend Hesiodus geassocieerd 
werd, en krijgt eigenschappen die eerst alleen van Hesiodus waren. Plato’s concept van 
inspiratie, Aristoteles’ idee van Homerus’ dichtkunst en de groei van retorische 
theorievorming zijn de belangrijkste factoren die ervoor zorgen dat Homerus steeds meer het 
ultieme icoon niet alleen van de dichtkunst maar veeleer van de Griekse taal en cultuur in het 
algemeen wordt. Hesiodus wordt in vergelijking daarmee steeds onbelangrijker en verandert 
van ‘de andere dichter’ in simpelweg een andere dichter die hoogstens als een extra illustratie 
geldt van kwaliteiten die allemaal in de meest voortreffelijke zin in Homerus zijn 
vertegenwoordigd.  
 
Samenvattend kunnen we het volgende stellen. Hesiodus mèt Homerus (de ‘heilige’ 
Hesiodus) geldt als een culture hero die in zijn gedichten een theologie en gedragscode voor 




nagevolgd. Deze opmerkelijk vaak voorkomende Hesiodus - in dertig procent van alle 
verwijzingen naar Hesiodus wordt Homerus als gelijkwaardig voorgesteld - staat alleen op het 
gebied van ethiek naast Homerus; in de filosofie en de poëzie hebben ze weinig tot niets 
gemeen. Hesiodus tegen Homerus (de typische Hesiodus) is de Hesiodus die ons het best 
bekend is: het is de boerendichter die zijn poëtische vaardigheden tot het uiterste aanspreekt 
om lijsten van alleroudste goden en alledaagse klusjes te produceren. Hoewel Hesiodus 
slechts in tien procent van alle gevallen expliciet met Homerus wordt gecontrasteerd, blijkt de 
‘typische’ Hesiodus toch essentieel voor de beeldvorming, van zowel ons als van de oude 
Grieken, al is het alleen maar omdat zijn eigenschappen voor een deel worden doorgegeven 
aan de ‘moderne’ Hesiodus.  
    Deze ‘moderne’ Hesiodus, met wie zestig procent van alle verwijzingen gemoeid zijn, zit 
tussen de twee andere Hesiodi in: hij heeft met beiden te maken, maar toont ook een geheel 
eigen en zeer interessant profiel. Hij was een heros, die als een gewaardeerde leraar 
aangaande het leven in de polis gewogen adviezen gaf over balans en rechtvaardigheid. 
Daarboven was hij een belangrijk filosoof, die totale systemen zoals taal of de kosmos vanuit 
een atomistisch perspectief benaderde. Zijn gedichten en stijl werden gezien als simpel maar 
verfijnd. Deze moderne Hesiodus zien we tegenwoordig nauwelijks, omdat we zo vaak door 
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